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Despite the signing of the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended 
the two decades of South-North Sudan war; and the 2015 Agreement on the 
Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, to end the current civil war, armed conflicts 
persist in South Sudan. Two key inadequacies of the liberal peacebuilding model, 
applied to address modern conflicts in Africa and across the globe are its insistence 
on international justice instruments such as the International Criminal Court, and the 
failure to recognize the role of local approaches and to incorporate them into 
peacebuilding intervention policies. This has resulted in failures to address the 
grievances and bitterness of war affected people and to reconcile divided 
communities. This study examines the potential and limits of applying local 
approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding in South Sudan. Based on empirical data 
obtained through qualitative case study conducted in South Sudan over five months 
in 2016, the findings reveal that despite the wide use of local institutions and justice 
mechanisms, many challenges exist, that pose serious difficulties in solely applying 
these strategies to transitional justice. However, for the liberal peacebuilding model 
to address the root causes of internal conflicts and build sustainable peace, local 
strategies could provide a significant complementary contribution, since dealing with 
the past entails more than retribution and truth seeking. The study has wider 
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implications in practical and theoretical considerations for ongoing armed conflicts in 
Africa and other parts of the world. 
  
 iii 
12018735 
 
Declaration 
This research work is my original and has not been submitted to any PhD programme 
in any University.  
 
Martin O Lino Agwella 
 
Author_______________________________ Date_____________________ 
 
This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval. 
 
Dr. David Harris 
 
Supervisor_________________________ Date_______________________ 
 
 
 iv 
12018735 
Dedication 
This thesis is dedicated to my late brother and sisters JAMES LINO AGWELLA, LILY 
LINO AGWELLA, and REBECCA LINO AGWELLA and my parents who inspired my 
work in many ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
12018735 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is out because of guidance and support given to me by several persons 
and organizations. Notably, I thank my supervisor Dr. David Harris who provided the 
academic and professional support I needed, and Prof. David J. Francis who 
assisted me with the initial formulations of the study. I am also grateful to the 
Department and staff of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, especially Prof. 
Caroline Hughes, Prof. Donna Pankhurst, Michele Mosley, and Sandra Hall, who 
were particularly helpful through their friendship and willingness to assist and offer 
me the academic atmosphere and facilitation necessary for this work. Special thanks 
go to Archbishop Paolino Lukudu Loro for the support to undertake the study.  
I thank the Open Society Foundation, for financing my field work; and Fr. Paul Okeny 
and who facilitated my movements during field work in Greater Bahr el Ghazal and 
Abyei. The 2016 Fellowship at the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in 
Cape Town, South Africa, and the Easter 2017, Sudan Archive Visiting Library 
Fellowship at the University of Durham provided me with additional research time. 
The cooperation of my respondents and those who assisted me in data collection 
and transcription deserves sincere appreciation. Mike O’Brien, Chris Grumpy and 
Dr. Nicki Kindersley have been kind to proof read the work at various stages. I also 
thank members of my family, the Agwella, my brothers; Primo, John, Silvestro, Dr. 
Emmanuel, Augustine and Charles; and sisters, their list being long to mention by 
names, for their encouragement and various kinds of support. Special thanks also 
go to Fr. Moses Pitya and Fr. Lorenzo Frosio for their friendship and support 
throughout the journey, and to Janet Vaughan for formatting the final manuscript. 
 vi 
12018735 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AAA Addis Ababa Peace Agreement 
ANC African National Congress 
ARCSS Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan 
AU African Union 
AUCISS African Union Commission of Inquiry in South Sudan 
AUHIP African Union High Level Implementation Panel 
CAVR Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timore 
 Leste 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CTRH Commission for Truth Reconciliation and Healing 
DC District Commissioner 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation 
DoP Declaration of Principles  
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
DUL Durham University Library 
DUP Democratic Unionist Party 
DVD Digital Video Disc 
GOS Government of Sudan 
GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan 
HCSS Hybrid Court of South Sudan 
 vii 
12018735 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HLRF High Level Revitalization Forum 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IDP Internally Displaced Person 
IFI International Financial Institutions  
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development  
IJR Institute of Justice and Reconciliation 
IOM International Organization for Migration 
JMEC Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission 
JPA Jonglei Peace Agreement   
KI Key Informant 
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army 
NA Native Administration 
NCP National Congress Party 
NDA National Democratic Alliance 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NIF National Islamic Front 
 viii 
12018735 
NSCC New Sudan Council of Churches 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
OCHA Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan 
PoCs Protection of Civilian Site 
PPP People to people Peace Process  
QIP Quick Impact Project 
RCA Reparation and Compensation Authority  
RSS Republic of South Sudan 
SAD Sudan Archive Durham 
SAF Sudan Arm Forces 
SCBC                Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
SCC                  Sudan Council of Churches 
SPLM/A Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army  
SPLM/A-IO Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition 
SSDF South Sudan Democratic Front 
SSLA South Sudan Law Society 
SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation of Movement 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
SSWA South Sudan Women Association 
 ix 
12018735 
SWAN Sudan Women Association in Nairobi 
SWVP Sudanese Women Voice for Peace 
TC Truth Commission 
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan 
UNMISS Nations Mission in South Sudan 
UP Umma Party  
US United States 
USA United State of America  
YCS Young Christian Student 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
12018735 
Table of content 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................i 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................. iii 
Dedication .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. v 
Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................. vi 
Table of content ...................................................................................................................... x 
Chapter One ........................................................................................................................... 1 
Research Introduction, Methodology & Design .................................................................... 1 
1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Genesis of the study ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Statement of the Problem ........................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework ...................................................................... 4 
1.4 Significance of the study .............................................................................................. 7 
1.5 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 9 
1.6 Research Design and Methodology ........................................................................... 10 
1.6.1 Epistemological Approach ................................................................................... 11 
1.6.2 Sampling strategy and rationale ......................................................................... 12 
1.6.3 Selection of participants ..................................................................................... 12 
1.6.4 Research Location: South Sudan ......................................................................... 14 
1.6.5 Methods of Data Collection ................................................................................ 16 
1.7 Reliability and validity ................................................................................................ 21 
1.7.1 Reliability ............................................................................................................. 22 
1.7.2 Validity................................................................................................................. 22 
 xi 
12018735 
1.8 Field work and its challenges ..................................................................................... 23 
1.9 Transcription and Analysis of Data ............................................................................ 27 
1.10 Ethical Considerations .............................................................................................. 29 
1.11 Reflexivity ................................................................................................................. 31 
1.12 Structure of the thesis .............................................................................................. 33 
Chapter Two ......................................................................................................................... 36 
Conceptual Framework and Literature Review ................................................................... 36 
2.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 36 
2.1 Theorizing a Liberal and an African Philosophy of Peace .......................................... 37 
2.1.1 Critique of Liberal Peace Theory ......................................................................... 38 
2.2 African Philosophy of Peace: The Ubuntu Principle .................................................. 44 
2.2.1 A critique of Ubuntu ............................................................................................ 46 
2.3 Conflict and peacemaking .......................................................................................... 53 
2.4 Contemporary armed conflict .................................................................................... 53 
2.5 Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding ...................................................................... 57 
2.5.1 Conflict resolution concept ................................................................................. 58 
2.5.2 Peacebuilding concept ........................................................................................ 59 
2.5.3 Post-conflict as a concept ................................................................................... 62 
2.5.4 Local approaches in Africa .................................................................................. 64 
2.6 Hybridity ..................................................................................................................... 66 
2.7 Human Rights and international treaties and laws.................................................... 70 
2.8 Justice and Reconciliation .......................................................................................... 74 
2.9 Transitional/Post conflict justice ................................................................................ 76 
2.9.1 Prosecutions (Retributive justice) ....................................................................... 77 
 xii 
12018735 
2.9.2 Truth Commissions (non-judicial bodies) ........................................................... 79 
2.9.3 Restorative justice ............................................................................................... 83 
2.10 Reconciliation ........................................................................................................... 84 
2.11 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 87 
Chapter Three ...................................................................................................................... 88 
A History of Conflicts, Peace Agreements and International Efforts at Peacemaking ........ 88 
3.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 88 
3.1 The Sudan’s North-South conflict .............................................................................. 89 
3.2 The British Southern Policy ........................................................................................ 90 
3.3 Post-colonial Administration, Ideology and cultural perception ............................... 93 
3.4 The 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement .................................................................. 94 
3.5 The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ................................................... 97 
3.6 Mediation, negotiations and role of regional and international actors .................. 100 
3.7 Critique of the CPA Process ...................................................................................... 104 
3.7.1 Exclusion of Civil society, Political Parties and Other Armed Groups ............... 105 
3.8 Post CPA and post-independence conflicts ............................................................. 108 
3.9 Reconciliation efforts in South Sudan ...................................................................... 111 
3.9.1 The big tent policy ............................................................................................. 111 
3.9.2 Civilian Disarmament ........................................................................................ 112 
3.9.3 National Reconciliation Process ........................................................................ 115 
3.10 The 2013 conflict .................................................................................................... 116 
3.11 Role of regional and international actors during the 2013 crisis........................... 122 
3.12 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 125 
Chapter Four ...................................................................................................................... 126 
 xiii 
12018735 
A Comparative Survey of Local Peacemaking Institutions and Practices in South Sudan . 126 
4. 0 Introduction............................................................................................................. 126 
4.1 Understanding local institutions and traditional authorities .................................. 126 
4. 2 Traditional Authorities during colonial and post-colonial periods ......................... 131 
4.2.1 Council and role of elders ................................................................................. 134 
4.2.2 Chieftainship and role of Chiefs ........................................................................ 138 
4.3 Role of Spiritual Agency and Traditional Religious Actors ....................................... 146 
4.4 Typology and sources of traditional conflicts in South Sudan ................................. 151 
4.4.1 New forms of conflict ........................................................................................ 153 
4.5 Local Methods of Peacemaking in South Sudan ...................................................... 155 
4.6 Customary Law ......................................................................................................... 156 
4.7 Mediation and Arbitration ....................................................................................... 158 
4.8 Arbitration ................................................................................................................ 162 
4.9 Local as Restorative Justice ...................................................................................... 163 
4.10 Nexus between Mediation, Compensation and reconciliation ............................. 164 
4.11 People-to-people peace process............................................................................ 167 
4.11.1 Akobo conference, 1994. ................................................................................ 169 
4.11.2 Wunlit conference, 1999. ................................................................................ 170 
4.12 Gender and local peacemaking .............................................................................. 172 
4.13 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 178 
Chapter Five: ...................................................................................................................... 179 
Dinka and Nuer Post-Conflict Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms ............................. 179 
5.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 179 
5.1 Aims, Types and Scope of Justice ............................................................................. 180 
 xiv 
12018735 
5.2 Concept and practices of Justice among Nuer the Dinka ........................................ 182 
5.2.1 Concept of Justice among the Nuer .................................................................. 182 
5.2.2 Concepts of Justice among the Dinka ............................................................... 186 
5.3 Customary law, local institutions and mechanisms ................................................. 188 
5.4 Role of traditional authorities (spiritual Leaders) .................................................... 193 
5.5 Religious Functionaries and Magical Experts ........................................................... 197 
5.6 Homicide and blood feuds ....................................................................................... 200 
5.7 Mediation and Arbitration ....................................................................................... 203 
5.7.1 Truth-seeking .................................................................................................... 204 
5.7.2 Oaths and Ordeal among the Nuer ................................................................... 206 
5.7.3 Swearing among the Dinka ............................................................................... 208 
5.8 Compensation .......................................................................................................... 210 
5.9 Reconciliation and re-integration of offenders ....................................................... 214 
5.9.1 Concept of reconciliation among the Nuer ....................................................... 214 
5.9.2 Concept of reconciliation among the Dinka ..................................................... 215 
5.10 Dinka and Nuer local reconciliation practices........................................................ 216 
5.11 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 220 
Chapter Six ......................................................................................................................... 221 
Blending Local and International Approaches ................................................................... 221 
6.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 221 
6.1 Customary versus International law ........................................................................ 223 
6.2 Human rights violations and international law ........................................................ 227 
6.3 Local approaches and the impact of change ........................................................... 230 
6.4 Civil wars and disempowerment of traditional institutions and authorities ........... 233 
 xv 
12018735 
6.5 Tradition and Ethics of Wars and violations of Human Rights ................................ 237 
6.6 Contemporary and traditional warfare .................................................................... 238 
6.7 Politics, chiefs and changing circumstances ............................................................ 240 
6.8 Local justice and international legal standards........................................................ 243 
6.9 Local Mechanisms: Application, strengths and weaknesses ................................... 247 
6.9.1 Mediation .......................................................................................................... 247 
6.9.2 Procedures: ....................................................................................................... 248 
6.9.3 Compensation ................................................................................................... 249 
6.10 The Church and traditional authorities .................................................................. 255 
6.11 Transitional Justice and the 2015 Peace Agreement ............................................. 257 
6.11.1 Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) ............................ 258 
6.11.2 Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) ............................................................. 261 
6.11.3 Reparations and Compensation Authority (RCA) ........................................... 266 
6.12. Findings ................................................................................................................. 267 
6.13 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 269 
Chapter Seven .................................................................................................................... 271 
General Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 271 
7.0 Introduction: ............................................................................................................ 271 
7.1 The core arguments of the study ............................................................................. 271 
7.2 Wider Implications ................................................................................................... 275 
7.3 Further research ....................................................................................................... 280 
Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 282 
Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet ....................................................................... 282 
Appendix 2: Consent form ................................................................................................. 285 
 xvi 
12018735 
Appendix 3: Data collection Instruments........................................................................... 286 
Appendix 4: List of interviews ............................................................................................ 293 
Appendix 5: Thesis Planner 2014-2018 .............................................................................. 296 
Appendix 6: Fieldwork Plan ................................................................................................ 294 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 310 
 1 
12018735 
Chapter One 
Research Introduction, Methodology & Design 
1.0 Introduction 
This study focuses on local peacemaking and contemporary armed conflicts in South 
Sudan. The aim is to explore the potential utility of local approaches to the resolution 
of modern conflicts and whether the mechanisms practised by the Dinka and the 
Nuer ethnic communities can be applied to the current hostilities in South Sudan to 
build sustainable peace. It seeks to understand the role local peacemaking 
procedures have played in local settings, and could play in global peace efforts, with 
special focus on post-conflict justice and reconciliation. The focus for investigation 
and analysis concerns the period after the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) up to and including the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). The study also analyses the transitional justice 
policies provided in the agreements, or lack thereof, to deal with the legacy of the 
wars. 
1.1 Genesis of the study 
This study was motivated by the desire to fill a gap in knowledge and to understand 
how local peacemaking initiatives can interact with the dominant liberal 
peacebuilding strategies which are applied across a wide range of post-conflict 
settings to deal with violent conflict and to build peace. As a South Sudanese 
national, my special interest in the strife in South Sudan and a passion to work for 
peace have developed based on my personal experience of war. More than half of 
my life has been spent in war situations; I was born during war and raised in war. 
From 1986, for example, I was separated from my parents for a period of 15 years 
without any communication. When I finally visited my parents in a refugee camp, my 
own mother could not recognize me due to the long separation.  
Overall, my personal experience in peacebuilding work across East Africa, 
particularly in Sudan and South Sudan before and after the signing of the 2005 CPA, 
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inspired the study. I oversaw and was a member of the Board of Governors of 
Bakhita FM Radio; a community radio station that was established by the Sudan 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference (SCBC) in 2006 to work for peace and reconciliation 
in South Sudan. In 2010, I set up a sub-regional peace and reconciliation forum, 
championed by the Young Christian Student (YCS) Movement, which brought 
together students from South Sudan, the Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in 
an attempt to create a platform for the exchange of ideas linked to the search for 
solutions to conflict-related problems and the cross-border issues facing the sub-
region; and to ascertain how students and young people in the East African region 
could play their role in regional peacebuilding and reconciliation. I also organized 
peace education programmes for young people in schools and Churches.  
Between 2012 and 2013, I conducted a piece of academic research on 
peacebuilding in South Sudan. This was undertaken as part of the requirements for 
a Master’s Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford. In 
that study, I examined the role of the Church in peacebuilding in South Sudan, and 
established that the Church played a key role in conflict resolution and reconciliation, 
in advocacy for peace, as well as acting as a humanitarian and development service 
provider during the two decades of the civil war. Despite the absence of any 
functional government institutions or the engagement of institutions such as the UN 
and other agencies in most parts of the war-affected Southern Sudan, the Church, 
as a civil society actor in partnership with local and traditional authorities, was 
present and helped to make peace among divided communities as well as between 
the rebel factions.  
I also worked in partnership with several NGOs, both local and international, and 
with traditional institutions which used local mechanisms to resolve resource-based, 
cross-border and other conflicts through traditional and indigenous action. I was 
involved, through the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church in Juba, 
in the capacity building of traditional leadership for local peace mediation; supporting 
and training the representatives in the use of peace language during the cross-
border peace and reconciliation meetings with their counter-parts from Northern 
 3 
12018735 
Uganda, following the Ugandan rebels’ Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) incursions 
and operations in South Sudan.  
My work with traditional leaders, shaped my interest to explore and understand the 
potential and relevance of local peacebuilding mechanisms, but also challenged and 
inspired me to ask questions such as: where is the place and role of these institutions 
in the broader contemporary peace processes? Can these mechanisms be applied 
to the modern conflicts and if so how and to what extent? These questions have yet 
to find answers alongside my main research questions. However, it appears that 
during the Sudan’s decades of civil war, South Sudan relied on the efficacy of local 
initiatives, which had been in use in some form since the pre-colonial period, to deal 
with protracted hostilities. My view has been that if explored and properly 
understood, local mechanisms of peacebuilding could be applied in some form, and 
perhaps as a compliment to international approaches to the resolution of modern 
conflicts in South Sudan; hence the rationale for undertaking this study. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
In the last two decades peace processes that have ventured to address 
contemporary armed conflicts in the Global South, and specifically Africa, have 
insisted on internationally-sponsored practices, such as state rebuilding, good 
governance, democracy and the International Criminal Court (ICC). But this 
insistence has consistently led to lack of recognition and incorporation of local 
procedures in peacebuilding programming. In most cases, these conventional 
recipes have periodically met with failure (Mac Ginty 2008a). 
This Liberal peace model was applied (except for transitional justice instruments), to 
resolve the armed conflict in the Sudan which resulted in the signing of the 2005 
CPA, that ended the twenty years of war between the Government of the Sudan 
(GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); and more 
recently, to the 2015 ARCSS, to end the twenty months of fighting between the 
government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).  However, more than a 
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decade after the CPA, South Sudan still finds itself grappling with significant political 
problems related to unresolved issues and the near collapse of the ARCSS that 
make peace a matter of grave concern. However, unlike the CPA, ARCSS included 
a transitional justice component and provided for the establishment of a Hybrid Court 
for South Sudan (HCSS) alongside two other transitional justice mechanisms that 
will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
The choice of peacemaking measures is crucial when attempting to find solutions to 
any armed conflict. Relevant procedures should consider the people’s histories, 
cultures, and experiences and the specific political contexts which are crucial for an 
understanding of the root causes of conflicts and which are required for local 
participation, legitimacy, ownership, and sustainability of outcomes. An over-reliance 
on liberal peacebuilding models has not yielded the expected results in South Sudan; 
particularly as, so far, no mechanisms have been put in place to deal with the 
bitterness felt among war-affected communities.  
1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The theories upon which my thesis is grounded are a critique of liberal peace theory 
and an analysis of the African philosophy of peacemaking (Ubuntu), together with 
the key concepts that make up the study: conflict resolution, peacebuilding, local 
approaches, contemporary conflict, transitional (post-conflict) justice and 
reconciliation. These are discussed in chapter two of this thesis.  
Liberal peacebuilding is premised upon the idea that democracy and a free market 
economy encourage people to resolve and express their differences peacefully and 
that this is the best foundation for development and accountable governance 
(Newman 2009: 39); and that retributive justice is the most effective route to conflict 
resolution and dealing with past human rights violations. A growing body of research, 
however, suggests that modern violent conflicts exist within contexts of a hybrid 
political order (Boege 2011: 432), and increasingly questions the relevance of liberal 
peacemaking in achieving results within such settings. Critics of the liberal peace 
model assert that the main shortcomings of contemporary peace processes based 
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on the liberal peace model are their repeated failure to recognize local approaches 
and cultural resources of conflict-affected people and to incorporate them in their 
intervention and practices (Murithi 2008); and to address the bitterness experienced 
by war-affected communities and the sources that generate it (Gawerc 2006: 437). I 
concur with the above critiques and argue that the persistence of armed conflict in 
South Sudan following the signing of the 2005 CPA, after independence in 2011, 
and after the signing of the 2015 ARCSS is largely due to the failure to recognize, 
appreciate and incorporate cultural resources in the peace processes, to address 
the grievances of the affected people and to reconcile the bitterly divided 
communities.  
Conversely, despite growing interest in promoting local approaches in post-conflict 
peacebuilding, the literature shows wide research gaps. Francis (2012) notes that 
over a decade of extensive fieldwork in post-conflict societies in Africa, reveals a 
huge under-researched area as to what happens when war formally ends. Boege 
(2011: 434) observes that scholarly research and political practice have not 
adequately addressed traditional non-western approaches to conflict transformation. 
Similarly, previous research on peacebuilding and local peacemaking mechanisms 
in South Sudan have marginally dealt with issues of post-conflict justice and 
reconciliation (Wassara 2007). There is, therefore, limited or no literature in South 
Sudan with this focus. The academic community will benefit from the study in terms 
of new knowledge and an enrichment of the peacebuilding literature. 
Since the slaving era of the 18th and 19th centuries, the colonial periods from the 
1880s, and post-independence civil wars from 1956, South Sudan has suffered 
significant violence and insecurity.   Liberal peace values such as democracy, human 
rights, rule of law and socio-economic development were alien to common ideas of 
governance and war time practice. Young (2012: 10) observes that gross human 
rights violations were committed in South Sudan by all parties in the two-decade civil 
war which ended in 2005. Interestingly, despite the protracted civil strife which also 
pitted some communities against each other, the people of South Sudan continued 
to co-exist. How this was possible in the face of suspicions, inter-communal tensions 
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and armed clashes perpetrated by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA, 
and by multiple militia and self-defence groups, is yet to be understood. However, 
coexistence may have in part been possible because of people building peace using 
traditional and local techniques; and there is indeed evidence of local peacebuilding 
efforts, notably during the SPLM/A political and armed struggles of 1983-2005. 
Johnson (2011), for example, noted that it was grass roots peace efforts that 
attempted to heal the rift in South Sudan following the 1991 SPLA split (I will discuss 
the SPLM/A split in Chapter Three). This reinforces the point of Barnes (2005), who 
argues that local civil society groups bring several important qualities for responding 
to specific cases of conflict.  
The long history of South-North wars and inter-communal differences in South 
Sudan seems to have bequeathed a rich peacebuilding heritage that regulates feuds 
through various customary mechanisms. These localized peacebuilding initiatives, 
taking place at both the grassroots and the sub-national levels, have continued since 
the inception of the Sudan’s second civil war in 1983 up to the independence of 
South Sudan in 2011. But, since the signing of the CPA in 2005 and the country’s 
independence in 2011, the state and other peacebuilding efforts that were employed 
in South Sudan downgraded native peacebuilding strategies in favour of the 
dominant Western liberal approaches to conciliation. Moreover, the civil war has 
weakened the social fabric and left communities polarized, in such a way that any 
slight provocations arising, for example, from shared use of resources, such as land 
and water, could spark fresh violent confrontations.  
The implosion of South Sudan, with major conflicts before and after its independence 
in 2011, and the descent of the country into another war in December 2013, despite 
ongoing peacebuilding efforts, could be mainly attributed to the failure of the 
predominantly western peacebuilding procedures to take into account and recognize 
the local realities of the disputes, such as the available resources in South Sudan 
and the role local endeavours had played in conflict resolution and management 
since pre-colonial times. However, unless the potential and limitations of grass-roots 
initiatives is empirically explored and understood, their efficacy (or lack thereof), for 
 7 
12018735 
possible application to the resolution of modern conflicts, will remain unappreciated 
by global peace policies. 
I do not assume any preconceived ideas of what roles local mechanisms ought to 
play. Instead this thesis seeks to explore the opinions, views and experiences of 
research participants, establishing and validating their voice as to how home-grown 
approaches work (and do not work), and could contribute to the resolution of modern 
conflict in the given context. The study focuses specifically on the Dinka and the 
Nuer peacemaking mechanisms as used in the aftermath of violent conflicts and 
their possible application to post-conflict justice and reconciliation. The reasons for 
focusing on the Dinka and the Nuer are; the legacy of the 1999 Wunlit peace and 
reconciliation conference, which settled the post-SPLA split and violent conflict 
between the two ethnic groups; and the current conflict which right from its inception, 
pitted Dinka and Nuer ethnicities against each other.   
1.4 Significance of the study 
This research intends to make an impact on actors in South Sudan, most especially 
on grassroots and civil society activists, regarding the question of peacebuilding. 
This impact includes setting out the relevance, potential, usefulness and limitations 
of indigenous mechanisms, agencies, and resources of conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding in South Sudan; and how these can be used to address current strife, 
particularly on issues of accountability, justice and reconciliation. Peacebuilding 
requires several different measures, approaches and stakeholders at various levels. 
Lessons will be learned from the findings for possible application, if found relevant, 
to address current and future hostilities. To actualize the contribution of this study, 
the Church, as a faith-based and civil society actor of which I am a part, will use the 
findings of this research to help establish a training facility for indigenous 
peacemakers to prepare them in the early recognition of obstacles that threaten 
peace and provide them with a skill-set for devising ways and means to overcome 
such problems. This could take the form of arranging opportunities for dialogue, or 
establishing local councils to address these issues. The wider society would benefit 
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from the community conflict-management skills and capability, and this, in its turn, 
would help build sustainable peace in South Sudan.  
This thesis also aims to contribute to the current peacebuilding scholarship trend of 
the “local turn” which promotes emancipatory peace, with new empirical evidence 
for South Sudan. Local turn in peacebuilding is a wider critical turn in the study of 
peace and conflict which focuses on the epistemological values of the recourse to 
localism in conceptualization and execution of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2013). It is a recognition of the importance of culture, history and identity, 
and the significance of the local critical agency, and resistance, of the unintended 
consequences of external blueprints, and of rights and needs in everyday contexts. 
“It has been much influenced by postcolonial scholarship and by scholars from the 
global south who are particularly aware of the issues of power relations in peace” 
(Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 769). Policy makers in the international community 
have also shifted their focus more towards decentralization and grassroots 
empowerment, including a role for traditional authorities, in their efforts to create a 
liberal peace (Leonardi 2007: 538). 
But why this rise of interest in the local? One factor that helps explain this, is the 
growing understanding of the complexity of conflict by many bilateral donor states, 
international organizations and international financial institutions (IFIs); and this has 
been matched by a growing understanding that responses to conflict must also be 
multi-dimensional, long-term and flexible (Mac Ginty 2008a: 124). This study will 
examine whether this upsurge of interest is real or rhetorical. The research has no 
intention whatsoever, to romanticize grass roots initiatives or consider such a model 
as an antidote to liberal peace.   
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1.5 Research Questions 
This study sets out to answer the following questions: 
Central research question 
What is the potential utility of local approaches to the resolution of modern conflicts 
in South Sudan?  
Secondary Research Questions 
To what extent can the Dinka and the Nuer justice and reconciliation mechanisms 
be applied to post conflict peacebuilding? 
Objectives 
• To understand the cultural institutions of peacemaking in South Sudan, and 
the methods they apply 
• To determine the roles traditional leaders have played in administering justice 
and reconciliation after violent conflicts 
• To establish whether these roles are still capable of serving the same 
purposes they once did 
• To find out the types of conflicts that were settled by local methods 
• To ascertain the limits of local peacemaking procedures 
• To determine whether the dominant Western liberal peace approaches leave 
room for local versions of restitution 
• To determine whether local initiatives were included in the peace processes 
that led to the CPA and ARCSS 
• To find out stakeholders’ perceptions (local and international) about the 
application of local techniques to transitional justice and reconciliation 
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1.6 Research Design and Methodology  
The main purpose of research methodology is to explain how the research questions 
can be answered. So, there is always a close association and integration among 
research questions, research methodology, and method of data collection (Schensul 
2012: 71). Based on the required information for my research questions, I used a 
qualitative approach to generate answers. I needed data that came from the 
participants’ opinions, perceptions, personal views, feelings and experiences which 
were qualitative in nature. I used a case study design for examining the South Sudan 
context as a setting for understanding the phenomenon under investigation. Yin 
(2003: 13) defines the case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and under technically 
distinctive situations in which there are many more variables of interest than can 
possibly be handled at a time. Local peacemaking approaches are not 
homogeneous and, given the diversity of cases, I could not deal with all of them in 
this study, so a case study was a better option for my thesis. The rationale for the 
choice was that the case study provides a detailed description of the problem under 
study and allows for in-depth investigation to gain valuable and unique insights, as 
it focuses on relationships and processes within social settings which tend to be 
interrelated (Descombe 2003: 32). It is a very useful design for exploring an area 
where little is known or where you want to have a holistic understanding of the 
situation, phenomenon, episode, site, group or community (Kumar 2011: 127). 
In terms of case types, I used a single instrumental case study for my investigation. 
Creswell (2007: 73) defines case study research as a qualitative approach in which 
the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems 
(cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple 
sources of information. As noted above, the inquiry focused on specific ethnic 
communities in South Sudan as units of analysis: the Dinka and the Nuer. The major 
weakness of the case study is that findings are not always generalizable to other 
situations (Leedy and Ormrod 2013: 141). The aim is not to establish how the case 
findings can be generalized, as every community in South Sudan has its own 
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traditional and local peacemaking approach, but to understand what conclusions 
could be drawn from the study to inform such practices in other settings.  
1.6.1 Epistemological Approach 
I used social constructionist and interpretivist techniques as the ontological and 
epistemological dimensions of the phenomenon of my investigation. Gergen (1985: 
85)  defines social constructionism as a perspective which believes that a great deal 
of human life exists as it does due to social and interpersonal influences; a 
proposition that tends to disagree with the positivist view that there is an objective 
reality that exists independent of human persons. Positivism is a foundational 
perspective which argues that objects in the world have meaning prior to and 
independent of any consciousness or experience of them; a concept which 
embraces objectivist epistemology (Crotty 1998: 27).  
Conversely, social constructionism is an anti-foundational philosophical perspective 
which is associated with the post-modern era in qualitative research and views 
knowledge as constructed, as opposed to created (Andrews 2012: 1). The Social 
constructionist perspective employs interpretive epistemology where knowledge is 
constructed by interpreting data obtained from research participants and study 
settings. This philosophical view takes the position that social and cultural 
phenomena emerge from the ways in which actors in a setting construct meaning; 
and where the researcher comes to understand behaviours, language and the 
meanings attributed to them through immersion in the setting and interaction with 
the study participants (Schensul 2012: 76). Thus, everything that is real for us comes 
from communal relationships; which means communities socially construct reality 
for what it is. I chose this philosophical paradigm because the phenomenon of my 
investigation (local peacemaking approaches) is socially and culturally constructed 
and lived by people. 
This social constructionist and interpretivist approach enabled me, through my 
interactions with the research participants, to understand the local peacemaking 
approaches as practiced by Dinka and Nuer, and to interpret as knowledge the social 
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constructions involved. That is, the meanings and values that the study participants 
assigned to these processes (Lapan et al. 2012: 8). I found constructionist and 
interpretivist methods very helpful for interaction with my participants during 
interviews as they made sense of their practices and lived experiences. The 
perspective was also very useful in data analysis where I had to interact with the 
participants’ stories, opinions, attitudes to understand, make sense of, and interpret 
them as knowledge. 
1.6.2 Sampling strategy and rationale  
Sampling is the process of selecting individuals or groups from a population of 
interest, whilst a sampling strategy is the plan set forth to ensure that the sample to 
be used in a research study represents the population from which the sample is 
drawn (Kumar 2011: 193). This thesis used purposive and snowball sampling 
techniques to identify the right research participants for the study. The rationale was 
that purposive sampling lends more strength in case study research as data sources, 
participants or cases are selected according to how much can be learned from them 
(Moore et al. 2012: 253). Patton (1987) cited in (Moore et al. 2012: 253) describes 
this approach as seeking “information-rich” sources rather than producing 
representative samples. I designed inclusion and exclusion criteria based on the 
research questions and the required data; the nature of the research questions and 
required answers determined who was to be involved in the study. Expert knowledge 
and peacebuilding roles were the criteria used to include or exclude potential 
participants.  
1.6.3 Selection of participants 
I selected the sample based on my judgment that the individuals (key informants) 
would provide me with the required information. Kumar (2011: 213) observes that 
the selection of a sample in qualitative research is guided by a researcher’s judgment 
as to who is likely to provide him with the best information. I used gatekeepers, 
people who helped me connect with my potential participants. Hamersley & 
Atkinson, (1995) cited in (Creswell 2007: 125), define a gatekeeper as an individual 
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who is a member of or has insider status within a study population, and who is the 
initial contact who leads the researcher to participants. After cultivating a rapport with 
the participants, I employed the snowball technique to recruit other participants. The 
snowball is a sampling strategy in qualitative inquiry that identifies cases or 
individuals of interest from people who know those who are information-rich (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994) in (Creswell 2007: 27).The challenge with the snowball 
technique however, is that of linking up with key informants and people with expert 
knowledge; and, also that if the participants chosen at the first stage are biased, the 
study may also be biased. With this factor in mind, during the fieldwork I tried my 
best to be careful with the recruitment of the key informants to ensure that the 
selection of the respondents was based on possession of knowledge, biased or not, 
which was valuable to the study.  
The sample for my study consisted of six categories of participants whom I judged 
to possess the required information. The first category was composed of traditional 
leaders. I targeted Dinka and Nuer chiefs and elders, spiritual leaders and traditional 
healers, both men and women, mainly focusing on those who were involved in 
culturally-based peacemaking and conflict management activities in their 
communities, including peace mediators, community and opinion leaders. The 
second category comprised civil society groups which included faith-based 
organizations, international and local NGOs, the media, donor agencies and 
international development corporations. I drew up a list of civil society organizations 
that were involved in peacebuilding activities and in the peace process that had led 
to the signing of the 2015 ARCSS.  
The third category was the international community which included the United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other UN agencies, the Troika 
member countries (US, UK & Norway) as special backers of South Sudan peace 
processes, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional 
body and South Sudan peace mediator. IGAD consists of countries in the East and 
Horn of Africa, namely: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Kenya and Uganda. The fourth category was the government and other political 
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actors. This category included government institutions and officials, other political 
actors such as the SPLM/A and its factions, and the National Political Parties’ 
Alliance. The fifth category was made up of professionals and experts. This category 
included academics, lawyers and other key intellectuals. The sixth category included 
women and youth organizations and individuals. 
I planned for a sample of 35-40 participants while considering some related factors. 
Robson (2011) notes, for instance, that the sample size for a study is determined by 
such elements as the number of questions asked, the required details of the analysis 
and the resources such as cost, time and effort.  However, I was also aware of 
another critical deciding factor, namely; the concept of a saturation point, as 
explained by Kumar (2011: 213), where the quantity of information collected over 
time becomes of such reduced proportions as to be insignificant or non-existent. This 
means that though sometimes an estimated number of participants is made prior to 
the study, actual numbers are determined by the amount of data that are obtained 
and the point at which the evidence becomes redundant with no new information 
coming in (Moore et al. 2012: 253). 
1.6.4 Research Location: South Sudan 
South Sudan is the location of the study. It is a landlocked country in East-Central 
Africa, the youngest state in the world. It obtained its independence from Sudan 
through a referendum vote in July 2011 as provided for in 2005 Sudan CPA signed 
between GOS and SPLM/A. It ended two decades of civil war. South Sudan is 
bordered by Sudan in the North, Ethiopia in the East, Kenya in the South East, 
Uganda in the South, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the South 
West, and the Central African Republic in the West. It has an area of 619,745 square 
kilometres.  It has a population of 11.5 million people.1 In terms of administrative 
structures, South Sudan constitutionally consists of ten states, although these were 
                                                     
1 The 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census was conducted in 2008 as provided for in the 2005 CPA 
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increased by Presidential decree to twenty-eight in October 2015,2 and thirty-two in 
January 2017.3 The ten states,4 were; Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, 
Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, 
Jonglei, Lake, Unity and Upper Nile (see the Map below), administered by elected 
Governors.5 Each state comprises several counties determined by size and 
administered by appointed Commissioners. Payams also exist at a level below that 
of county. These are run by administrators. Counties, Payams and Bomas are 
structures at local government level. 
I conducted part of my research in Juba, the capital and the largest city, situated in 
Central Equatoria state. While it is home to the ethnic Bari, it accommodates 
residents from almost all the ethnicities of South Sudan, as well as other nationals. 
I chose Juba because of the presence of key international bodies such as UN 
agencies, Embassies, the Head offices of international and regional partners, not to 
mention the staff of national government and academic institutions and local 
peacebuilding actors.  
 
                                                     
2 In 2015 President Salva Kiir increased by a Presidential decree the number of states from 10 to 28. But the 
boundaries of those states remain contested; http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56581 
3  https://paanluelwel.com/2017/01/22/the-32-federal-states-of-the-republic-of-south-sudan/  
4 I have used the former ten states in this study because they are enshrined in the transitional constitution of 
South Sudan 2011; but also, because the 28 (now 32) states are still contested and have also become one of 
the reasons some aggrieved communities for example, the Shilluk in Upper Nile are fighting the government 
and their neighbouring Dinka community since the announcement of the decree. 
5 The governors were elected during the 2010 elections as provided for in the CPA. Now, almost all the 
governors have been appointed by the President. 
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Figure 1: Map of South Sudan 
 
Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS - October 2011 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/southsudan.pdf  
1.6.5 Methods of Data Collection  
Based on the research questions, methodology employed and empirical nature of 
the study, I asked “how and what” questions to generate qualitative data. The 
questions sought descriptive responses; individual opinions, feelings and 
experiences which are not easily observed and may only be best revealed through 
interviewing key informants (Moore et al. 2012: 251). The research generated data 
from both primary and secondary sources where primary sources of data included 
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interviews both formal and informal and observation; and methods for collecting 
secondary data included books, journals, theses and dissertations, internet sources 
and archival materials.   
Interviews 
I used semi-structured interviews to collect primary data. Semi-structured interviews 
resonate with case study strategy to generate descriptive responses obtained in 
reply to open-ended questions which are useful for seeking the opinions, personal 
views, feelings and experiences of the participants about the research problem. It is 
also good to establish rapport with the participants and gain their cooperation. 
However, the method is time-consuming and expensive. It took me between 45-60 
minutes, and sometimes more, to interview one respondent, besides organizing and 
analysing the rich data.  
I carried out a total of 43 formal interviews. I interviewed seven participants from the 
traditional leaders; I carried out individual interviews with three participants from 
international civil society organizations and fourteen from local civil society and faith 
based organizations. I also interviewed five academics and professionals, four 
participants from government officials and political actors, three participants from the 
international community, five women and two youths.  
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Table 1:  Formal and Informal Interviews 
 
Interview Segment Formal 
interviews  
Interview Segment Informal 
interviews 
Traditional leaders 
(chiefs & elders) 
7 Traditional leaders 2 
International civil Society 
organizations 
3 International civil society 
organizations 
1 
Local civil society 
organizations 
6 Local civil society 
organizations 
 
1 
Faith based 
organizations 
8 Religious Leaders 2 
Academics and 
professionals 
5 Academics 1 
Government officials and 
other political actors 
4 Government Officials 1 
International community 3 Military Personnel 
 
2 
Women  5 Women 1 
Youth 2   
Total Number of 
Interviews 
43  11 
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I also conducted eleven informal interviews with traditional leaders, religious leaders, 
government officials, military personnel, academics, international and local civil 
society and women. The informal interviews helped me to clarify some of the issues 
which emerged from the formal interviews. There were of course challenges, for 
example, last moment cancellation of interview appointments by potential 
respondents and finding good interview locations.  
In terms of ethnic representation, Dinka and Nuer constituted approximately half of 
the research participants, but some ethnic groups from the different regions of the 
country were also represented. I planned to ensure that the six categories of my key 
informants were balanced in terms of age and gender. But this was not exactly 
feasible because participants’ selection was based on purposive sampling; who 
could provide the required information as described in the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria. However, I made deliberate efforts to ensure that women and youth were 
represented. In some locations such as Agok in Bahr el Ghazal, for example, more 
women than men were interviewed. Out of the seven participants I interviewed there, 
five were women. This was very important because it evened up with some locations, 
for example, the Juba and Wau, where most interviewees were men. The total 
number of female interviewees came to thirteen out of 43 research participants. The 
overall participants’ age-sets were between 20-80 years. 
Observation 
Observation is a purposeful, systematic and selective way of watching and listening 
to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place (Kumar 2011: 140). I used 
observation to understand non-verbal information, both during face-to-face 
interviews and during some functions and gatherings that were related to my 
research. For example, I attended two court cases in Mayen Abun of Warrab State 
involving cattle theft that resulted in the death of two people. The court proceedings, 
which were a mixture of arbitration by chiefs and mediation by traditional village 
elders, ended with a resolution to return the stolen cattle and compensation for the 
lost lives. As a non-participant observer, I was interested in the behaviours rather 
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than the perceptions of the people involved in the court cases and so observation 
was the best method to collect the required information. 
Adding observation as my method of primary data collection made it a mixed 
qualitative method of data collection and analysis. Kumar (2011: 262) argues that 
the use of mixed qualitative methods of data collection in social research is very 
helpful for corroboration and triangulation of data to ensure trustworthiness and 
validity.  Furthermore, he observes that multiple methods of data collection are an 
important aspect of a case study, namely, in-depth interviewing, obtaining 
information from secondary records, gathering data through observations, collecting 
information through focus groups and group interviews and so on. However, the use 
of observation as a method of data collection may sometimes suffer from a few 
problems. Kumar (2011: 141) notes that individuals and groups may change their 
behaviour when they become aware they are under observation; there is the 
possibility of observer bias; and interpretations drawn from observation may vary 
from observer to observer. I was conscious of these realities during my fieldwork. 
Focus Group Discussions 
Focus group interviews refer to group interviews aimed at discussing specific issues 
(Robson 2011: 285). I did not use focus group interviews for several reasons: first, 
because of the sensitivity of my research topic. The political atmosphere in South 
Sudan at the time of my field work was not conducive to focus group discussions on 
a conflict that had assumed ethnic dimension and which pitted the communities 
under study (Dinka and Nuer) against each other. Second, gatherings of people in 
groups required special permission, yet National Security operatives were 
suspicious. Doing so would endanger the participants and my safety as well, and 
that would be contrary to ethical research considerations. 
Nevertheless, alongside semi-structured interviews and for purposes of triangulation 
and corroboration of data, I used informal interviews and discussions, observation 
and secondary analysis. Moore et al (2012: 151) describes triangulation as finding 
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agreement among evidence collected from multiple sources and using various 
methods to increase the validity and trustworthiness of findings. 
Documentary analysis  
I also used information that came from secondary sources that related to my 
research. According to Kumar (2011: 163), secondary sources include government 
publications, earlier research, personal records and mass media which cover reports 
published in newspapers, magazines and on the internet, books and other published 
information. I used journal articles, dissertations, theses, archival materials, working 
papers, workshop and conference proceedings, reports, census results and maps of 
the study sites, to provide supplementary data about the case under scrutiny, the 
reason being that such data were needed to inform the study as well as to put it in 
perspective. To evaluate and ascertain the documents’ authenticity, I verified the 
originality and reliability of the source by checking the authors, the providers of funds 
for the work, and the circulations of the documents.  
Other methods of data generation 
Ethnographic observation was one of the methods I would have favoured for this 
study, particularly when approached from the sociological and anthropological 
perspectives. But this method requires a longer period of fieldwork ranging from 6 to 
12 months or more. This did not correspond with my study timeframe and funding. 
But I still applied direct observation during my data collection, which is central to 
qualitative research. Lapan et al. (2012) argue that, even if participant observation 
is not part of the study design, understanding something about the cultural setting is 
critical in considering appropriate tools of inquiry. 
1.7 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity relate to the appropriateness, quality and accuracy of the 
procedures that a researcher has adopted for finding answers to his or her research 
questions. 
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1.7.1 Reliability 
Reliability is the extent to which a research instrument provides similar results and 
indicates accuracy when used repeatedly under similar conditions (Kumar 2011: 
396). I used simple and plain language to formulate interview questions to ensure 
clarity for my respondents. The flow and logical arrangement of questions in the 
overall interview guide were tested through pilot interviews with various people who 
were familiar with the research context. Where necessary, adjustments were made.  
The aim was to make it easier for the respondents to understand what was being 
asked and likewise, through simple open-ended questions, to be able to obtain 
accurate and more reliable data. I maintained a consistent standard method of 
asking questions, though with slight variations because of prompts and probes. This 
was very useful in the context of cross-checking the data. I used the triangulation 
approach. The aim in this regard was to ensure that there was agreement of 
evidence from the data which had been collected using the methods that I had 
applied. It is claimed that when the researcher obtains similar findings from multiple 
sources using various methods, the information is considered more trustworthy. 
1.7.2 Validity 
Validity refers to the appropriateness of each step in finding out what you set out to 
do or the judgment that an instrument is measuring what it is supposed to measure 
(Kumar 2011: 178). The concept of validity in this regard, is used to ensure that the 
methods and techniques used to generate data for research are genuine and 
suitable to achieve their purpose. My quality criteria for judging the goodness or 
quality of the inquiry is based on the framework suggested by Guba and Lincoln 
used in the constructivism paradigm, as cited in Denzin and Lincoln (1994) cited in 
(Kumar 2011: 184-5).which translates into ‘trustworthiness and authenticity’; where 
trustworthiness in qualitative research is determined by four indicators: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability, which reflect validity and credibility 
in quantitative research.  
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1.8 Field work and its challenges 
I spent a fair amount of time planning and preparing my approach to the field work. 
This included identifying research sites, the number of participants to be interviewed, 
criteria for selection and their cross-cutting composition in terms of diversity of views, 
perceptions, opinions and experiences. I developed a fieldwork plan based on my 
research questions and objectives, to determine the required data I hoped to obtain 
from the various categories of my key informants (Refer to Appendix 5, page 294). 
In the planner, I also defined who could and who could not give the required data on 
specific questions and why. The field work plan proved very helpful as the exercise 
of anticipating responses familiarized me with the kind of data I gained from the 
interviews and helped me in seeking clarification using probes and prompts and in 
the data analysis. However, I had to try to avoid being satisfied with my pre-
determined answers, as in some cases the responses did not correspond to those I 
had anticipated.  
Months before I travelled to the field, I initiated contacts with several of my potential 
participants and some institutions. I sent out emails with participant information 
sheets attached, to provide background information and explain the purpose of the 
study. Most of them responded positively, while a few did not. Some of those who 
initially did not answer my emails were later contacted by my gatekeepers and 
agreed to be interviewed. Generally, I was very impressed by the willingness of 
people to participate in the study. This may have been because of the timeliness of 
the study or perhaps because it provided the motivation to contribute to peace. 
In terms of accommodation, I was fortunate. Being a Catholic priest, I could reside 
with the community of priests. Except for Wau, where I stayed in a local guest house, 
it was the same in all the field work areas where the Catholic Church enjoys a 
presence. Being in priests’ communities facilitated an easy identification of 
gatekeepers and a rapid building of trust and confidence. Transport was always 
made available to me by the priests and that made it easy to visit my participants. 
Apart from access, it was also easy to identify research assistants and translators 
when needed, particularly in interviews with village chiefs and elders, but most of the 
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interviews were conducted in English and the local Arabic dialect, over both of which 
I have a good command. The fieldwork provided a satisfyingly steep learning curve 
and arguably proved to be the best study time of my PhD. Being aware from my 
research training that it entails a lot of challenges, I read and consulted widely and 
that process by itself was very enriching in terms of scholarly development. It made 
me handle my respondents professionally, apply research ethics appropriately and 
ask good questions targeting the goals of my study. 
However, I also encountered several difficulties. The first was linked to the socio-
political situation of South Sudan, where the study site is still in a state of civil war 
and many people have been displaced to neighbouring countries as refugees while 
others are sheltering in the UN Protection of Civilians’ sites (POCs) in South Sudan 
as internally displaced persons (IDPs). This meant that accessibility to some areas 
and participants was a challenge due to lack of security. As an insider researcher, 
another challenge was to negotiate access to some research areas due to suspicion 
and lack of trust created by the ethnic dimension of the conflict. However, being a 
priest, my entry point was the Church, which because of its moral authority and 
perceived neutrality commands a lot of respect and trust from a large section of the 
population. Furthermore, my familiarity with the country’s national and ethnic politics 
also helped me to overcome any tendency to bias that I may have. 
There were some deviations from the proposed study locations as outlined in my 
field work plan. Unity State, mainly home to the Nuer, was inaccessible due to poor 
security and transport difficulties. Instead I interviewed some displaced Nuer chiefs 
and elders in Juba. I had also planned to conduct interviews in Bor (Jonglei State), 
and in Rumbek (Lakes State) both of which are predominantly Dinka areas. At the 
time, I started my field work, there was active inter-communal fighting going on in 
Rumbek; and in Bor, where most of the civilian population, displaced during the 
clashes between the government and opposition forces in 2014, had not yet returned 
home and the situation was not yet normal. I therefore, decided to choose different 
sites, namely, Warrap state and Abyei Administrative Area, also the Dinka areas in 
Bahr el Ghazal which were relatively calm and peaceful. Generally, there was tense 
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political atmosphere and great concern about security surveillance targeting people 
who were discussing issues relating to the conflict situation of the country. This 
affected the participation of some senior government cadres who, although initially 
expressed willingness to take part in the study, later failed to turn up, which meant 
some essential information could not be obtained.  
In Warrap state, I conducted interviews in Kuajok, Gogrial, Turalei and Mayen Abun. 
Gogrial was of special interest because there was a recent inter-clan violent eruption 
which claimed twenty lives; and local peacemaking mechanisms were used to deal 
with the altercation. In Abyei Administrative Area, I interviewed participants in Agok 
and in Abyei town. I questioned more women than men in Agok and Abyei because 
of their well-organized women’s associations and the willingness of their leaders to 
participate in the study. In Wau, the capital of Western Bahr el Ghazal state and the 
second largest city in the country, I mainly interviewed academics and the staff of 
UN agencies involved in peacebuilding. This was because unlike in the other 
locations where I interviewed chiefs, women and youth, academics and senior NGO 
officials were based in Wau the seat of Bahr el Ghazal University and UN regional 
offices. 
Another location was Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, which I treated as a special case 
in terms of the flexibility required by field work and the purposive sampling and 
snowball techniques employed. I did not initially plan to travel to Kenya as I thought 
I would meet and interview Lazaro Sumbeiywo,6 in South Sudan during the 
launching of the peace agreement implementation in Juba by the Joint Monitoring 
and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), a commission charged with the responsibility 
to oversee the implementation of the ARCSS. It so happened that Lazaro did not 
attend the event and yet many comments were made about him by the people I 
                                                     
6 Lazaro Sumbeiywo was the Kenyan peace Envoy to Sudan between 2003 and 2005 and the IGAD chief 
mediator for the 2005 Sudan CPA; he also co-mediated the 2015 ARCSS. 
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talked to and that convinced me that I should consider travelling to Kenya to interview 
Gen. Sumbeiywo, which I did.  
 
Figure 2: Map of South Sudan showing research sites visited 
 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Sudan-
administrative_map.png  
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1.9 Transcription and Analysis of Data 
At the beginning of each interview I asked every participant if I could record the 
interview. All of them granted permission except one who declined because of her 
position in the government. I listened to all the recorded interviews and read the field 
notes I had taken. After familiarizing myself with the recorded interviews, I then 
started to transcribe the data, an exercise which took me three months to complete. 
It was a time-consuming task to transcribe 42 individual interviews, each of which 
was between 45 and 60 minutes long.  
I carried out the transcription of my recorded interview data while still in South Sudan.  
I contracted three persons to help in the transcription but I still had to spend time 
familiarizing myself with the data transcribed by my assistants. Robson (2011: 478) 
observes that even if someone else has done the transcription for you, it is still 
essential for you to spend time familiarizing yourself with the data, and you should 
also check the transcripts against the original recording for accuracy. I reviewed the 
transcripts and wrote separate comments related to each interview as a way of 
organizing the data. The process of transcribing and familiarizing myself with the 
recorded interviews as part of data analysis greatly increased the clarity of the text. 
Repeated reading of the data to search for meanings and patterns was a tedious job 
but helped me handle the data with ease during the writing because I had gained an 
in-depth understanding of the information.  
The process of piecing data together, of making the invisible obvious, of recognizing 
significance from insignificance, of linking seemingly unrelated facts logically, of 
fitting categories one with another and attributing consequence to antecedents is 
known as data analysis (Creswell 2007: 163). So, analysis of data is a ‘breaking up’ 
of complex information into smaller parts and explaining the whole in terms of the 
properties of, and relations between, these parts (Robson 2011: 412). I carried out 
primary data analysis in four stages, all of which followed thematic coding 
procedures. I drew upon the guidelines provided by Miles and Humberman (1994) 
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cited in (Creswell 2007: 148), in analysing qualitative data, which includes data 
reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and verification. Data reduction in this 
case is the process of sorting out key words through a coding process, themes, 
categories or responses whereas further reduction of data is the presentation and 
visualizing process which is meant to present the in-depth picture of the case using 
narratives, tables, figures and diagrams, referred to as data display, aimed at making 
the data more understandable (Creswell 2007: 163).  Data display then is its 
representation through tables, charts and diagrams which make the data more 
understandable. 
The rationale for choosing the thematic approach was its flexibility in terms of the 
theoretical framework which tended to fit very well with the case study. Other 
reasons for the choice of the thematic technique include its being user-friendly and 
good for summarizing key features of a large body of data (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
The disadvantages of thematic analysis, however, include a lack of clarity about its 
precise methods of analysis. It has been described in terms such as ‘there is “no 
best way” for thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006), which means anything 
goes, and that could be a weakness.  
The next stage involved coding and the development of categories. This is a sorting 
out process which involves comparing, contrasting and combining data (Robson 
2011: 468). This was done by describing the cases and their contexts and classifying 
them to establish themes or patterns. The next step was to devise tables and 
diagrams to identify some interrelated factors, their relationships and their 
frequencies, directed by the research questions. My focus at this stage was to 
identify and select the issues and categories which appeared relevant to each 
question or group of questions and put them together. After completing the coding 
and the development of categories, I drafted an initial summary of findings which I 
shared with my supervisor for comments and guidance. 
Once I completed the development of the categories, I identified patterns and trends, 
to create further categories and, based on the evidence of the data that I collected 
at an earlier stage, I generated and established meanings and initial conclusions. 
 29 
12018735 
Robson (2011: 473-9) states that data display is a tactic for drawing meanings and 
making verifications by going back to the original sources of data to ensure that the 
meanings and conclusions drawn do not conflict with the data. I verified the 
meanings and findings through reference to the recordings and notes I took during 
the interviews and preceding stages of the analysis. This was then followed by the 
write-up of the chapters.  
This stage was supported by a library research at Durham University, where in 
September 2016, I was awarded the inaugural Sudan Archive Visiting Library 
Fellowship,7 for Easter, 2017. I engaged with archival resources on traditional and 
local institutions and mechanisms dating back to pre-colonial and colonial times. The 
additional research time was very fruitful as it helped in writing and in evidence 
collection. It provided me with an understanding of how cultural and historical 
resources can inform contemporary peacemaking and peacebuilding to address the 
dynamics of locally and culturally embedded sources of conflict. 
1.10 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics approval was given on December 18, 2015. 
Obtaining informed consent 
Upon my arrival in the field, and having contacted my gatekeepers I started the 
process of obtaining informed consent from potential participants to ensure their 
voluntary involvement. I carried printed copies of the consent forms to offices and 
individuals I visited and I made sure I had obtained their consent prior to any 
interviews. The details in the form included; the aims and objectives of the research, 
                                                     
7 The Sudan Archive Library Fellowship is a two-month residential programme, meant for Doctoral students 
studying Sudan and South Sudan or the wider East African region whose research would be supported by the 
study of materials held in the Archive at Durham University. More information on The Sudan Archive at 
Durham is found here;  https://www.dur.ac.uk/library/asc/sudan/  
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the role of participants, the length of the interview (45-60 minutes), the duration of 
their participation in the study, the use of the study results and their freedom to 
withdraw from the study at any time within the process, with or without the 
information provided (Appendix 2, page 283). I made sure the consent form was well 
understood before a participant signed it. However, not all participants gave formal 
informed consent. Some, particularly those from local communities, simply gave 
verbal consent after they have understood what was required of them.  
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
To ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of those involved, I informed them about 
the measures I had put in place which included: no disclosure of names and the 
avoidance of the use of language and descriptions which might reveal a participant’s 
identity, both in reports and publications. I also notified them that all documents 
would have names and identifiers securely in my possession and no one would have 
access to them. I offered and applied complete anonymity to all the participants, as 
required by the politics and security of the study context. However, none of the 
participants made such a request. I used coded numbers or letters to identify the 
person concerned. This meant keeping all information anonymous even during its 
analysis, reporting and dissemination.  
Personal data were saved in a memory stick during the field work and at the 
University. The folder was securely stored in my laptop and University drive and was 
kept under lock and key. This information will only be destroyed after the completion 
of the study, as per the duration provided for in the University of Bradford data 
storage policy. 
Personal and participants’ safety 
I was aware of the political and security sensitivities of my research and of the 
potential problems regarding personal safety that it could raise. Upon arrival in Juba, 
and before embarking on the interviews, I sought an update on the security situation 
on the ground and learned that circumstances had deteriorated and had gone from 
bad to worse following the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013. I confined my 
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movements only to places where safety was assured. Though I was an insider 
researcher, I decided that putting safety measures in place was vital to avoid any 
suspicion or unpredictable situations. All interviews were conducted during working 
hours except for those that had sure security guarantees and were in safe locations. 
I did not disclose to anyone my personal contacts and residential address.  To 
ensure my participants’ safety, I made advanced arrangements for interviews and 
let them choose their preferred location and time. I avoided public and busy places. 
The government, international and NGOs, official interviews were conducted in 
offices and, in a few cases, in hotels and restaurants. For local communities, most 
interviews were carried out in a Church compound or under a tree. 
The anticipated potential psychological risks and harm to participants included 
anxiety and the reawakening of traumatic experiences because of participating in 
the study, which involved talking about issues of human rights abuses and atrocities 
suffered. Though none of such incidence happened, I had planned to minimize them 
by organizing some counselling support. All this was done to ensure that a “no harm 
principle” was adhered to protect the participants from any hurt that might result or 
spring from the study, and that if any did occur, the risk would be minimal. 
1.11 Reflexivity   
The researcher’s self-awareness about how his/her social identity and background 
influences the research process is referred to as reflexivity (Robson 2011: 22). Moss 
(1995) cited in (Rose 1997: 309), refers to reflexivity as those introspective aspects 
of thought that are self-critical and self-consciously analytical and these include the 
researcher’s reflection as to how his/her research will be reasonably objective and 
accepted by the scientific community. Reflexivity is critical to the conduct of field 
work because a more reflexive and flexible approach allows the researcher to be 
more open to any challenges to the theoretical positions and assumptions that 
fieldwork gives rise to.  
While familiarity with the context of my research was an advantage in terms of 
making initial contacts, and planning my approach to the field, I had to know that 
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conducting research in a familiar environment required a prominent level of 
consciousness, humility, flexibility and openness. It is obvious that my motivation in 
this research as described above relates to certain facets of my identity such as 
being a South Sudanese, a Catholic priest, a peacebuilding practitioner, and a 
member of a minority ethnic group in the country. I was aware that these dimensions 
of my identity as a researcher could bring into play during fieldwork, not only inside 
and outside factors but also some of my values, assumptions and biases.  
My identity characteristics and positionality could have reflected some power 
relations during interviews. Madge (1993) cited in (Rose 1997: 308) argues that 
when situating knowledge, it is crucial to consider ‘the role of the multiple “self”, how 
a researcher’s positionality (in terms of race, nationality, age, gender, social status, 
sexuality) may influence the “data” collected and thus the information that becomes 
coded as “knowledge”. The challenge was real in my case as some participants 
tended to see me more as a priest and not a researcher, particularly in those 
research locations where I was asked out of necessity by some priests to preside 
over or to concelebrate during Sunday masses. I appreciated the challenge but 
made sure it did not influence my conduct when interacting with research 
participants. I always tried to present myself to my participants as a PhD research 
student and not a minister of the church at that point. It was of course difficult for 
some of them to see the difference; and that resonates with the view of Fraser et al. 
(1992) cited in (Giampapa 2011: 133) who argue that researchers bring their 
biographies and subjectivities to every stage of the research process and these 
influence the questions they ask and the ways in which they try to find answers. 
However, they further stressed that as researchers cannot help being socially 
located persons, their subjectivities should not be regrettable, but as one element in 
the human interactions that comprise our object of study.  
I entered the field well equipped with research skills gained from Graduate School 
training and discussions with my supervisors, and from my engagement with 
appropriate theoretical and methodological literature and knowledge to 
conceptualize what being in the field means about ensuring ethical and rigorous 
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research. Besides, I also engaged with different bodies of literature on South Sudan 
conflicts and politics, peacebuilding approaches and Dinka and Nuer justice and 
reconciliation mechanisms. However, I was conscious that interviewing is an 
interactive process and so tried to avoid pre-empting answers and giving the 
impression that I already knew some of the things they were telling me. I always tried 
to portray myself as an interested learner. 
Despite my preparation for field work and continuous personal reflection however, 
there were still challenges due to unexpected circumstances, which I had to 
negotiate and deal with. For example, some participants invariably saw me as a 
South Sudanese and not as a researcher during interviews and they sometimes 
side-tracked and wanted to talk local politics with me and some kept saying, as they 
provided answers to my questions: “Of course, you know this as a South Sudanese”. 
The problems which confronted me during my fieldwork were not only about 
appreciating the participants’ behaviours, language and their perception of me, but 
also about understanding my own identities and background and their influence on 
interpreting the meaning my participants assigned to the interview data. Giampapa 
(2011: 132) for example, notes that being in the field entails a great many complex 
issues in terms of the researcher-participant relationship across space and time. 
1.12 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters; 
Chapter one; is the introduction to the thesis as presented and discussed above.  
In Chapter Two, I discuss both the theoretical and conceptual framework for 
analysis. I critique the liberal peace theory and the extent of its influence on 
international peacebuilding approaches and debates. The analysis of the theory 
sheds additional light on the reason that alternative or complementary methods such 
as indigenous mechanisms are continuously relegated in favour of the Western 
liberal peace approach. I also discuss the concept of Ubuntu (the African philosophy 
of peace); and indigenous approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction. I then conceptualize peacebuilding as a method of conflict resolution, 
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tracing the origin of the concept to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of 
contemporary armed conflicts in the 1990s; and transitional (post-conflict) justice and 
reconciliation.  
Chapter Three; sets out the historical perspective and political context of the South 
Sudan conflict; tracing it to the different colonial periods and policies up to the 
independence of Sudan in 1956; and the policies and ideology that characterized 
the post-colonial and post-independence governance in Sudan. I explain how the 
Sudan administration, which aimed to build the nation based on Arab culture and 
Islamic ideology, led to two North-South civil wars which raged for about five 
decades with the brief interlude of the Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1972, and 
subsequently the CPA signed in 2005 which ushered in the independent state of 
South Sudan in 2011 through a referendum vote; followed by a quick relapse in 2013 
to another civil war.  
The Chapter then analyses the peace agreements that attempted to settle the 
persistent violent conflict in Southern Sudan as the territory of Sudan, with South 
Sudan as an independent state. I discuss the strategies employed during the CPA, 
which not only marginalized indigenous and traditional mechanisms in the process, 
but also failed to include any transitional justice component in the agreement. I 
examine the role of the international community including the UN, the international 
agencies and NGOs; regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and IGAD and 
the role of state and non-state actors.  I also discuss the causes of the conflict, which 
continues to rage despite signing of the ARCSS in August 2015, to decipher the role 
of indigenous schemes in the agreement. The conflict analysis shows that the 
current South Sudan struggle is intricately linked to the colonial and post-colonial 
history of Sudan and the failures of the CPA to address the underlying root causes 
of the dispute and to deal with the legacy of the war.   
Chapter Four; is an empirical (case study) chapter. In this chapter I try to explore 
and understand local institutions, actors and methods of peacemaking across South 
Sudan in a comparative perspective to other African countries. To appreciate the 
changes which may have taken place and figure out their potential role in modern 
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conflict, I sift through the literature and responses from key informants, the practices 
from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods to the present.  
Chapter Five is a further empirical (case study) chapter. Here, I explore the concept 
of justice and reconciliation and the meaning they carry among the Dinka and the 
Nuer. I examine justice and reconciliation practices and local restitution to ensure 
accountability, reintegration and reconciliation between and amongst communities 
after violent conflict. I discuss the role of traditional leadership (chiefs and councils 
of elders) in mediation, adjudication, restitution and restoration. I also look at 
examples of justice and reconciliation that have been implemented at different points 
in the past (the colonial period, 1930s, Sudan’s post-independence period (1956-
1982) and during the SPLM/A war (1983-2005) by Dinka and Nuer communities to 
find out the outcomes of the implemented programmes. I investigate what has been 
happening lately in terms of justice and reconciliation from 2005-2015 after the 
signing of the CPA and ARCSS. I also critique local initiatives while outlining areas 
that could inform and benefit contemporary peace processes. 
Chapter Six; is an analysis chapter where I discuss and assess the potential roles 
and limits of indigenous institutions and approaches with a view to establishing a 
common ground by blending the indigenous and international justice strategies for 
possible application in the resolution of contemporary armed engagements. I 
examine the extent to which Dinka and Nuer justice and reconciliation mechanisms 
can be applied to transitional justice. It is a synthesis of topics discussed in this study, 
ranging from theories and the historical context, to the case study and empirical 
evidence. 
Chapter seven; concludes the thesis. I provide a thesis summary, core arguments 
and synthesis, drawing together the general findings, practical and wider 
implications and referring to the main research question to see the extent to which it 
has been answered. 
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Chapter Two 
Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses key concepts that constitute a framework for the study which 
explores the potential of local approaches to the resolution of contemporary armed 
conflicts; their relevance and application to transitional justice and reconciliation in 
the aftermath of violent conflicts and attempts to situate local initiatives in the broader 
issue of peacebuilding discourse and debates. The chapter critiques the liberal 
peace theory upon which the international peacebuilding model is grounded; it sets 
out and analyses the African philosophy of peace-Ubuntu, and conceptualizes 
peacebuilding, justice and reconciliation as methods of conflict resolution. It argues 
that understanding the different conceptual perspectives sheds light on the extent to 
which the potential and limitations of local peacemaking strategies can be 
ascertained and whether they can be applied to modern disputes to build sustainable 
peace.  
The chapter comprises four sections: firstly, a critique of liberal peace theory and an 
exploration of African philosophy of peace; secondly, the concept of conflict and the 
emergence of the contemporary armed conflicts at the end of the Cold War; and the 
concept of peacebuilding. In engaging with the concept of post-conflict 
peacebuilding, this section will discuss the notion of local strategies, together with 
their potential and limits; and the concept of hybridity, which provides an interface 
and relationships between liberal and local approaches; third, the chapter will 
conceptualize human rights from universalist and  cultural relativist perspectives in 
relation to international treaties, conventions and laws; and fourthly and finally, the 
chapter will turn to conceptualize justice and reconciliation, as components of post-
conflict peacebuilding, under different transitional justice mechanisms: prosecutions 
(retributive justice), truth commissions (non-judicial bodies), local mechanisms 
(restorative justice), and the concept of reconciliation. 
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2.1 Theorizing a Liberal and an African Philosophy of Peace 
A critique of liberal peace as the dominant peacebuilding approach and of African 
philosophy of peace forms the theoretical foundation of this chapter and the entire 
thesis.  
The Western liberal peace approach 
The international (Western) approach to peacebuilding is grounded on the liberal 
peace thesis, which views a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy 
as the most effective and lasting antidote to violent political conflict (Boutros-Ghali 
1992; Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 172). The rationale for the assumption of this 
model is that violent conflict has multiple causes that are rooted in the political, 
economic and social structures of society and any attempts to resolve such 
disagreement must deal with these structural problems. Since these kinds of conflict 
are somewhat generic, a universal peacebuilding approach or template can be 
applied across all cases (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 172).The model focuses on 
building state and state institutions to build peace. As such, emphasis is put on 
building a liberal state in war-torn societies that would promote liberal values such 
as, the protection of individual rights, the rule of law, a free market economy, and 
democracy (Tom 2011: 94). This approach manifests itself through political and 
economic liberalization.  
Paris (2004) observes that since the end of the Cold War, international peacebuilding 
interventions, which are based on the liberal peace agenda, have been the main 
strategy of the international community, and promoted by the UN and donor 
agencies, to resolve armed conflicts, prevent relapse into further war and violence, 
build state institutions and create sustainable peace and development in conflict-
prone and post-war societies across the world. But he maintains that the application 
of a universal peacebuilding template across all cases is problematic since the 
current international approach is grounded on the Western liberal theory, a technique 
which at times may not be applicable or suitable to certain non-western scenarios 
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(Paris 2004: 42). The biggest weakness is its failure to recognize the existence of 
other approaches and local agency in the war-affected environments. 
Liberal peacebuilding and peacebuilding are therefore, not the same though 
sometimes the two concepts have been used interchangeably. Whereas the 
dominant liberal peacebuilding places emphasis on creating a liberal state, 
democratization, a free market economy, individual rights and the rule of law, 
peacebuilding emphasizes issues such as social justice, welfare provision, tradition, 
custom, culture, the grassroots, reconciliation, equity, humanistic agendas for peace 
rather than technocratic institutional state-centric agendas for peace (Tom 2011: 94). 
This means that proponents of liberal peace including leading states, such as the 
US and UK, promote not only a peacebuilding practice across the world but also an 
ideology; and as will be discussed under the critique of the approach, this apparently 
explains their consistent reluctance to recognize other societal institutions, 
resources and practices that, in their view, do not reflect the liberal systems, 
arrangements and values they promote.  
As such, liberal peacebuilding in this case, represents minimalist approaches that 
put emphasis on ending overt violence, and peacebuilding represents the maximalist 
approaches that aim at addressing root causes of conflict and structural violence 
such as social injustice and poverty (Newman 2009). The standard success, 
according to Call (2008: 6-7), is to strike a middle ground that includes ending overt 
violence and ensuring no recurrence of warfare as well as using sustained national 
mechanisms for the resolution of conflict, signified by participatory politics; where 
participatory politics does not equate to liberal democracy, but refers to mechanisms 
used by aggrieved social groups to feel that they have a voice and stake in the 
national political system. Bringing about an understanding of this is kind is the goal 
of this study. 
2.1.1 Critique of Liberal Peace Theory 
As a conceptual framework for peacebuilding and maintenance of global order, 
liberal peace programmes have been criticized by many scholars, researchers and 
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practitioners. Critiques have focused on a wide range of controversies, such as the 
impact and legitimacy of promoting liberal democracy and market economics in 
conflict prone-societies, the nature of the state and state-building in many regions of 
the developing world, and the broader question about power, the threat to peace and 
security, and intervention in international politics (Newman 2009: 26).  I will mainly 
focus on the contentious points that are closely related to my research topic: 
transitional justice and reconciliation. 
Liberal peacebuilding focuses on state-building to build peace. But it also has non-
state elements, usually the promotion of civil society, yet a Western understanding 
of civil society (Orvis 2001). Critics view the state-building aspect of peacebuilding 
as a “thinly disguised attempt to modernize and thus, civilize dysfunctional third world 
countries that are incapable of developing viable indigenous forms of cohesion” 
(Newman 2009: 30). Moreover, peacebuilding is more focused on what peace 
means qualitatively, and it does not have to be necessarily connected to the state. It 
is through liberal peacebuilding which has emphasized building liberal states that 
peacebuilding has been connected to the state. In this sense, contemporary state-
building in post-conflict societies is a positivist instrumentalist Western Westphalian 
project which argues for the need to build a state to build peace. It is not, therefore, 
surprising that state-building is fraught with tensions and contradictions (Paris and 
Sisk, 2009). 
Referring to democratic peace, proponents argue that certain kinds of liberally 
constituted societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and 
in their international relations, than illiberal states. This argument is premised upon 
the idea that democracy and a free market economy encourage people to resolve 
and express their differences peacefully and that this is the best foundation for 
development and accountable governance (Newman 2009: 39). This argument 
asserts that consolidated democracies do not go to war with each other because 
democracies have institutional constraints upon leaders that make initiating conflict 
with other countries more difficult; and that, because such countries are 
interdependent economically, going to war may disrupt economic and trade relations 
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(Newman et al. 2009: 11). This view however, ignores the fact that though 
democracies do not go to war with each other, they go to war with ‘non-democratic’ 
countries. In their efforts to ‘democratize’ those societies they have often been 
violent themselves (Newman et al. 2009: 11). Such has been the case, for example, 
in military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya (Mac Ginty 2008b). 
Furthermore, state building to build peace has been challenged by some critics, as 
early demands for democratic elections can exacerbate conflict in divided societies; 
economic liberalization and capitalism could marginalize the poor and create new 
grievances; opening up to the influence of globalization could also make states more 
fragile (Paris 2004); and in this way liberal economics and democracy can contribute 
to instability and exacerbate conflict (Newman 2009: 39). In South Sudan for 
example, the 2010 general elections earlier noted, intended to provide political 
legitimacy for the two parties to the 2005 Sudan CPA; the NCP and SPLM, resulted 
in several rebellions. Other war-shattered countries have had similar experiences 
where elections and structural adjustment programmes (SAP), designed for 
democratic and economic development and stability, have apparently hindered the 
consolidation of peace, and in some cases even sparked renewed violent conflicts. 
Political liberalization in Angola, through hurried elections in 1992 after several years 
of political turmoil, contributed to the resurgence of violence; and in Mozambique the 
effects of economic liberalization through SAP conditions imposed by international 
financial institutions (IFIs) after the 1992 peace agreement, have threatened to 
reignite the conflict (Paris 2004). This means that the very process of political and 
economic liberalization of the liberal peace agenda has generated destabilizing side 
effects. A significant amount of research suggests that transitional societies moving 
towards democracy may be more likely to experience civil conflict, especially in poor 
and divided societies (Newman 2009: 39). Subjecting such societies to political and 
electoral competitions at an early transitional stage provides recipes for war. 
The assumption that informs liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts has 
ostensibly led to the viewing of peacebuilding as state building. The question, 
however, is whose vision of the state is being used by those engaged in international 
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peacebuilding?  According to Newman (2009: 30), such institutions always resemble 
the Western secular notion of the state, based upon liberal values not something 
that is unquestionably accepted in all contexts as legitimate or appropriate. Critics 
argue that the liberal peace formula for peacebuilding reflects an extension of the 
Western hegemonic powers over developing nations. The ICC, for example, is seen 
as one of the hegemonic agendas to ‘civilize’ conflict societies within the transitional 
justice framework that puts emphasis on the rule of law (Sriram 2009). Similarly, 
Jackson (2009: 320) holds the view that the ICC is an expression of liberal views of 
universal human rights that seek to protect the individual from justice that is the 
preserve of the state.  
This expression of human rights is at the very core of liberal peace theories of post- 
conflict reconstruction. Such externalized endeavours could signal the importation 
of governance values that may not be compatible with the local context. Post-conflict 
peacebuilding within the framework of liberal peace is therefore, not neutral; it 
reflects ideological values and serves the interests, values and priorities usually of 
the interveners and not those of the victims (Newman 2009: 38). Perhaps this 
explains the reasons why liberal peacebuilding interventions have generally 
encountered disappointing results despite the huge resources invested in the efforts.  
Specifically, the international instruments of justice, such as the ICC and ad hoc 
tribunals modelled on liberal peace practices, do not take into consideration local 
attitudes to peace, making the affected communities passive recipients. Moreover, 
apart from its exorbitant costs in terms of resources, and time, these interventions 
are often short-term solutions to more complex problems. To address the root 
causes of disagreement and develop mechanisms of conflict management and 
accountability in governance, one would have to make long-term commitments. 
If these are the key weaknesses of liberal peace proposals for post-conflict 
peacebuilding, what are the alternatives? Despite Paris’ critical stance regarding 
democratization and marketization as the panacea for long-term peace, security and 
development in war-torn and post-conflict societies, he controversially maintains that 
he does not see any viable alternative to liberal peacebuilding; and insists that 
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despite their many flaws liberal peacebuilding interventions have done more good 
than harm (Paris, 2010). The claim that there is no alternative to liberal peacebuilding 
is (misleadingly) one reason it is being promoted by the international community as 
a universal paradigm or blueprint to put back together collapsed states and rebuild 
war-ravaged societies. It appears that this is the most problematic assumption of the 
liberal peace model which often neglects the role of the conflict affected societies, 
their programmes, cultures, values, experiences and political contexts which are 
required for local participation, ownership and sustainability. For example, 
transitional justice mechanisms applied in Africa are often international justice 
instruments such as the ICC or Ad hoc tribunals that mainly focus on the retributive 
justice dimension to address the issue of impunity instead of restorative justice 
mechanisms that are relevant to reconcile bitterly divided communities.  According 
to Boege (2011: 433), local approaches have been in use and relied upon in many 
countries in the global South and particularly in Africa since pre-colonial times. That 
they have been in use for so long, though constantly changing, may be their strength.  
Murithi (2008: 16) notes that what can be learned from local approaches is the 
emphasis and value they place on achieving peace through forgiveness, healing, 
reconciliation and restorative justice. This has been the missing element in most 
internationally brokered peace agreements; South Sudan is a case in point, where 
issues of justice, accountability, redress of past grievances and reconciliation were 
marginally dealt with in the CPA (Waihenya 2006: 158). Similarly, Gawerc (2006: 
437) argues that one of the greatest shortcomings of contemporary peace processes 
is that they often fail to address the bitterness among war-affected communities and 
the sources that generate it. Consistent with this position, Mac Ginty (2008a: 141) 
proposes that the recurrent criticism of liberal peacebuilding has been its over-
emphasis on state and institutions building to the neglect of the emotional or people-
focused dimension to conflict, such as inter-group perception, trust-building and 
reconciliation. Moreover, the main issue with international mechanisms such as the 
ICC, is the overemphasis on the retributive aspect of justice as opposed to other 
non-judicial mechanisms. 
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Boege (2011: 433) emphasizes that traditional and local approaches, have 
relevance and potential within the hybridity of large-scale violent conflicts and hybrid 
political orders in many fragile states and environments in the global South, where 
many of the contemporary conflicts can no longer simply be perceived as 
conventional wars, inter-state or civil wars to overthrow the state government, but 
are characterized by an entanglement of a host of actors, issues and motives. He 
stresses that a new dimension is added to the ‘new war’ thesis by the involvement 
of non-state actors and institutions, where traditional social entities such as extended 
families, lineages, clans, ethnicities, religious and ethno-linguistic groups become 
parties to the violent clashes, introducing their own agendas into the overall conflict 
setting; these provide the space for traditional attempts at conflict transformation, 
while making it possible and necessary to utilize them. It can then be argued that by 
claiming that there is no alternative to the liberal peace procedure while relegating 
local approaches to peacebuilding in the aftermath of violent conflict, the liberal 
peace and liberal peacebuilding strategies ignore vital local resources, institutions 
and roles that could subsequently undermine the entire effort. Some examples of 
ICC, ad hoc tribunals and TRC in Africa speak to this point.  
Evidence indicates that the ICC’s intervention in Northern Uganda and the indictment 
of five LRA Principals including their leader Joseph Kony despite the passing of 
Amnesty Act in 2000, precluded the possibility of success at the Juba peace talks, 
and assured that agreement between the Government of Uganda and the LRA could 
not be reached (Higgs, 2016). In Rwanda where there was a mix of justice systems; 
international, national and local to address the post-genocide situation, the 
relationship was characterized by suspicion and friction rather than by productive 
cooperation. In Sierra Leone, tensions between the Special Court and TRC branded 
their work, as the TRC’s restorative approach is at odds with Western preferences 
for justice through prosecutions favoured by international community (Graybill 2017: 
45), though the TRC itself was seen by the rural Sierra Leoneans as a foreign 
institution. Despite this tension however, the two transitional justice bodies have 
complemented each other. Having spent only a week in each of the country’s12 
provincial headquarters, mainly due to financial constraints, the Sierra Leone’s TRC 
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left large areas of the country uncovered (Alie 2008: 130). This gap would be filled 
by Fambul Tok, a traditional reconciliation process that continued operating beyond 
the TRC’s life. This is where the recognition and incorporation of local approaches 
in intervention policies is significant for ensuring ownership and sustainability.  
2.2 African Philosophy of Peace: The Ubuntu Principle 
Whereas liberalism is the Western philosophy of peace, its African counterpart is 
centred on common humanity which views life and the world in terms of community, 
as opposed to individualism. Despite the diversity in Africa in terms of socio-cultural, 
economic and political organizations, one common worldview underpins African 
societies, the concept of shared humanity. This concept is referred to as ‘Ubuntu’ in 
the Bantu root (Zulu) language of Southern Africa (Nabudere 2004: 10). The concept 
of Ubuntu has been part of the African cultural worldview for a substantial period. 
One respondent stated, “it is very difficult to trace the exact beginning of the concept. 
However, through quite many historical and cultural studies, it is traced way back to 
the time of Bantu civilizations: those that used to live in central, east and Southern 
Africa” (KI 42: 2/12/16).8 
As an African notion, Ubuntu is about the essence of being human; expressed in the 
Zulu maxim: “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”, which literally means “a person is a 
person through other persons” (Nabudere 2004: 10). Tutu (1999: 34) speaks of 
Ubuntu as “humanness” and as the philosophy of a shared humanity in which we 
define ourselves through our relations with other people: “my humanity is caught up, 
is inextricably bound up in yours; I am human because I belong, I participate, I share; 
what dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me”. The key concept describes 
how people and individuals belonging to the Nguni ethnic groups in the largely Bantu 
Southern African region, view each other or share their perspective of the world, 
which is, that “human beings are human beings through other human beings and 
                                                     
8 Interview 42, with Tim Murithi: (2/12/2016) 
 45 
12018735 
people are people through other people” (KI 42: 2/12/16),9 ; this creates a sense of 
interconnectedness from which one derives certain practices of humane 
engagement, not only at a social level but also in terms of how goods are distributed 
within society, and at the political level, how problems are solved and decisions are 
made.  
This concept has been defined by several scholars: According to Murithi (2006), 
Ubuntu is an African cultural world view; Archbishop Tutu in his book No Future 
Without Forgiveness (1999: 34) summarizes the characterization of Ubuntu by 
saying that; 
“A person who possesses the Ubuntu attitude is the one who is noted as 
being hospitable, generous, friendly, compassionate and caring towards his 
fellow human beings. Ubuntu not only embraces hospitality and caring 
about others but also a willingness to go that extra mile for the sake of 
others. It involves an individual being individual in community and belonging 
within that social, moral and political framework; and since the focus is on 
community and common humanity, the solitary individual is a contradiction 
of this concept”.  
Based on this emphasis on community and peaceful coexistence, Ubuntu does 
provide a framework and philosophical basis for reconciliation in the aftermath of 
violent conflict (Nabudere 2004: 10). As one informant explained, “I believe Ubuntu 
has a lot of resources that it can provide for our efforts to promote peacebuilding and 
reconciliation in Africa” (KI 42: 2/12/16).10 For example, through an inclusive 
community-wide conflict resolution and reconciliation forum, a council of elders or 
the king himself mediates using this notion of Ubuntu to highlight the importance of 
peacemaking through the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of shared 
humanity between peoples (Arthur et al. 2015: 71). In Ubuntu societies, the entire 
                                                     
9 Interview 42, with Tim Murithi: (2/12/2016) 
10 Interview 42, with Tim Murithi: (2/12/2016) 
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society is typically involved at various levels at trying to reach a solution to a problem 
which is viewed as threatening the social cohesion of the community. This means 
Ubuntu approaches emphasize a link between conflict resolution and reconciliation, 
rather than viewing them as separate phases (Murithi 2008: 27). The act of 
reconciliation symbolizes the willingness of the parties to move beyond the 
psychological bitterness that had prevailed during the conflict situation. The principle 
of Ubuntu implies that we create a healthy relationship based on the recognition of 
human interconnectedness where everyone is linked to everyone else.  
The Ubuntu world view, promotes an element of restorative justice, as opposed to 
prosecution or punishment as a form of retributive justice (Villa-Vicencio 2009: 124). 
Restorative justice is at the centre of the Ubuntu principle. It is more concerned about 
the restoration of the victim and the victimized community than about the increasing 
costly punishment of the offender. It directly holds offenders accountable to the 
person or community they have victimized. It encourages the entire community to be 
involved in holding the offender accountable and promoting a healing response to 
the needs of victims and offenders. It places emphasis on getting offenders to accept 
responsibility for their behaviour and make amendments, whenever possible, rather 
than on the severity of punishment (Freeman and Hayner 2003: 111). This means it 
recognizes a community’s responsibility for the social conditions that contribute to 
the offender’s behaviour. Villa-Vicencio (2004: 36) observes that the aim of 
restorative justice is to contribute to the rebuilding of society by seeking to address 
the personal and communal dimensions that create the possibility of rebuilding life 
in the wake of tragedy and destruction. These include the re-empowerment and 
restoration of the dignity of victims and survivors, the restoration of civil trust and the 
affirmation of the right to such basics as food, housing, health-care and education. 
2.2.1 A critique of Ubuntu 
The concept of Ubuntu is critiqued from political and historical perspectives. After 
recognizing that the Ubuntu concept has deep roots in African culture, one can raise 
certain doubts. If that is so, why does a nation like Rwanda, knowing what Ubuntu 
means, allow genocide to occur? Why are there numerous clashes and civil wars 
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happening in Africa where a supposedly Ubuntu understanding is rooted? Why is 
there rampant corruption leading to under-development and lack of services, and 
why do Africans seem to be failing to peacefully resolve their problems based on the 
Ubuntu principle? Are common humanity and interconnectedness the preserves of 
Africa? Unless these questions, among others, find convincing answers, there is a 
danger in trying to romanticize Ubuntu as a concept. I now turn to engage with these 
questions and debate them by examining the weaknesses and strengths of the 
Ubuntu concept and practices. 
Some critics question the continental character of Ubuntu philosophy because at 
best, it is a Bantu philosophy not related to the way of life of and outlook of other 
ethnic groupings of Africa. The question is, to what extent is Ubuntu a cross-cutting 
philosophy in the African continent? Based on my encounters and conversations 
with people from various parts of the continent, and having engaged with the relevant 
literature on the Ubuntu concept and practice, I would contend that it is, indeed, a 
cross-cutting philosophy in Africa. One can find variations of it in central Africa, west 
Africa and eastern Africa. For example, Murithi (2008) maintains that among some 
ethnic groups in Kenya, there is the notion of Utu which speaks to this notion of 
Ubuntu, of collective coexistence and the need for Africans to recognize their 
interconnectedness and what binds them.  
Ubuntu is therefore, not unique to the Bantu in Southern Africa, and not exclusively 
a Bantu philosophy. Though more developed in South Africa, there is synergy 
between the Ubuntu concept and traditional values in other African countries. It is 
about the importance of human social cohesion and mutual fulfilment (Villa-Vicencio 
2009: 14). According to Nabudere (2004: 11), many scholars confirmed that Ubuntu 
is part of the world view of Africans in most parts of the continent, stretching from 
the Nubian Desert in the Sudan to the Cape of Good Hope and from Senegal to 
Zanzibar. Murith (2008: 26) also states that Ubuntu is a cross-cutting philosophy of 
peace in Africa as the approach is utilized in many societies and communities that 
are spread out across Southern, Central and East Africa. However, while the 
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essence of this philosophy is the same across the continent, every African society 
has its descriptive term and ways to practice this philosophy. 
But Ubuntu is not unique to Africa either; Murithi (2008) argues that it is found in 
some religious texts such as Abrahamic heritage and other global philosophical 
works. This is especially legitimate if the concept is to be understood in its definition 
as the essence of being human: Because Ubuntu forms the basis of the African 
philosophy of being in which; ubu evokes the idea of “being in general”, and ntu 
denotes “being human”; the words suggests the wholeness and oneness of all life, 
the location and individual humanness within the larger whole (Nabudere 2004: 11). 
What is unique however, is that it is an African conceptualization which enables 
Africans to ground a certain way of seeing the world and of being in the world from 
an African indigenous perspective.  
Ubuntu is not obviously the absolute answer to understanding the life of a human 
being, but it has the potential to make a significant contribution to building and 
promoting the culture of peace. There is significant potential in terms of application 
and for utilization to promote peace in the continent. It has underpinned attempts to 
settle disputes and conflicts at different levels on the continent, and is central to the 
idea of community and political reconciliation (Villa-Vicencio 2009). The African 
Union for example, as a continental organization has occasionally made references 
to Ubuntu principles and approaches to dealing with some of the urgent challenges 
that Africa faces as a continental society. One respondent asserted;  
“if you draw from the principles and practices of Ubuntu you can delineate 
some specific practical dimensions that could be utilized in dealing with 
contemporary African conflicts and indeed make a possible contribution to 
global peace efforts; for example, from Ubuntu, you can derive certain 
principles of how political dialogue can be run in an inclusive manner based 
on that notion of interconnectedness; from Ubuntu, you can get a sense of 
what an Ubuntu economy might look like, in terms of a much more 
distributive agenda of state resources or resources of the community to 
ensure that all members of any political and social community receive what 
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is necessary to sustain themselves and their families” (KI: 42:2/12/16).11 
This as well resonates with the position of Kelshell (2008). 
In this context, Nabudere (2004: 10) suggests that the rejuvenation of the philosophy 
of Ubuntu is important, both for its contribution to political reconciliation and for the 
ways in which it provides Africans with a sense of self-identity, self-respect and a 
basis for social reconstruction. It enables Africans to deal with conflict in a positive 
manner by drawing on the humanistic value handed down to them through their 
history. Politically and philosophically, Africans can make a unique contribution of 
these values to the quest for peaceful coexistence in the world.  
It does not, of course, follow that all Africans propagate, practice or are consciously 
aware of the philosophy any more than any other influential and dominant philosophy 
of life, such as liberalism, practised and propagated globally. Nabudere (2004: 11) 
argues that some who are aware of it dismiss it as a post-colonial utopian invention 
of African political elites in the age of globalization. While such a critique may raise 
some doubts regarding the concept and principles of Ubuntu, it is important to 
remember that the main liberal peacebuilding school of thought, has been quite 
dominant to the extent that even though it has a European and north American origin, 
many Africans have internalized it as their way of perceiving their strategy of dealing 
with peacebuilding which ultimately undermines African efforts to sustain, entrench 
and plant the roots of peace deep in their continent. Furthermore, Boege (2011: 434) 
argues that, while Western thinking about politics in general and conflict 
transformation in particular presents a very specific and narrow perspective, yet it is 
conventionally taken for granted and has become so overwhelmingly predominant 
in today’s world that it appears as the universal model, where other thinking 
perceived as “the other” of, or different from the Western approach.  
Although it might be true that Ubuntu is a post-colonial construction, so is the 
dominant liberal framework of peacebuilding. I would therefore, argue that the 
                                                     
11 Interview 42, with Tim Murithi: (2/12/16) 
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concepts must stand in parallel and operate in complementarity. This means it is 
important to analyse at a theoretical level this notion of Ubuntu, examine its essence 
and then promote it to frame processes of peacebuilding. Such a move can also 
provide some indications of the types of mechanisms and institutions needed to 
advance peacebuilding in Africa. One of the recurring critiques of indigenous 
approaches to peacemaking based on the Ubuntu principles is gender bias, such as 
the missing voice of women in peace discourse and the relegation of their role and 
agency to the background in peace efforts. This will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
Given the radical nature of Western cultural influence on African states and societies, 
many contemporary critics contest the relevance and place of traditional African 
initiatives such as the Ubuntu approach in the face of the complexity of modern social 
structures and the conflicts they generate in Africa. There are others who argue that 
traditional methods of dispute resolution should be confined to local communities, 
while the modern Western alternatives should be applied to the cities, formal sector 
institutions and state systems (Omeje 2008: 88). Such a categorical distinction 
seems both conceptually and empirically problematic because of the immense 
diversity and overlapping dynamics of the African heritage. Confining such 
mechanisms to local communities in the face of increasing hybrid large-scale violent 
conflict is to deny any potential and possible contributions such approaches may 
have for contemporary peace efforts.  
The impact of Western cultural influence on traditional African values and practices 
is real, but change is not confined to African tradition, as any socially constructed 
realities, such as Western culture itself, is not static. Furthermore, if considered 
relevant, the application of local resources to modern conflict may have an impact 
where liberal peacebuilding has failed. But the question is, will that still be African 
culture? It will certainly be a new cultural hybrid form; but culture is something that 
is changing and not indefinitely static. Even African states themselves are not local 
to Africa. They are cultural contructs that Africans have borrowed from a principle 
which was established by the peace of Westphalia in Europe 1648 ((Fischer 2012). 
The important thing is that Africans do have ideas and world views that they can put 
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on the table relating to their efforts to build and promote peace in their continent and 
the world. This means that what is practiced in Africa today could be a form of 
hybridity where two dimensions of conflict resolution procedures are used 
complementarily; that is, the Western model and the African.  
The usage of the Ubuntu principles has also been critiqued in the context of the 
South African TRC. While the application of the principles of Ubuntu to the South 
African TRC purportedly helped the peace process to work by promoting peace and 
reconciliation after the several years of apartheid regime, it was far from perfect. One 
of the criticisms of the TRC process was that forgiveness, as part of reconciliation, 
was involuntary. My informal conversations with several South Africans revealed that 
reconciliation in South Africa has been politicized and is not organic, because people 
were not allowed to decide on the path. One of them said that forgiveness was 
presented as a moral obligation and responsibility as encouraged by commissioners 
(KI 41:17/11/16).12. The question is thus, who benefits from this concept of 
forgiveness? Certainly, it benefited the perpetrators of the apartheid violations. This 
means that reconciliation was not in the interests of both parties as could lead to 
peaceful coexistence, as claimed by the Ubuntu principle. 
Similarly, Gacaca system,13 a Rwandan traditional conflict resolution mechanism 
applied to deal with post genocide justice and reconciliation had many weaknesses; 
First, it was only identical by name to the old Gacaca due to a marked discontinuity, 
so that it was largely an invented tradition. Second, state intervention through legal 
                                                     
12 Interview 41, with a transitional justice specialist: 17/11/2016 
13 Gacaca court (in Kinyarwanda) means a system of community justice inspired by Rwandan tradition where 
Gacaca can be translated as “justice on the grass”. The modern Gacaca was reinvented to try those accused 
of involvement in the 1994 genocide. The courts were set up to speed up the prosecution of hundreds of 
thousands of genocide suspects awaiting trial. It worked alongside ICTR and Rwandan national courts. It 
finished its work in 2012. 
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and social engineering made it more of a state political tool than what it used to be 
(Ingelaere 2008: 32). 
Another objection to local approaches like Ubuntu is that a limited sphere of 
applicability restricts their national relevance. This is because they depend on the 
existence of community relationships and values to which they can refer and that 
provide the context for their operations. This means conflict within and between 
families, between neighbours, within and between villages or clans lend themselves 
rather easily to traditional approaches. It is difficult to tackle conflict that involves 
members of other communities that adhere to another law, be it another customary 
law or formal statutory law.  Bleiger and Brigg (Boege 2011: 443)  further add that 
conflict between neighbouring local communities poses relatively small problems as 
some overarching customary principles might be developed and applied that allow 
for the temporary creation of common ground, whereas conflicts between local 
communities and outside actors, for example, state authorities and multinational 
enterprises, pose much larger problems regarding the applicability of traditional 
initiatives. 
But it is important to note that conflict and culture are context-specific. The claim of 
universal relevance is the reason liberal peacebuilding is being criticized in the first 
place. While every situation is unique, lessons can be learnt from experiences of 
different societies and their peacemaking techniques. In South Sudan, empirical 
evidence exists where local justice measures have been applied beyond ethnic 
borders. Leonardi et al. (2010: 66), for example, observe that there has been no 
failure of local practices to address interethnic conflict despite fear of the post CPA 
demographic changes where many returning refugees prefer to settle in towns than 
in rural areas, producing more ethnically mixed areas. They argue that the local 
courts appear to be settling large numbers of cases between people of various ethnic 
groups without too much difficulty. 
There is also a critique of Ubuntu based on human rights such as gender insensitivity 
and certain practices that contradict human rights principles. For example, the 
peacemaking role is the preserve of older men. According to Alai (2012: 128), local 
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approaches as restorative justice face several challenges regarding the upholding 
of international standards. I will come back to this in Chapter Six.  
2.3 Conflict and peacemaking 
The term conflict has been defined in many ways by different scholars. Ramsbotham 
et al. (2011: 30), for example, define it as the pursuit of incompatible goals by two 
different groups, and emphasize its usage to apply to any political conflict, whether 
it is being pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. Armed conflict, on the 
other hand, is defined as a dispute where the parties on both sides resort to the use 
of force and where such disagreement can encompass a continuum of situations 
ranging from a military attack on a civilian by a single soldier to an all-out war with 
massive casualties (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 31). A typical example of armed 
conflict is the war raging in South Sudan since December 2013. 
Based on the above definition, conflict can be violent or non-violent. This is actual 
violence or structural violence. Actual violence includes behaviour such as killing, 
beating, torture, maiming and so on (Fisher et al. 2000: 9). Structural violence on the 
other hand is a condition where systems (national or international) discriminate, 
sometimes through policies between groups, communities and nations. In this case 
it may be difficult to draw a clear line between, for example killing with a gun and 
killing through deprivation of food and other essentials of life (Fisher et al. 2000: 9). 
Thus, violence consists of actions, words, attitudes, structures or systems that cause 
physical, psychological, social or environmental damage and/or prevent people from 
reaching their human potential (Fisher et al. 2000: 4). This means that to address 
the underlying root causes and effects of combat, a peacebuilding framework, such 
as that embedded in liberal peace theory, may have to focus not only on state 
institutions and socio-economic development, but also on the human and psycho-
social dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction.  
2.4 Contemporary armed conflict  
Conflict takes place either between states or within states but in recent decades, its 
nature has shifted away from inter-state to intra-state engagements where a 
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proliferation of ethnic, religious, cultural and resource-driven hostilities have become 
the major threats to international peace and security (Cheeseman et al. 2015: 165). 
The end of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath witnessed the advent and 
escalation of internal armed struggles and an increase in the involvement of ethnic, 
sectarian, linguistic and communal groups in intra-state wars (Bercovitch and 
Jackson 2009: 186-7). Unlike the inter-state hostilities, these wars are fought within 
nation states. Different names have been used to describe intra-state fighting. In this 
study, contemporary armed conflict, modern conflict, civil war and internal conflict 
are used interchangeably. 
As a concept, contemporary armed strife has been used by conflict resolution 
scholars to describe intra-state conflicts, the most common form of warfare which 
emerged at the end of the Cold War, often between communal groups and the state 
(Lederach 1997: 2). For Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 31), contemporary conflict refers 
to the prevailing pattern of political and violent encounters at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. These convergent definitions tend to suggest that the 
termination of the ideological struggles between the Eastern and Western blocs in 
the late 1980s witnessed a reduction in inter-state wars, which characterized most 
of the twentieth century, and an increase in the number of internal wars from the 
early 1990s. Similarly, Kaldor (1999) defines contemporary conflict as New War; 
Azar, as protracted social conflicts; Burton, as deep-rooted conflict; and Benjamin, 
as intractable conflict (Gawerc 2006: 436). 
The labels used to describe contemporary bellicose encounters in the above 
definitions are instructive and they apparently point to the nature and forms of the 
conflict. Lederach (1997: 23) observes that many of the key characteristics of 
contemporary antagonisms follow from their internal nature where conflicting groups 
live in close geographic proximity and sometimes as neighbours and yet are locked 
into long-standing cycles of hostile interactions. These conflicting groups may have 
direct experience of violent trauma that they associate with their perceived enemies 
and which is sometimes tied to a history of grievance and enmity that has 
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accumulated over generations, and such disputes are characterized by deep-rooted, 
intense animosity; fear; and severe stereotyping.  
Depending on their underlying causes, contemporary disagreements took different 
forms in the aftermath of the Cold War. Roberts (1994:6), cited in Paris (2004: 41), 
argues that at the end of the Cold War, it was the “apparently remorseless rise of 
ethnic and communal conflict” that became a major challenge for the international 
community”. Egwu (2007:406), in Omeje (2008), observes that in Africa, the end of 
the Cold War, especially in the 1990s and the early 2000s, witnessed an 
intensification of the incidence of intra-state conflicts; horizontally between different 
socio-ethnic and cultural aggregates within a national territory and vertically between 
groups who felt excluded and marginalized from existing power structures on the 
one hand, and the central authority on the other.  But what are the links between the 
Cold War and the emergence of internal wars? Why were and are the wars 
concentrated in the global South and particularly in the African continent? What 
makes these wars intractable? Who is well placed to provide solutions to the 
grievances that cause these wars? The discussions in this chapter will attempt to 
provide answers to these questions. 
The conditions that promoted the emergence of internal discord in Africa and other 
parts of the world can be explained in terms of the political and ideological conditions 
that prevailed during and after the Cold War.  According to Lederach (1997: 5), 
during much of the Cold War the superpowers were never directly engaged in armed 
combat in their own territories; instead, most wars were proxy, fought through, in, or 
over client states aligned with the superpowers; and given their colonial history and 
the scramble for territorial dominance by Western states, Africa became an easy 
prey and was one of the continents where most of these proxy wars were taking 
place. This bipolar context in general had two effects; firstly, it suppressed many 
latent conflicts within the sphere of influence of either of the superpowers as was the 
case in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as for instance, in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and the Balkans (Lederach 1997: 5). Secondly, it increased the volatility of, and 
exacerbated conflicts in the developing world as, for instance, in the Horn of Africa 
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and Central America, where it created a dominant frame of reference in which the 
primary explanation for armed conflicts was an ideological struggle between East 
and West (Lederach 1997: 5-6). 
Many of these conditions however, suddenly changed when the Cold War ended in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s when tensions between the superpowers declined 
and neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was willing to maintain Cold War 
levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in 
parts of the world that were strategically perceived as insignificant, such as sub-
Saharan Africa (Paris 2004: 16). This means that countries that had been battle 
grounds for proxy wars and had depended on foreign aid from the superpowers and 
used it to monopolize domestic political power and to suppress internal opposition, 
lost their ability to quell internal dissent and became vulnerable to intra-state violent 
struggles. Therefore, depending on the region, it can be argued that the bipolar 
context served both to suppress conflict when it was ongoing and to intensify it at 
the end of the Cold War; where the suppressed internal grievances and conflicts 
resurfaced in the immediate post-Cold War period in the form of intra-state clashes 
among various domestic actors. 
Conflict scholars have outlined several causes for contemporary armed 
engagements. Regehr (1992), cited in (Lederach 1997: 8), argues that the primary 
bones of contention in intra-state affairs concern governance and often involve the 
pursuit of autonomy or self-government for certain regions or groups; and that at 
least half of the current wars have to do with the redefinition of territory, state 
formation or control of the state. These wars are often called ethnic conflicts, given 
that what is at issue are group and community rights and not just individual human 
rights. Important to bear in mind is the community aspect of the conflict which I will 
return to in chapters four and five when discussing indigenous mechanisms of 
peacemaking in South Sudan.     
In opposition to this view, Friberg (1992), in (Lederach 1997: 8), insists that it is more 
accurate to name these “identity conflicts “rather than ethnic conflicts, given that 
there is nothing innately ethnic about them; rather it is often the failure of governing 
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structures to address fundamental needs, provide space for participation in 
decisions, and ensure an equitable distribution of resources and benefits that makes 
identification with a group so attractive and salient in a given setting”. The latter 
argument tends to resonate with the situations in some countries experiencing civil 
war in Africa; South Sudan, for example, seceded from the North in 2011 after over 
four decades of identity conflict.  
As Regehr has observed, “Identity conflicts emerged with intensity when a 
community, in response to unmet basic needs for social and economic security, 
resolves to strengthen its collective influence and to struggle for political recognition. 
Almost two thirds of the armed conflicts can be defined as identity conflicts, and in 
the last two decades, some estimates count as many as 70 political conflicts 
worldwide that involve groups formally organized to promote collective identity 
issues” (Lederach 1997: 8). It can therefore be argued that the proliferations of intra-
state wars following the end of the Cold War and the need to find appropriate 
mechanisms for resolving them and building sustainable peace is what led to the 
evolution of peacebuilding.  
2.5 Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding  
Peacebuilding is a conflict resolution method that goes beyond the more limited 
objectives of conflict management and conflict settlement and aims at the complete 
transformation of the political, economic, and social structures within a nation that 
can lead to violent conflict; and to achieve a durable and lasting peace, 
peacebuilding utilizes and combines the whole range of conflict resolution methods 
and approaches which includes: mediation, legal processes, preventive diplomacy, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, regional task-sharing, non-official 
diplomacy, and justice and reconciliation approaches in a comprehensive, 
multidimensional and long-term conflict transformation project (Bercovitch and 
Jackson 2009: 168). Given the intricate nature of internal conflicts, there has been 
an upsurge of interest in recent years in the role of indigenous approaches. Boege 
(2011: 432) for example, argues that since most conflicts are context-specific, 
traditional approaches to conflict resolution that are grounded in the cultures of 
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conflict-affected people play an important role in contemporary conflict resolution 
and that sustainable peace can only be achieved by involving them; hence the focus 
of this study. This study focuses on exploring the potential and limitations of 
indigenous procedures in view of their application to justice and reconciliation in the 
aftermath of violent conflicts. To put the study into perspective, I will start by 
conceptualizing conflict resolution. 
2.5.1 Conflict resolution concept 
Conflict resolution means a range of formal and informal activities undertaken by the 
parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence 
in conflict and to achieve some understanding on the key issues in conflict, a political 
agreement or a jointly acceptable decision on future interactions and distribution of 
resources (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 1). According to Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 
31) conflict resolution is a comprehensive term which implies that the deep-rooted 
sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. But how are the sources of 
conflict addressed and transformed? In most cases these processes involve 
compromise from both parties to the conflict in the interests of peace and co-
existence; and addressing deep-rooted sources of conflict means peacebuilding 
engagements at various levels involving multiple actors and mechanisms including 
traditional leaders and methods.    
The above definitions suggest that conflict resolution is not an event but a process 
that has several stages and levels; which involve acknowledging that there are 
escape routes to the achieving of peace through the use and involvement of a range 
of initiatives and actors both from inside and outside the conflict context. It can 
therefore, be argued, based on the liberal peace theory and practice, that for 
peacebuilding to address the causes of discord and build sustainable peace in the 
aftermath of violent conflict, all the stakeholders, local resources, societal agencies 
and institutions may have to be involved. Similarly, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 
10) state that the new approaches to conflict resolution are becoming increasingly 
multi-dimensional that is including UN peace operations, regional organizations, 
global, regional and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as opposed to 
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the previous approaches which are best described as mono-dimensional and 
narrowly defined. This translates into the idea that new strategies for conflict 
resolution have evolved at the various levels and that they are designed to produce 
inclusive structures and long-term settlements of disputes. But how this will work in 
practice requires scrutiny as the international community continues to exclude local 
institutions and actors from participating in conflict resolution and peacebuilding after 
civil wars. South Sudan is a case in point where not only were the customary 
authorities excluded from the 2005 CPA negotiations and subsequent peacebuilding 
efforts, but also civil society and other armed groups and political parties (Young 
2012). Although the 2015 ARCSS peace process involved civil society, it did not 
incorporate indigenous mechanisms in its implementation programming.  
2.5.2 Peacebuilding concept  
The post-Cold War shift in conflict nature, led to the evolution of the concept of 
peacebuilding which aims at preventing the resumption or escalation of violent 
encounter and establishing a durable peace (Newman et al. 2009: 3). This also 
meant a shift in the UN’s traditional peacekeeping procedures which could not match 
the emerging post-Cold War peace and security challenges. The traditional 
international approach was intended for inter-state conflict through monitoring 
ceasefires between hostile states (Richmond 2002: 7). 
The peacebuilding concept was popularized and gained international prominence in 
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when the then UN Secretary General, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented his 1992 policy statement, An Agenda for Peace. 
He defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend 
to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 
11) The concept was initially defined as a post-conflict activity aimed at consolidating 
peace; and the policy document describes the practical aims of peacebuilding as: 
disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody 
and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training 
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect 
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human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 32)  
Although transitional justice mechanisms would later form a vital component of post-
conflict peacebuilding, at that early stage of the concept development, the policy 
statement was silent about justice and reconciliation as key strategies in situations 
where human rights are grossly violated and abused. Moreover, if peacebuilding is 
geared towards identifying structures and building capacity, institutional or 
otherwise, then the question of agency should not be framed in terms of the primacy 
of the international over the local, as is the case today, but rather in terms of an 
exchange that affects agency on the ground and in the local area (Jabri 2013: 5). 
The scope of the UN’s peacebuilding concept progressively expanded over the 
years, so that in subsequent documents peacebuilding was considered as a range 
of activities that included preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping 
(Jenkins 2013).  In the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995), 
for example, it was recognized that peacebuilding required multifunctional peace 
support operations that worked across a range of security, humanitarian, economic, 
and political areas. Following an initial military intervention phase, as the situation 
stabilized, responsibility would be handed over first to civilian agencies and then to 
local agents (Young 2012: 5). The questions are: was the role of local agents as key 
stakeholders considered in international peacebuilding programming and 
interventions or were these simply rhetorical statements meant to silence local 
agents while restricting them to a passive, supporting role? I will come back to this 
in Chapter Six. 
The 2000 Brahimi Report further, conceptualizes peacebuilding as not only ending 
violent conflict, but also aimed at seeking to address its underlying root causes. The 
report has defined peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict 
to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (Brahimi, 2000:3) 
cited in (Bellamy et al. 2010: 129). The report provided a wide range of peacebuilding 
activities designed to help avoid a return to violent conflict, the promotion of peaceful 
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co-existence and the use of non-violent means for resolving conflict. It recommended 
the addition of further peacebuilding tools and strategies, including the establishment 
of a peacebuilding Unit in the UN, the adoption of quick impact projects (QIPs), and 
the creation of special funds for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR), and electoral assistance programmes (Jenkins 2013).  This definition takes 
the concept further to include the idea of positive peace which, according to Galtung 
(1976), is a condition of social justice and pluralism in which the root causes of 
conflict are, if not fully eliminated, successfully managed through nonviolent 
processes of political representation, negotiation and compromise. The Brahimi 
Report implies that peacebuilding is in effect, a hybrid of political and developmental 
activities targeted at the sources of conflict. 
Annan (2003) cited in (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 169-70), attempted to 
systematize the UN’s peacebuilding activities even further by arguing that effective 
peacebuilding required better coordination and synchronization of efforts, carefully 
conceived strategies, flexibility in implementation, institutional capacity, proper 
evaluation, a “lesson learned” process, system-wide guidelines and generic 
methodologies. It can be argued that the Annan efforts in their search for a more 
robust and effective peacebuilding architecture resulted in the establishment of the 
UN Peacebuilding Commission; but has it incorporated mechanisms other than the 
liberal (Western) peacebuilding instruments? The answer is broadly in the negative, 
though generally, the peacebuilding concept has come to mean many things which, 
in terms of the liberal peace theory, includes: ending overt violence, building 
democracies, strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, promoting 
justice, reconciliation and stability and enhancing development (Paris 2004). 
However, despite the expansion and modification of the concept, it has remained 
elusive and contested among academics and policymakers with no consensus 
regarding definition, approaches and practice. The different interpretations of the 
concept of peacebuilding reflect the variations in approaches and priorities of 
agencies, institutions, actors and countries involved in building peace and post-war 
state reconstruction (Jenkins 2013). 
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In view of the above peacebuilding conceptualization, Bercovitch and Jackson 
(2009: 173)  state that peacebuilding generally entails concerted action by 
international third parties working both in a military and civilian capacity, employing 
a mixture of short-to- medium and long-term political and development activities that 
are aimed at recovering from war, preventing a relapse into violent conflict, 
strengthening local capacities for peaceful conflict resolution and creating the 
conditions for genuine long-term human security. This argument may well be valid 
but the element of “strengthening local capacity”, including the application of local 
initiatives in contemporary peace processes, seems to have always been lacking in 
liberal peace theory and practice.  
However, Lederach (1997: 20-1) defines peacebuilding as a comprehensive concept 
that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, 
and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful 
relationships. The term involves a wide range of activities and functions that both 
precede and follow formal peace accords (post-conflict). Lederach’s framework 
suggests a comprehensive approach to the transformation of conflict that addresses 
structural issues, the social dynamic of relationship building, and the development 
of a supportive infrastructure for peace. The orientation of this study is along the 
lines of Lederach’s definitions. It discusses peacebuilding as a concept that 
transforms conflict by addressing structural issues (justice), and engaging with the 
social dynamic of relationship-building (reconciliation) and the development of local 
infrastructure for peace (local approaches). But the concept of post conflict is 
problematic; thus, its meaning in the context of this study needs to be clarified.  
2.5.3 Post-conflict as a concept 
The historical perspective of conflicts in South Sudan and international efforts at 
peacemaking will be discussed in chapter three. But it is important to put South 
Sudan as a case study into perspective in this theoretical chapter, to provide a better 
understanding as to whether it is a post-conflict society, a country in conflict or both. 
So, what is South Sudan’s status in relation to armed conflict?  I would argue it is a 
post-conflict state in relation to the 2005 Sudan CPA which politically settled the two 
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decades of North-South clash; but it is also a country in conflict in relation to the 
hostilities which erupted in December 2013 and are still raging despite the 2015 
ARCSS, signed between the government of the RSS and the SPLM-IO. However, it 
is important to analyse what conflict and post-conflict situations are; 
The idea of armed conflict relates to a situation in which organized groups engaged 
in acts of violence against each other, for instance, a state against a rebel movement 
and this is conducted in accordance with a dominant narrative, whereas, “post 
conflict” would mean the end of such violence, and a return to normalcy and peace 
(Lambach 2007). Such an understanding of post conflict makes it hard to provide a 
clear idea of extensive violence where open violence has dragged on, but in which 
there has been a slowdown in violence, such as the case of Northern Uganda.14 For 
example, a conflict is considered to have ended when “violence is no longer 
explained in terms of the dominant narrative of conflict”. According to this 
explanation, even if South Sudan has continued to experience different forms of 
violence after the signing of the CPA in 2005 through to its independence, South 
Sudan can be considered a post-conflict country. However, it is a country in conflict 
since the eruption of the 2013 crises. Viewing conflict and post-conflict situations as 
social constructs, “discursive delimitations of the kind of behaviour that is to be 
expected and allowed in a specific set of circumstances”, would mean a narrative of 
peace is put at the centre of the definition of post conflict Lambach, (2007:10) in 
(Tom 2011). 
For Call (2008: 175), the concept of post conflict has three uses: 1) it refers to the 
period when open warfare is said to have come to a virtual end either through a 
peace agreement or a military victory, 2) it refers to “societies that have gained a 
                                                     
14 Since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the rebel movement, LRA and the 
government of Uganda in 2006, the government of Uganda has encouraged internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
to return to their homes (manning,2009) as it considers that the situation has become a post conflict one. Yet 
the LRA has not laid down its arms, but has retreated to the DRC. In this case, conflict in Northern Uganda has 
diminished with the retreat of the LRA to the DRC. 
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formal peace agreement, even when the political violence that the peace agreement 
was designed to end has not been significantly diminished”, though this should more 
accurately be called a “post-accord” situation, 3) it relates to the “apparent military 
defeat of one side in armed conflict, but more particularly the fall of a regime 
associated with the army”. According to Call, the first meaning of the term post 
conflict tends to be more useful than the last two, since in such a situation there are 
changes that come about, including security sector reform (SSR), the building of 
more effective state institutions, elections, DDR, reconciliation and transitional 
justice initiatives, development programmes and the reconstruction or building 
economic institutions. Based on Call’s three interpretations, South Sudan lies in the 
interface between post-conflict and post-accord. This thesis uses the first sense of 
the idea of post conflict adopted by Call. 
2.5.4 Local approaches in Africa 
Local approaches are a part of peacebuilding and African conflict resolution. 
Although often used interchangeably, traditional and local are two different terms. A 
conceptualization of the two terms will be provided in Chapter Four. Despite its long 
history of practice in different societies and communities in the continent, there 
appear to be deliberate efforts by supporters of modern strategies to undervalue the 
local approaches. Broadly speaking, the international initiatives in Africa to resolve 
conflict, build peace and encourage development, for example, have usually 
neglected home-grown resources and capacities (Murithi 2008). Nevertheless, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, local and traditional solutions have been widely applied in post-
conflict situations. They revolve around mediation, arbitration, compensation and 
reconciliation. The Gacaca which was employed to deal with the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide (Clark 2014); the ‘Mato Oput’,15 which was used to re-integrate 
                                                     
15 Mato Oput is an Acholi traditional ceremony that aims to reconcile and re-establish relations between the 
clan of the victim of a killing and the clan of the killer by “cooling of hearts” of both parties, building 
forgiveness, and providing justice and compensation. It involves both parties drinking from the same calabash 
of bitter roots of the Oput tree (Mato Oput Project, 2009). 
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ex-LRA combatants and to reconcile communities in Northern Uganda (Ogora 2009; 
Allen and Macdonald 2013); and the ‘Fambul Tok’16 used to reconcile communities 
and to deal with the legacy of the Sierra Leone’s civil war (Graybill 2017: 145) are 
examples of recent usage of these mechanisms in African post-conflict societies. 
These mechanisms had their successes and failures. 
The Gacaca courts eased the burden of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and national courts that were strained by caseload of genocide 
suspects. It enabled local communities to participate in the process and thereby 
provided opportunity for catharsis as it enabled them to know the truth, bring about 
closure and reconcile. However, the new Gacaca was an invented tradition that 
departed from the old Gacaca in many ways. Attendance was involuntary and its 
programme and process were apparently determined and influenced by the state. A 
critique also runs that it reflected victor’s justice which contradicts the way old 
Gacaca traditionally worked. Huyse (2008: 12) summarizes the critiques by stating 
that while reconciliation as a way to national unity was one of the stated objectives 
when the Gacaca tribunals in Rwanda became part of a broader transitional justice 
policy, their actual experience, however, raises serious doubts about whether the 
outcome can be called successful. 
Mato Oput traditional ceremony facilitated the reintegration of Ex-LRA child-soldiers 
and combatants among the Acholi and contributed to peace in Northern Uganda by 
promoting reconciliation. But LRA conflict impacted as well other ethnic sub-regions 
in Northern Uganda such as the Teso and West Nile. The Mato Oput’s lack of 
national relevance meant that it could not be applied in the entire Greater North. This 
                                                     
16 Fambul Tok means “family talk”, built upon the Sierra Leone’s family talk’s tradition of discussing and 
resolving issues within a family circle. It is a community-owned local reconciliation programme that brings 
together perpetrators and victims of violence or abuse through conducting truth-telling, confession, apology, 
forgiveness and cleansing ceremonies rooted in local traditions. It was applied by rural communities in Sierra 
Leone to deal with the legacy of their decade long civil war. 
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means the mechanism does not adequately address the issue of communal 
transitional justice between parties of different ethnicities. So far, much of the work 
of academics and practitioners about traditional reconciliation in Northern Uganda 
focused on the Acholi people (The Mato Oput Project 2009). 
The Sierra Leone’s Fambul Tok mechanism was designed to address the roots of 
conflict at the local level. It covered areas in rural communities where Special Court 
and TRC could not reach; it was inclusive of women and youth population historically 
excluded from such ceremonies and participation was voluntary unlike in the past, 
where a community decision to reconcile made participation a mandatory (Graybill 
2017: 148). Although it may have deviated from the original traditional practice, it 
incorporated progressive values such as inclusivity and representation of the rights 
and agency of women and youth.  
So, as with Ubuntu, local peacemaking schemes are not without inadequacies. While 
they have strengths which can be leveraged, being inclusive and participatory, open 
and transparent, cost-effective, credited with legitimacy from the community, aim at 
restorative justice, healing and reconciliation (Boege 2011); they are also marred by 
several weaknesses. I will come back to this in Chapters Four and Six. 
2.6 Hybridity  
The term hybridity has recently gained a prominent usage in peacebuilding, 
particularly in the study and practice of transitional justice, to describe courts that 
have been developed in post-conflict settings, such as Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East 
Timor and Rwanda. Belloni (2012), cited in Yamashita (2014: 1) defines hybrid as a 
state of affairs in which conventional and local peacebuilding coexist. This implies 
that the key point of hybridity pertains to the relationship between the liberal and 
non-liberal, and it can further be argued that the introduction of new concepts in 
peacebuilding such as local and hybridity is another reason peacebuilding has 
become the focus of vigorous debate in recent years.  
While conventional forms of peacebuilding are modelled on liberal norms and ideals 
such as, state sovereignty, democracy, market economy, human rights, rule of law, 
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and transparency in governance, the concept of hybrid peacebuilding in contrast, is 
designed to include, as a  part of the strategies to achieve sustainable peace in post-
conflict societies, diverse institutions and norms that deviate from the predominant, 
Western model of peacebuilding (Yamashita 2014: 1). More specifically, hybrid 
peacebuilding  signals a willingness to accept and work with traditional institutions 
and values based on religious, ethnic and kinship connections, and to explore how 
they can be combined with those of modernity to bring a lasting peace (Yamashita 
2014: 1). Consistent with this argument, Richmond (2011:17) advances the concept 
of hybridity and emphasizes that it should have a place in peacebuilding which would 
represent both the capacity of international liberal and local peacebuilding actors 
and projects to engage with each other, which might perhaps be to the benefit of the 
local version of peace. This resonates with the focus of this study: to explore the 
relevance and potential of local approaches for possible application to modern 
conflict in a complimentary fashion.  
Drawing on Sierra Leone’s experience with internationally-sponsored peace, for 
example, Francis (2012: 19) observes that the missing element in liberal 
peacebuilding is the recognition and utility of hybridity between the external 
peacebuilding programming and local resources, societal agencies and institutions 
to ensure local participation, ownership and long-term sustainability. In keeping with 
this position, Murithi (2008) argues that incorporating the insights and the best 
practices of local processes into official peace, to create a hybrid peace process, 
can improve the efficacy of peacemaking. But the expectation of a hybrid peace 
process as a final solution to improve the effectiveness of peacemaking and 
peacebuilding is an exaggeration. First, the experience of countries that have 
experimented with Hybrid tribunals or Special courts, like Rwanda and Sierra Leone, 
has shown the process to be marred by more tension than productive cooperation. 
Second, what is lacking in this line of argument is the recognition that in the process 
of applying the concept of hybridity, power relations between the liberal and the local 
strategies may end up in favour of the liberal peacebuilding model, particularly in 
terms of structure, skills, resource capacity and wider applicability. 
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The significance of hybrid approaches to the resolution of contemporary conflicts 
and to building sustainable peace is however grounded in the idea of hybrid political 
order and hybrid violent conflicts. Boege (2011: 433) argues that regions of fragile 
statehood, such as those found in the global south, are generally places where 
diverse and competing institutions and logic of order and behaviour overlap and 
intertwine. This can be seen in the logic of formal state, the logic of informal 
traditional societal order, the logic of globalization and international civil society with 
its abundance of highly diverse actors, such as NGOs and International 
organizations among others. In such an environment, the state must share authority, 
capacity and legitimacy with non-state actors and institutions; this is a hybrid political 
order which considerably differs from the Western model of state. 
Conversely, many large-scale contemporary violent confrontations are hybrid socio-
political exchanges in which state-centric and non-state-centric traditional and 
economic factors overlap and mix. Thus, in violent disputes of this kind, it is argued 
the state has lost its central position both as an actor and framework of reference 
(Boege 2011: 433) This means, therefore, that the hybrid nature of many 
contemporary violent disagreements in the global south needs to be taken into 
consideration when it comes to post-conflict peacebuilding. The idea of hybrid peace 
appears to show a paradigm shift in peacebuilding strategy and offer some remedies 
for concerns about recognition, local participation, ownership and sustainability. It 
should be noted that hybrid peace allows the local to regard peacebuilding as a more 
flexible and dynamic process as it enables a critical reassessment of the global-local 
relationship in peacebuilding (Yamashita 2014: 2) 
However, as with liberal and local peacebuilding approaches, hybrid peace is not 
without its problems. According to Yamashita (2014: 3) two issues particularly stand 
out; the first is related to the effectiveness of hybrid peacebuilding and the question 
of whether it proves a better strategy. The argument here is about clarity of aims; 
whereas liberal peacebuilding has a relatively clear idea of what to achieve to bring 
stability and peace, hybrid peacebuilding stems from scepticism towards such 
universalist benchmarks and pursues the goal of recognition. Linked to this is the 
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view that these two worldviews might be incompatible. For example, while the 
international entity pursues the objective of retributive and punitive justice towards 
violators of human rights as a fight against impunity, the local approaches pursues 
restorative justice to reinstate both victims and perpetrators of human rights 
violations with the idea of reconciling them and their communities to peaceful 
coexistence based on the Ubuntu principles. It is likely these two disparate goals 
may clash and lead to tensions; a point I will come back to in chapter six.  
Since hybrid peacebuilding emphasizes unique local conditions and criticizes the 
one-size-fits-all approach of the liberal model, peacebuilding practices under this 
approach do not submit themselves easily to an assessment that uses an 
international framework or cross-case analysis. Again, to point out that the social 
conditions and the resultant peacebuilding efforts are “hybrid” does not make the 
concept a useful guide for a better implementation of international assistance. For 
this to happen, a policy-relevant framework that could enable constructive 
assessment of the actual practices would be needed (Yamashita 2014: 3). 
The second, concerns the ambivalence of the hybrid peace argument when it comes 
to its suggestions for the future of peacebuilding. Whereas liberal peacebuilding 
maintains that the implementation of the liberal systems and values will lead to 
lasting peace, hybrid peacebuilding underlines the possibility that the introduction of 
liberal norms and institutions is not the only way to sustainable peace. But hybrid 
peacebuilding can be construed as meaning the establishment of conditions of 
lasting peace through a proper combination of liberal and non-liberal systems and 
values. In so far as this stance sees the merits of liberal institutions only in relation 
to the objective of sustainable peace, hybrid peace does appear to signal a retreat 
of liberalism from its current dominance as the only peacebuilding paradigm and on 
the other hand, it is possible to see hybrid peace as a renewed attempt to expand 
liberalism in peacebuilding (Yamashita 2014: 3). 
Interestingly, despite these apparent weaknesses of hybrid peacebuilding concepts, 
there are multiple examples of a local turn in peacebuilding as explained in chapter 
one, whereby donor states, international organizations and INGOs pay more serious 
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attention to local-level dynamics even if this may be mainly for instrumental and 
rhetorical reasons (Mac Ginty 2008a). This implies that peacebuilding scholars and 
practitioners are aware of the legitimacy and advantages to be gained by 
cooperating with local partners and providing space for their complementary role.  
2.7 Human Rights and international treaties and laws 
Concerns about respect for human rights principles have in recent years come to 
occupy centre stage in global politics and international relations. Laws to protect and 
safeguard human rights have been enacted by international community at different 
periods, since the end of the World War II; prominent among them are the 
international human rights and humanitarian laws. But the different conceptions of 
human rights across the world have sometimes attracted serious debates. According 
to Goodhart (2005: 353), most theoretical discussion of human rights focuses on the 
contentious debate over their validity, and the debate primarily concerns what moral 
significance should attach to the origins of ‘universal’ human rights in the philosophy 
of Christian Europe and the Enlightenment. This debate pits universalists, who hold 
that human rights reflect timeless and absolute moral truths, against cultural 
relativists, who assert that moral truth or validity is an expression of the values and 
beliefs of a specific culture.  
Universalists maintain that some moral principles are valid regardless of when and 
where they originate, and further, claim these principles have the status of 
metaphysical truth; hence human rights are universally valid because they derive 
from such principles. Among the claims and principles to which this transcendent 
status is sometimes ascribed are autonomy, dignity, equality, and human needs 
(Goodhart 2005: 353). The primary difficulty however, with moral universalism lies in 
showing that certain moral principles are in fact true. Despite numerous 
sophisticated attempts to provide a persuasive trans-cultural moral justification for 
human rights, profound disagreement persists about their philosophical foundations. 
There are different worldviews among different peoples in distinct parts of the world. 
For example, and as discussed above, these could be the liberal understanding of 
life being individualistic or the African worldview that it is communitarian.  
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On the other hand, according to relativists’ views, cultures differ so widely in their 
moral norms and practices that no principles can be valid across all of them. While 
they do not typically reject the existence of moral truth, they hold that truth or validity 
can be assessed only within the moral framework of a specific culture (Goodhart 
2005: 354).  Unlike the universalists, then, relativists conceive the validity of a moral 
principle as closely related to its origins; that concepts of human rights originated in 
the West, means that they must reflect distinctively Western values and beliefs.  
Whether human rights are valid in non-Western cultures is for relativists a question 
of whether the values and practices of those cultures include or can support human 
rights and in what form. In this regard, the earlier discussions in this chapter about 
Ubuntu implies that its values and practices support human rights; an argument that 
some universalists may contest. The main difficulties with cultural relativism are that 
it presumes a high degree of homogeneity within cultures, a presumption belied by 
internal disagreement and contestation, and that it remains unclear why widespread 
acceptance of norms and practices alone should count as a moral justification for 
them (Goodhart 2005: 354). The difficulties identified in both perspectives could 
mean that there is a need to offer a balanced and reasoned perspective as to the 
benefits and contributions of both, and to examine whether they can practically 
engage and work together in terms of interventions in dealing with post-conflict 
justice issues to build sustainable peace. This entails acknowledging that, indeed, 
some human rights principles are universal; and that at the same time, it is also true 
that truth and validity can better be assessed within the moral framework of a specific 
culture. This study is based on the social constructionist approach, and so a relativist 
perspective may provide a better philosophical foundation.   
However, the legal universalism of human rights signifies their status as principles 
of international law; and where positive international law is the body of law generated 
by agreements among states: treaties, conventions, and so on, as positive laws bind 
the signatories of specific instruments and are universal insofar as the instruments 
in question are acceded to by virtually all states (Goodhart 2005: 354).  It follows that 
human rights conventions are a form of positive law, some of which enjoy near-
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universal status through the ratification by most states. Though the evolving legal 
universalism of human rights is hampered by the constraints of the international 
system in matters of jurisdiction and enforcement (Novak 2015), in recent years 
international instruments of justice such as the ICC have been increasingly applied 
to deal with legacies of human rights abuses across the globe, regardless of 
contextual relevance. But, generally, there is growing acceptance of human rights 
as obligations binding upon all, and it is on this basis that in Chapter Five, I will 
critique the local justice mechanisms of the Dinka and the Nuer of South Sudan. 
The cultural relativist perspective and the African philosophy of peace seem to exert 
a degree of influence on the way certain scholars perceive how international systems 
work, especially regarding human rights and their promotion through international 
agencies and justice instruments. These human rights movements are grounded on 
the principles provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and the two subsequent international 
covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights, 
adopted in 1966 and based on the declaration (Boyle 2005: 343). Though not legally 
binding, the declaration has become the foundation for establishing obligatory legal 
norms to govern international behaviour regarding the rights of individuals.  
The role that is being played by modern human rights movements which have sought 
to internationalize the promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms based on liberal 
international philosophy has raised concern among some scholars. Murithi (2005: 
341), for example, holds that human rights need to preserve the dignity of all people 
and to ensure a more dynamic and culturally inclusive understanding of human 
rights. He maintains that, ever since the UDHR was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly, on 10 December 1948, there has been an ongoing debate about how 
human rights standards were formulated, codified and adopted by appealing mainly 
to Western cultural and philosophical traditions; whether the absence of other 
cultural belief systems during the definition and drafting of the UDHR necessarily 
invalidates the universality of the current human rights discourse;  whether these 
standards are truly representative of a global consensus on notions of human dignity; 
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and whether the UDHR is really complete in its formulation. He reasons that if there 
is indeed a Western bias in the human rights discourse then the current human rights 
paradigm is excluding lessons that can be learnt from others (Murithi 2005: 341). 
The current understanding of, and discourse on, human rights tends to promote 
individualism as opposed to the communal lifestyle of other cultures, particularly 
African societies, such as that based on the principle of Ubuntu. The notion of 
Ubuntu sheds light on the importance of promoting human rights through the 
principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of shared destiny between peoples 
(Murithi 2005: 342). The Ubuntu philosophy seems to offer important resources for 
resolving conflict and healing the past. For example, an ubuntian is diminished when 
others are humiliated, tortured, oppressed or treated as if they were less than who 
they are. As a human being through the agency of other human beings, it follows 
that what we do to others also impacts upon ourselves; and in the process of 
dehumanizing another, in inflicting untold harm and suffering, the offender is 
inexorably being dehumanized as well (Tutu 1999; Murithi 2005: 342). Ubuntu 
provides a value system for giving and receiving forgiveness which in turn furthers 
human rights in war-affected societies and countries in transition from authoritarian 
regimes. 
The main argument here is that the notion of human obligation to other people, when 
the understanding of human rights focuses on individualism, tends to become 
marginalized, which contrasts with what people in many non-Western cultures 
believe to be important. This perspective questions the notion of a universal 
conception of justice that can be advanced by a world court. This universalizing 
tendency is often driven by a civilizing and modernizing imperative, which self-
evidently marginalizes the others’ conception of justice, as it assumes that there is 
one way of conceptualizing justice, which is flawed and alienating (Murithi 2012: 
201). 
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2.8 Justice and Reconciliation 
Justice and reconciliation approaches have emerged in recent years as viable 
strategies for national reconstruction of the moral and political order following a civil 
war or repressive dictatorship; and their aim is to deal with the past, particularly the 
legacy of massive human rights abuses, and lay the foundation for a peaceful and 
democratic future (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 151). In terms of peacebuilding, 
this implies that reconciliation and justice procedures have a key role in promoting 
the rule of law, democratization and trust-building in societies emerging from violent 
conflict and/or authoritarian leadership. The two approaches are a part of the broad 
array of measures that are used in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, despite 
attempts to conceptualize the terms by scholars, such as, Hayner (1994), Kritz 
(1995), and Lederach (1997), there is yet no generally accepted theory of 
reconciliation and justice (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 152). This means these 
notions are still poorly understood and envisaged. But where have these strategies 
come from?  Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 152), suggest that these methodologies 
of conflict resolution emerged in the context of the profound restructuring of the 
international system that took place at the end of the 1980s and that two key 
movements contributed to the spread of these approaches: the internationalization 
of justice, and the end of the Cold War.  
Firstly, the internationalization of justice refers to the spread and strengthening of 
international human rights law and humanitarian law, as seen in a growing number 
of international conventions and treaties, the diffusion of human rights values and 
ideals, the establishment of the international war crimes tribunals and the ICC, 
numerous national trials of human rights abuses, the emergence of large number of 
human rights-based NGOs and an increasingly active civil society, and the 
establishment of more and more international bodies devoted to the promotion and 
strengthening of universal human rights (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 152). 
Similarly, Huyse (2008), observes that this period resulted in the establishment of 
the ad hoc tribunals of The Hague (for the former Yugoslavia) and Arusha (for 
Rwanda), and in the gradual spread of the principle of universal jurisdiction. But to 
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what extent has the internationalization of justice taken into consideration the 
meanings of justice in different contexts? Whose definition of justice applies? And 
whose definition has been internationalized? Who is involved in making and bringing 
justice? These are some of the concerns and questions that need answers to 
understand the claim and rationale for the internationalization of justice. 
For example, since its establishment more than a decade ago, the ICC is still 
grappling with how it can bring justice to perpetrators of atrocity crimes when national 
courts are unable or unwilling to do so (Beitzel and Castle 2013: 42). There is 
resistance from some member states, signatories to the Rome statute, who tend to 
see the ICC as foreign, neo-colonial, far removed from the context of conflict and 
having over-complicated legal procedures. To many, the ICC is a politicized 
institution that has become an instrument of some powerful leading states to target 
leaders in various parts of the world such as Africa; and this view appears to be the 
core reason for growing sentiment among some African countries to pull out of the 
ICC. Burundi has done, perhaps Kenya may follow South Africa which is still in the 
process. There are also arguments that it is a highly ideological institution and that 
its focus on retributive justice is problematic. 
Perhaps the challenges facing the justice and reconciliation approaches to post-
conflict peacebuilding could be managed if the ICC keeps to its complementary, 
rather than a lead role, and looks equally to the crimes and violations in continents 
other than Africa. There is a need to consider the application of non-judicial 
mechanisms particularly those that are used in conflict settings.  Advocating a hybrid 
approach to dealing with the past, Alie (2008), for example, argues that if the Sierra 
Leone TRC’s recommendations, as outlined in its final report of 2004, were fully 
implemented, they would act as a catalyst for the social and legal reform required to 
address impunity and establish a culture of respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, 
as well as helping the social regeneration of battered communities.  
Secondly, the end of the Cold War marked the moment when a large number of post-
communist states in Eastern Europe faced the problems of how to deal with the 
repression of the past and construct stable democracies; a number of military and 
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civil dictatorships in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, influenced by the third wave of 
democracy, began to make way for more participatory forms of government; and  a 
number of civil wars, such as those in El Salvador, South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Cambodia had negotiated an end (Bercovitch and 
Jackson 2009: 152). There was thus, a sense of urgency in the quest to find suitable 
mechanisms for managing transitions and building stable peace in the aftermath of 
civil war, which contributed to the development of justice and reconciliation formulas.  
2.9 Transitional/Post conflict justice  
The terms “transitional justice” and “post-conflict justice” are used here 
interchangeably to denote the range of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms aimed 
at dealing with a legacy of large-scale abuses of human rights and/or violations of 
international humanitarian law (Kerr and Mobekk 2007: 3). These processes are 
designed to address the need for accountability, to provide justice and to foster 
reconciliation in societies in transition from authoritarian to democratic rule and from 
war to peace. The international Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines 
transitional justice as a response to systematic widespread violations of human 
rights which often occur in the context of authoritarian regimes and/or civil strife; it is 
justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive 
human rights abuse (Alai 2012: 124).  
The terms have emerged precisely in situations following intra-state struggles waged 
against unjust systems of government, when more democratic governance is being 
phased in, but the newly empowered people feel obliged to make a case against key 
figures of the old dispensations Crocker (1998) cited in (Malan 2008: 133). The 
concept became popular particularly after the Cold War, with a huge shift in the way 
post-conflict states and the international community responded to the question of 
how to deal with those who had committed human rights abuses when a civil war, 
genocide or brutal dictatorship ended. The dominant strategies for dealing with 
serious human rights violations before the end of the Cold War were silence, 
amnesia and amnesty. Transitional justice seeks recognition for victims of violations 
and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Being both 
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backward- and forward-looking, transitional justice seeks to ensure accountability for 
past abuses while guaranteeing their non-recurrence.  
Transitional justice themes include: Prosecution, TRCs, reparations, restitutions, 
institutional reform, amnesty, lustration, memorialization and traditional justice 
mechanisms (Wachira et al. 2014: 185).  Some of the transitional justice methods 
that have been adopted by governments in societies in transition include: criminal 
prosecutions, truth seeking, reparation programmes, and the reform of key 
institutions including the security sector and the judiciary (Alai 2012: 124). But in 
recent years, prosecutions have been greatly privileged over other procedures. This 
appears to be the work of agents of liberal peacebuilding, including; civil society 
organizations, donor agencies and rights movements that tend to push for trials 
regardless of the context and political circumstances that characterize societies in 
transitions. Moreover, transitional justice scholars have increasingly pointed to the 
failure of many donor-driven transitional justice initiatives to deliver a form of justice 
that is meaningful to the worldview of victims and survivors of atrocity. The current 
transitional justice approach is not sensitive to issues of identity, culture and 
resources and not rooted in local practices and understanding of justice  
 The focus on accountability for violations of civil and political rights has commonly 
resulted in the exclusion of issues of past and ongoing economic inequality and 
structural violence. Lessons from these interventions have led to arguments that 
transitional justice must encompass an agenda deliberately focused on socio-
economic challenges that are related to the root causes of many violent conflicts.  
For the sake of clarity however, this study focuses on prosecutions, TRCs and local 
justice mechanisms. 
2.9.1 Prosecutions (Retributive justice)  
The theory and rationale behind justice approaches to transitions is that the 
investigation and punishment of human rights violators is necessary for restoring the 
moral order of the society (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 153). According to 
Brouneus (2003: 32) tribunals play a salient role in justice, accountability and 
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reconciliation; the punishment of certain crimes is considered in both theory and 
practice to be important for reconciliation and there is a legal and moral perception 
that the most severe crimes such as instigating genocide must be punished. 
Apparently, this is the reason reconciliation and justice are now a key part of the 
international diplomacy of intervention, most often seen in truth commissions and 
human rights trials. But is retributive justice the right and adequate mechanism to 
deal with the transition from violence to peaceful politics after civil war situations, 
where gross human rights violations and mass atrocities have taken placed between 
and within communities?  
Haden (2004) cited in (Wachira et al. 2014: 185) argues that ideally, a transitional 
justice regime requires that human rights violations be subjected to the application 
of human rights law; and so, criminal prosecution is consistent with international 
human rights law, notably the obligation to punish crime. The argument is that 
criminal justice is believed to have intrinsic worth and is regarded as a basic 
ingredient of a stable democracy, as it helps identify the perpetrators, emphasize 
accountability; deter the commission of future atrocities, and satisfy the need of 
victims for the full restoration of dignity (Wachira et al. 2014: 186). But to what extent 
is punishment having a deterrent effect, whether specific, as when aimed at the 
offender, or general as when directed towards the public? Apart from this scepticism, 
there are other counter-arguments which point out that prosecutions have been 
found to be impractical and inadequate in the context of post-conflict transitions: 
among other reasons, they are lengthy and costly; also, it is impossible to prosecute 
all offenders. As most institutions in post-conflict societies, including the judiciary, 
are dysfunctional, weak and inept, it detracts from the reconciliation agenda, and 
could create conditions for revenge and a new cycle of violence, and the focus is on 
the offender and not the victim (Hayner 2002; Wachira et al. 2014: 186-7). 
Again, holding human rights violators accountable does not seem to contribute 
towards reconciliation and peaceful transition to democracy. Beitzel and Castle 
(2013) for example, question the degree of certainty that can be placed in the belief 
that punishing the guilty will bring some comfort to the surviving victims and deter 
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future war criminals. Similarly, Zehr (2002) asks how the retributive model actually 
can serve to promote reconciliation and reintegration in the complicated context of 
New Wars, since the current models express enthusiasm for incarceration and 
incapacitation. It seems the international community, as third party from this 
perspective, has a limited role to play if reconciliation between divided communities 
is to be achieved through trials. The role of the international community may be 
important in terms of possibly ending violence through arrests of key individuals in 
command; however, their role in bringing justice to situations where non-state actors 
(popular agency) are involved in the gross violations of human rights, as in the case 
of the Rwanda genocide or intra-state war, is perhaps overstated. 
2.9.2 Truth Commissions (non-judicial bodies) 
“Truth commission” (TC) is a generic term that has been given to official bodies set 
up to investigate and report on a pattern of past human rights abuses (Hayner 2002: 
5). There are diverse types of TC which are sometimes called by a variety of names 
determined by the given mandate. According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 155) 
the term is used generically to describe a wide range of official and semi-official 
bodies set up to investigate a history of human rights violations in a country during 
a specific period. This means every TC is unique and context-specific. Similarly, 
Wachira et al. (2014) define TCs as bodies established to investigate and report on 
human rights abuses over a certain period in a specific country or in relation to a 
specific conflict.  
TCs are temporary non-judicial bodies that enjoy a measure of de jure 
independence;  are usually created at the point of political transition, either from war 
to peace or from authoritarian rule to democracy;  are officially sanctioned by the 
state, and in some cases, by the armed opposition as well, in a peace accord;  are 
usually in operation from one to two years;  complete their work with a submission 
of a final report that contains recommendations; and focuses on violations of human 
rights and sometimes of humanitarian norms as well (Freeman and Hayner 2003).  
According to Hayner (2002: 14), TCs have the following four characteristics: they 
focus on the past; investigate the pattern of abuses over a period, not a specific 
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event; are generally a temporary body that completes its work with an official report; 
and are officially sanctioned to assure the accessibility of information, and that the 
recommendations of the concluding report are taken seriously. 
It has apparently become common for peace agreements following civil wars to 
include the establishment of a TC as one of the transitional justice mechanisms to 
investigate the truth about violations of human rights during the conflicts. In the last 
two decades, several TCs have been established that were embodied in peace 
agreements which settled civil wars across the globe. Huyse (2008) recounts that in 
Africa, a few of the most recognized ones have been South Africa (1995), Sierra 
Leone (2004) and Liberia (2005). This is because the nature of most contemporary 
armed conflicts, which concern governance and often involve the pursuit of 
autonomy of self-government for certain regions or groups, could be associated with 
repression by regimes and polarized communities targeting each other with impunity. 
In South Sudan both the SPLM/A war (1983-2005) and the war which erupted in 
2013 have pitted the government against some communities, but also set 
communities against each other, such as the Dinka and the Nuer, Murle and Nuer, 
Shilluk and Dinka, among others.   
But how does a TC achieve its goal in situations of peace achieved through 
settlement, where a former regime forms a large section of the government of the 
day, and rebels constitute a big part of the national army? Who can guarantee that 
the TC’s reports are taken seriously? In South Africa, for example, former president 
F.W. de Klerk successfully instituted legal proceedings to obstruct the Commission, 
at least temporarily, from naming him in the report. Similarly, the African National 
Congress (ANC), unhappy with the Commission’s conclusions about its past actions, 
attempted to block publication of the entire report; and Thabo Mbeki speaking in his 
capacity as the president of the party said the ANC has serious reservations about 
the TC’s process and report, and as communicated by Priscilla Hayner, that in 
particular they found that “the net effect of the commission’s findings is to 
delegitimize or criminalize a significant part of the struggle of our people for 
liberation” (Hayner 2002: 44-5). 
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The ultimate goals which are sought through each TCs or TRC’s internal 
organizational structures, processes, and procedures, are to end and account for 
past violations, promote cathartic healing of victims and perpetrators, enhance 
national reconciliation, strengthen a new and democratic political order, and 
legitimate new policies (Wachira et al. 2014: 4).  What is still open to question is how 
the practice of making past atrocities public knowledge as intended, would ensure 
that they did not occur again, and equally it is unclear if and how knowledge can be 
translated into deterrence. Reconciliation requires more initiative, time and 
deliberate actions than those immediately availed of by a transient mechanism such 
as the TRC (Wachira et al. 2014: 83) As outlined above, most TRCs have a life span 
of only one or two years, a short time to complete a reconciliation process in the 
aftermath of sustained violations and bitterness. 
Furthermore, TRC’s mandates are generally broad and far-reaching, and include the 
revelation of truth, the making of recommendations for reparations and institutional 
reforms, amnesty, and the promotion of reconciliation (Wachira et al. 2014: 7). In 
some examples such as in Africa, before these TRC’s mandates are accomplished, 
another instance of unrest or armed conflict would often have started, derailing the 
entire process. It can therefore, be argued that TRCs, while they may have been 
successful in some post-conflict societies, seem not to have achieved their intended 
goals in most post war countries. In Liberia, although the TRC successfully 
concluded its mandates and presented recommendations which included; 
prosecutions and political censure of, and amnesty for, some of those most 
responsible for human rights violations during the fourteen-year Liberian war, mostly 
ex-warlords and political actors, these actors’ negative and sometimes ambiguous 
reactions to the recommendations undermined the work of the TRC; especially when 
those barred from public offices continued to run in the elections (Lappin and Harris 
2010: 185). Lappin and Harris also argue that, besides the lukewarm reactions of 
the international community to the TRC’s recommendations, especially regarding the 
Liberian President’s human rights records, the TRC itself, discredited its work due to 
a flawed process and internal divisions among its members that resulted in some of 
them not signing the final report (Lappin and Harris 2010: 186). 
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The goal of a TC is to promote reconciliation on a national level through speaking 
openly of a silent and conflictive past to avoid latent conflicts and bitterness between 
opposing parties (Freeman and Hayner 2003). But how can TCs promote 
reconciliation? As explained by Freeman and Hayner (2002: 126), they can 
encourage tolerance and understanding by allowing the conflicting parties to 
observe each other’s grievances and sufferings. This may help build empathy, 
thereby deterring acts of vengeance and countering the rivalry and hatreds arising 
from past events. Commissions can also provide a safe and impartial forum for direct 
restorative justice processes in which the victim, the offender, and/or other 
individuals or community members can actively participate in the mediation and 
resolution of past grievances of a less serious nature. Furthermore, Commissions 
can recommend practical and fair measures for the necessary reintegration of 
certain categories of offenders back into society. Potential rewards for instituting TCs 
therefore, include: to allow reconciliation, to outline the needed reforms, to allow 
victims a cathartic airing of their pains, to represent an important, official 
acknowledgment of a long-silenced past, and that this process will help keep such 
horrors from being repeated (Hayner 1996: 19). During a difficult political transition, 
a TC can also be used by new leaders to demonstrate or underscore a break with a 
past record of human rights abuses to obtain or sustain political legitimacy (Hayner 
1996: 19).  
Some of the lessons learned from the experiences of documented TCs around the 
world demonstrate that the expectations of TCs are almost always greater than what 
they can achieve: most particularly, rapid reconciliation, a significant reparation to all 
victims, as well as a full resolution of many individual cases, and institutional reforms. 
Few of these expectations can be fulfilled by most TCs. Some levels of 
disappointment is not uncommon as a TC comes to an end, or as a government 
accepts but then does not move to implement the recommendations of a TC’s  report 
(Hayner 2002: 8). 
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2.9.3 Restorative justice  
Restorative justice is a procedure in which the goals of peace and justice are 
complementary and advanced together, as is the case with local justice mechanisms 
(Beitzel and Castle 2013: 47). The focus of local approaches is restorative justice, 
where the victim’s need for restoration and the perpetrator’s need for reintegration 
are both considered and addressed, to reconcile them and their communities, as 
opposed to retributive justice which prioritizes punishment of the offender over 
reconciliation. Restorative justice seeks to connect the past, the present and the 
future while responding comprehensively to justice needs and requirements with 
respect to all parties impacted by crime: victims, communities and wrongdoers (Zehr 
2002: 20). The focus of this approach is not only on the victims or perpetrators, but 
also on the community and the relationships required for future co-existence. As 
discussed above, this is in line with the principle of Ubuntu which promotes harmony 
as a core value of human interconnectedness. 
If the concept of justice is as described above, the question to be addressed is, to 
what extent can justice be delivered and reconciliation achieved by an external actor 
such as the ICC? By involving the local community to attend to the needs of victims 
and the responsibilities of the offender and the community, restorative justice is 
better able to respond comprehensively to the justice requirements, as it is 
compatible with peacebuilding in war-torn societies, and dissolves the dichotomy 
often presumed between justice and peace (Beitzel and Castle 2013: 42). In this 
regard, it can be argued that the restorative justice approach represents a more 
adequate theory of justice, and has considerably more support from the local 
populations than the retributive approaches currently informing international 
attempts at dealing with tensions between justice and peace for violence-torn 
societies. Zehr (2002: 3) outlines the difference in orientation between retributive 
justice and restorative justice because many feel that the process of retribution 
deepens wounds and conflicts rather than contributing to healing and peace.  
Restorative justice would offer two more conceptual distinctions for doing the work 
of justice than retributive approaches, as it would change the focus of addressing 
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crime to include victim’s need, and would look to the future, to create the kind of 
society desired (Beitzel and Castle 2013: 46). As noted in the discussion of Ubuntu, 
despite these qualities, local approaches as restorative justice are marred by 
weaknesses, such as gender insensitivity and certain practices that contradict 
human rights principles. Zehr (2002: 60) maintains that we should not lose those 
qualities which the legal system at its best represents: the rule of law, due process, 
a deep regard for human rights, and the orderly development of law. It can then be 
argued in this regard that as a problem-solving technique, restorative justice is better 
suited than other approaches to justice in dealing with reconciliation among victims 
and perpetrators in civil war situations. However, it seems a better method would be 
to strike a balance where both justice approaches would serve their different goals 
in a complementary manner, hybridity. 
2.10 Reconciliation 
The concept of reconciliation has numerous meanings and sometimes several of 
them are used in the same context. Wachira et al. (2014: 79) observe that although 
the concept is widely used, there is little consensus about the meaning and 
application, and sometimes the different usages of the term are confusing. For many 
countries around the world the word reconciliation means different things. In Latin 
America for example, the term reconciliation may be tantamount to amnesia, forgive 
and forget. But for people in Asia and in Africa, reconciliation is key to peaceful 
coexistence. This implies that reconciliation is not only an elusive, but also contested 
concept. This may be due to the wide variation in the contexts in which reconciliation 
takes place. For example, Hamber and Kelly (2004: 3-5), developed a working 
definition of reconciliation for Northern Ireland by summarizing several meanings and 
five interwoven and related strands of reconciliation. According to them, 
reconciliation involves developing a shared vision of an inter-dependent and fair 
society; acknowledging and dealing with the past; building positive relationships; and 
attending to significant cultural and attitudinal change as well as substantial social, 
economic and political change.  
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Similarly, Hambar and Van de Merwe (1998,) cited in (2014: 81), have identified at 
least five different ways in which the term reconciliation was used in South Africa: as 
the dissolving or blurring of racial identities in order to forge a new society; as the 
promotion of inter-communal understanding and coexistence; as the rediscovery of 
a new conscience at individual level through moral reflection, confession, and 
repentance; as a human rights approach that emphasizes regulating behaviour 
through law; and as trust building through restoring personal bonds and 
interpersonal relationships. Two points are common to both definitions: the need to 
re-establish broken relationships and the need to create a shared future. This implies 
that in the aftermath of internal conflicts, where people had abiding relationships but 
which were shattered by violent hostilities, reconciliation is capable of being a key 
peacebuilding process and conflict resolution method.  
Brouneus (2003: 20) observes that reconciliation after internal armed conflict is a 
social process that involves mutual acknowledgement of past suffering between 
former enemies and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into 
constructive relationships towards sustainable peace. Transforming relationships by 
addressing the bitterness and anger that have characterized conflict situations is key 
to peaceful coexistence, and is an integral constituent of the Ubuntu principle. This 
is significant because unlike situations of traditional inter-state war, where a group 
of people in conflict are separated by borders and distance and may choose to 
simply avoid contact with each other, in intra-state wars people have to continue 
living together in close physical and emotional proximity; bound by an array of 
intimate and complex relationships; various kinds of political and economic 
interdependencies, social ties and, historical and cultural commonalities (Lederach 
1997: 30). This requires confronting the past, especially when it involves serious 
abuses that can form the basis of renewed hostility (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 
152). 
Lederach (1997: 30) defines reconciliation as being “a focus and a locus”; where the 
focus of reconciliation is upon building new and better relationships between former 
enemies; and as a locus, “reconciliation represents a place or location of encounter, 
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where parties to a conflict meet”. In this place he argues, the traumas of the past 
and the hopes for the future must be formulated and brought together by discussing 
the issues of truth, forgiveness, justice and peace. Truth is the longing for 
acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experience, but it 
is coupled with mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a 
new beginning; and justice represents the search for individual and group rights, for 
social restructuring, and for restitution, but is linked with peace, which underscores 
the need for interdependence, wellbeing, and security (Lederach 1997: 29). 
While reconciliation is a process that aims to build relationships, and forge a new 
future in post-conflict societies, the pragmatic view of reconciliation as anchored in 
the negative intent of avoiding the presumed undesirable political consequences of 
pursuing justice and accountability is apparently becoming a widespread practice. 
According to Wachira et al. (2014: 79), this seems to be the most prevalent 
interpretation of reconciliation in lay and political discourses; and in this sense the 
term seems to refer to political accommodation as opposed to retributive justice, 
where differences are set aside and actions that may provoke counter-reactions by 
powerful forces or alienate some in society are avoided in favour of more non-
confrontational policies. The concern here is for the general preservation of harmony 
and coexistence while issues of accountability, to the extent that they are deemed 
to be divisive, are avoided or kept to a minimum.  
But how can this kind of reconciliation address the grievances of the victims and 
communities and build broken relationships?  The answer to this question requires 
more investigation. However, from the conflict-resolution and peacebuilding 
perspectives, reconciliation is viewed as a process of recasting or restructuring 
conflictual relationships to more peaceful, just, and equitable ones (Assefa, 1996; 
Krieberg,1998; Auerbach,2009) cited in (Wachira et al. 2014: 80). As discussed 
above, reconciliation is determined by the context of the society in which the term is 
applied.  This study however, will be more guided by the definition provided by 
Lederach (1997) where the focus of reconciliation is on engagement with the issues 
of justice, truth, peace and forgiveness that tends to resonate with the restorative 
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justice and indigenous peacemaking approaches based on the African philosophy 
of peace. 
A common question often asked is: does truth lead to reconciliation? Or, put 
differently, is it necessary to know the truth to advance reconciliation? While the 
answer may be ‘yes’ for some and ‘no’ for others, reconciliation as a concept may 
be more affected by other factors quite apart from knowing or acknowledging the 
truth about past wrongs. Hayner (2002: 6), for example, suggests that true 
reconciliation might depend on a clear end to the threat of further violence; a 
reparation for those injured; attention to structural inequalities and basic material 
needs of victimized communities; the existence of natural linkages in society that 
bring formerly opposing parties together; or, most simply, the simple passage of 
time. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has theorized and critically analysed key concepts that constitute the 
framework for this study, which specifically explores the potential of indigenous 
approaches to the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts in South Sudan and 
their application to post-conflict justice and reconciliation. It has also conceptualized 
and engaged with literature on contemporary armed engagements, conflict 
resolution, peacebuilding, indigenous approaches, hybrid peace, justice and 
reconciliation as methods of conflict resolution.  As a literature review, the chapter 
provides the basis and foundation for a deeper analysis and understanding of 
indigenous mechanisms and related themes within subsequent chapters of this 
study. The next chapter will focus on conflicts in South Sudan from a historical 
perspective, together with peace agreements and international efforts at 
peacemaking.  
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Chapter Three 
A History of Conflicts, Peace Agreements and International Efforts 
at Peacemaking 
3.0 Introduction 
Until its independence in 2011 following a referendum on secession, South Sudan 
was a part of Sudan. To better understand the current conflict in South Sudan, it is 
necessary to consider the broader historical perspective of the Sudan’s North-South 
conflict which ended with the signing of the CPA in 2005 and ushered in a new state. 
An analysis starting from South Sudan’s post-independence period may ignore the 
momentous underlying factors that are at the heart of the conflict. By analysing the 
Sudan and South Sudan’s hostilities and the peace agreements which attempted to 
settle them; this chapter also presents a case regarding the role of local initiatives in 
contemporary peace processes and subsequent post-conflict peacebuilding 
interventions. Considering the persistence of clashes in South Sudan, despite 
international efforts to intervene, it argues that it might prove appropriate in such 
contexts to complement these endeavours with local strategies founded on the 
histories and cultures of conflict-affected communities.  
The chapter examines the North-South conflict in the light of colonial policies and 
activities as well as the governance system and ideology adopted by the post-
independence northern regimes which perpetuated the strife with two successive 
civil wars; (1955-1972) and (1983-2005). It will critically analyse the contemporary 
peace processes sponsored by the international community that led to the signing 
of the 2005 CPA between the rebels, SPLM/A and the ruling NCP. It will further 
discuss the post-CPA and post-independence causes of the conflict in South Sudan 
and the peace process that led to the 2015 ARCSS, signed between the government 
of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the SPLM/A-IO; and it will provide a 
conclusion. 
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3.1 The Sudan’s North-South conflict 
The Sudan and South Sudan have known more war than peace since their 
respective independence, and this can best be understood and explained in terms 
of their pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial realities. The pre-colonial political 
organization of the Sudanese community, like other African societies, was generally 
based on independent kingdoms and sultanates, controlling varying amounts of 
territory and engaged in trade, cultural interchange and military conflict (Masabo 
2013: 139); which means that Sudan was composed of different nations; but as from 
1821 to 1956, it was under different external political control. As a political entity, 
Sudan is a recent creation (Kabbede 1997: 16). Modern Sudan, therefore, had its 
origins in an amalgamation of existing pre-colonial states: Nubia, Kush, Funj, Fur 
and Southern chiefdoms, including the Zande empire, Anuak and Shilluk Kingdoms  
and the Ottoman Empire, 1821-1885; and the Anglo Egyptian Condominium’s 
colonial state, from 1898-1956 (Lesch 1998: 25). For nearly two centuries, the 
people of Southern Sudan, as part of Sudan, suffered under different colonial rules.  
Guided by the different colonial policies and ideological orientations, these historical 
stages of state formation in Sudan contributed to the intricate sources of uneasy 
relations between the Southern and Northern regions of Sudan after independence 
in 1956. These relations were marked by decades of conflict which started months 
before the withdrawal of the British imperial power (Johnson 2011: 21). Shaped by 
the patterns of the colonial administration and its ‘Southern policy’ (explained below) 
and the governance systems adopted by the post-colonial leaders in Sudan, these 
relations remained the source of conflict for more than the second half of the 
twentieth century (Young 2012: 19). Depending on the analytical dimensions and the 
tools employed, the multiple causes of the conflict which are intricately inter-related, 
have been broadly identified: it is commonly argued that the origin of the conflict lay 
largely with the skewed colonial policy that concentrated political, economic and 
administrative development in the North; in cultural and religious issues and 
competition for political dominance, later perpetuated by oil resources (Masabo 
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2013: 143).  The genesis of the North-South conflict is therefore, generally,  
attributed to the colonial past (Kabbede 1997: 16). 
Colonial activities ranged from the slave trade, particularly brutal during Turko-
Egyptian colonial rule; the exploitation of resources such as ivory and elephant tusks 
and the slave trade mainly during the Mahdist rule; and the unequal treatment, 
marginalization of certain groups and concentration of socio-economic development 
in selected areas to the neglect of others mainly under Anglo-Egyptian rule (Kabbede 
1997: 16). A brief analysis of the British colonial policy concerning South Sudan is 
of special significance in this section.   
3.2 The British Southern Policy 
The organization and treatment of the Sudanese, resulting from the different and 
foreign control of the Sudan, was based on racial and religious criteria. For example, 
capitalizing on the socio-cultural and racial differences, the British instituted the 
Southern policy (1922-1947) which intensified the North-South divide and later led 
to the outbreak of the first civil war following the military mutiny in 1955 which marked 
the beginning of Southern secessionist struggles (Masabo 2013: 139). The North-
South geographical division was instituted in 1922 when the British adopted a 
separate system of administration for the Southern region, consisting of the 
provinces of Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile (Collins 2008). 
Administratively the three provinces were segregated until 1947, and were largely 
ignored in terms of social and economic development (Kabbede 1997: 17). The few 
social services such as schools and clinics that were available were provided by 
Christian Missionaries for the most part. There was also the idea that the British 
generally did not want to spend any money on empire, so, they relied on missionaries 
and a handful of administrators in the South to minimize costs, and worked 
extensively through indirect rule, i.e. ‘customary authorities’ in both Southern and 
Northern regions.  
The ‘Southern Policy’ stated that “the administration of the South was to be 
developed along ‘African’, rather than ‘Arab’ lines, and that the future of the Southern 
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Sudan might ultimately lie with the countries of East Africa, rather than with the 
Middle East” (Johnson 2011: 11). As early as the 7th century, the Northern part of 
Sudan had evolved along Islamic/Arabized lines with its cultural orientation towards 
Egypt and the Arab World; while the Southern part of Sudan evolved along African 
lines, with its cultural orientation towards Africa (Nantulya 2004: 1). While the idea 
of ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ identities are also constructs, it seemed that the British 
Southern policy (differently interpreted) followed on this early development. These 
two competing identities became a crucial issue at the heart of the conflict in Sudan.  
Two different patterns of administration for the North and the South were already in 
practice prior to the enunciation of the policy (Johnson 2011: 11): Administrative 
patterns neglected Southern regions and eventually left the South and other 
peripheral parts17 of the Sudan vulnerable at independence to their northern 
counterpart, mainly the tribes of central Sudan. These tribes, in particular the 
Jaliyyin,  Shaggiya, and Danagla,  received most benefits from British colonialism, 
the best opportunities for education, and held the key positions in the colonial state 
(Young 2012: 3). The British aimed to build a firm alliance with tribal notables and 
leading merchants and religious families in the North to counter the influence of its 
Egyptian partner in the joint rule of Sudan; and up until 1947, Britain had not been 
fully committed to administering the South as part of Sudan, entertaining the notion 
that it might eventually be linked to the East African colonies as per the ‘Southern 
Policy’ (Johnson 2011: 25).  
The South was virtually administered as a separate state after the British introduced 
the ‘Closed Districts’ Ordinance’,18 another colonial policy which precluded northern 
                                                     
17 Although discussions in the following sections centred on South-North war, a reference is made here on 
core-periphery understanding of Sudan’s power structures, development and civil wars.  
18 Closed District Ordinances were used throughout the British Empire to restrict access to specific districts for 
a variety of reasons, usually economic. They were applied to anyone who was not a member of the district 
being closed, who then had to apply for a permit to enter. Parts of Darfur and Nuba Mountains were closed 
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merchants and others from going to the South and prepared the South to join the 
British colonies in East Africa (Young 2012: 3). The ‘Closed District Ordinance’ was 
a way to build a bulwark against the slave trade, the spread of Islam and the Arabic 
language, and the British administration encouraged Christian missionaries19 to 
convert the Southern Sudanese from their traditional religions to Christianity, teach 
them English, discourage the use of Arabic, and even prohibiting the use of Arab 
clothing (Collins 2008: 35). Permits were required for travel between the South and 
the North and other closed Districts.  
The policy may have initially been in favour of the South, but it was a recipe for 
conflict when the South was expected to join the North rather than East Africa. These 
regions had been separate and were administered by distinct policies. Moreover,  
the turning over of state power to the Northern elite, created serious resentment in 
the South where the handover of power was viewed as exchanging one colonial 
authority for another (Young 2012: 3). The failure of the colonial authorities to allow 
the people of the Closed Districts to exercise their rights to self-determination when 
                                                     
districts, and later White Nile district, initially as part of the belated efforts to combat the residual slave trade. 
But the list of closed districts changed over time (conversation with Douglas Johnson, 13/2/2018) 
19 Historical accounts on the role of missionaries was not homogeneous. Relationships between colonial 
government and missionaries were not always cordial. British administrators often had an ambivalent attitude 
towards missionaries and the education they provided. Missions were regulated by the sphere system, which 
was put in place to prevent sectarian disputes being imported to the Southern provinces. During the 1920s 
and 1930s the ideals of Native Administration as practised in most parts of the South meant that 
administrators were happy for South Sudanese to be educated in their vernacular languages, but they wanted 
to return school children to their home areas as “better villagers”. In Upper Nile especially, some British 
administrators were very much against missionaries introducing clothing, or introducing ideas that would 
upset native custom. There was also the national question since not all missionaries were British: Austria was 
enemy aliens since World War I. Italians in World War II, Americans and Australians were being disapproved 
of as being “colonials” (conversation with Douglas Johnson, 13/2/2018). 
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the British abruptly reversed their policy in 1947 was one of the main factors that 
contributed to the first civil war in Sudan: a rebellion which started with a mutiny in 
Torit in 1955, four months before Sudan’s independence on 1st January 1956 and 
raged for 17 years (1955-1972). The rebellion called for full independence of South 
Sudan and was led by Joseph Lagu of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SSLM) with its military wing the ‘Anyanya’ guerilla army. Somewhat akin to colonial 
policies, the post-independence administrative system and ideology were factors 
that perpetuated the North-South’s decades of conflict.  
3.3 Post-colonial Administration, Ideology and cultural perception 
Sudan’s post-independence governance established an unequal relationship 
between the centralizing power of the state and its peripheries (Johnson 2011). This 
marginalized regions such as Southern Sudan, Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile 
and Eastern Sudan (Waihenya 2006: 48-9). The state machinery was controlled by 
a few northern elites who dominated the government, as they were the ones who 
were privileged with better education during the colonial period. These elites 
advocated a brand of Sudanese nationalism shaped in their own image; and initiated 
policies of national culture that promoted homogenization around this image, which 
served to undermine the culture, identity and customs of the Sudanese people who 
did not fit this model. Drawing on this idea, Collins (2008: 137) argues that in the 
history of independent Sudan there has always been a persistent and pervasive 
assumption that Sudan was an Arab nation whose citizens would eventually adopt 
Arab culture, language and religion. This was a deep-seated conviction in northern 
Sudan which, given the diversity of the country, was unfortunately divorced from 
reality as manifested in the subsequent rebellions.  
Islamization and Arabization agenda was common to all successive post-colonial 
regimes as each introduced its own brand of political Islam and attempted to 
legitimize its control through fostering an Islamic-Arab identity for the country (Young 
2012: 4). This was vehemently opposed by the Southerners who saw it as another 
form of slavery (Masabo 2013: 144). Sudan has a duality of identities as it is both 
African and Arab and practices more than one religion. Although the country is 
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predominantly Islamic in terms of religion, mainly in the North, it inhibits a 
considerable number of citizens from practising religions other than Islam; the people 
from Southern Sudan, for example, practised Christianity and African traditional 
religions; as did some people in Southern Kordofan and the Southern Blue Nile. 
Despite this diversity, the successive post-independence Northern regimes 
remained intolerant. The central government, especially during the Abboud military 
regime (1958-1964), adopted and put in practice policies that undermined the 
identity, cultures and customs of the South. It imposed Islam and Arabic through 
coercive policies such as; the requirement and encouragement to chiefs and officials 
to convert and take Muslim names, use Arabic as official language when discharging 
their duties among others, and declared Friday as the weekly day of religious 
observance and rest. It also closed Mission schools and restricted Christian 
missionaries and later in 1964, expelled them from the country (Kabbede 1997: 4). 
Sharia law was imposed in 1983 by Jaafar Mohamed Numeri’s regime and the 
Arabic language was elevated as a national language and a language of instruction 
(Masabo 2013: 145). 
The successive regimes followed the same policies pursued by their predecessors; 
and consistent attempts to pursue nation-building based on Arab and Islamic identity 
were a common agenda.  Sadiq el Mahdi, for example, who became Prime Minister 
in 1966 and again in 1986, reiterated Sudan’s future by declaring that “Islam has a 
holy mission in Africa and Southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission”  (Malwal 
2005: 41). Arabization and Islamization policies would continue to play key roles in 
the conflict throughout the post-independence administration. 
3.4 The 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement 
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAA) signed in 1972 in Ethiopia between the 
GOS and the SSLM settled Sudan’s first conflict. The agreement which was 
mediated by the World Council of Churches, assisted by the All African Council of 
Churches and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), with support from the 
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, granted a large measure of autonomy to the 
South, allowing the region to have its own elected assembly and executive body that 
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would be responsible for its internal affairs. It confirmed the Southern boundaries to 
remain at independence in January 1956. It recognized the Southern religious 
beliefs, languages and traditional laws and asserted the equality between Islam, 
Christianity and local traditional beliefs as religions of the people of South Sudan 
(Bashir 1984: 27). It also accepted the reintegration of the Anyanya guerrilla fighters 
into the national defence forces, to resettle and rehabilitate the people dislocated by 
the war and to create better conditions for development opportunities (Deng 1987). 
The agreement did not include any indigenous mechanisms. 
Although the most important event in the political history of the post-independence 
Sudan and one which underscored the fact that national unity is possible in diversity 
(Kabbede 1997: 6), the agreement lasted for only a decade as President Jaafar 
Mohamed Nimeri was unfaithful to its terms. As will be discussed in the following 
section of this chapter, this was to become a trend that leaders brokered agreements 
but did not implement them. Southerners continued to be marginalized from the 
central decision-making processes and the regime failed to pay significant attention 
to the socio-economic development needs of the region (Zerai 2010). 
The political and economic challenges faced by the regime at that time are crucial to 
an understanding of Nimeri’s behaviour regarding the agreement. Faced with 
political and economic crises in the late 1970s, Nimeri pursued political 
accommodation and reconciliation with his political opponents in the north with whom 
he had earlier fallen out, including the Muslim Brotherhood who never favoured the 
South’s self-rule. These northern political forces believed that the agreement gave 
too much to Southerners and would foster separatism (Leach 2013: 107). Their 
alliance with Nimeri was a major reason behind the abrogation of the agreement. 
But this followed a series of events in violation of the  agreement’s terms by Nimeri: 
namely, the extraction of oil after its discovery in 1979 and an attempt to redraw 
North-South borderlines around this new oil area; the construction of the Jonglei 
Canal to enhance the smooth flow of water through the Sudd to increase the supply 
for agriculture in Northern Sudan and Egypt at the expense of local residents in 
Jonglei; the use of land to extend mechanized agriculture and exploit mineral 
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resources in the South; and finally the Southern autonomous region’s re-division in 
1983, into three separate regions (Kabbede 1997: 10). 
The patronage and authoritarian systems practiced by Nimeri that allowed for his 
direct interference in Southern affairs, reinforced by ethnic and regional divisions 
among Southern political elites, facilitated the re-division (Leach 2013: 110). Most 
Southern Sudanese were opposed to the re-division and considered it not only a 
violation of the 1973 permanent constitution that granted self-rule to the South, but 
a weakening of the South’s unity (Johnson 2011: 55). The re-division of the Southern 
region contributed to serious political differences and regional tensions among the 
South Sudanese who were yet to build cohesion around a single identity; the 
bitterness would significantly increase during the SPLM/A and after the signing of 
the CPA in 2005. The South Sudanese resentment was further exacerbated by the 
imposition of Sharia, also known as the ‘September Law’, nationwide in 1983; but 
this came when the SPLM/A had already started in June of the same year with a 
mutiny in Bor (Lesch 1998: 47). 
The SPLM published a manifesto after the Bor mutiny in 1983, and despite the 
manifesto’s focus on the grievances of the South, the non-separatist vision 
advocated by its leader John Garang was to establish a democratic ‘New Sudan’ 
where there would be justice for all, equal treatment and development and respect 
for diversity (Collins 2008: 142).  Supporters of this idea were drawn from most of 
the marginalized communities in the Sudan, particularly from Southern Kordofan, 
Blue Nile, Abyei and later Eastern Sudan20, who had hoped for a wide democratic 
change in the country (Johnson 2011: 64). The SPLM/A’s commitment to a united 
Sudan meant that it could form a common political front with the exiled northern 
                                                     
20 The people of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile who equally felt marginalized, joined the SPLM/A, 
and fought alongside Southern Sudanese because they had hoped for a democratic change; but were to be 
disappointed by the CPA and its provisions which exclusively defined Sudan’s conflict in North-South terms. 
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Sudanese opposition parties (Johnson 2016a: 143), hence, the creation of the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1995, a coalition of internal and exiled 
opposition parties in the North and the South. It was made up of the SPLM/A, 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Umma Party (UP) and other smaller northern 
parties. As an anti-government umbrella group, it opened the Northern-Eastern 
Sudanese front to the civil war and made it a centre-periphery rather than simply a 
North-South conflict (OCHA 2006: 4). 
But in 1991 SPLM/A suffered a split21 that pitted the Torit faction of John Garang 
against the Nasir faction of Riek Machar and Lam Akol which announced its goal to 
be the total independence of the South (Johnson 2016a: 44). However, despite their 
call for independence of the South, like the Anyanya 2, the Nasir faction continued 
to get its support from Khartoum, a situation which Khartoum tolerated to weaken 
the liberation Movement. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the split was to 
have a negative impact on the Movement and relationships amongst South 
Sudanese communities. 
3.5 The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
The 2005 Sudan CPA ended the 21 years of North-South civil war.  Peace initiatives 
to resolve the conflict were undertaken by various individuals, organizations and 
governments (Malwal 2005: 25). Peace talks in the early years of the war were 
conducted in Nairobi and Addis Ababa in 1989. The Nigerian government facilitated 
two rounds of peace negotiations, referred to as Abuja 1 and Abuja 2 in 1992 and 
                                                     
21 In August 1991, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, SPLA Commanders in Nasir announced the overthrow of John 
Garang, SPLA/M leader. They denounced Garang as a dictator, called for greater democracy in the SPLM/SPLA 
command structures, and pledged themselves to a greater respect for human rights especially in the regards 
to the release of political prisoners, and a halt to the recruitment of child soldiers. They also announced that 
the SPLM/SPLA’s new objective was to obtain the independence of the Southern Sudan. The main targets and 
casualties of the fights between the factions in Bor and Kongor districts were civilians (Johnson, 2011: 97).  
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1993 respectively (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 131). The most promising internal 
attempt at achieving peace was the DUP-SPLM/A agreement in 1989 which was 
aborted in the same year, when the National Islamic Front (NIF), which became the 
Sudan’s ruling party, overthrew the Sadiq al-Mahdi government (Young 2012: 81). 
The delay in reaching a peace deal made analysts question whether the parties in 
conflict were negotiating in good faith. Young (2012: 79), for example, attributes the 
failure to reach a peace deal to Khartoum’s regime which was reluctant to accept a 
political process and was committed to making the war against the SPLM/A into a 
jihad.22  
The “New Sudan” agenda of the SPLM/A, on the other hand, was unlikely to be 
attained except by war (Malwal 2005: 16). This became an incentive to pursue a war, 
particularly because as noted above, the slogan had attracted a huge following from 
different marginalized areas of Sudan, as the war has been called by the name of 
“national liberation”. The divide-and-rule, and proxy militia, aspects of the war after 
the 1991 split; and how all sides and militias were often profiting from the conflict for 
example, through controlling border points, oil areas, aid routes and so forth, was 
also a factor that prolonged the civil war. This resonates with Boege’s observation 
on how large-scale violent conflicts like in the case of Sudan’s war attract a host of 
actors, issues and motives, where in the context of globalized markets, war 
economies emerged; and actors in these war economies (warlords among others), 
are often linked to non-state traditional social entities  (Boege 2011: 433). 
                                                     
22 Following the NIF taking power in Khartoum on 30th June 1989 through a coup led by Brigadier General 
Omar Hassan Al Bashir, of the Revolutionary Command Council, a set of structural changes and processes 
were set in motion to serve and secure the new Islamic model. These processes included Islamization, Arabism 
and Mobilization of armed militia to fight a jihad, (Holy War) against any groups or regions mounting 
resistance. The rebellions in the South was branded as resistance to Islam that called for a jihad which 
attracted foreign elements from the Muslim world. Sudan was to be governed by Islamic principles and the 
laws of Quran according to the interpretations and regulations of the NIF led by Turabi. 
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After over a decade of unsuccessful peacemaking attempts by regional bodies, the 
IGAD, backed by a consortium of its international friends, notably the United States 
of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway, known as the ‘Troika’, and 
Italy, the AU and other peace partners, brokered the CPA (Malwal 2005: 11). Several 
factors contributed to the rejuvenation of the peace process that finally brought about 
the CPA, and key among them were the following: firstly, both sides to the conflict 
apparently had come to a position of a hurting stalemate. A hurting stalemate is a 
situation where each side in a conflict comes to the determination, following a cost 
and benefit analysis, that outright military victory is unlikely or impossible and so 
there is more to be gained from a cessation of hostilities and engagement in the 
negotiation process than maintaining the status quo of violent conflict (Antwi-
Boateng and O' Mahony 2008: 134). The stalemate which developed in the late 
1990s paved the way for the negotiations resulting in 2005’s CPA (LeRiche and 
Arnold 2012: 89).  
Secondly, developments in the international, regional and sub-regional arenas, 
especially the end of the Cold War, and changes in the international political climate, 
played a pivotal role. Communism fell and the Derg regime in Ethiopia was 
overthrown in 1991, which lost the SPLM/A the support it had enjoyed from the 
Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. With heightened concerns, particularly in 
the USA, about international terrorism after 11 September 2001; and Sudan being 
identified as one of the countries on the US State Department list of state sponsors 
of terrorism, pressure was brought to bear on Sudan (Young 2012: 89). Osama Bin 
Laden and his Al Qaeda organization moved to Sudan in 1991, from where he 
directed some of his first terrorist attacks (OCHA 2006: 4).  
The NIF regime was therefore under duress to strike a quick peace deal with the 
rebels or else face a regime change. The bombing of the Dar El Shifa pharmaceutical 
plant in Khartoum North in 1998 by the Clinton administration could have been an 
early warning to the NIF regime. The passing of the Sudan Peace Act in 2002 which 
accused Sudan of genocide for killing more than two million civilians in the South 
during the civil war since 1983 (OCHA 2006: 5), and the call for further sanctions if 
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the government of Sudan was found not to be negotiating in good faith, clearly 
showed how the USA put its weight and support behind the IGAD mediated peace 
process. Internally, the regime was also under pressure; Bashir’s fallout with the 
more radical Hassan al-Turabi’s wing of the National Congress Party (NCP), a new 
name which replaced the NIF, ushered in a change of policy, which made the regime 
more palatable internationally (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 134).  
3.6 Mediation, negotiations and role of regional and international actors 
The AU as its former incarnation, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), was the 
first inter-governmental organization to directly engage with the Sudan conflict. 
Under the auspices of the OAU, peace talks were held in Abuja, Nigeria in 1992 and 
1993. SPLM/A factions; the SPLM/A Nasir of Riek and the SPLM/A Torit under 
Garang were brought together for the first time since their split in 1991, and the talks, 
to a considerable extent, forced compromise regarding the achieving of self-
determination among Southerners. This conceptual unity shaped southern politics 
during the remaining years of the war culminating in the CPA (LeRiche and Arnold 
2012: 94).  
Starting in 1993, IGAD began mediating between the warring parties. IGAD countries 
had a direct interest in working very hard to find a peaceful solution to the fighting in 
Sudan (Malwal 2005: 12). Their own internal security, especially Uganda, Kenya and 
Ethiopia, was affected through the cross-border incursions of the warring Sudanese 
factions; their social services were severely constrained by the influx of thousands 
of Sudanese refugees; and even their own domestic politics was affected by the civil 
war in Sudan. The first significant milestone of IGAD’s efforts, achieved in 
September 1994, was a Declaration of Principles (DoP), postulating the right of 
Southern self-determination through a referendum and secular democracy within a 
united Sudan (LeRiche and Arnold 2012: 106). However, between 1994 and 2002 
the peace process stalled, war intensified especially among Southern factions 
following the split. 
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The IGAD peace process resumed in 2002; and based on the issues to be 
addressed in accordance with the causes of the conflict, the mediation and 
negotiation process leading to the Sudan CPA was a complex process. The main 
issues were: national identity, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization 
and the Arabization and Islamization policy’s impact on the people of Southern 
Sudan (Waihenya 2006). The peace process was set to address these issues and 
achieve peace, democratic transformation and a united Sudan. IGAD, led by Kenya, 
took on a mediation role to provide the necessary communication and facilitation to 
assist the North and South Sudan to resolve their differences and to ensure peace 
in the region. The CPA was therefore, a result of the IGAD mediation efforts. 
The role of the international community in the Sudan peace process has been 
remarkable. My discussion in this sub-section will cover this role before, during and 
after the signing of the CPA, and later in the chapter, during and after the eruption 
of the December 2013 conflict and peace process. Without strong American 
pressure, for example, the Sudan peace process would likely not have gone 
anywhere. For nearly nine years before 2002, the IGAD peace process had failed to 
make any real headway (Malwal 2005: 19). The 2002 appointment of former US 
Senator, John Danforth, as Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan was the 
beginning of serious US involvement in the Sudan peace process (OCHA 2006: 5) 
and paved the way for a clear course for peace. While pressure from the American 
human rights activists and the Congressional Black Caucus attracted most attention 
within the Clinton administration, under Bush it was the Christian right, the oil 
industry and, most significantly, security and intelligence interests who pushed for 
action (Young 2012: 122). The concerns of human rights activists and the Black 
Caucus were the gross human rights violations and racial discrimination against the 
blacks in the Sudan. Church leaders mainly in Bush’s home town of Texas pressed 
him to deepen the US engagement in Sudan where Christians were being 
persecuted. This was further influenced by Bush’s personal friendship with the 
evangelist Billy Graham and his son Franklin, who operated their own NGO, 
Samaritan’s Purse, in Sudan (Young 2012: 122). 
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American interest in the oil industry in Sudan was also a factor; where they felt the 
benefits of their efforts at Chevron establishing the oil industry in Sudan in the 1970s 
were being reaped by Asian companies and the Talisman Company in Canada. 
Achieving a peace agreement by the Bush administration would end the embargo 
imposed by Clinton’s administration and provide security for them to operate in 
Sudan (Young 2012: 123). But the US also had security interests to pursue in the 
Sudan. As noted above, the hosting of the Al Qaeda organization by Sudan posed 
a threat to the US and to international peace and security. Urgent action was needed 
to disrupt this terrorist activity by ending the conflict in Sudan. Some of the credit for 
the signing of the CPA therefore, goes to the USA and three European countries: 
Britain, Norway and Italy, who cooperated in facilitating funding to the peace process 
(Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 134). 
As far back as in 1989, before the peace process, the international community had 
been heavily involved in relief and humanitarian efforts to help the Sudanese victims 
of the war (OCHA 2006: 5). The UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was the best 
testimony to the involvement of the international community to support the war 
victims in Sudan. American and European NGOs were engaged not only in providing 
relief to the people of South Sudan, but they also exposed human rights abuses and 
war atrocities committed against civilians by the warring Sudanese parties to the 
outside world and urged the world to come to the aid of the people of South Sudan 
(Malwal 2005: 17). Without the support of the UN, the exercise of self-determination 
would never have happened in accordance with the CPA, in 2005. This was 
acknowledged by the Speaker of South Sudanese Legislative Assembly (SSLA) at 
the inaugural meeting of SSLA on 8 August 2011 (Johnson 2016b: 97).  
CPA implementation 
The CPA had six protocols: the Machakos being the first; named after the town in 
Kenya where the agreed principles and the framework document, which became the 
CPA, were discussed and signed. The core CPA points included: a six-month pre-
interim period to establish the needed institutions and implementation mechanisms, 
and a six-year interim period within which these several stages were to be 
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implemented; border demarcation, a national census after two years, democratic 
elections after three years, popular consultations23 for the people of Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile, and an internationally-monitored referendum for the people 
of Southern Sudan and Abyei at the end of the six years (Antwi-Boateng and O' 
Mahony 2008: 133).  
Few of the requirements laid out in the CPA were fully met. Some were dismal 
failures, and others were never even attempted which suggests that the stated 
objectives of the peace process, namely, the unity of Sudan, democratic 
transformation and sustainable peace, were not achieved (Young 2012: 98). The 
2008 census results were contested by the South; the general elections were 
allegedly rigged and dissatisfaction with the results led to a series of rebellions. The 
big achievement for the South was the referendum on secession  in which the people 
of Southern Sudan voted 98.3 per cent for separation (Young 2012: 221). Despite 
this however, the Abyei referendum to allow the people of Abyei to choose between 
remaining as part of the North or becoming part of the South was not implemented. 
Abyei was originally a territory of the South but was transferred by the colonial 
administration to Kordofan in 1905 for administrative purposes (Johnson 2011: 171). 
In the interim period, 2010, the NCP and the SPLM agreed to a High-Level 
Implementation Panel of the African Union (AUHIP), led by Thabo Mbeki, the former 
South African President, to facilitate post-agreement arrangements though there 
was a feeling that IGAD had been side-lined (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 151). The 
Panel continues to support the parties in dealing with the outstanding post-CPA 
issues that, among others, include: the situation of Abyei, the borders between the 
two countries and the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. But since 
the eruption of the 2013 hostilities in South Sudan, which I will discuss in the next 
                                                     
23 The CPA mandated a process of popular consultation, which permits the people of Southern Kordofan and 
Blue Nile to either adopt the CPA as the final settlement between the two states and Government of Sudan 
or renegotiate the CPA to remedy any shortcomings to reach a final settlement. 
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section, the Panel’s focus has been more on Sudan’s struggle between the 
government and the various rebel groups, while IGAD has mediated the South 
Sudan dispute between the government and SPLM/A-IO.  
The failure to fully implement the CPA followed the lines of the 1972 AAA. One 
reason the elite brokered peace deals and did not implement them could be the non-
inclusive way the agreements were negotiated. The AAA centred on Joseph Lagu 
and the Sudan government, and the CPA around John Garang and Osman Taha, 
without the participation of the civil society, other political actors and armed groups.  
Putting people who had the highest authority in their respective parties to raise the 
level of negotiations; ensuring the seriousness of both parties in the negotiations, 
and giving hope for the negotiations’ success, were some of the arguments in favour 
of Garang and Ali Osman who led the process. But the assumption that they would 
continue to be in positions of authority to implement the agreement they reached 
was a major risk. Garang soon died in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005 and Ali 
Osman did not lead the NCP government and was later removed from office (Young 
2012: 106-7). Moreover, the two had agreed that critical issues, ranging from Abyei 
to border demarcation and reconciliation, would be resolved in the presidency of 
which both would be members; and in the event, many of the most intractable 
problems facing the implementation of the CPA were left to the presidency, but they 
remained unresolved. 
3.7 Critique of the CPA Process 
The CPA process, based on the liberal peace approach has been critiqued for 
several weaknesses. Apart from its usual quick-fix- exit strategy to conflict resolution, 
other interlocutors such as, civil society, faith-based actors, traditional authorities, 
and other armed groups from both South and North Sudan were excluded from the 
process. This section of Chapter Three argues that the failure to be inclusive, and to 
recognize, appreciate, and incorporate indigenous mechanisms and cultural 
resources in the peace process to address the grievances and reconcile the bitterly 
divided communities is largely responsible for the persistence of armed conflict in 
South Sudan. This is also the case with conflicts in the border areas between Sudan 
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and South Sudan. I now turn to discuss some of the key weaknesses and the 
limitations of the international efforts at peacemaking in South Sudan regarding the 
2005 CPA.  
3.7.1 Exclusion of Civil society, Political Parties and Other Armed Groups 
The role of civil society, both international and local, is crucial in peacemaking and 
sustainable peacebuilding, particularly in a war where multiple non-state actors were 
involved, and characterized by a weakened social fabric and polarized communities. 
Under such circumstances, civil society, traditional authorities and women play a 
role in trust and relationship building leading to reconciliation. Young (2012: 109) 
argues that the negotiating parties’ claims that some political parties and civil society 
elements were consulted, were  unevidenced and untrue, and that negotiations were 
monopolized by the Sudan government and the SPLM/A. The IGAD peace process 
was confined to the warring parties even though the Sudanese political situation was 
too complicated to be resolved by the two parties on their own (Malwal 2005: 32).  
The armed groups, especially the liberation movements that signed the Khartoum 
and Fashoda Peace Agreements, were also excluded from the peace process 
(LeRiche and Arnold 2012: 99). The Khartoum and Fashoda peace agreements 
were the accords signed by Riek Machar and Lam Akol respectively with the 
government in Khartoum following their split from the SPLM/A Torit faction in 1991, 
and their own (Riek and Lam) split within Nasir faction. The South Sudan Defence 
Force (SSDF), for example, a militia group collectively known in the agreement as 
“other armed groups”, was almost the size of SPLM/A mainstream; it was formidable 
enough to be a peace agreement spoiler, but was still marginalized from the IGAD 
peace process. For several years during the struggle, this force fought the SPLM/A 
alongside the SAF (OCHA 2006: 5). Backed by the US, Garang was strongly 
opposed to the bringing of the SSDF into the peace process and it seemed they had 
agreed that the SSDF be banned within one year, which of course meant impending 
danger to peace in the South. The only reason this did not happen was that with the 
death of Garang and the coming to power of Salva Kiir Mayardit, an agreement to 
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incorporate the SSDF into the SPLA was reached on 8th January 2006, known as 
the Juba Declaration (Thomas 2015: 211). 
The absence of a civil society, political parties and other armed groups from the 
negotiations meant that the mediation was narrowly focused and therefore, lacked 
inclusivity which in turn suggested that it ran counter to the stated objectives of the 
CPA: sustainable peace, democratic transformation and making the unity of Sudan 
attractive to all parties. Since neither the SPLM nor the NCP wanted a civil society 
and the traditional authorities to play a role in the peace process, and since the 
mediators plus the US-led quartet (the US, Norway, the UK and Italy) appeared to 
share these sentiments, the result of the peace process was that the root causes of 
the conflict and grievances remained unaddressed, resolutions were not 
implemented, and localized wars continued. There was a brief resumption of war in 
Higlig between Sudan and South Sudan, a continuation of wars in the three areas of 
Abyei, Southern Kordofan and South Blue Nile, and a proliferation of inter-communal 
conflicts in South Sudan and, finally, South Sudan’s descent into civil war in 2013.  
Moreover, despite the CPA’s exclusive focus on the North-South conflict during the 
negotiations, there was no attempt to address the intra-South conflicts which were 
fought alongside the 22 years of civil war. A respondent said, “there were two sets 
of conflict in Sudan; intra South Sudan and North-South Sudan, where the former 
was going on concurrently with the later” (KI 30: 9/3/16)24.The North-South conflict 
was the focus of the IGAD mediation, which completely ignored the South-South 
conflicts, which probably caused the most suffering to the people of Southern Sudan 
and which continued even after the South gained independence. Furthermore, no 
constructive efforts were made during the peace process or since the signing of the 
CPA to seriously confront the pain, trauma, bitterness, and distrust that the war had 
inflicted on the population. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), widely 
                                                     
24 Interview 30, with a Human Rights Lawyer: (9/3/2016) 
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supported by civil society, was written off by the negotiating parties claiming that it 
would undermine the peace process (Young 2012: 116).  
The Sudan peace process made no attempt to build trust between the parties. One 
reason the CPA failed to achieve its aims was a lack of trust between the SPLM and 
the NCP, which continued through the implementation and the post-CPA periods. 
Trust could have only come about through extensive meetings and debates, and not 
through the liberal peace model where mediators followed prescriptive and legalistic 
procedures, imposing strict timetables, and establishing a vast array of commissions 
and other bodies (Young 2012: 116). Unlike the CPA, the 1999 Wunlit people-to-
people peace process (PPP), for example, between the Nuer and the Dinka built 
trust and repaired relationship. Wunlit peace process is dealt with in Chapter Four.  
This lack of reconciliation has been of great significance, particularly for the 
northerners and southerners who lived in the border areas and whose lives were 
highly interdependent, notably the Abyei people and the Misseriya nomads: their 
problems were exacerbated during the war but not addressed by the CPA (Young 
2012: 113). Moreover, the need for north-south reconciliation, if the supposed 
commitment to a united Sudan was to be achieved, could only be realized by 
involving the Sudanese people, and the starting point for this would likely have been 
via civil society and traditional actors (Young 2012: 112). As the case of South Sudan 
illustrates, it appears that liberal peacebuilders tend to pursue their agenda of 
democratization, economic liberalization, respect for human rights and rule of law, 
promotion of civil society and good governance (Harris 2013: 155), rather than to 
improve the role of native mediation in civil war situations. Thus, local civil society 
and local strategies were excluded from the entire process. 
The peace process was a top-down approach intended only to serve the interests of 
the peace partners (Young 2012: 79). It followed the all too familiar manifestation of 
liberal Western discourse hegemony in addressing and resolving conflicts in Africa, 
which is fashioned by the universalistic conflict resolution formula of peace 
negotiations with a trajectory of ceasefire agreements, transitional governments, 
demilitarization and constitutional reforms, democratic elections and transitional 
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justice based on judicial mechanisms (Daley 2006). The 2010 general elections, 
although endorsed by the international community, were marked by violence, 
harassment, intimidations by the government security in favour of the SPLM party, 
followed by rigging of the elections results (Young 2012: 136). As will be discussed 
in the next section, this was followed by local rebellions particularly in Jonglei state 
of losing candidates of the elections.  
 
Source: pickle92.wordpress.com&www.icrc.org 
3.8 Post CPA and post-independence conflicts 
Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, and the country’s independence achieved on 
9th July 2011, peace in South Sudan remains fragile. At independence, the 
government of South Sudan (GOSS) was embroiled in a multitude of crises and 
Sudan and South Sudan almost went to war during negotiations over the terms of 
secession; oil production shortly stopped and battles were fought (Rolandsen and 
Daly 2016: 151). There has been a recurrence of hostilities between the two 
countries along the border and resource-rich areas. According to Copnall (2014: 
220), at the separation of the two states in 2011 there was no agreement over the 
precise South-North border line, as the border was in dispute, with several areas 
being claimed by both parties. Again, when South Sudan became independent, the 
Figure 3: Map of Sudan (Left) and Map of South Sudan (Right) 
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North lost 75 per cent of its oil reserves, but the South as a land-locked country 
remained reliant on the Northern oil infrastructure of: pipelines, refineries and the 
seaport to export its oil. The unresolved oil issue became a major obstacle in the 
relations between the two states and as such constituted a serious impediment to 
peace between them. 
The aftermath of the elections provided for in the CPA was characterized by 
rebellions of the candidates who either refused to concede defeat or claimed there 
was vote rigging. It can be argued that the general election and its aftermath was 
the salient factor that created a crack in the relationship between the liberation 
fighters, their communities and followers that would markedly widen with the eruption 
of the 2013 crises. Was the hurried general election necessary at that early phase 
of the CPA when guns were still in the hands of people emerging from two decades 
of war, and in a country, that was ignorant of democratic exercises such as 
elections? One could say it was unnecessary. But this points to the Western liberal 
practice, critiqued in chapter two, of fulfilling requirements based on the universal 
template applied in conflict situations, of state building and post conflict 
reconstruction regardless of contextual realities.  
Poor integration was another factor that contributed to post-CPA clashes. The 
repatriation of South Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
was initiated between 2006 and 2008, when the government’s focus was mainly on 
implementing the key milestones of the agreement, notably the 2008 census, the 
2010 elections, and the 2011 referendum. Both governments, the SPLM and the 
NCP, were vying with each other to make sure that they mobilized people for their 
own objectives. The SPLM now wanted to ensure secession for South Sudan, and 
Khartoum was struggling to keep a united Sudan. The return movements were 
organized by the government simply at ad hoc level, without any proper analysis or 
re-integration plans or any idea of what services were available on the ground. The 
main participants in the repatriation programme were therefore, the UN and the 
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International Organization for Migration (IOM) (KI 27: 7/3/16)25. This means that 
there was no proper linkage between the re-integration plan and the available 
development plan of the country as the two would normally be expected to merge 
and smoothly transmute into development.  
Failing to find basic services, such as schools, health services, water and shelter 
among others, by 2008, many displaced people decided to return to wherever they 
had been during the war. Those who remained found themselves embroiled in 
conflicts between the host communities and the returnees where re-integration was 
only managed by the customary authorities (chiefs and elders). The diverse cultures, 
behaviours and practices adopted by those returning from their countries of exile 
notably: Northern Sudan and the East African countries of Uganda and Kenya, were 
also a source of resentment as the host communities were intolerant of these new 
life styles which were different to theirs. These contradictions especially among 
young people gave rise to unfortunate stereotypes that caused tensions and 
problems even within families. These included notions related to the use of 
language, dressing code, eating habits and the use of the toilet, among others.  
During the war people lost most of their resources. When they returned, there was 
rampant land grabbing, and a conflict of establishing historical rights, community 
rights and rights to urban space. Cattle-keeping communities opted to begin raids; 
continuing older patterns of raiding, particularly with inflation in bride wealth costs, 
and this was fuelled by the proliferation of arms in the hands of the people (KI 27: 
7/3/16)26 Pastoralists and farmers were also in conflicts mainly in Equatoria.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
The livelihood of farmers depends on the crops just as that of pastoralists on their 
animals; so, when the latter drive their animals into farmers’ fields it means 
confrontation, and because everybody wants to survive the farmers will obviously 
react and this often ends in violence (KI 31:10/2/16)27. But the most crucial cause of 
                                                     
25 Interview 27, with a South Sudanese intellectual: (7/3/2016)  
26 Interview 27, with a South Sudanese intellectual: (7/3/2016)  
27 Interview 31, with an Academic: (10/2/2016) 
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hostility is the proliferation of small arms which reinforces violence. Most of the 
pastoralists are armed and when they come into confrontation with farmers, they 
don’t have to negotiate but use force and this degenerates into wider confrontations 
with the opposing communities. Most often these skirmishes at lower level escalate 
to national level. Such hostilities have been seen in places like Western, Eastern 
and Central Equatoria states where peace conferences have been held to build 
amicable relationships (KI: 31: 10/2/16)28.  
3.9 Reconciliation efforts in South Sudan  
While justice and accountability for the human rights violations committed during the 
two decades of conflict were totally downplayed by the negotiating parties, 
reconciliation was only included as an ad hoc in the CPA which failed to take place 
(Waihenya 2006: 158). The non-inclusive nature of the peace process meant that 
the two parties to the conflict negotiated the peace in their own interests and terms, 
and avoided any issue that would implicate them. According to Young (2012: 112), 
both the NCP and the SPLM were reluctant to accept any form of transitional justice 
mechanisms. The transitional justice component was therefore not included in the 
agreement. However, as I will shortly discuss, there were some efforts after the 
independence of South Sudan in 2011 to bring about reconciliation and these 
included; President Salva Kiir’s “big tent policy” (discussed below), the establishment 
of a national healing and reconciliation committee, and civilian disarmament. 
3.9.1 The big tent policy  
The different militia and armed groups in South Sudan as noted above, were 
excluded from the peace process and held grudges when the CPA was signed in 
January 2005. Most of these groups known in the CPA as “Other Armed Groups”, 
particularly the SSDF, which fought the SPLA for many years during the war 
alongside the SAF; and in return received money and supplies of arms from 
                                                     
28 Interview 31, with an Academic: (10/2/2016) 
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Khartoum (Johnson 2014: 305). With his ‘big tent policy’ intended to bring all South 
Sudanese under one big national umbrella, President Salva Kiir offered amnesty as 
part of reconciliation to all the armed factions. This offer was accepted on 8 January 
2006 at the Juba Declaration by Paolino Matip, the leader of the SSDF (Hutchinson 
and Pendle 2015: 421).  
The big tent policy averted armed clashes that could have been imminent between 
the other armed groups, especially the SSDF and the SPLA, in a bid for inclusion 
and recognition during the interim period. Already, in the wake of the signing of the 
CPA, war loomed between the SPLA and SSDF, in addition to the outbreak of a 
multitude of local conflicts suppressed by the war (Young 2012: 133). The amnesty 
also united South Sudanese for the referendum vote in January 2011. Though the 
intention of the policy was good, it was seemingly a repeat of the 1972 amnesty 
offered by President Nimeri that did not serve the reconciliation needs of the 
Sudanese. These SSDF forces failed to fully integrate with the mainstream SPLA, 
but remained loyal to their individual commanders and groups, only to realign along 
ethnic lines during later hostilities. Johnson (2014a: 305) attributes the parallel 
problem within the SPLA to an incomplete recovery from the split in the 1990s. 
3.9.2 Civilian Disarmament 
Two civilian disarmament campaigns were carried out in South Sudan during the 
CPA interim period and after the independence of South Sudan respectively. What 
prompted the disarmament campaigns? First, there were inter-communal skirmishes 
across the country throughout the interim period of the CPA, particularly in Jonglei 
state.  According to Johnson (2014a: 305), the most serious threats to South Sudan’s 
security prior to 2013 was ongoing fighting between mainly armed civilian groups in 
Jonglei state, which was partly an unresolved legacy of the war. Jonglei had been a 
recruiting ground for anti-SPLA militias by Khartoum, especially among the Murle of 
Pibor; and during the SPLA split in the 1990s, many Nuer civilian groups also armed 
themselves to fight the SPLA and to protect themselves against their similarly armed 
neighbours (Johnson 2014a: 305). Like much of South Sudan, Jonglei was awash 
with weapons, and civilian disarmament became a priority during the interim period. 
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The absence of reconciliation component in the CPA meant that community 
grievances remained unaddressed and scores were now being settled through a 
cycle of revenge attacks.  
The year 2009 in particular witnessed one of the most volatile situations in the 
country of inter-communal fighting mainly in Jonglei state (Johnson 2016b: 102). 
Cattle-raiding turned into very violent attacks on villages with hundreds of children 
and women killed or abducted in the aftermath. The scale of direct attacks on civilian 
communities by armed youths became a matter of concern. The deadliest were the 
attacks carried out by the Lou Nuer on Murle in Pibor, and the counter-attacks in 
Akobo which prompted the government to disarm armed youths all over Jonglei; Lou 
Nuer, Murle and Dinka (Johnson 2016b: 102). It was unlike the traditional cattle 
raiding which was carried out using spears, bows and arrows and guided by some 
ethical considerations. The use of sophisticated machine guns complicated the 
matter. The militarization of the youth in both Murle and Nuer society during most of 
the SPLM/A war also impacted negatively on traditional institutions and 
mechanisms. With guns in their hands, the generational balance of power appeared 
to have shifted from traditional leaders towards the youth.  
But despite the disarmament plans, which were to be simultaneously carried out 
amongst the three communities in two phases: first voluntarily, then; second 
forcefully if needs be; the campaigns generally resulted in failure and in human rights 
violations. The SPLA forces deployed to disarm the civilian population in Jonglei did 
not receive regular food supplies, and instead subsisted on the cattle belonging to 
the inhabitants, thus further exacerbating local problems (Young 2012: 2). Between 
2009 and 2010 for example, disarmament failed because the Lou Nuer and Murle, 
communities managed to hide weapons, and the voluntary aspect of the process 
was short-lived; proliferation of weapons thereafter fuelled civilian violence, with a 
series of smaller raids.  
The largely voluntary start of the campaign and the relatively peaceful manner with 
which it proceeded could be attributed to community leaders who may have 
convinced the youth to cooperate. Though the first campaign was met with casualties 
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among both the SPLA and the White Army,29 the chiefs saw disarmament of the 
latter as critical to efforts to regain authority in their communities. The casualties 
were reportedly great. According to Young (2007:6), estimates of the death toll 
fluctuated; at least 400 SPLA soldiers died, yet some put the number at 700 and the 
UN officially claimed 1,200 White Army fighters had died during the disarmament 
campaign. The estimated quantity of weapons collected in the Jonglei disarmament 
ranged from 3,300 to 3,701 (Johnson 2016b)  
The second comprehensive disarmament campaign was launched by the 
government in 2012, but the count of weapons collected was small and armed 
groups continued to operate in different part of the state (Johnson 2014a: 306). 
There was limited cooperation with community leaders; the SPLA was in the forefront 
of the process, and its contingents were Nuer. This raised concern that ethnicity was 
a motivating factor behind their rougher and at times violent behaviour which 
prompted the Pibor commissioner to call for a temporary suspension of the 
disarmament for fear that Murle youth would join the escalating rebellion led by one 
of their members by the name of David Yau Yau  (Johnson 2016b: 117).  
Reconciliation was thought to be the only solution to the cycle of violence. The stalled 
Jonglei peace process was re-launched and Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, of the 
Episcopal Church of South Sudan and Sudan, was appointed by the President to 
chair the committee for Community Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance (Johnson 
2016b: 115). This second try included all the ethnic groups of Jonglei, and visits to 
all communities in the state, including: meetings with youths, women, chiefs and 
                                                     
29 The White Army is an armed Nuer youth group formed in 1991 during the SPLA split of the 1990s and 
continued to recruit more members to add to their rank. They were known for their involvement in the Bor 
Massacre of 1991 in collaboration with the regular units of Riek Machar’s Nasir faction of the SPLA. Their name 
derived from the fact that they were not a uniformed force and was irregularly armed. The White Army is not 
part of the militias defined as ‘Other Armed Groups’ in the CPA (Johnson, 2014:306). 
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other leaders, all of which culminated in an All Jonglei Peace Conference. A 
Framework Agreement for peace was signed on 5 May, 2012 by the paramount 
chiefs of all these communities (Johnson 2016b: 115). The agreement was important 
owing to its commitment to return abducted women and children. A peaceful 
disarmament with UNMISS’30 involvement was recommended by all the three 
communities at the peace conference, but was interrupted by the 2013 eruption of 
conflict in Juba. The recommendation of UNMISS’s involvement demonstrates 
hybridity in action, and is indicative of the possibility of a convergence of the local 
and international approaches that will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
3.9.3 National Reconciliation Process 
In 2013, a committee was arranged by the government of South Sudan to champion 
a national healing and reconciliation process under the leadership of the then Vice 
President Riek Machar, but he was soon removed and replaced by the Church’s 
leadership (Ashworth 2014: 222). Much as the role of this committee was important 
for the reconciliation of the fragmented communities, its establishment, as explained 
below, was characterized by several controversies. The process lacked a legal basis 
and was alleged to have been politicized. First, the committee was constituted by a 
Presidential decree instead of an Act of Parliament. The CPA was no longer in force 
after the independence of South Sudan; which meant that the legal basis for such a 
process would only come from the parliament. Second, the removal and replacement 
of the committee’s first chair, Dr. Riek Machar, was also seen as a move taken on 
political grounds. Moreover, there were no reconciliation efforts before 2013, 
                                                     
30 The UNMISS facilitated the entire process, through transport and logistical support, and with their civil 
affairs officers. At the same time, UNMISS engaged actively with political leaders of the different communities, 
both in Juba and in Jonglei (Johnson, 2016:115). 
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presumably to avoid engaging with past hurts which could have jeopardized the unity 
needed for a referendum vote.  
The committee envisaged a two-stage process to create space for reconciliation: 
first, widespread consultation and listening across the whole country at every level; 
second, an explicit reconciliation process designed after listening to the nation 
(Ashworth 2014: 222). Some progress may have been made by the committee, but 
from my conversations, both formal and informal, with several people during my 
fieldwork in South Sudan between January and June 2016, I understood that the 
committee was not popular and people seemed not to believe it would deliver. One 
of those I spoke to, for example, commented: “It is the committee of the President. 
It gets its instructions from the President and reports to the President. Key officials 
of the committee talk as if they represent the government” (KI 7: 4/2/16).31 Such 
sentiments reflect a dissatisfaction among the citizens which is associated with the 
way they think the government politically manipulates important national processes 
such as reconciliation. 
3.10 The 2013 conflict 
The cumulative outcome of the political differences, regional conflicts, legacy of war, 
failure of the CPA to address grievances, post-CPA bitter inter-communal 
relationships, rebellions and bad governance, was the 2013 crisis. In December 
2013, South Sudan plunged into a violent internal encounter. Opinions are divided 
as to the causes of the war, but one narrative runs that it was triggered by a political 
power struggle within the SPLM, the South Sudan ruling party, where a group of 
politicians from the party earlier sacked from their government positions in July of 
the same year claimed to have called for reforms in the party. The government’s 
counter narrative insisted it was an attempted coup led by the former vice-president 
Riek Machar.  
                                                     
31 Interview 7, with a Justice and Peace official: (4/2/2016  
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The tensions that amounted to this crisis have been brewing since the middle of 
2012 when the schisms within the SPLM have become public32. In the months 
leading to the December 2013 crisis, the country witnessed political actions by 
Presidential decrees that were indicative of power struggle whose explosion was 
only a matter of time. The July to December 2013 build-up to the crisis included the 
sacking of vice president Riek Machar and the entire cabinets.33 It seems that the 
earlier dismissal of senior army generals in January of 201334  was part of the tension 
as well. The final rapture was accelerated by a meeting of the National Liberation 
Council of top SPLM leadership on December 14, 2013. 
More than ten ex-cabinet ministers and officials of the SPLM alleged coup plotters, 
were arrested and detained but Riek escaped from Juba, simply to declare himself 
a few days later as the leader of the rebellion which was made up of army defectors 
and some armed civilian Nuer groups (Johnson 2014a: 300). But the Nuer civilians 
were allegedly reacting to the targeted killings of their fellow Nuers in Juba, said to 
have been orchestrated by armed youths recruited by the President (Johnson 2014a: 
300). Between December 16th  and 17th 2013, Nuer residents in Juba were 
reportedly, targeted in house-to-house searches by the Presidential Guards and 
ethnic Dinka SPLA; several hundreds were killed and thousands sought protection 
in UN compounds (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 157). The conflict spilt over to the 
army and from the army to the Dinka and Nuer ethnic communities. The ethnic 
dimension soon became more pronounced as apparently some Dinka and Nuer 
politicians and military leaders quickly invoked their experiences of the 1991 split in 
the Movement that pitted Nuer and Dinka communities against each other.  
                                                     
32 Interview 27, with a South Sudanese intellectual: (7/3/2016) 
33https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/24/south-sudan-salva-kiir-sacks-cabinet Accessed on 
20/2/2018) 
34https://paanluelwel.com/2013/01/22/names-of-retired-spla-generals-mixed-reaction-from-juba/ 
(Accessed on 20/2/2018) 
 118 
12018735 
For instance, one of the participants interviewed for this study said: “the history of 
the SPLA is littered with episodes from its past. The SPLA was already divided in 
1991 when Machar broke away and formed the Nassir group; and so, when the 2013 
incident happened, people actually recalled very easily what happened in 1991” (KI 
31: 10/2/16).35 It seemed this view was confirmed by the speech of President Salva 
Kiir at the outbreak of the war when he appeared on national television in military 
uniform and made a comparison with the ‘Bor Massacre’ of 1991 to describe the 
incident as a coup attempt. An appeal to past sentiments, such as that made by the 
President concerning an event that had taken place more than two decades earlier, 
despite Machar’s public apology, means that the wounds of the past have not yet 
healed, especially at ethnic and community levels.  
As noted above, the failure to incorporate local solutions in the CPA process had left 
unaddressed people’s grievances which included community feuds, issues of justice 
and accountability for past human rights violations and reconciliation. The 
unresolved issues resurfaced with a vengeance as a second rift developed within 
the SPLM/SPLA in Juba in late 2013 (Hutchinson and Pendle 2015: 8). According to 
Johnson (2014a: 302), the incident related to the convergence of the two parallel 
disputes that had been developing since 2005: one in the governing party, the SPLM, 
and the other in the army, the SPLA; and that both had their origins in unresolved 
tensions following the spilt in the SPLA in the 1990s and the incomplete reintegration 
of anti-SPLA forces into the SPLA after 2005.  
However, beyond that, the failure of the CPA to appreciate the history of Southern 
Sudan and the grievances amongst Southerners that preceded the inception of the 
1983 liberation struggle was an important determinant of conflict in the post CPA 
and post-independence South Sudan. Though the liberation movement managed to 
rally the support of the South Sudanese for the struggle, the CPA took it for granted 
that the South Sudanese were united. This was true to the extent that unity was 
needed to fight the number one enemy: The North. With the acquiring of an 
                                                     
35 Interview 31, with an Academic: (10/2/2016)  
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autonomous government in 2005, and independence in 2011, the full truth lay open 
for all to see: a fragmented society which was soon burdened with numerous 
problems; lack of trust between people from the three regions of Equatoria, Bahr el 
Ghazal and Upper Nile; land issues, border and boundary problems, war-time 
grievances, an actual or perceived sense of marginalization and an unfair share of 
peace dividends; all coupled with weak state institutions and bad governance, such 
a state was strongly prone to conflict.  
The inter-communal tensions that characterized relationships amongst tribes after 
the CPA and independence helped facilitate the spread of the warfare to other parts 
of the country. Important to note is that ethnicity is a social construction that has 
been used to suit different political and economic interests. For example, the 
relationships amongst southern tribes were constructed during the liberation war to 
reflect collective victimization. This sentiment was crucial and appealed to by the 
liberation leaders to create a sense of purpose and unity to fight the common enemy, 
the north. But this was reconstructed in the independent South Sudan to target other 
groups during and after the 2013 crisis. But to what extent was the war ethnic? To 
answer this question, one needs to understand the CPA legacy and the link between 
the SPLM and SPLA. 
Out of expediency, and to have a united South Sudan to secure a referendum vote 
for independence, the Juba Declaration of 2006, without vetting, incorporated all the 
different militia groups and the predominantly Nuer SSDF, into the SPLA which was 
already Dinka-dominated. By incorporating the militia groups that were inherently 
tribal by nature into one already dominated by a single tribe, the government simply 
institutionalized a tribal army (KI 30: 9/3/16).36 Lacking conventional military training, 
the idea that a national army’s role is to defend national sovereignty did not exist in 
the minds of the militias. So, when Salva Kiir, a Dinka and Riek Machar, a Nuer, 
disagreed and fell out, the move was easily extrapolated to forces that were tribal by 
nature and institutionalized that way. Consequently, they took sides. What the 
                                                     
36 Interview 30, with a Human Rights Lawyer: (9/3/2016)  
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leaders had to do from a political standpoint was simply to demonize the other tribe 
and convince his own side to stand up and fight his private war in the name of the 
entire ethnicity. This is an idea around which the militia group is built: namely, to 
protect ethnic interests (KI 30: 9/3/16).37 It can be argued therefore, that tribalism or 
ethnicity was not a cause of the war but something that sprang from political rivalry 
and the way the army was constituted. The war was described as ethnic because 
people followed their leaders; but it did not start because the Nuer hated the Dinka 
or the Dinka hated the Nuer. Johnson (2014a: 307), argues that it was the pattern of 
fighting in Juba, where (reportedly) the Nuer were targeted and the subsequent 
defections of mainly Nuer units of the SPLA that led many observers to characterize 
this as an ethnic war between the Dinka and the Nuer. 
This resonates with the view of one participant who stated: “I believe that originally 
it was not an issue of ethnic conflict. It quickly turned to violence and took on an 
ethnic dimension because our society is still a rudimentary one where people tend 
to see things in terms of the ethnicity” (KI 25: 27/2/16).38 Perhaps it is appropriate to 
describe the conflict as the consequence of a revenge factor rather than an ethnic 
war. People from both sides were killed and once the killing started, then the revenge 
dynamic followed. Another participant argues “obviously on the East Bank the Nuer 
and Dinka and Shilluk, keep fighting each other. But it is misleading to call this 
conflict an ethnic war. On the West Bank, for example, the Dinka and the Nuer are 
not fighting but Dinka are fighting Dinka, and in Unity State, it is mostly Nuer fighting 
Nuer; so, for me it is a revenge dynamic” (KI 25: 27/2/16).39 The impulse for revenge, 
takes us right back to 2009, as discussed above; the fighting between the Murlei and 
Nuer, and back to 1991, between the Nuer and the Dinka and even as far as 1983, 
the re-division (Kakora). The same participant emphasized: Even amongst church 
leaders, I have heard people say, “We will revenge on them, even if it takes us 20 or 
                                                     
37 Interview 30, with a Human Rights Lawyer: (9/3/2016)  
38 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016)  
39 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016)  
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30 years, we will get revenge” (KI 25: 27/2/16).40 In this case the desire for revenge 
seems to thrive where grievances remain unaddressed or where impunity exists. 
Conversely, failure to reform the security sector was the main cause of the war, one 
respondent asserted: the domination of the SPLA by two nationalities: the Dinkas 
and Nuers, who comprise more than 90 percent of the SPLA, cannot qualify it to be 
called a National Army (KI 18: 11/3/16).41 It seems the targeting of specific ethnic 
communities during the war could not have happened if the country had a National 
Army in which the population was proportionally represented. In terms of army 
composition, one of the respondents described the war as ethnic. “if you have 
different tribes of South Sudan represented in the national army, a single tribe could 
not be targeted like what happened to the Nuer in Juba, to the Dinka in Bor and 
Bentiu and to the Shilluk in Malakal” (KI 18: 11/2/16).42 The security sector reform to 
constitute a unified and disciplined national army, as was done during the 1972 
AAA,43 would most likely be the solution.  
Though the analysis of the 2013 conflict does not seem to indicate that the war was 
ethnic, the creation of more states by presidential decrees appear to have made it 
so. Although the idea of having more states is favoured by some communities, the 
way the boundaries have been set, it does seem to indicate an ethnic agenda. 
Perhaps that is how the Shilluk in the Upper Nile and some of the people, such as 
                                                     
40 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016)  
41 Interview 18, with a member of opposition political party: 11/3/2016) 
42 Interview 18, with a member of opposition political party: 11/3/2016)  
43 When AAA was signed in 1972, the bulk of the fighters were Equatorians. But they agreed for an army of 
Southern Sudan to be made up of 6,000 and to be divided equally between the three provinces at that time; 
Equatoria, Bahr El Gazal and Upper Nile, each gave 2000. They were integrated and became a real National 
Army. This was not the case when the CPA was signed. There was no recruitment and anyone who had not 
gone to the bush cannot be in the army, yet some new people could be allowed to replace their relatives who 
were disabled or unable to continue for one reason or the other (source: informal conversations during 
fieldwork).   
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the Fartit of Raja, in Bar El Ghazal see it (KI 25: 27/2/16).44 Nevertheless, even in 
Equatoria, there have always been boundary disputes, so the creation of more states 
could exacerbate those disagreements when the war ends and in that sense the 
fighting will become ethnic, but more especially among groups like the Dinka, the 
Shilluk and the Nuer (KI 25: 27/2/16).45 In view of this, I would argue that 
communities may need to be consulted as to what they prefer and their views taken 
into consideration, even if that would mean holding a referendum to decide on a 
system of governance including the number of states. 
3.11 Role of regional and international actors during the 2013 crisis 
As a continental body, the AU has always worked alongside IGAD. In the early 
months of the 2013 crisis, the AU established a commission of inquiry on South 
Sudan (AUCISS) headed by the former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo 
(AUCISS 2014: 8). The mandates of AUCISS were to investigate the human rights 
violations and other abuses committed during the armed conflict in South Sudan; to 
investigate the causes of the underlying violations; to make recommendations on the 
best ways and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation, and healing among all 
South Sudanese communities; to make recommendations on how to move the 
country forward in terms of unity, cooperation and sustainable development; and to 
submit a report within three months. The commission presented its final report in 
October 2014; and part of the provisions in the ARCSS signed in August 2015 was 
based on the AUCISS report (AUCISS 2014: 8). 
IGAD 
In 2015 IGAD again brokered a peace deal between the government of the Republic 
of South Sudan and the SPLA/M-IO, known ARCSS (ARCSS 2015). The war that 
resumed ten months later eventually led to a near collapse of the agreement. 
However, a new peace initiative has been initiated in August 2017 by Regional 
                                                     
44 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016)  
45 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016) 
 123 
12018735 
leaders: the South Sudan High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) (Verjee 2017: 1). 
This IGAD-led process to revive the stalled 2015 peace agreement is supported by 
the international community through bodies such as the AU, Troika and the UN to 
end the strife and bring a sustainable solution to the crisis. 
UNMISS 
Established under Chapter VII after the independence of South Sudan in 2011, 
UNMISS was mandated by the UN Security Council to protect civilians under 
imminent threat within the country and to support peacebuilding and state-building. 
These were to include the core functions of the state, such as the rule of law, police, 
the justice sector, conflict mitigation and resolution, strategic support to reforms in 
the security sector, military justice and special protection of women and children 
(Johnson 2016b: 98).  UNMISS also assisted the reconciliation process in Jonglei 
following the Jonglei inter-communal attacks and the violent civilian disarmament 
campaigns discussed above, through logistical support and advice, advocacy with 
authority in the communities, and by sending integrated mission teams to the field to 
meet the communities (Johnson 2016b: 108).  
But the role of the UN in South Sudan after the eruption of the 2013 conflict is 
controversial. The UN and the international community in general are criticized for 
failure to intervene decisively at the ominous signs of possible political violence in 
2013, occasioned by the internal power struggle amongst the SPLM politicians. Hilde 
Johnson, the special representative of the UN Secretary General and the head of 
the UNMISS at the time, admitted that although the situation was tense, the eruption 
of violence took the UN by surprise (Johnson 2016b). There were other criticisms. 
Rolandsen and Daly (2016: 154), for example, argue that after independence, the 
many compromises that had been made with Khartoum, the shrinking of the circle 
of advisors around President Salva Kiir, the neglect of the party apparatus, and 
squabbles over money and corruption created such tensions that it was only a matter 
of time before these tensions would rise to the surface.  
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The UN has been accused of meddling in the conflict that erupted in 2013 in South 
Sudan. A respondent reported that both the government and the rebels threatened 
to bring evidence regarding the UN’s support to the opposing side (KI 34: 14/3/16).46 
This created a tense relationship that affected the delivery of vital humanitarian aid 
by the UN to the affected areas. Interviews with several individuals, both national 
and international, also point to a common view that the UN was hesitant even in 
reporting violations that affected their own personnel, premises and equipment. One 
respondent commented, “when it is common opinion that the militias of Peter Gadet 
shot down a UN helicopter near Bentiu in 2014, it was never declared officially by 
the UN who shot their helicopter down, yet the UN was in the area (KI 34: 14/3/16).47 
It seems the UN’s silence, despite investigations regarding this incidence as 
reported, made some people to maintain such accusations. 
UNMISS has been applauded for protecting civilians against targeted killings by the 
conflict parties since the eruption of the conflict in December 2013, up to the present. 
But to what extent has UNMISS protected South Sudanese civilians? This question 
is crucial, because there were many instances when the UN protection of civilian 
sites (PoCs)48 came under attack. The last case of such an attack was in Malakal in 
February 2016, allegedly by SPLA troops. UNMISS purportedly, failed to protect 
civilians within their compounds where civilians were targeted and killed while under 
the supervision of the peacekeepers. For example, one respondent recalled 
UNMISS’ first reaction to the civilians whose lives were at risk during the first few 
days of the December 2013 conflict, in Malakal. “They did not open their gates, they 
were reluctant; they got convinced that the matter was serious after some of those 
running to the UN base got killed; this was war” (KI 34: 14/3/16).49  
                                                     
46 Interview 34, with a journalist: (14/3/2016)  
47 Interview 34, with a journalist: (14/3/2016)  
48 In April 2014 there was an attack on civilians in UN base in Bor (UNMISS, 2015) 
49 Interview 34, with a journalist: (14/3/2016)  
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The same respondent said, according to the IDPs investigation, more than 40 people 
lost their lives and about 100 were wounded. She added that the UN puts the death 
toll lower than reported by the IDP’s. They based their information on the hospital 
statistics, but not all those who died were brought to the hospital as some, especially 
the elderly, were burnt in the tents when armed elements set fire to the camp itself, 
targeting Shilluk and Nuer ethnic groups (KI 34:14/2/16).50 It seems it was this failure 
that prompted the UN headquarters in New York to order investigations into the 
behaviour of their own troops in South Sudan. The experience has also 
demonstrated that very few peacekeeper troops have been ready and are ready to 
protect civilians as mandated. Although there may be some professional elements 
among the UN’s forces, it seems UNMISS has never given a quick-response fire. 
Their orders are lacking, and they cannot take individual initiative. But without the 
UN providing protection to civilians in their bases and other services including 
feeding, medical and other social services, the situation would have been completely 
different. 
3.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the current South Sudan’s conflict from a historical 
perspective, tracing its origins and links to a colonial and post-colonial Sudan of 
which South Sudan was part until its independence in 2011. It has critically assessed 
the 2005 CPA, which ended the Sudan’s second civil war; and the role of the liberal 
peace approach which was used in the peace process. It has also discussed the 
post CPA and post-independence conflicts in South Sudan. Based on the analysis, 
it seems that the role of grassroots strategies is crucial to the success and ownership 
of a peace process, for reconciling bitterly divided communities and sustaining 
peace. This suggests a possibility for complementarity and hybridity in post-conflict 
peacebuilding. The next chapter will attempt to understand the local peacemaking 
institutions across South Sudan in comparison to other African countries. 
                                                     
50 Interview 34, with a journalist: (14/3/2016)  
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Chapter Four 
A Comparative Survey of Local Peacemaking Institutions and 
Practices in South Sudan 
4. 0 Introduction 
Chapters four and five of the thesis are case study chapters. Whereas the latter 
specifically, focuses on the Dinka and Nuer local justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms, this chapter considers local institutions and practices in South Sudan 
at a general level. It offers a review of tradition, various cultural institutions, conflicts 
and conflict resolution practices across South Sudan; parts of which predate the 
colonial and pre-colonial contact periods. It also examines how some of the practices 
may have changed over time, while allowing for internal and external influences on 
these very institutions and mechanisms. These topics will be discussed in relation to 
other African countries within contexts of post-conflict settings, considering diverse 
types of violent disputes that have been addressed by cultural agencies and 
mechanisms. The chapter argues that, despite the scale of changes resulting from 
colonialism, evangelism, modernization, globalization and civil wars, local 
peacemaking organizations and judicial procedures are still widely used in South 
Sudan. The chapter comprises four sections: first, understanding local peacemaking 
institutions in South Sudan-what they are and their roles as well as their strengths 
and weaknesses; second, the typology of conflicts resolved by local institutions and 
mechanisms; third, the methods of peacemaking; fourth, the role of women in local 
peacemaking and, finally, the conclusion. 
4.1 Understanding local institutions and traditional authorities 
The first and major challenge that one faces in trying to understand the cultural 
institutions of peacemaking and local justice is the problem of defining the 
terminologies used to describe them. Key concepts for this study have been dealt 
with in the theoretical Chapter Two. However, the terms traditional and local have 
been reserved for conceptualization in this chapter. As a concept, the cultural 
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institution of peace-making seems so fluid that it has attracted different labels: 
“traditional”, “local,” “indigenous”, “endogenous” “customary”, “informal”, 
“grassroots” and “community-based”. While these adjectives have been used 
interchangeably (Allen and Macdonald 2013: 2), each label when contextually 
applied, tends to carry some inherent nuances. In this chapter, only the terms 
“traditional” and “local” are conceptualized, because these are pertinent to this study.  
The term “traditional” often tends to suggest profoundly internalized normative 
structures, patterns followed from time immemorial in static economic and social 
circumstances (Alie 2008: 133). But African institutions, whether political, economic, 
or social, have never been firmly established, as will be discussed in detail in this 
chapter. They respond to changes resulting from several factors and forces (Alie 
2008; Huyse 2008: 7-8). It follows that the term “traditional” does not necessarily 
mean old-fashioned or archaic institutions and practices which are kept intact as they 
were originally constructed and practised. The term denotes a practice or norm that 
has a heritage of considerable duration (Mac Ginty 2008b: 121). This heritage has 
its roots in the pre-colonial or pre-contact history of local societies and has been 
practised in those societies over a considerable period of time, but has constantly 
changed over time in the process of interacting with the outside world (Boege 2011: 
432). 
This raises the question as to whether what is considered “traditional” today is still 
traditional given the changes that may have taken place in those societies. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two, such approaches vary considerably from 
society to society, from region to region and from community to community. South 
Sudan for example, is a country with more than 60 ethnicities. It is likely there are as 
many approaches as there are ethnic groups albeit, the variations many not 
essentially be in substance, but practice and interpretations. Against this 
background, Mac Ginty (2008a: 151) observes that traditional approaches are 
always context-specific and has rightly cautioned against over-homogenizing the 
“traditional”. 
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The term “local” on the other hand has been conceptualized in diverse ways as; 
“level”, “local institutions”, “agency”, and “process”, among others. I have used the 
term throughout the thesis as a more appropriate concept to reflect broader issues 
relating to conflict, and in line with the current peace building literature on ‘the local’. 
To situate my study within this body of literature, and to provide a better 
understanding, I will analyse each of the four main conceptions of ‘the local’. 
First, as a level, the term has been defined in a descending order from the global to 
the regional, from the regional to the national, and from the national to the local 
(Shaw and Waldorf 2010: 6). However, Goodale (2006) has challenged the 
conceptualization of ‘the local’ in a nested set of ‘levels’ in descending order. The 
notion of ‘levels’ obscures the fact that no location in the world exists in detachment 
from national and global processes; and that it would be hard to find places that, 
despite being remote from metropolitan centres are not pervaded by circulation of 
ideas and practice. When the local is conceptualised as a level, we place it in 
different frame and set it up to carry meanings of remoteness, marginality and 
bounded contours  (Shaw and Waldorf 2010: 6). This means that through a levels-
based definition we depoliticized locality, constructing it as a residual category 
characterized both by separation from the international, regional and national, and 
by absence of modernity. 
Second, as local institutions, Schierenbeck (2015: 1024) argues that ‘the local’ can 
be understood through the lived experiences and knowledge of mainly local officials 
and citizens and interpreted by conducting interviews and extensive filed work in the 
specific settings. This resonates with the case study methodology and a social 
construction paradigm adopted for this inquiry. As institutions, the local has been 
analysed through the lens of decentralisation. The establishment of an accountable 
local government branch of the state in a post-conflict setting, with inclusive and 
democratic features, is what brings the new order, ideally of peace, reconciliation 
and reconstruction to the citizens (Schierenbeck 2015: 1024). This means that the 
legitimisation of the emerging regime is key to establishing a meaningful state-
society relationship. In this aspect, the local is identified through its local institutions 
 129 
12018735 
and their officials. Schierenbeck (2015: 1025) reports on Hyden’s  argument that the 
notion of the local in an African setting refers not only to the grassroots but also to 
local government officials, since members of the elite as the elected representatives 
are ‘brokers’ for the poor. As a result, there are few, if any where subalterns act in 
resistance to what they perceive as oppressive structures.  
Third, ‘the local’ is conceptualized as agency carried out by grassroots movements, 
political parties and civil society at local level.  Schierenbeck (2015: 1026) observes 
that in their analysis of local agency in the post-conflict setting of Kawzulu-Natal, 
Jarstad and Hoglund defined agency as political participation in broader sense; that 
is as participation in both political parties and community activities. Similarly, Kappler 
and Richmond (2011) argue that in the aftermath of the 2006 Palestinian 
parliamentary elections, external actors have undermined local efforts to overcome 
political and societal fragmentation. Here the local is defined as grassroots agency, 
where grassroots initiatives and activities should be ‘navigation points’ and act as 
support for policy makers and peacebuilders. This means without context specific 
and detailed knowledge of local agencies, the peacebuilding framework will reflect 
externalized conception of civil society, what Kappler and Richmond call 
romanticizing civil society (Kappler and Richmond 2011). This analysis points to the 
importance of understanding, recognising and including the local in peacebuilding 
interventions if the role of external actors is to lead to sustainable peace.  
But is the local static and always a victim of exclusion by external interveners? 
Schierenbeck (2015) argues that there is a need to challenge the local as static and 
a victim to what is being done to it. She argues that in the critical school of 
peacebuilding there is a growing acknowledgement that peacebuilding in post-
conflict societies involve local voices and multiple notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’. But the 
immediate concern is what outsiders, interveners and peace builders do with this 
knowledge and how the knowledge translates into practice that allows for efficiency 
and local emancipation in building peace. Similarly, Hughes (2009) in her analysis 
of a women’s campaign for justice in East Timor, shows that local actors (poor 
people) might not necessarily, or at all regard international interventions as 
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oppressive. Local actors tend to consider intervention as an economic opportunity 
and try to reconstruct or renegotiate the agenda promoted by both local elites and 
liberal peacebuilders (Hughes 2013). So, the ‘local’ is not simply co-opted into a 
liberal peacebuilding agenda. Instead in practice, international interventions often 
takes in complex ongoing local struggles with multiple subalterns (Schierenbeck 
2015). 
The ‘local’ turn highlights the importance of understanding local perceptions of peace 
and people’s views about bringing sustainable peace in their communities. However, 
it’s equally important to understand people’s perceptions of power structures and 
their own position in peacebuilding. This implies not only recognizing the complexity 
between the local communities and international actors involved, but also 
acknowledging the complexity and multiple forms of agency carried out by local 
representative and institutions (Schierenbeck 2015: 1027). 
Fourth, the local is defined as process in constant flux and change, as an activity 
that needs to be frequently situated and contextualized in time and space. 
Contextualized knowledge can help us to understand and interpret “the local”, 
although it might not be enough to grasp the complexity (Schierenbeck 2015: 1024). 
According to her, Mac Ginty argues that one of the main reasons for the ambiguous 
position of the local is the (ethnocentric) territorialisation of the concept. The local 
turn is part of this trend with its focus on subnational levels of governance and 
geographically situated local governments. Rather, he advocates the need to de-
territorialise the local and regard it as an activity that needs to be situated and 
contextualised: He contends that through their everyday activities, individuals and 
communities can give localities, workplaces and networks a reputation. Thus, Mac 
Ginty calls for ‘everyday knowledge’, like the ‘navigation points’ offered by Pogodda 
and Richmond (Schierenbeck 2015: 1026) 
Other scholars such as Kappler for example, argue along the same lines; for a 
process-oriented localisation, where the local agency is viewed as ‘situated in time 
and space and subject to constant transformation. In her empirical study of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Cyprus she shows how local actors constantly position and 
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reposition themselves in peacebuilding network (Schierenbeck 2015: 1026). On her 
part, Paffenholz states that the construction of ‘the local’ and the local/global as 
binary entities within the critical school of peacebuilding have made ‘the local turn’ 
less relevant for peacebuilding research and practice (Schierenbeck 2015: 1026). 
She suggests a need for enhanced analysis of how the local/international is 
constituted globally and in various settings. She argues for closer collaboration with 
area researchers to be able to gain in-depth knowledge of local settings and power 
structures while building peace. 
The different contributions and conceptions of the local converge on the need to 
understand the local for constructive and effective engagements in peacebuilding. 
Local knowledge refers to the understanding, skills and philosophies developed by 
societies with long histories of interactions with their natural surroundings. For rural 
people, local knowledge informs decision-making about fundamental aspects of day-
to-day life.51 This study aims to understand the potential and limits of local 
approaches to modern conflicts and peacebuilding. It will therefore, mainly rely on 
the conceptualisation of ‘the local’ as agency.  
4. 2 Traditional Authorities during colonial and post-colonial periods 
As understood and used in South Sudan, the term traditional authorities refers to 
kings, chiefs, elders and spiritual leaders such as prophets and so forth, Badal 
(2006) cited in (Hoehne 2008: 14). Ethnic communities in Southern Sudan had 
varied and complex kinds of traditional authorities before colonial rule, known by 
various titles. However, institutions of traditional authority differ markedly among 
groups and in distinct locations. Among some ethnic communities, traditional 
authorities during colonial periods had very weak and unstable positions. Among 
Nuer and Dinka, for example, various kinds of traditional authorities existed. Evans-
                                                     
51 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/priority-areas/links/related-information/what-is-local-
and-indigenous-knowledge/ Accessed on May /3/2018 
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Pritchard (1940), observes that since both groups are acephalous52 societies, the 
power of traditional authorities among them is limited and depends on the individual 
skills of the person holding it. Although these traditional leaders were acknowledged 
as overall authority, they were not necessarily the kind of cooperative leaders that 
the colonial government needed (Leonardi et al. 2010: 23). To secure the kinds of 
compliant leaders that would serve British interests, the specific title of chief was 
created through the 1931 Chiefs’ Court Ordinance, as part of the British 
administrative system of indirect rule (Leonardi et al. 2010: 23). But this does not 
mean that the relationship between colonial administration and chiefs was devoid of 
problems. As will be discussed later in this Chapter and in Chapter Six, sometimes 
it was characterized by coercion and harsh treatments.  
According to Johnson (2003: 12), Native Administration (NA)53 proceeded relatively 
quickly in Northern Sudan during the colonial rule compared to the Southern Sudan 
where it took longer. Only a few groups in the South such as the Shilluk, the Anyuak 
and the Azande, knew centralized and hierarchical structures of authority; but the 
colonizers sought to bring the kings under control and to diminish their power 
(Johnson 2003: 12). In the absence of reliable traditional institutions, the British 
introduced similar hierarchical structures to those of the North in the South among 
the sedentary agriculturalist communities, such as Equatoria, where chiefs and sub-
chiefs were nominated to represent their communities. Equally among the Southern 
pastoralist societies such as the Dinka and the Nuer, these offices had to be created 
and the result was the chiefs’ courts of Southern Pastoralists (Bradbury et al 2006: 
22). The British implemented the same policy to the different societies but with 
uneven effects: In places with established hierarchical authority, chiefship was 
shaped by pre-existing roles. But in Dinka and Nuer areas (as well as in other ethnic 
                                                     
52 Acephalous (headless) societies are without formal political leaders, without any institutionalized system of 
power and authority (Boege 201:438).  
53 This was the indirect rule policy of colonial administration. An administration must in its initial stages 
demand some form of indigenous leader through whom orders may be transmitted (SAD 72/6/40). 
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groups without centralized authority) the policy reshaped societies quite 
dramatically. 
The indirect rule system introduced in the 1930s, commonly known as NA, was 
already practiced in other parts of colonial Africa. Brock-Utne (2001: 4) argues that 
it was a common practice across all the British colonies in Africa that imperial 
administration was based on the principle of indirect rule. The basic principle of NA 
was that local administration should be conducted through indigenous structures of 
authority, employing local law or custom (Bradbury et al 2006: 22). According to 
Johnson (1986: 68), the explicit aims of indirect rule were; first, to keep the costs low 
and administration simple; second, to “develop” native institutions by eradicating 
their “negative” aspects and fostering “positive” ones. This was one-way Sudanese 
values and those of other African countries were eroded and negatively influenced 
by colonialism. 
As will be discussed below, hereditary traditional and spiritual authorities in South 
Sudan were gradually removed and replaced by more loyal colonial government 
chiefs.  The regulation and management of local conflict under the Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium rule became part of the responsibilities of the government which 
operated through the NA. This affected existing institutions of conflict resolution, 
such as those of the Dinkas and the Nuers in South Sudan (Bradbury et al 2006: 
22). The administrative structure established under the condominium endured until 
the end of the first civil war in 1972. With the successive post-colonial regimes of 
Sudan, Laws were enacted which limited and weakened the powers of traditional 
leadership. For example, in the 1970s administrative changes under the Nimeri 
government, including the abolition of the NA significantly weakened local control 
over lands and livelihoods (Bradbury et al 2006: 22).  This means that both 
colonialism and the post-colonial administrations have contributed both to the 
strengthening and weakening of the powers of customary institutions in South 
Sudan. I will come back to this later in this Chapter and in Chapter Five. 
Generally, traditional authorities work as mediators, arbitrators, religious specialists, 
but also occasionally play a political role as leaders in wars/conflicts (Johnson 1994). 
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Each community has developed and practises certain ways of resolving conflicts 
when they arise and these ways are centred on traditional chiefs and elders. This 
resonates with the argument of Omeje (2008: 88) that peacemaking roles in Africa 
have been generally constructed and institutionalized around indigenous leadership 
such as; traditional kings, chiefs, priests, healers, elders, big men and others. The 
focus of the section below will be on elders, traditional chiefs and spiritual leaders. 
4.2.1 Council and role of elders 
All over South Sudan, elders occupy a leading position in society and are highly 
respected as custodians of customs, cultural values, traditions, knowledge and 
heritage. This was the case until the SPLM/A war of 1983-2005, irrespective of ethic 
groupings; Nilo-Saharan peoples. For example, Western Nilotic: Dinka, Nuer, Atuot, 
known as Jii; Acholi, Pari, Shilluk, Anuak known as Luo. Eastern Nilotic: Bari, 
Mundari and Ateker (Toposa Jiye, Nyangatom), Maa (Lotuho, Lokoya). And Niger-
Congo peoples, for example, Adamawa and Ubangian; Zande, Ndogo, Sere, Mondu, 
Bai and Bviri (Johnson 2016a: 32). 
The Lotuho (Otuho), one of the ethnic groups that occupy the Eastern part of South 
Sudan, for example, is stratified according to age groups which are promoted to take 
leadership roles through rites of initiation. The highest and most respected of these 
age-groups is the Council of Elders which is also entrusted with a peacemaking role. 
Kariuki (2015: 1) emphasizes that the institution of elders is one of the crucial 
organizations for conflict resolution in most African societies. Similarly, Malan (1997: 
28) argues that elders are respected as trustworthy mediators all over Africa 
because of their accumulated experience and practical wisdom, and so preference 
regarding peacemaking was traditionally given to them. 
These cultural leaders, use their position of moral influence to find acceptable 
solutions to disagreements. Among the Acholi for example, traditional chiefs and 
elders are regarded as custodians of cultural values, norms and traditions that guide 
societal relationships both internally as well as with other ethnic communities. They 
are regarded as guardians of lives and property such that when disputes arise, they 
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are the ones who resolve them and reconcile the conflicting parties by appealing to 
traditions and customary law (KI 16: 19/6/16).54 Similarly, the main institutions in 
Dinka and Nuer communities are comprised of elders, chiefs, spiritual leaders and 
prophets (Nuer).  
Elders are highly esteemed for their knowledge of the customs, myths and history of 
the communities and the relationships of the parties in conflict. Their rich experience 
in conflict regulation, their skills in interpreting signs of reconciliation and their skills 
as orators, facilitators, peacemakers, as well as their social capital as leaders of the 
community/communities, empower them to negotiate a resolution to the conflict that 
is acceptable to all sides (Boege 2011: 442).Their advice is taken seriously and when 
they caution the community against actions such as going to war, for example, 
people would listen, because they give convincing reasons and could even predict 
the consequences of going to war. This may be because of their roles as oral 
historians, able to discuss causation and consequences of rash actions based on 
past knowledge.  
Dispute resolution by elders can be categorized in two main ways: The council of 
elders and a single elder (Kariuki 2015: 1). A council of elders usually consists of 
more than one elder and acts as a form of third party in dispute resolution. The 
second form of organization is where a single elder presides over the dispute 
resolution process. The most basic example of this organization is where a family, 
clan head or the eldest individual in an extended family resolves the dispute related 
to that family.  
But elders have sometimes demonstrated the tendency to manipulate traditional 
institutions and their mediation role to their own advantage as opposed to those of 
other members of society, particularly women and youth, who are largely excluded 
from membership in the council of elders and their role in conflict mediation and 
arbitration. This sometimes resulted to uneasy relationships. For, example, many 
                                                     
54 Interview 16, with an Acholi elder: 19/6/2016) 
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have argued that abusive and autocratic practices of traditional authorities helped to 
fuel the civil war that ravaged Sierra Leone in the 1990s by driving aggrieved young 
men away from their villages, and into the various armed factions, in rebellion against 
a social system that trapped them in a rural underclass (Manning 2009: 1). 
A respondent said in nearly all ethnic groups in South Sudan, membership of the 
council of elders is the preserve of elderly men who most of the time pass verdicts 
and impose solutions regarding conflicts involving women and youth without their 
active participation (KI 26:14/3/16).55 Another respondent said women, for example, 
have been and still are denied the freedom to divorce and leave their abusive 
husbands, simply to protect the family name, image and marriage institutions and 
bride wealth (KI 29: 19/2/16).56 Protecting and promoting relationships during conflict 
resolution may be in line with the African philosophy of peace, which focuses on 
harmony and peaceful co-existence, but it is inappropriate in situations where there 
are persistent practices of oppression and injustice such as abusive marriage 
relationships. The same respondent said that;  
“women are the victims of certain practices perpetrated by elders. She gave 
an example of one woman who requested divorce after frequent cases of 
domestic violence and battering by her husband. It was turned down by the 
elders each time she reported it and finally, the woman was killed by her 
husband. She said that had there been at least one woman in the council of 
elders she would understand what her fellow woman was going through and 
would have supported her case” (KI 29: 19/2/16).57  
This is one example where the council of elders is insensitive to specific situations 
and failed to cater for the needs of all members of the society. But through their 
intermediary and an investigative function, councils of elders play an advisory role 
                                                     
55 Interview 26, with a South Sudanese journalist: 14/3/2016) 
56 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/2016) 
57 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/2016) 
 137 
12018735 
to the traditional leader on how to resolve conflicts. By listening to the view of the 
members of the society, a council of elders advises on solutions that may promote 
peace and reconciliation between the aggrieved parties and so, maintains the overall 
objective of sustaining the unity and cohesion of the community (Murithi 2008: 26). 
Becoming an elder 
Across countries of the African continent, one becomes an elder58 by age. Most of 
the participants (27 out of 43) interviewed for this study between January-June 2016, 
also said age is one of the main criteria for becoming an elder in many tribes in South 
Sudan, particularly among the Nilotics.  One respondent said, among the Acholi just 
as among the Otuho tribe of Eastern Equatoria state, members of an age-set are 
initiated through Orwanga (initiation rite) into an age group which assumes a specific 
leadership position and a role until another age-set is initiated to take over (KI 15: 
18/6/16).59 This means that one cannot rule beyond his generation, but this does not 
contradict the role and position of elders as peacemakers. The Othuo is well known 
for keeping to this system to the extent that a succeeding generation such as the 
Monyimiji (youth), for example, could remind traditional experts about the initiation 
schedule for the next generation of leaders (KI 15: 18/6/16).60  While generally this 
could be considered democratic governance and peaceful transfer of power, it 
seems at a political level this value is being eroded by the wave of changes sweeping 
across the African continent where there is a growing tendency, which is also 
frequently and sometimes successfully challenged, amongst leaders to remain in 
political power despite constitutional term limits. 
                                                     
58 It is important to note that the term elder is generic as it includes people within certain age brackets. 
Sometimes the title is earned by positions of responsibility in a community; as such chiefs fall in the elder 
category. However, as used in this study, elders refer to senior men who serve as conflict mediators and 
advisors to chiefs and kings. 
59 Interview 15, with an Acholi elder: (18/ 6/2016) 
60 Interview 15, with an Acholi elder: (18/6/2016) 
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We have seen frequent attempts in recent years to change some clauses in national 
constitutions that remove Presidential term limits, for example, in Uganda, Burundi 
and Rwanda. The result of such moves is sometimes violent conflict. The current 
war in South Sudan has also been attributed to a power struggle within the ruling 
party (KI 31: 10/2/16);61 (Johnson 2014a; Rolandsen and Daly 2016). What 
happened to the African values and systems of governance? Is this the question of 
how much colonialism destroyed in its establishment of centralized, bounded nation-
states, for example the Buganda Kingdom among others? These questions are 
beyond the scope of this study, but ones that warrant investigation. However, 
monarchs and hereditary leaders in general often remain in power and are only 
replaced by their sons when they die. The idea that initiation as an African practice 
is democratic and a means of peaceful transfer of power does not seem to translate 
into democracy as understood by the West. Nevertheless, major inter-communal 
disputes in South Sudan that have resulted in loss of lives and serious offences are 
resolved by members of the Council of Elders who also act as advisors to chiefs and 
Kings.  
4.2.2 Chieftainship and role of Chiefs 
The local history of chieftainship in South Sudan dates to the first contact of the local 
community with the colonial rule of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium of Sudan. 
Leonardi (2015: 2) argues that these histories locate chiefship firmly in the 
encounters of rural people with the forces of state power, dated to quiet specific 
moments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; which means it represents 
the first coming of the state. Prior to colonialism, as noted above, there were various 
forms of traditional leadership known by various names with distinct though 
sometimes overlapping roles. The creation of the institution and specific title of chief 
through the 1931 Chiefs’ Court Ordinance, as part of the British administrative 
system of indirect rule ,(Leonardi et al. 2010: 23), dramatically changed the institution 
                                                     
61 Interview 31 with an academic: 10/2 2016 
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and role of traditional authorities. With the establishment of the colonial chiefs’ 
courts, powers to administer justice were given to the chiefs who were appointed by 
the colonial administrators. This was a major shift in traditional leadership in South 
Sudan and it had a far-reaching impact on traditional politics, governance and 
maintenance of order.  
The chiefs’ courts were to administer the native laws and customs prevailing in the 
area over which the court exercised its jurisdiction provided that such native laws 
and customs were not contrary to justice, morality and order (Jok et al. 2004: 14).  
The question is, whose justice, morality and order? These colonial ideas referred to 
the Western notions of justice, morality and order as represented by the colonial 
administrators. Colonial administrators and District Commissioners (DC) were to 
approve certain traditional practices, yet remained suspicious even of those they 
have approved. Sudanese and African justice systems, conflict resolution and 
reconciliation practices were measured, permitted or prohibited based on colonial 
needs or Western values. 
The result of this cultural interference is part of the reason why the use of the term 
local rather than traditional is preferred in this study when referring to customary 
conflict resolution and reconciliation practices in South Sudan and other African 
countries that were subjected to colonial administration. However, while in colonial 
terms, the enactment of the chiefs’ court ordinance was an act aimed at ensuring the 
chiefs’ allegiance to the colonial administration, it also formally recognized the 
realities of traditional ethnic life and overall it strengthened the power of customary 
law in the nation (Jok et al. 2004: 15). But the transfer of power from the previous 
traditional spiritual leaders such as the Dinka Bany Bith (Spear Master) and the Nuer 
Kuar kwac (Leopard-Skin Chief) or Kuar muon (Earth Master) to chiefs by the 
colonial administration for example, as I will discuss in Chapter Five, may not have 
been a formal recognition of the local justice systems.  
The new government chief acted as intermediary with the colonial officials, but 
continued to work with other community leaders, such as spiritual experts and those 
responsible for other specialist functions (Leonardi et al. 2010: 23). This means not 
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only recognition of the roles of the various traditional authorities, but also 
acknowledgement of colonial chiefs’ lack of spiritual, magical and ritual expertise. 
Some chiefs’ courts referred people to diviners or other practitioners outside the 
court to hear cases related to witchcraft accusations or to admit evidence derived 
from supernatural activities, since for many people the results of rituals and oracles, 
or the pronouncements of diviners, are a credible form of evidence (Leonardi et al. 
2010: 55). It seems chiefs’ courts in some rural communities still make such referrals 
to specialist functionaries. According to Hutchinson and Pendle (2015: 10), after the 
independence of South Sudan, and  despite a prohibition from the national 
government of such referrals by chiefs, Nuer chiefs referred difficult cases to prophet 
Nyachol, a Western Nuer female prophet who operated as an informal appeal judge 
on the margins of the dysfunctional government court system (Hutchinson and 
Pendle 2015: 10). The persistence of chiefs and families to seek her judicial and 
purification services suggests that local justice is still valued by some largely rural 
communities of South Sudan. 
Becoming a chief 
There are three different methods in contemporary South Sudan through which 
chiefs are made: hereditary arrangements, democratic elections and confirmation by 
the relevant authority, and appointment by the government or rebel authority. 
Hoehne (2008: 14) categorized these procedures as; the “hereditary principle”; the 
“democratic principle”; and the “authoritarian principle”. First, prior to the British rule, 
which is still the practice in some communities, traditional leadership was hereditary 
in most communities in South Sudan. Based on the predominant patriarchal system, 
the incumbent chief chose, from among his male children the one with qualities that 
befitted chieftainship. Among the South Sudanese Acholi, in normal circumstance, 
the choice fell on the first- born male child of the first wife, as chiefs were known for 
marrying more than one wife. But certain qualities were required. For example, 
among the Nuer, five qualities have been identified as characteristic of a leader: 
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integrity, wisdom, justice, generosity, and skill in public speech (KI 2: 23/1/16).62 
While these may still be the required qualities, it seems in some communities they 
exist more in principle than in practice since, at least from the SPLA war time, it has 
been possible for anybody to become a chief by appointment even those considered 
to be lacking in the required qualities and to be unpopular in their communities.  
A crucial point to note is that traditional as well as colonial chieftaincy excluded 
women from this role. Asked if there are women chiefs in Dinka community, a female 
respondent in Agok said; 
“No, even if you go to the local court; you would not find a single woman. 
Even in this administrative area, all commissioners, executive directors and 
advisors are men. We have only one advisor in the whole government who 
is a woman. In line with the national constitution which grants 25 per cent 
representation to women, we made a request to contest for positions of 
chiefs. I was one of those who asked to run for the post of chief in my village, 
because we have good women with wisdom who are equal to men or could 
even outperform them, but nobody agreed on this. I wish in future that 
women can also be chiefs, to run these local courts, and play a role that 
may defend the rights of women, and be able to address the inequality of 
men over women and to also defend men who suffer injustice” (KI 29: 
19/2/16).63 
Another respondent charged the British colonial masters for neglecting the 
involvement of women in community leadership and peacemaking. According to him, 
when they introduced the office of chief, the British only asked for men and not 
women and in that way set a precedence that has continued through post-
colonialism to the present day.64 This resonates with the position of Brown (2007:7) 
                                                     
62 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
63 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/ 2016) 
64 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
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in Boege (2011: 447) who argues that “Colonial and later western accounts have 
persistently overlooked the significance of women’s activities for political life within 
indigenous communities and have rendered invisible traditional forms of activity in 
which women’s work was and is highly valued”.  
Second, one could become a chief through selection (local elections). Selection of 
chiefs for example, among the Ngok Dinka began during colonial administration in 
1940s (SAD 72/6/52).65 He is elected by his community to represent their interests 
in the court established, and recognized by the government who appoints him to the 
various levels of local government structures and appoints a chief nominee as 
Paramount Chief at County level. Chieftainship operates according to the structures 
of local government enshrined in the national constitution of South Sudan; County, 
Payam and Boma (Local Government Act, 2009).66  But this is not homogenous and 
not true for every community, there is varied picture across the country. Leonardi 
(2015: 2) for example, observes that individuals have been recognized or selected 
as chiefs because they were seen to know how to deal with government, both in the 
sense of developing strategies for coping with its threats and demands, and in the 
related sense of brokering deals with it.  
Third, one is directly appointed by the government or rebel leadership (during war 
time) often without respect for the wishes of the local population. The criteria 
continued to change during the post-colonial period and during the two decades of 
civil war in South Sudan (1983-2005).  Badal (2006) cited in (Hoehne 2008: 14), 
observes that in the post-colonial years and particularly during the civil wars, many 
chiefs were simply appointed by the state agents and/or guerrillas. Both the SPLM/A 
and GOS appointed chiefs and politically and militarily manipulated the institution to 
their advantage. In these circumstances politics plays a role in the making of a chief, 
                                                     
65 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; Durham University Library (DUL), Special 
Collections GB 0033, Sudan Archive Durham (SAD). 
66 Local Government Act of South Sudan, 2009. 
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as County commissioners and sometimes state governors oversee the elections 
and/ or appointments of chiefs. One respondent remarked “most current chiefs are 
appointees of the government who, in the eyes of their communities, lack the 
required powers such as that of casting an effective curse that could sentence 
somebody to death and that is why they have lost respect” (KI 3: 27/2/16).67 It seems 
the main concern here relates to the idea of accountability and legitimacy. 
But if this means chiefs are now largely accountable to the authorities who appointed 
them and therefore, have no legitimacy, how were the British-made chiefs 
accountable to anyone other than the British? Chiefs have always been politicized 
and politically appointed, particularly from the period of the slave trade onwards 
(Johnson 2016a). The controversy in recent years, in some societies around how 
one becomes a chief has implications not only in his justice role and how people 
perceive it, but also about legitimacy in relation to historical and hereditary chiefship. 
(Leonardi 2007) reports one such experience among some clans of the South 
Sudanese Kakwa where hereditary and SPLA made chiefs and their supporters 
engaged in disagreements about legitimacy after the end of the APLM/A war. 
Role of Chiefs and current challenges 
Traditional leadership (chieftaincy) since pre-colonial time has been the office of 
senior royal (chiefly) family men. However, the cycles of war over the last three 
decades, have also seen younger men, sub-chiefs, non-chiefly family men, 
promoted as representatives and “chiefs” across South Sudan and refugee camps, 
as leaders in crises. This was the case among the South Sudanese Acholi and Madi 
refugees in Northern Uganda (KI 16:19/6/16).68 This shift has introduced changes 
that have affected the long domination of senior men and chiefly families, providing 
space for younger people to participate in what used to be known as the elders’ 
profession. In some communities, including the Dinka and the Nuer, some level of 
                                                     
67 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: 27/2/2016) 
68 Interview 16, with an Acholi retired chief: (19/6/2016) 
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education and ability to speak Arabic and English have been introduced as 
conditions for becoming a chief. A respondent said, this allowed several young Nuer 
to become chiefs in 2010 (KI 10: 7/2/16).69 Apart from their age, the significance of 
the shift was in having leaders who were well-informed, but who might well lack 
experience, cultural knowledge and community management skills. They might also 
be Pentecostal Christians which could result in a degree of tension between 
traditional and Gospel values regarding ritual performances. It seems particularly, 
Pentecostal Christians tend to be uncompromising about the spiritual roles of 
traditional leaders. 
The wartime period (1983-2005) witnessed a huge conversion to Christianity in 
South Sudan. Hutchinson (2001: 316) observes that beginning in the mid-1980s; 
younger Nuer men and women particularly from Western Nuer, for example, began 
to embrace Christianity. She observes that older men, by contrast, were more 
reluctant to adopt a new religion that directly undermined their privileged positions 
as the sacrificial mediators of their religious supplications. But traditional institutions 
and authorities have not been spared changes. Leonardi et al. (2010: 54), observe 
that  traditional leaders are generally said to have lost influence and authority with 
the rise of the churches and the wider cultural and social changes of recent decades, 
but they remain important especially in rural areas, and among pastoralist and 
farming communities.  These transformations are not however, confined to South 
Sudan as native societies everywhere in the world have come under outside 
influences. Boege (2011: 437) observes that indigenous societies have not been left 
unchanged by the powers of originally European-capitalist expansion, colonialism, 
imperialism, evangelism and globalization. 
On the other hand, the war and extensive militarization of society, especially among 
young men have inevitably eroded the chiefs’ power to enforce the orders of their 
courts. Most respondents (31 out of 43) interviewed by this study between January 
and June 2016, attributed the erosion of traditional values to war, displacement and 
                                                     
69 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: 7/2/2016) 
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refugee life and the proliferation of arms in the hands of civilians who became militias 
or self-defence groups. One respondent claimed; 
“In the 90’s when we were doing the people-to-people peace conferences, 
we knew that if we had the chiefs in agreement, then the youth would follow. 
I think today you can’t say that. Today the youth have their guns, they have 
their own leaders. I think they still respect the chiefs on certain issues but 
when it comes to fighting, I don’t think they respect the chiefs, I think the 
youth make their own decisions” (KI 25: 27/2/16).70 
The two decades of war have very much reduced the power and status of tribal 
chiefs who are pivotal in the functioning of customary law, and has undermined the 
formal legal infrastructure of South Sudanese society. The implementation of military 
tribunals in place of customary courts throughout the civil war over time eroded the 
status of chiefs within their communities Dengtiel (2001) in  Jok et al. (2004: 15). 
Despite these changes, the chiefs are still very important pillars of society, one 
respondent stated, especially since over “80 percent of our issues are still customary 
law based and many of our people are not educated and are still living in rural areas, 
so the chiefs are very important in our life” (KI 1: 20/1/16).71 In general, people 
frequently express a preference for the negotiated, flexible settlements of the chiefs’ 
courts over any rigid application of written law (Leonardi et al. 2010: 39). But these 
are not without challenges. 
Many chiefs including courts officials in rural communities of South Sudan are 
illiterate and have little or no training on the laws and regulations governing local 
courts. This means the courts are likely to overstep the bounds of their official 
mandate, for example by hearing cases they should not, or by levying fines that far 
exceeded the allowable amount, or otherwise act outside the law. Some of these 
challenges are common across the continent. Rukuni et al. (2015: 75) for example, 
                                                     
70 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016) 
71 Interview 1, with a Lawyer: (20/1/ 2016) 
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observe that the lack of written rules makes the traditional arbitration process in 
Zimbabwe vulnerable to abuse and bias as judgment is at the discretion of the chief. 
Yet, some of the arbitrators are often ignorant of the provisions of state laws on an 
issue they may be addressing, hence likely to pass a judgment that may be at 
variance with state laws. With regard to Sierra Leone, Manning (2009: 5)  said that 
supervision of local courts is very minimal, and they also lack judicial independence 
as their ties to local governance systems often make them vulnerable to influence 
and bias. Moreover, government authorities have sometimes also relegated these 
institutions to minor roles or even bypass them entirely in some instances.  
Despite the outlined limitations, the quest to apply indigenous justice mechanisms is 
likely to continue. Throughout the global south there are vast regions in which the 
power and authority of state law is “nominal rather than operational”, Falk Moore 
(1986:150) cited in Allen and Macdonald (2013: 3). In South Sudan, most rural 
populations rely on the local justice system (KI 1: 20/1/16);72 in post-conflict Sierra 
Leone it has been estimated that some 85 per cent of the population does not have 
access to formal justice and relies upon traditional measures Sriram (2007: 598, 
cited in Allen and Macdonald (2013: 3); in Afghanistan in those areas not controlled 
by the Taliban, an estimated 80-90 per cent of all disputes are mediated in the 
customary system Wojkowska,(2006) cited in (Allen and Macdonald 2013: 3). 
4.3 Role of Spiritual Agency and Traditional Religious Actors 
The centrality of spiritual agency in all human spheres is the basis for a spiritual 
dimension that exists in indigenous dispute resolution. Despite its many aspects, 
many Africans see life as holistic. Traditional approaches cannot be classified into 
political and juridical, rather they are holistic, comprising also social, economic, 
cultural and religious-spiritual dimensions (Boege 2011: 441). This is in accordance 
with the entirety of traditional lifestyles and world views in which the different spheres 
of societal life are hardly separated Barcham (2005) cited in (Boege 2011: 441). For 
                                                     
72 Interview 1, with a South Sudanese Lawyer: (20/1/2016) 
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example, for most African people, death does not mean the disappearance of the 
dead. The dead are rather understood to continue in a spirit form and as such are 
recognized as the living dead or ancestors. When called upon, ancestors can 
intercede and advise the living on what needs to be done (Nabudere 2004: 12). Such 
intercession forms a crucial part of reconciliation rituals where according to Ubuntu 
philosophy, the ancestors reveal their ongoing presence through the lives of the 
living.  
In addition to the ancestors, there are also the unborn who are understood as 
existing in the future. As such the living are required to ensure that the unborn are 
brought into the world and that they are required to remember those that lived before 
them (Nabudere 2004: 12). This means that as the individual is related to the 
community, so too is the present age linked to the past and to the future. Life is thus 
seen to embrace the unborn, the living and the living dead. It is a world of beings 
both visible and invisible, in which it is possible for the living to engage with the 
unknown in ways that have a direct influence on their own being, behaviour and 
obligations (Nabudere 2004: 12). These invisible forces represent a set of African 
explanations for life that cannot easily be explained in terms of Western rationality.  
Traditionally, conflict is understood as an integral part of uncertainty in human 
existence, and supernatural beings, as part of that unexplained world, have a 
privileged understanding of it, because they represent historical and future needs 
(Nabudere 2004: 13). The spiritual dimension of conflict resolution refers to creating 
and restoring impaired relationship with God, the spirits, ancestors, family and 
neighbours as the case might be (Mbiti 1991) This is critical for restoring other 
relationships at the physical level. In this context, rituals play a key role in the 
reconciliation process. Ritual ceremonies bring together the people, the past, the 
present and the future, the ancestors and the gods for the sealing of the conflict 
resolution (Boege 2011: 442).They help to link people to the past, present and future. 
Mbiti (1991) argues that Africans are deeply religious; religion can be found in all 
aspects of life including rituals, ceremonies, festivals, symbols and arts, sacred 
places, objects, proverbs or saying, beliefs or worship.  
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The Nuer, for example, hold the concept of kwoth: an all-pervading deity associated 
with the sky, but present to a greater or lesser degree in all things, which supplies, 
directly or indirectly, an explanation for phenomena which cannot be accounted for 
in terms of everyday life (Howell 1954: 204). This applies to material objects, human 
beings, events, and situations. The word kwoth also has connections with the entire 
range of spiritual forms and concepts: ancestral spirits, household spirits, medicine 
spirits, talking spirits, sky spirits, earth spirits (Howell 1954: 204). Against this 
backdrop, spiritual leadership is so significant among the Nuer, and it seems that is 
also the main reason Nuer prophets were so numerous and powerful.  
Traditional healers, diviners, herbalists, spiritual seers also play a key role in conflict 
resolution throughout different societies in Africa.  Several respondents interviewed 
for this study (28 out of 43) reported that alongside the elders’ mediation role and 
customary chiefs’ courts in South Sudan, people in rural communities access the 
services of these experts in resolving conflicts that have spiritual dimensions such 
as witchcraft, curses and oath-swearing.  A respondent, for example, said “traditional 
and spiritual experts are very important. They inflict a curse on individuals for 
perceived wrong, undo curses cast by an enemy and administer oaths to uncover 
truth regarding matters of conflict” (KI 3: 27/2/16).73 Similarly, Kariuki (2015: 5) 
argues that the respect, fear and reverence that these experts have in society, make 
them play a crucial role particularly in truth seeking, and they also mediate between 
the living, ancestors and God.  
Conflicts arising from witchcraft are regarded as private matters and are not resolved 
by the customary courts but by the people involved and by spiritual leaders. The 
practice of swearing oaths for example, is a shared method of obtaining truth in 
South Sudan and most African societies. But in recent years, the Western-style use 
of the Bible by Christians and of the Quran by Muslims in formal courts for this 
purpose has become common and equal to more traditional methods (Leonardi et 
al. 2010). This is one-way modern religions have impacted on traditional spiritual 
                                                     
73 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
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practices even if the more rural communities prefer the traditional ones. Kariuki 
(2015: 5) observes that though governments in general since the colonial period 
have been suspicious of the authority of religious leaders and supernatural 
practitioners in Africa, they have recognised the power of the judicial sanctions they 
can provide, particularly in peacemaking.  
Based on this assumption and as noted above, the customary chiefs’ courts in South 
Sudan have incorporated some of these sanctions, particularly to uncover the truth 
through swearing of oaths.  The curses of elders or spiritual leaders may have been 
partially undermined by colonialism, social change, mobility, urbanization, the 
influence of modern religions, and the influence of guns, but the power of the spiritual 
and supernatural in local society continues in most communities in South Sudan. It 
has huge effects on the decisions people make in seeking to resolve disputes. 
Leonardi et al. (2010: 23) argue that this is because in general people tend to 
associate courts with the danger of creating a permanent rift in social relations, which 
in turn risks the wrath of the ancestors, spirits, and divinity, or the potential use of 
harmful magic by an enemy. 
Several examples across the African continent show how spiritual leaders and 
healers play a key role in healing and reconciling divided societies particularly when 
war ends. In Mozambique, for example, traditional healers played a crucial role in 
the reintegration of the ex-soldiers after the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992. 
They conducted reception and reintegration rituals for former soldiers as a way of 
reconnecting to their former alienated communities in the post-civil war Mozambique 
(Igreja and Dias-Lambranca 2008: 67). Although the government and the people in 
Mozambique took a political decision not to employ modern transitional justice 
instruments such as prosecutions of perpetrators and truth commissions, they 
maintained their traditional practices and belief that the death of individuals through 
traumatic acts, or the breaking of taboos, such as the killing of human beings without 
metaphysical and/ or social legitimization, is an offence that requires immediate 
redress through atonement rituals. If wrong-doing is not acknowledged, the spirit of 
the innocent victim will return to the realm of the living to struggle for justice (Igreja 
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and Dias-Lambranca 2008: 68). Thus, they invoke the role of the institution of 
Madzoca74 and the magamba75 spirits to deal with their bitter past. Generally, 
traditional spiritual power and techniques have been invoked and employed at 
community level to deal with modern conflicts and the atrocities associated with them 
Despite their key role in conflict resolution, traditional spiritual institutions and 
authorities have sometimes played the negative role of inciting and promoting 
conflict as their interpretations of incidents and events could be false but, 
nevertheless, believed in and taken seriously by those who felt themselves victims 
of the situations and who sought revenge on innocent suspects they considered 
enemies. Sometimes spiritual leaders also claim the spiritual powers and capability 
they do not have. For example, Howell (1954: 216) argued that there was a tendency 
among Nuer spiritual experts of the second category such as prophets, to assume a 
Leopard-Skin position, to conduct the ritual of homicide although they had no 
traditional right to do so. That any one of repute among them would claim that he 
possessed or was possessed by many different spirits, not just a single spirit. This 
suggests that spiritual leaders could be corrupted to misuse their supernatural gifts 
and powers for money or power. Spiritual institutions and leaders also discriminate 
against women. For example, Igreja and Dias-Lambranca (2008), observe that in 
                                                     
74 Madzoca healers worked under the guidance of ancestral spirits. They were specialized in divination and 
would disclose health or social problem by disclosing all the invisible dimensions of the problem at hand and 
define an intervention strategy (Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, 2008:69-70) 
75 The magamba spirits established themselves as a local institution of healing activity alongside the existing 
ancestral madzoca healers. The common logic of operation of the two is revenge for an alleged unjust death. 
Magamba spirits can possess anyone in the war-affected area so long as the individual or his/her family has a 
history of abuse, abandonment, trauma and victimization through murder. Magamba spirits affected many 
victims after the Mozambican war and for these spirits to be dealt with successfully, the violence of the past 
cannot be ignored. There is a need to engage with the past, to find out what injustices were done, to 
acknowledge the wrong doing and to repair the damage. Magamba spirits bear witness in multiple forms to 
the violent events that occurred during the civil war (Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, 2008:69-70)  
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Mozambique, only the spirits of men killed during the civil war are allowed  to return 
to the realm of the living to claim justice. 
4.4 Typology and sources of traditional conflicts in South Sudan 
The types and sources of conflicts in most cases determine the methods employed 
to resolve them.  Most conflicts and their resolution methods in South Sudan and 
other traditional African societies were predominantly local. They ranged from family, 
clan and village, inter-communal and inter-tribal disputes. Occasionally, there were 
also land boundary disputes as kings and chiefs wanted to expand their territories 
and jurisdiction politically (Malan 1997). The main types and common sources of 
disputes in South Sudan have been socio-economic: mainly over grazing area, water 
sources and fishing ponds; blood feuds76 as well as family and cultural disputes, 
especially due to intermarriages (Wassara 2007: 4). Similarly, Duany (2003: 209) 
confirms that intercommunity conflict generally occurs over grazing lands, water 
pools, fishing grounds and other shared natural resources. While some of the types 
and sources of discord were typical of pastoralist societies, others such as land and 
family disputes were cross-cutting and shared with most sedentary agriculturalist 
societies. The focus in this section is on inter-tribal disputes that have resulted in the 
loss of many lives. There will be a discussion in the following section of how they are 
settled, using customary law and traditional justice system. 
Cattle herds are the main source of income and livelihood for the pastoralist 
communities of South Sudan: the Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Mundari, Toposa, Buya, 
Didinga, Jie and Kachipo among others. Among the tribes that occupy the Kidepo 
Valley in Eastern Equatoria State such as the Lango, Didinga, Dodos and Othuo, for 
example, the root cause of disputes was mostly revenge for an offence previously 
committed over cattle rustling or during fighting over grazing and water resource 
                                                     
76  A long running bitter disagreement or fight that leads to loss of lives, often between social groups; families, 
clans and/or ethnic groups. It is common in South Sudan especially among pastoralists, because of organized 
cattle raids and fights over grazing land and water points. 
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areas (Brock-Utne 2001: 3).The lives of these communities depend on the cattle they 
own. Cattle define their livelihood as they can be sold in exchange for other 
commodities. As Brock-Utne (2001: 2) reported; with regard to these tribes, “a cow 
is payable as dowry in marriage negotiations or used in exchange of grain during 
hunger situations. Cattle are used as a source of milk, beef and cow dung mixed 
with mud is used for mud sliding the wall of the huts for shelter. Cattle are a highly 
regarded asset”. 
Similarly, the livelihood and prestige of the Dinka and the Nuer depend on cattle. 
Cattle are cared for through seasonal movements in search of grazing land and 
water. This is the period when there is a concentration of people in the cattle camps 
in the lowland grazing grounds known as the toich. It is also a period when tensions 
build within and between herding communities. Concentration of cattle herders could 
also trigger cattle raids leading to inter-communal violence (Wassara 2007: 4). Water 
and its resources, mainly fish, have contributed to many intra- and inter- community 
conflicts among the different cattle-owing ethnic groups in South Sudan. Quarrels 
are associated with watering cattle and with fishing. Fishing is an important human 
activity of survival when cattle herders congregate in the lowland grazing areas along 
the banks of the Nile River and its tributaries. Ethnic groups or segments of ethnic 
groups own pools and ponds that contain fish. Trespassing these pools and ponds 
results in serious disputes that often lead to violence (Wassara 2007: 4). 
This means that these tribes who have lived as neighbours or adjacent to each other 
have always been in conflicts of some sort; either when they meet during their 
seasonal movements in search of pasture and water; through planned raids to steal 
cattle from the other group or in attempts to reclaim their cattle supposedly stolen 
during previous raids. Either way, these confrontations often resulted in loss of life. 
As will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, these conflicts were always 
resolved by the relevant institutions described above and the prescribed solutions 
were always respected, binding and sustainable. However, the scale of loss in both 
human lives and property was not always as high and alarming as it is today, 
because of the use of primitive weapons such as spears, bows and arrows and strict 
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adherence to ethical warfare conduct, where vulnerable groups such as women, 
children the elderly, the sick, the wounded combatants and those who had 
surrendered were not always targeted. 
4.4.1 New forms of conflict 
The long-standing conflict in South Sudan over grazing lands, water sources, and 
cattle rustling amongst pastoralist communities have been exacerbated by the easy 
availability of small arms, militarization of civilian populations, displacement of local 
people, and the partial breakdown of traditional methods of conflict resolution. But 
these changes did not start with the civil wars that were fought during the last five 
decades. This started since the 1800s and followed different historical periods for 
example: when slave raiding and guns started to change local societies and 
militarize chiefs, through to 1900s-1930s, “pacification” of the British, when villages 
were bombed and guns given to chiefs, to post-colonial period under successive 
Sudanese regimes in the 1950s (Lesch 1998; Johnson 2003; Collins 2008; Johnson 
2011). 
The protracted civil war (1983-2005) has altered the nature of traditional disputes in 
South Sudan. The forced migration of people inside South Sudan and abroad and 
the prolonged separation of communities for a period of more than two decades have 
imposed sets of conflict-prone relationships. Clashes have become more complex 
in the aftermath of the CPA in 2005 and the independence of South Sudan in 2011. 
New conflicts have also emerged between returnees and host communities 
(Wassara 2007: 5). 
Furthermore, Westernization has imported and intensified impersonal warfare; the 
more impersonal the conflict, the harder it is to employ traditional forms of 
reconciliation. As described by Myers and Shinn (2010: 5), villages burned by 
unknown assailants, persons killed by bombing from airplanes, and even death 
inflicted at the range of an automatic weapon are examples of impersonal conflict. 
The trajectory of a bullet lodged into the person’s body, is much more difficult to trace 
during major gun battles, as often a gun-fighter would not know for certain whether 
 154 
12018735 
or not he had killed someone (Hutchinson 2001: 315). The victim may never see the 
attacker and traditional leaders on both sides of the problems find it more difficult to 
reach an understanding in bringing this kind of mayhem to an end or of assessing 
blame and determining appropriate compensation. Moreover, the larger the scale of 
the conflict, the less opportunity there is for traditional efforts alone to succeed in 
ending the problem (Myers and Shinn 2010: 5).  
South Sudan experienced this new kind of warfare for over two decades during the 
SPLM/A civil war. This reached its climax with the split within the SPLM/A in 1991, 
and recently with the eruption of hostilities in 2013. According to Hutchinson (2001: 
314-5), the most crucial factor was the creation and introduction of new 
interpretations of war morality in Nuerland,77 among the SPLA forces and the Nuer 
civilians. SPLA Commanders embarked on an ideological campaign among the 
SPLA forces, and convinced the local civilians as well that there were two kinds of 
war, and hence two kinds of homicide. Murders carried out in the name of the koor 
kume (government war) were entirely devoid of the social and spiritual risks 
associated with deaths caused by more localized koor cieng (homeland wars).  
Homeland war was founded on the structural logic of feud (ibid). But as discussed 
above, for the feud to become effective, the personal identity of the original slayer 
must be known, to determine the relational boundaries of the specific individuals, 
families and spirits involved. Government war on the other hand, was declared 
entirely impersonal, secular and final; there was no possibility of claiming 
compensation cattle from a slayer’s family, no need to purify the killer, and no reason 
to memorialize the death through special sacrificial offerings and posthumous 
marriages, Hutchinson (1996) in Hutchinson (2001: 315). The new interpretations of 
war morality may have been intended for war mobilization, but could have helped 
                                                     
77 Hutchinson studied the Nuer. It is not clear whether this was only for the Nuer or a common experience 
that could be generalized. 
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dismantle traditional morality such as high regards for human life associated with 
Nuer culture and spirituality.   
The handling of killings that occur as part of local fighting, raiding and warfare and 
their associated cycles of revenge has generally posed one of the greatest 
challenges to local justice in South Sudan from the colonial and post-colonial periods 
to recent times. The use of modern weaponry in recent years has further 
exacerbated the judicial challenge as it is extremely difficult to identify individual 
killers in a group conflict. This challenge however, is not unique to indigenous 
interventions as retributive justice mechanisms cannot both prosecute and conduct 
trials in situations of mass killings where individual killers cannot be identified. The 
case of the Rwandan genocide, for example, illustrates how backlogs of cases 
prompted the reintroduction of the traditional mechanism of ‘Gacaca’ to expedite 
dealing with the cases (Waldorf 2010: 186). 
4.5 Local Methods of Peacemaking in South Sudan 
Traditional and local mechanisms of peacemaking are social constructs that are 
grounded on the world view, cultural values, norm and practices of a specific 
community or people. Mainly divided into agriculturalist and pastoralist communities, 
peacemaking in South Sudan is informed by their socio-economic and political 
arrangements. However, the methods are generally alike as they rotate around the 
concepts of mediation, compensation and restitution (to be dealt with later in this 
Chapter and in Chapter Five), with substantive difference only in the application of 
these principles from one community to the other (Wassara 2007: 11). Equally, 
similarities as well as differences exist in conflict resolution methods among different 
African traditional societies whose approaches are determined by traditions, 
circumstances and the personalities involved. Omeje (2008: 89), for example, 
argues that since pre-colonial times, negotiation, mediation, adjudication and 
reconciliation have been developed to different levels and practised in various 
African communities, where the practices usually involve the intervention of 
reputable elders, either on their own initiatives or by the invitation of a concerned 
third party or the disputants.  
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In South Sudan, as in most African countries, the format is the neighbourhood 
system or the ‘palaver hut’. This is a method of local peacemaking where family, 
relatives and neighbours participate alongside parties to the conflict, witnesses and 
elders. These stakeholders participate in the efforts to amicably resolve the hostility 
by asking questions to conflict parties, witnesses and sometimes elders; give 
remarks and comments, sharing experiences or citing relevant examples from 
previous settlements, all of which are intended to contribute to solutions to the 
disagreement. Brock-Utne (2001), describes it as a traditional republican method of 
active dialogic settlement involving negotiation sometimes tempered with mediation 
and arbitration in which all parties in a conflict take part in deliberation until 
consensus is reached.  
This approach relates to the heart of Ubuntu which is about the importance of 
interconnectedness and the promotion of harmony and peaceful coexistence. Brock-
Utne (2001: 12) argues that the involvement of the community makes the 
transformation process participatory in the full sense as it involves more than just the 
inclusion of the parties and mediators. This further promotes a sense of belonging, 
which in turn, may contribute to the restoration, maintenance and building up of 
relationships. Generally, indigenous and traditional methods of conflict management 
and resolution in South Sudan are based on customary law. To provide a better 
understanding as to how these methods work, I first turn to conceptualize customary 
law in South Sudan. 
4.6 Customary Law 
The term “customary law” is generic. It is the entirety of the orally transmitted norms 
and values and practices that govern the everyday life of the community and that are 
legitimized through supra-human and supernatural institutions such as the spirits of 
the ancestors of the god(s), Chapman and Kagaha (2009) cited in (Boege 2011: 
441). As applied to South Sudan and across some African countries, it refers to the 
body of traditions, mores, social conventions and rules that through long usage and 
widespread acceptance direct and govern traditional African society (Jok et al. 2004: 
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11). Customary law is the expression of the customs, beliefs and practices of the 
people of South Sudan.  
Each of the different ethnic communities in South Sudan has its own long-developed 
strategies of conflict resolution. Equally, each different ethnic group has its own 
discrete body of customary law and, as noted above, there are thought to be over 
sixty such groups in South Sudan; which means there are more than sixty bodies of 
customary laws systems reflecting individual ethnic identities (Jok et al. 2004: 13). 
Custom is to the society what law is to the state. A valid custom must be of 
immemorial antiquity, certain, reasonable, obligatory and non-repugnant to statute 
law, though it may derogate from the common law; customary law is therefore as 
much social convention as a legal protocol (Jok et al. 2004: 11). A basic tenet in 
customary law is reconciliation, a vital tool in conflict resolution. Custom is a rule of 
conduct obligatory to those within its scope, established by long usage; a valid 
custom has the force of law (Jok et al. 2004: 11). 
These bodies of customary law are both oral and written especially among the Nilotic 
tribes such as the Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk and Anuak. The body of customary law 
administered by Nuer tribunals established by colonial administration, for example, 
was coded to ensure standardization of the general principles. According to Howell 
(1954: 1), who published “A Manual of Nuer Law”, the work sprang from one of the 
resolutions of the Nuer DCs’ Meeting, later called the ‘Nuer Chiefs’ Council’, a 
special body set up by the Governor of the Province in 1943 which enabled him to 
study and record the cases which appeared before the courts. It may be worth noting 
that colonial attempts to write down customary law then, tends to make the law less 
fluid. 
Dengtiel (2000) in Jok et al. (2004: 13) divides customary laws in South Sudan into 
two generic categories: a central authority system which includes the Azande, Shilluk 
and Anyuak (ruled by Kings), and a decentralized authority system which includes 
the Dinka, Nuer, Acholi, Bari and Fertit tribes, among others. These systems typically 
represent ethnicities and sub-ethnic units where local individual chiefs and sub-
chiefs or communities, normally of kinship networks, exercise core social and legal 
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powers. Customary law was the principal source of social order and stability within 
the region during the SPLM/A war. It remains the predominant source of law in 
contemporary South Sudan. Over 90 per cent of day-to-day criminal and civil cases 
are executed under customary law (Jok et al. 2004: 6). It has been recognized that 
four primary sources of custom exist: ‘Practice’, defined as a custom or tradition that 
has been repeated over many generations at the community rather than the 
individual level; a binding or persuasive decision from the court; not just customary 
but also “statutory courts” which are empowered to preside over customary law 
cases; religious beliefs, important in the treatment of matters like incest and adultery; 
“morality” and moral principles, Dengtiel (2000, cited in Jok et al, (2004: 12). 
4.7 Mediation and Arbitration 
Mediation based on customary law is the most commonly used local conflict 
resolution method in South Sudan. Where mediation is used, the mediators, mostly 
elders, are sought from within the community of the parties. A mediator may also 
voluntarily take the initiative or they may be requested by one of the two parties of 
the dispute to intervene (Gado 2013: 223). Mediators are people with status, 
wisdom, integrity and experience in the community and with a wide knowledge of 
customary law. Such a person or a group of people must be accepted by the parties 
to the conflict. If one or both parties see them not to be just and fair in the role, then 
it is unlikely the dispute will be resolved and the dissatisfied party may appeal to a 
mechanism such as the court of law. This means that the extent to which a mediator 
or mediators succeed depends on how they are perceived by the parties in conflict 
and how they carry out their role.  
The mediators’ roles include: pressurizing, manipulating, persuading, making 
recommendations, giving assessments, conveying suggestions on behalf of the 
party and so forth. They do these through clarifying information, promoting clear 
communication, interpreting standpoints, summarizing discussions, emphasizing 
relevant norms or rules, envisaging the situation if agreement is not reached, or 
repeating the agreements already attained (Brock-Utne 2001: 11). As there is no 
predetermined model, mediators change their roles from time to time as they deem 
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necessary to reach a peaceful conclusion and reconciliation. While these may serve 
the normative purpose aimed at peace, a greater focus tends to be on communal 
reconciliation which ignores the individual’s rights to pursue the case if necessary 
until guilt is established and justice done.  
Lack of fair trial where a perpetrator, for example, does not have access to legal 
representation by an advocate is a weakness of the traditional justice system 
according to the Universalist idea. However, the ample time given to a perpetrator 
and witnesses to argue their case, the participation of all the people with stakes in 
the case during the process who can pose questions and cross-examine the 
perpetrator and witnesses; and the consensus-based decision reached by elders, 
chiefs and the people could mean fairness which, of course, may not be understood 
or even accepted by the Western legal system. Alie (2008: 133) observes that justice 
here means seeking or establishing the truth, allowing each party an opportunity to 
express and defend itself, and so truth-telling is an integral part of the justice system 
in local societies. 
Stakeholders in the mediation process are usually individuals, groups and ethnicities 
that are concerned with the issue of the dispute. Tribal leaders, elders and notable 
community personalities usually take part in the mediation process and dispute 
resolution gatherings on behalf of their ethnicities or respective groups. The social 
context of emerging disputes is very important and these are usually determined by 
circumstances such as a nuclear family or an extended family, immediate 
neighbours, a larger neighbourhood or different parties of a state.  The mediators’ 
focus is future-oriented, as they look forward to improved relations not only between 
the disputants but also among all those involved and so, instead of directing the 
question towards apportioning of blame, it is pointed towards a solution (Brock-Utne 
2001: 9).  
As noted above in this section, across many local communities in South Sudan and 
elsewhere in Africa, there exists the tradition of ‘palaver hut’ settlements of disputes. 
The dispute settlement is not necessarily in a ‘hut’ as the name suggests, but could, 
as the case may be take place in a community hall, village square or under the shade 
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of an expansive tree (Omeje 2008: 90). South Sudanese in general and the Dinka 
and the Nuer in particular often times conduct their deliberations under the shade of 
any big tree relatively located in the middle of the village to allow parties from nearby 
communities to participate. However, for deliberations that sometimes take the form 
of arbitration in chiefs’ courts, they are either conducted under a shade or palaver-
like huts constructed for that purpose, sometimes referred to as the chiefs’ court. 
The Kpelle people of Liberia of West Africa are known for their ad hoc local meetings 
called “moots” or “house palavers”, where the conflicting parties arrive at mediated 
settlements through the use of experienced African leaders (Brock-Utne 2001: 
9).The decision-making process is characterized by considerations of the social 
importance of conflict-solving, as social relations and internal solidarity are crucial. 
This resonates with the Ubuntu principle of interconnectedness and peaceful co-
existence, where each party is expected to respond by a reciprocating concession 
from the other side to arrive at an amicable settlement. The agreement reached is 
shared with all parties including general community and affirmed as a social contract 
in a ritual way and this differs from society to society. This social perspective on 
conflict transformation has general advantages including shared understanding of 
the conflict. It also encourages harmony through active participation in the process 
by all parties (Brock-Utne 2001: 13).   
The mediation method may be participatory and inclusive, but not devoid of 
challenges. They tend to be slow in bringing about agreement because they proceed 
based on consensus building; and some of these traditions have been drawn from 
patriarchal societies which can be exclusionary towards women (Murithi 2008: 16-
7). This means there is a need to temper the progressive values that can be learned 
from these processes with the positive advances that have been made in promoting 
gender equality in peacemaking processes in Africa. Again, while traditional 
authorities can be a force for reconciliation, government manipulation of ethnic 
institutions and authorities has in many places weakened their local legitimacy and 
the role that they can play in mediation and peacemaking. As cautioned by Bradbury 
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et al. (2006: 13), one should therefore, avoid assumptions of the intrinsic nature of 
such social actors. 
The negotiation and mediation process in South Sudan which applies to other 
African societies is not prescribed. However, Malan (1997: 30) argues it has 
constituent parts that are influenced by the social context. These constituent parts 
he contends, include: exploring the background of the parties in conflict; decision-
making; consensus seeking; affirming an agreement; assisting with implementing an 
agreement, and a conclusion. The role of people with stakes in the conflicts, 
including the parties’ constituencies, is crucial in driving the process to an amicable 
solution. As the talking proceeds, there is openness to feedback or influence from 
the social surroundings, which may lead to modifications of the perceptions or 
positions of the mediators or the parties involved.  
Constituencies of the parties and the social groups present are respected (Brock-
Utne 2001: 11). The process is flexible and dynamic as it tends to seek broader 
understanding of the issues and circumstances surrounding the conflict. Clan elders 
for example, manage and resolve conflict based on customary law, but elders do not 
have authoritative power to determine the outcome of a conflict. They represent the 
preferences of their clans (Duany 2003: 212). However, the role of opinion leaders 
and the council of elders is crucial for such meetings to bear fruit. When an elder 
from a family, village or clan becomes involved in the talks, the traditional objectives 
are to move away from accusations and counter accusations, to soothe hurt feelings 
and to reach a compromise that may help to improve future relationship (Brock-Utne 
2001: 3). The talking usually covers all sorts of relevant background and explores 
the thoughts and intentions of the parties to the conflict. 
Conflicts in South Sudan as across Africa should be viewed in their social contexts, 
and not as isolated events. Malan (1997) observes that while a Western mediator 
may begin the exploration by retracing the steps of the parties to the point of the 
initial conflict, an experienced African leader, considering the social realities, might 
start from a vantage point further back in time and try to create a framework of social 
reference. He might ask questions such as: who are you and where are you from? 
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Explain your family links; where did you grow up? This is to provide a broader 
understanding of the issues. The immediate aim is to mend the broken or damaged 
relationship, rectify wrongs and restore justice. Another aim is to ensure the full 
integration of the parties involved into their societies once again, and to adopt a 
mood of cooperation. Other long-term aims are based on building harmony in the 
community (Brock-Utne 2001: 9). Based on the African philosophy of common 
humanity, family ties and community networking in South Sudan are constantly 
respected, maintained and strengthened. 
4.8 Arbitration 
Apart from mediation, conflict resolution in most communities in South Sudan follows 
the indigenous justice system (arbitration), i.e. through the customary process in 
chiefs’ courts. Elders usually discuss the issue to find a solution before it goes to the 
chiefs’ court. When they fail then the issue is passed on until it reaches the chief. 
Some conflicts may be resolved before getting to the stage of arbitration or before 
reaching the chief’s court. A conflict in the making, or which has just started can be 
prevented before it escalates, by a third party who offers to intervene as a mediator. 
Thus, mediation is also used for conflict prevention. Duany (2003: 210) observes 
that in South Sudan and in most African societies, the most important mechanism 
for preventing conflict is dialogue. Sometimes a case that is awaiting a hearing at 
the chief’s court can be withdrawn for a settlement at home. The chief may of his 
own accord also refer a case to the elders or clan heads for a solution. Alternatively, 
a third party may plead to withdraw the case for settlement at home. The mediators 
accept responsibility to settle the dispute outside the traditional court and to report 
back to the chief. 
Role of chiefs and Arbitrators 
Chiefs are arbitrators who pass judgement on cases in local courts. But do traditional 
mechanisms include justice elements that punish the offence? Though this may 
bring us to the debate about what justice means, proponents of local justice 
mechanisms, interpret justice and punishment more broadly and holistically. 
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Western legal approaches are adversarial, confrontational and evidence must be 
direct and specific. The process emphasizes establishing guilt and executing 
retribution and punishment without reference to the victim or the wider families or 
future reincorporation of the offender into the community (Brock-Utne 2001: 3). Local 
justice systems tend to use other means of social control to discourage antisocial 
behaviour. In the traditional Acholi society, for example, shame, mockery, jeering 
and social rejection, together with compensation are adequate forms of punishment: 
where punishment consists of a feeling of remorse that compels the wrongdoer to 
ask for forgiveness and reconciliation (Wasonga 2009: 31). But the weakening of 
traditional institutions due to social change means that these sanctions are no longer 
as effective in fulfilling the roles they once did.  
4.9 Local as Restorative Justice 
Local mechanisms have generally been presented as restorative justice. This 
explains the reasons compensation and reconciliation are central to local conflict 
resolution. Peacemaking is construed as a communal process of rebuilding, of 
bringing justice into an unjust situation because lasting peace requires reconciliation 
(Duany 2003: 209). This is in line with the Ubuntu principle of interconnectedness 
and peaceful coexistence. The South Sudanese see conflict as a threat to people’s 
relationships; and they see conflict resolution as restorative, leading to the re-
establishment of social cohesion. 
Based on the above description, do traditional justice mechanisms include 
punishment or retributive components? Where does this feature in local mechanisms 
across the ethnic groups of South Sudan? Several elements point to some kinds of 
punishment in South Sudan. The differing compensation among the Dinka and the 
Nuer, for example, in terms of number of cattle awarded for intentional as opposed 
to unintentional killings, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, would appear to be an 
example of some retributive aspects of local justice. Komakech (2012: 72) observes 
that while compensation was not seen as a means of punishment in local justice 
mechanisms, the motive and intention of the crime were considered in the amount 
to be rewarded. This suggests that there were at least some retributive aspects to it. 
 164 
12018735 
Many disputes might end in amicable settlement, confession of guilt and forgiveness, 
yet, there are instances in which both minor and heavy sanctions were applied in 
accordance with norms of the community concerned. Sanctions may range from 
restitution for rights and property to payment of death compensation and invocations 
of the wrath of the gods on the guilty and various forms of dishonour Khalil 
(2000:321, cited in Omeje (2008: 91). 
Punishment is part of the sanctions. However, unlike the communal nature of much 
of its other elements, punishment is a largely individualized element of traditional 
justice, where the individual who committed an offence is, for example, caned and 
not the clan. It is these various forms of social control and means of deterrence that 
African and other non-Western societies use based on their world view of justice to 
deal with crimes that are not understood in the liberal Western world. It seems in the 
Western understanding, punishment is generally equated with criminal justice and in 
accordance with the rule of law. African societies interpret punishment more broadly. 
For example, as noted above, shame, mockery, ostracism and compensation are 
adequate forms of punishment. While shame and fear of supernatural powers are 
internal social controls, sanctions associated with actions taken by others in relation 
to behaviours that may be approved or disapproved are external controls.  
Deterrence is the intended aim and primary focus of punishment. So, to entirely 
ignore the role of punishment in the practice of local justice would be an error. Is this 
another area of convergence between the local and the liberal international whose 
focus is that of trials and punishment to fight impunity and ensure the guarantee of 
non-repetition? The analysis and probable answer to this will be the focus of Chapter 
Six.  
4.10 Nexus between Mediation, Compensation and reconciliation 
Despite their variation from community to community and conflict to conflict, one aim 
remains consistently common to indigenous approaches, and that is the restoration 
of broken relationships to ensure peaceful co-existence. Generally, indigenous 
approaches emphasize and place a higher value on the link between mediation, 
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compensation and reconciliation rather than viewing them as separate and distinct 
processes (Murithi 2008: 28). This means that the different forms of accountability 
for offences committed, such as payment of blood price, fines, community service, 
apologies and so forth, are always based on the restorative justice procedures as 
opposed to Western legal approaches which tend to be more adversarial, retributive 
and based on punishment.  
The aim of mediation and adjudication is therefore not to punish the wrong-doers, 
but to restore social harmony so that different communities and ethnic groups can 
live side by side. The ritual ceremony and the sharing of meals between conflict 
parties signify new relationships after people have cut contact with the event of a 
murder. Among the Acholi of Northern Uganda, for instance,  which applies to the 
Acholi of South Sudan as well as to the Dinka and the Nuer, murder automatically 
breaks the relationship between the two clans, and the killer is not allowed to share 
in meals or take part in any other activities even within his own family or clan before 
ritual performances, otherwise a curse (cen) will bring down calamities upon the 
entire community (Wasonga 2009: 32). The restoration of a relationship through 
reconciliation rituals is in line with the Ubuntu principle. Myers and Shinn (2010: 3) 
confirm that traditional mechanisms are rooted in the culture and history of the 
African people which tends to see life in terms of relationships and peaceful 
coexistence which ought to be repaired if fractured by disputes. They emphasize 
group unity, reconciliation of individuals or groups, and peaceful reintegration into 
the community. Local techniques place the interest of the group upon that of the 
individual. 
The payment of death compensation is widely practised among ethnic groups in 
South Sudan, especially pastoralist communities. Compensation and restitution are 
significant in the efforts to repair damage caused to lives, property and relationships. 
The colonial administration recognized customary payment of blood-money as an 
essentially local system common to most people in the Sudan and particularly 
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among the Arabs of the north, known as dia78 (blood-money) (SAD 72/6/67).79 The 
payment of cattle for compensation as will be discussed in Chapter Five, carries 
special significance among the pastoralists. However, Leonardi et al. (2010: 63), 
observe that the payment of blood money widely practised among the Northern 
Sudanese Muslims appears to have trickled into South Sudan; where for example 
the terms puk in Dinka and dia are used interchangeably, although the usage 
specifically means cattle.  
This may not have come as a surprise for three reasons: first, the frequent cross-
border interactions between the Dinka and their neighbouring Northern Arab and 
Muslim tribes may have contributed through intermarriages and death incidences 
among them; second, the Ngok Dinka of Abyei has been part of Northern Sudan 
since their transfer by colonial officials for administrative purposes in 1905; and third, 
the massive displacement and long stay of South Sudanese in the North since the 
inception of the SPLM/A war in 1983, may have led to adaptation of certain practices 
including payment of dia. The acceptance of the blood price payment in monetary 
terms by cattle-keeping communities such as Dinka and Nuer, when circumstances 
dictate, instead of cattle is yet another demonstration that cultural practice is a social 
construction; and a confirmation that what is considered traditional is not static but 
dynamic and can respond to influence of circumstances and other cultures. This 
flexibility therefore, means that local justice systems could be socially reconstructed 
and perhaps even be applied in dealing with gross human rights abuses in the 
aftermath of internal violent conflicts. This translates to a social constructionist 
understanding of reality and knowledge.  
Not all the ethnic communities in South Sudan accept compensation that takes the 
form of money payment. Payment of blood money is feared in some areas as it 
conveys the risk that the blood of the deceased may accompany the payment and 
                                                     
78 Dia is an Arabic word for blood price which is practiced among the Muslim communities in North Sudan 
79 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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bring diseases and death to the recipients (Leonardi et al. 2010: 65). The Bari for 
example, an ethnic group in Central Equatoria state, often prefer cleansing 
ceremonies and rituals to payment of blood money. The Acholi people do not favour 
retribution, and often negotiate compensation and cleansing rituals and any 
restorative procedure outside the courts. In most cases both statutory and customary 
laws are applied where customary procedures aimed at reconciliation followed the 
formal court process. Contrary to the argument of Leonardi et al. (2010: 66), that 
such a process contravenes the criminal procedures requiring a punitive sentence, 
with the Acholi, the offender may even be sentenced yet traditional procedures may 
intervene as that is the only way to bring about communal reconciliation which 
cannot be achieved in the formal court of law. However, as observed by Leonardi et 
al. (2010: 65), some of the communities that have formerly opposed dia are now 
coming to favour it over other considerations such as death sentence. 
The payment of compensation is not left to the offender and his family alone. The 
immediate relatives contribute towards the payment. The involvement of the 
offender’s community in paying compensation demonstrates an acknowledgment of 
guilt, a sincere intention to reconcile and collective commitment to put an end to 
impunity and similar incidents from happening again. Referring to Ubuntu, Murithi 
(2006) observes that in Africa, a law-breaking individual transforms his or her group 
into a law-breaking group, and a feuding individual transforms his or her group into 
a feuding group: the essence of interconnectedness. 
4.11 People-to-people peace process 
A new local peacemaking model has been invented in South Sudan since the 1990s 
by the Church and traditional authorities: namely, the people-to-people peace 
process (PPP) which took the forms of peace meetings and conferences. This 
inclusive peace and reconciliation initiative which emerged during the height of the 
SPLM/A civil war in the 1990s was meant to address conflict among communities in 
the SPLA liberated areas; especially the impact of the 1991 split within the liberation 
movement on the local communities. The inter-communal fighting that followed the 
split took a toll on the local population. There was no government to intervene and 
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organize inter-ethnic meetings or enforce the law because, as the de factor 
government, the SPLA factions themselves were responsible for orchestrating the 
violence (Johnson 2014b: 5). Facilitated by the Church and backed by the SPLA, it 
drew on spiritual and moral authority, yet it was centred on indigenous mechanisms 
with the traditional authorities as the main actors. The process includes; trust 
building, storytelling, use of traditional peacebuilding techniques, reconciliation, 
symbolism and imagery (Ashworth 2014: 153). These are a kind of hybrid model in 
themselves that integrate three elements: traditional values, Gospel values and 
modern peacebuilding techniques, as seen in Wunlit (Redekop 2007; Ashworth 
2014: 152), which I will shortly discuss.  
Most of the respondents interviewed by this study (29 out of 43), referred to the 
success of PPP as a local initiative. The role of the Church has been highlighted as 
key to the success of the process. But the question is: How was it possible for the 
Church to work together with the traditional institutions with their ritualistic spiritual 
practices usually considered, especially by the Pentecostal Christians, as 
paganism? The answer lies in the African holistic view of life. Ubuntu philosophy 
involves a deep respect for all people’s religious beliefs and practices. This respect 
opens a space in African thinking for a mix of practices in which reconciliation 
develops a fuller meaning than it does in most religions; not least in its respect for 
the other, without requiring conversion or assimilation (Nabudere 2004: 13). Many 
Africans believe in one God, while others believe in a variety of gods and spirits. This 
means ubuntu allows for religious diversity. 
Although Christianity and Islam have influenced African spirituality, this has not done 
away with African traditional religious beliefs. The result is that many African 
Christians and Muslims today continue to practise African religion in what is normally 
called African Christianity, and Islam in Africa (Nabudere 2004: 13). As a 
demonstration of this pluralism of faiths, in South Sudan, it is not uncommon to find 
members of a family practising different religions or indeed syncretism; the 
simultaneous belief in different religions within one person or family: Christianity, 
Islam, traditional African religion or none; yet they respect each other’s beliefs. They 
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converge when it comes to rituals that link them with their ancestors, make peace 
and promote family welfare and coexistence. This could have been the driving spirit 
behind the PPP process. Rather than seeing religions as competing, Africans are 
often able to overlap different belief systems, combining them into one (Nabudere 
2004: 13). 
Applied to make peace largely amongst the Nuer sections of Lou and Jikany in 
Akobo, Upper Nile Region in 1994; and in Wunlit between the Dinka of Bahr el 
Ghazal and Nuer of Western Upper Nile in 1999, PPP reduced inter-communal 
violence and allowed free movement and sharing of resources such as grazing areas 
and water (Bradbury et al 2006: 29). There have been numerous smaller peace 
conferences that followed the approach such as the one conducted in 1995 in Ikotos, 
the Eastern part of Equatoria Region (Duany 2003: 205). But because they focused 
on the Nuer and the Dinka, the Akobo and the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation 
Conferences are of special relevance to this study. I now turn to briefly discuss them. 
4.11.1 Akobo conference, 1994. 
The 1994 Akobo peace and reconciliation conference was held to address the 
conflict which erupted between the Lou and the Jikany clans of the Nuer ethnic group 
in early 1990s. The conflict was caused in part by competition over the limited 
grazing area for livestock (Duany 2003: 17). It was attended by elders, religious 
leaders, young men, women and Nuer intellectuals. When asked to comment on the 
nature of the conference, a Nuer youth said; “I was in Akobo though young at the 
time. It was unusual for youth and women to attend such a high-profile traditional 
meeting, but it happened. I think everybody was happy not so much for the peace, 
but for participating and being represented” (KI 3: 27/2/16).80 One common objective 
was at the centre of the conference: to restore broken relationships and bring about 
the process of healing among their people.  
                                                     
80 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
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The conference was flexible. At times, there would be “court sessions” woven into 
the conference, when individuals or groups would face the community and defend 
themselves against accusations levelled against them (Bradbury et al 2006: 32). It 
was open-ended, time was not an issue. What mattered was disclosing the truth 
according to Nuer philosophy and religion, the only way to bring reconciliation and 
healing (Myers and Shinn 2010). This means the conference typically followed a 
traditional format where time was not considered a major constraint. To create an 
atmosphere conducive to dialogue, stories, songs and proverbs were used. When 
the elders felt that the whole truth had emerged, they then prepared for the sealing 
of the peace agreement. Ten Lou and twelve Jikany chiefs signed the agreement; 
the sacrifice of two white bulls sealed the covenant (Duany 2003: 17). The results 
were that since then, there have been no war between Lou and Jikanyi. It also 
provided an example that was followed in the Wunlit peace conference discussed 
below. However, a common weakness with the PPP has been the problem of 
disseminating the agreements’ resolutions to communities and serious follow-up on 
implementation, which sometimes provides leeway to spoilers. 
4.11.2 Wunlit conference, 1999. 
The 1999 Wunlit peace conference between the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal and the 
Nuer of the Upper Nile was held to resolve the conflict that erupted following the split 
in the SPLM/A in 1991 (Bradbury et al 2006: 29). Severe inter-factional fighting took 
place between the Torit group of John Garang, a Dinka and the Nasir camp of Riek 
Machar, a Nuer after the split. Efforts to reconcile principals of the factional groups 
had failed while the fighting was conducted along ethnic lines.  Johnson (2014b: 5) 
observes that prior to 1991, the border region between the Dinka of Bahr el Ghzal 
and the Nuer of the Upper Nile had been reasonably stable and peaceful, but after 
1991 both factions of the SPLA mobilized civilian forces in the region against each 
other, the main target being the main civilian population base of the opposing side. 
The Wunlit conference was organized by the New Sudan Council of Churches 
(NSCC), and the traditional authorities between February and March 1999. It brought 
a negotiated end to extended hostilities between the rival groups, which had endured 
 171 
12018735 
until that time (Bradbury et al 2006: 15). The Wunlit conference has been one of 
most cited by scholars as a successful local peace initiative in South Sudan. 
The success of the Wunlit peace conference was due to the long preparation for it. 
The preliminary meeting of chiefs from both communities in Lokichokkio, Kenya and 
their exchange visits to each other’s territory helped build trust and convinced  others 
that the process was genuine and peace between the two communities was possible 
(Johnson 2014b: 5) It seems that what is lacking in modern peace processes is the 
kind of preparation found in indigenous approaches which involve transparency, the 
participation of the grassroots population at local level and ownership by the people 
prior to actual negotiations. However, these preparations and the entire conference 
were possible because of the logistical support of the UN base at Lokichokkio where 
the chiefs first met, and the financial help from other NGOs and friends of the NSCC 
(Johnson 2014b). Is this a demonstration of the possibility of hybrid approaches to 
peacebuilding in South Sudan? I will focus on this question in Chapter Six. 
Perhaps one of the major weaknesses of the PPP is its dependency on the 
government (then SPLA) and the international community’s support for the 
implementation of resolutions which were; the establishment of community police 
groups, with radios for communication; request for humanitarian aid such as the 
provision of water points, shelter, schools and clinics to returning IDPs. Provision of 
food to help them settle in, as well as for host communities who shared what they 
had with the returnees. Seeds and tools were also needed to break the cycle of 
dependency on relief food (Ashworth 2014: 158). The government’s role is very 
important not only in guaranteeing security and facilitating the process, but also in 
its implementation. Johnson (2014b: 7) observes that where the government is 
absent or lax in its responsibilities, full implementation even of a popular agreement 
is impossible.  
Again, lack of logistical and financial support could jeopardize local efforts at 
peacemaking based on the PPP model. Thus, the participation of external agencies 
whether the Churches, international and national NGOs as well as international 
governmental agencies is important in this model of peacemaking (Johnson 2014b: 
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9). The failure of the international community to support the implementation of the 
Wunlit resolutions meant that most of the resolutions remained in papers. The 
question raised by this scenario is whether such complementarity does not lead to 
clashes of interests and goals between indigenous restorative justice and modern 
retributive justice regarding dealing with atrocity crimes; and the thorny issue of 
power relations between the local and the international. 
The lack of commitment by the international community, despite initially supporting 
the process, to fund the implementation phase of Wunlit resolutions seems to 
confirm the allegation that international bodies as agencies of the liberal peace 
approaches want things done their own way. According to Ashworth (2014: 158), the 
international community is always happy to support the high-profile peace 
conferences, but always had excuses to avoid supporting the low-visibility follow-up. 
The challenges faced in the Wunlit resolutions’ implementation was because the 
international NGOs and donors seemed focused on their own narrow programmes 
and plans and were unable to recognize something of national strategic importance. 
However, of significance to this study is the potential and possibility of hybrid 
approaches to peacebuilding of the indigenous and the modern. 
4.12 Gender and local peacemaking  
Gender role in traditional peacemaking has been a subject of concern considering 
how conflicts affect men and women differently and gender being at the heart of such 
a disparity. Most ethnic communities in South Sudan are clearly patriarchal. More 
than half of the respondents (27 out of 43) interviewed for this study said women’s 
role is relegated to the background. This means patriarchal cultures have also 
influenced legal systems, with the result that governance structures have tended to 
uphold the inferior status of women. A female respondent lamented. “They only need 
us to provide services during ritual ceremonies and to sing, dance and celebrate the 
peace they have concluded without us” (KI 5: 20/2/16).81 Usually mediators and 
                                                     
81 Interview 5, with a Dinka woman: (20/2/ 2016) 
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chiefs are men; women are neither selected as mediators nor made chiefs, and do 
not participate in the mediation process. But most of the time they participate as 
witnesses, observers or service providers during ritual performances and directly 
only if they are a party to the case.  
A body of literature seems to show this scenario as a cross-cutting issue in the 
African continent. In Burundi women are not allowed to become members of the 
Ubushingantahe,82 they can participate in the proceedings as the wife or a widow of 
a member (Allen and Macdonald 2013: 13). Gado (2013: 231) recounts that in 
Darfur, if women are involved as a party to conflict or as witnesses, they join the 
meeting but usually sit in the back seats (or floor mats) and separately from the men. 
Women always sit behind the men and are sometimes assigned a special place 
behind a screen to separate them from men, so only their voices can be heard. When 
a woman is part of the Judiyya83 as a witness, sometimes, she is not permitted to 
attend the whole session. In such a case, she is only allowed to provide her 
testimony when such a point is reached in the discussions and then she will be asked 
to leave.  
This practice undermines whatever potential may be there to apply local initiatives 
and the Ubuntu principles in resolving modern conflicts in a complimentary manner 
to international mechanisms promoting human rights and equality of treatment. But 
is this unique to Africa?  In all parts of the world, there are many practices like 
patriarchy that have promoted exclusionary conditions for women; which is also 
evident in Europe, North America, Asia and Latin America. Murithi, (2008: 26) argues 
that in any cultural framework, you will find challenges in terms of the way it is 
conceived historically. The extent to which women are included or excluded differs 
largely from one society to the other.  It would therefore, be misleading to simply 
                                                     
82 A council of elders in Burundi that settle inter-personal, community and other disputes. These include 
marital, family and land disputes among others. 
83 A local conflict resolution method based on customary law in Darfur 
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identify traditional societal structures with patriarchy and subordinate positions for 
women and liberal Western society with gender equality (Boege 2011: 447). This is 
not to downplay the understanding that in general the societal spheres of men and 
women are more clearly separated in traditional societies than in western liberal 
societies. The objective is thus, to extract the most progressive principles of African 
peacebuilding and combine them with other progressive ideas of gender rights and 
gender inclusivity. A respondent said, “although that may alter the so-called 
authentic nature of those cultural practices, I think in the 21st century we cannot try 
to replicate cultural processes that have previously been affected and distorted by 
colonialism and modern nation states in Africa” (KI 42: 2/12/16)84.  
Over the years there have been changes in some traditional structures; some 
communities in South Sudan have allowed for the involvement of women and 
informed youth in local and traditional peacemaking roles.  For example, among the 
Lopit85 community in Eastern Equatoria state, there is a female chief.86 There are 
similar experiences across African countries. Manning (2009: 17), for example, 
observes the role of a female paramount chief in Sierra Leone. This means that 
native and traditional institutions of peacemaking are both changing. With space for 
women’s participation widening with greater numbers elected as members of 
parliament, some serving as ministers, doctors, lawyers, academics, officers in the 
                                                     
84 Interview 42, with Tim Murithi: (2/12/2016) 
85Chief Madalina Tito Ohirong Ohire of Lopit tribe in Lopa County of Eastern Equatoria became chief during 
the years of war. She was among the sixteen South Sudanese and Nuba Mountains traditional leaders who 
went on historic tour to South Africa, Botswana and Ghana in August 2006  http://sudaneseonline.com/cgi-
bin/sdb/2bb.cgi?seq=msg&board=60&msg=1156150361&rn=0 (Accessed on 23/10/2017) 
86 It seems female chiefs existed in some communities much earlier. For example, Latuka rain queens, female 
negotiators in 19th century account among others. 
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police and army among others, it seems more women will become chiefs and others 
will play a direct role in the council of elders as mediators. Women seem to find most 
of these empowerment and capacity-building opportunities through the Church and 
NGOs, both local and international, operating in local communities. 
With the growth of democracy on the continent in recent years, some timely progress 
seems to have been made involving affirmative action policies in some countries 
regarding women’s inclusion and participation at all levels of government. A case in 
point is South Sudan where 25 per cent of posts are supposed to be held by women 
and enshrined in both the national and state constitutions (Transitional National and 
State Constitutions of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011). For a country like South 
Sudan just emerging from devastating war, with a miserable rate of female literacy, 
to take such a positive step, clearly means that gender-sensitive strategies for 
restoring the human dignity of all members of society is being adopted with added 
seriousness and urgency as well as challenging the social norms that try to enforce 
the subservience of women to men.  
Several women who participated in this study however, consider the transformation 
as too slow and as sometimes being frustrated by officials at the highest level of 
state governance. A female respondent in Juba said, “women are being let down by 
the executive arm of the national government. The president and his ministers do 
not follow the constitutional provision on women’s representation” (KI 24: 
2/3/2016).87 Although an affirmative action policy, giving 25 per cent of female 
participation in all positions of public service is enshrined in the transitional 
constitution of South Sudan, on many occasions, the President of the Republic has 
made appointments of cabinets without a single woman. This situation is being 
replicated at lower levels of government, such as states and counties, which means 
that, despite promulgated legislation on gender inclusion, it remains at policy level; 
so, in practice, it has yet to take root. This could be due to the influence of patriarchy. 
                                                     
87 Interview 24, with a state member of parliament: (2/3/ 2016) 
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Thus, empirical evidence contradicts the principle of Ubuntu in South Sudan with its 
claim of common humanity, justice, equality and peaceful coexistence. 
But the fact that these inequalities exist does not mean that local approaches to 
peacebuilding have nothing to teach us. Many of these strategies offer progressive 
value systems for maintaining social relationships and promoting harmonious 
coexistence which can provide insights that can contribute to peacebuilding in Africa. 
These values are at the heart of Ubuntu philosophy. Notwithstanding these 
challenges and unlike in the past years when women only played the role of 
rendering services during ritual performances, in the 1990s, particularly after the split 
in the SPLM/A, South Sudanese women directly participated in local peace 
processes. According to Duany (2003: 17-8), during the 1994 Akobo peace 
conference, Nuer women served as effective witnesses and acted as an informal 
truth commission during the open deliberations presided over by the chiefs. They 
shouted down any men whose testimony contained false statements and threatened 
to reveal what they knew. She emphasized that the shame of their response caused 
several men to revise their testimony so as not to be branded as liars. 
Perhaps the most important women’s local contribution to peace in South Sudan is 
the alliance of clans through intermarriage. One respondent reported that during a 
land boundary conflict between the Acholi and the Madi in Magwi County, Eastern 
Equatoria state in 2011, women from both communities married on either side 
communicated plans of attacks and urged their clans of origin to make peace before 
the conflict escalated further as the loss would be great (KI 27: 7/3/16).88 In such a 
situation, Duany (2003: 12) argues that women become community resources, 
providing information across clan lines that can lead to dialogue, and this can keep 
broader intercommunity relations positive.  
During the war years, several local women’s organizations, such as the Sudanese 
Women’s Voice for Peace (SWVP), the South Sudanese Women’s Association 
                                                     
88 Interview 27, with a South Sudanese intellectual: 7/3/2016 
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(SSWA) and the Sudanese Women’s Association in Nairobi (SWAN) were 
established and have been active in grassroots peace work. Among others, their 
activities have included networking and several peace activities from women’s 
perspectives, entailing the creation of mutual bonds between women in the 
communities and various traditional institutions in South Sudan. These ranged from 
peacebuilding training especially for women, creating peace demonstration centres 
in villages, and supporting small-scale local development projects (Duany 2003: 
216). These women associations were also engaged in advocacy with the SPLM/A 
military and political leaders and other stakeholders at regional and international 
levels; awareness raising and capacity-building for female community leaders at the 
grassroots on conflict resolution and peacebuilding; campaigns to ban landmines 
and prevent spread of HIV in collaboration with the local churches; promotion of 
reconciliation and respect for human rights within the Sudanese refugee camps in 
Kenya, aimed to contribute to the political empowerment of Sudanese women 
(Duany 2003: 216). These women’s organizations were local, but were organized on 
the model of modern civil society. They collaborated with and solicited funding from 
several international organizations. Their partnership demonstrates that hybrid 
approaches to peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan is possible. 
With the signing of the CPA, these local women’s organizations either became 
completely dormant or died. A former member of the SWVP interviewed for this study 
said “the CPA came with lots of opportunities for members of these organizations, 
most of them got absorbed into different government ministries and commissions 
and got lost there. Some of them even left with, and still keep, the Associations’ files 
as there was no handing over ceremonies” (KI 40: 15/6/16).89 Another respondent 
said, “This is our main weakness as local civil society, when opportunities come our 
way we tend to forget our goal, vision and objectives until the moment when things 
go bad again” (KI 6: 4/2/16).90 It seems many women who were members of these 
                                                     
89 Interview 40, with a civil society activist: (15/6/2016) 
90 Interview 6, with a civil society member: (4/2/ 2016) 
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associations and other members of civil society active during the war joined the 
government and/or NGOs and did not look back to support the sustainability of the 
associations they once worked hard to establish. Is it fair then to claim that the stable 
local civil societies most neglected by development partners and donors are the local 
institutions and authorities? The answer is often ‘yes’; they are ever present and 
mostly represent communities at the grassroots level irrespective of changing 
circumstances.   
4.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to understand the cultural institutions and peacemaking 
mechanisms in South Sudan at a general level, covering different historical periods. 
The role of women, and new models of local peacemaking such as the PPP, have 
also been discussed. The chapter examined how these institutions and mechanisms 
have changed over time due to contacts with other cultures. The key factors of 
change have been colonialism, modernization, evangelism and the impact of civil 
wars. Despite the extent of these changes, however, evidence shows that these 
institutions and mechanisms are still widely used in South Sudan. The next chapter 
takes these discussions into conceptually and empirically narrow environment. 
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Chapter Five:  
Dinka and Nuer Post-Conflict Justice and Reconciliation 
Mechanisms 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Dinka and Nuer justice and reconciliation mechanisms as 
practiced in the aftermath of violent conflict during colonial (1890s-1950s) and post-
colonial periods 1950s to date. It examines the concepts of justice, peace and 
reconciliation among the Dinka and the Nuer of South Sudan.91 It draws on empirical 
data from research interviews, combined with secondary social and historical 
research to discuss the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities 
regarding these mechanisms and their roles in resolving conflict and building peace.  
The chapter argues that these techniques have always worked within the overall 
socio-economic and political context of Dinka and Nuer ethnic systems, including 
institutions and structures that are derived from the communities’ own customs and 
values known as customary law. It is worth noting from the outset that Dinka and 
Nuer local methods are holistic and serve as conflict resolution, reconciliation and 
justice mechanisms. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one explores the concept of justice 
among Dinka and Nuer communities, and how justice mechanisms are used in 
                                                     
91 A specific reference is made to the Dinka and the Nuer of South Sudan because Dinka and Nuer ethnicities 
are also found in Sudan (Dinka) and Ethiopia (Nuer). The Ngok Dinka tribes of Abyei are still legally regarded 
nationals of Sudan as per the 1905 colonial administrative Act which transferred Abyei to the North. Despite 
the CPA’s provision for Abyei concurrent referendum with that of South Sudan in 2011, to decide whether 
they want to remain part of Sudan or become part of South Sudan should it secede; an official referendum 
has not yet been conducted. The oil-rich area remains contested by Sudan and South Sudan as attempts for a 
joint interim administration since 2005 has not worked.  Although Abyei area was covered in this study, most 
participants were interviewed in Agok town of the Greater Bahr el Ghazal where most of the Abyei population 
had taken refuge in 2011 during the armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in Abyei. 
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practice as conflict resolution tools; section two discusses Dinka and Nuer customary 
law, institutions and conflict resolution practices; section three reviews Dinka and 
Nuer reconciliation and re-integration methods; and section four discusses the role 
of Dinka and Nuer women in peacemaking.   
5.1 Aims, Types and Scope of Justice  
It is important to examine the aims, types and scope of concepts of justice among 
Dinka and Nuer communities before any attempt to discuss their meaning and 
significance both in the past and at present. The idea of justice among Nuer and 
Dinka communities is the aim to achieve social order, stability, reconciliation, and 
peaceful coexistence; and sometimes these qualities are implied in the usage of the 
concept (KI 2: 23/1/16).92 This is expressive of the philosophy of Ubuntu, which lies 
in the recognition that a healthy community at peace with itself can only be built if 
the human dignity of all its members is safeguarded (Murithi 2005: 342). Great 
significance is attached to justice in both societies. Referring to justice in the Nuer 
ethnic group, for example, one respondent said; “without justice, there will be no 
harmony and people cannot live together”93 (KI 2: 23/1/16). “Justice leads to 
reconciliation and peace which cannot be achieved without accountability” (KI 2: 
23/2/16).94 
Unlike the liberal Western understanding of justice with diverse types and meanings; 
retributive, restorative, reparative, redistributive and the like – justice in the Nuer and 
Dinka languages is holistic and means only one thing: the basis of social order which 
applies to different spheres of life.  Here we see how reference is made to Ubuntu: 
that of social order and peaceful coexistence. But this is equally relevant to the 
concept of conventional human rights as discussed in Chapter Two, which is 
common to both the liberal peace theory for maintaining international peace and 
                                                     
92 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/ 2016) 
93 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/ 2016) 
94 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/ 2016) 
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security and to the African philosophy of peace, that of common humanity and 
peaceful coexistence. Is this then one area of convergence between the two 
approaches? I shall come to this question in Chapter Six where divergences and 
convergences will be discussed. 
In terms of scope, the concept of justice among Nuer and Dinka communities 
permeates all spheres of life and extends beyond the living to include those who 
have died. The dead are still accorded their rights among the living. As discussed in 
chapter four, traditionally, for most Africans death does not mean the disappearance 
of the dead; the dead are rather understood to continue in a spirit form and as such 
are recognized as the ‘living dead’ or ancestors (Nabudere 2004: 12). It seems the 
widespread practice of posthumous marriage among the Dinka and the Nuer is 
based on this notion of justice that include the realm of the dead. In both ethnic 
groups, if a person dies before marrying, the living (family and relatives) have the 
obligation to marry for him a wife or wives and they are expected to raise the children 
in the name of the deceased to restore the lost procreative power (Hutchinson 2001; 
Leonardi et al. 2010). One respondent stated: “there is no way a dead member of 
the family can be forgotten. He may not be physically present, but he is alive in spirit, 
his brothers and uncles must keep his line alive by marrying for him and producing 
children in his name” (KI 3: 27/2/16).95 Despite assuming the procreative role with 
her, whoever is assigned that responsibility in Dinka and Nuer community must know 
that the woman is not his wife and the children raised will not be identified as his but 
as those of the deceased person. This is considered justice because Nuer and Dinka 
believe that if the dead are not served among the living, their anger will bring 
misfortune and cien (a curse) to the family because of that injustice.96 This means, 
as the individual is related to the community, so too is the present age linked to the 
past and to the future (Nabudere 2004: 12). 
                                                     
95 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
96 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016 
 182 
12018735 
The scope of justice among Dinka and Nuer communities as described above is so 
wide that its meaning can only be understood from the contexts to which the word is 
applied. My focus here is to understand its use as applied to cases of homicide and 
war-related crimes. I now turn to a comparative discussion of the concept of justice 
itself as conceived by each of the two ethnic groups and how it is applied in practice 
through adjudication and/or mediation as a method of conflict resolution. A caveat is 
added to account for the challenges involved in defining such a wide, rich, and 
complex concept as justice which has its origins in a philosophical worldview 
different from global narratives. In his book No future without forgiveness, Desmond 
Tutu (1999: 35) observes regarding Ubuntu that it is very difficult to render its 
definition into a Western language. This may also be the case here, where 
translations may fail to capture some of the nuances. 
5.2 Concept and practices of Justice among Nuer the Dinka 
5.2.1 Concept of Justice among the Nuer   
Among the Nuer, cuong (justice) could also be translated as “rights” which must 
always be respected or else instability would ensue that would disrupt the social 
order. Justice means fulfilling one’s obligations, and granting someone’s rights that 
accrue from relationships and membership in a family, extended family and 
community (KI 1: 20/1/16).97 A just arbiter is one who administers justice without 
favour even in a case that involves his own family or that of a stranger. Justice also 
means ‘equality’, which resonates with the Nuer belief that people are all equal and 
that nobody is less than another; being educated or not, rich or poor, young or old, 
Nuer or foreigner does not matter; this is one reason why the Nuers call themselves 
Naath which translates as “humans” (KI 2: 23/1/16).98 The history of the Nuer 
expansion and assimilation of people from different ethnic groups including the Dinka 
(Howell 1954), is a demonstration of this claim.  A Nuer respondent said “Nuers value 
                                                     
97 Interview 1, with a Lawyer: (20/1/2016) 
98 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
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human beings and see humanity as one; they don’t believe in division and 
segregation” (KI 2: 23/1/16).99 Strangers in Nuer society are married to royal and 
important families to remove inferiority and integrate them. One informant said, “A 
young man, for example, is given a beautiful girl from the daughters of Nuer leaders 
or a young woman married to one of the sons of these leaders where they become 
members of royal families” (KI 2: 23/1/16).100 They are indigenized to the Nuer 
community and calling them strangers after that can bring war as that is considered 
an affront to the person to whom they are related. In that way strangers become 
Nuers with full rights and obligations. The informant concluded “this is the reason 
most of the Nuers cannot claim originality because we come from all the tribes of 
South Sudan” (KI 2: 23/1/16).101  
Howell (1954: 7) confirmed that the Nuer called themselves Naath which simply 
means “people”; “nok nei te Naath” translated as “we are the people”. However, 
contrary to the above explanation he argued that the expression was descriptive 
enough of Nuers’ purposes and revealed their arrogant belief in their own superiority 
over other human beings. The Nuers tend to see themselves as superior compared 
to their Dinka neighbors, for example, in terms of their bravery and fighting skills (KI 
2: 23/1/16).102 This suggests that Nuers believe all Nuers including those assimilated 
are equal but outsiders are not. However, justice in Nuer also means “sharing”. 
People must share whatever is available and one of the requirements for becoming 
a leader in Nuer society is generosity. Selfishness is considered equivalent to 
injustice (KI 2: 23/1/16).103  
As such, issues of justice permeate every aspect of Nuer life. Polygamy, for 
example, is a widespread practice, where a Nuer man can marry as many wives as 
                                                     
99 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
100 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
101 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
102 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
103 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
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his wealth (cattle) will allow. When he is married to three wives, for instance, he 
cannot pay bride wealth for the young wife before he has paid for the older ones, 
which is considered justice. Again, this applies to treatment of children in a family. 
The first-born male from the first wife had rights to marry first with entitlements 
including inheritance. The first herd of cattle is given to him, followed by the eldest 
son of the second wife up to the third. “You cannot marry two wives to the first son 
before his brothers from the same mother or different mothers marry their first wife. 
That is injustice” (KI 2: 23/1/16).104 As illustrated and elaborated through the above 
example, in this context, justice means equality of treatment, and in that case the 
concept and practice conform to the principle of Ubuntu which promotes equal 
treatment and peaceful co-existence because of common humanity and 
interconnectedness. 
Regarding conflict resolution, justice equates with compensation; for example, 
payment of blood price in the case of homicide to restore the loss. “When a victim’s 
life is compensated and reconciliation rituals performed, then there is already peace 
among individuals, families and communities; nobody is allowed after compensation 
to kill in revenge” (KI 2: 23/1/16).105 Post-conflict justice among the Nuer, then, 
means repairing the damage, restoration or paying back what was lost, such as life, 
reputation and property. The biggest question concerns whether a lost life can be 
repaired or restored to what it was before. As will be discussed under compensation 
in the following section, it is about the payment of cattle that is used to marry a wife 
for the living dead and raise children in his name and keeping his life for posterity. 
This resonates with the cultural significance observed by Leonardi et al. (2010: 65), 
which suggests that the practice points to restoring the loss of procreative power of 
the dead person.  
Interestingly, justice also means “revenge” and revenge means justice.  One 
informant said, “uncompensated damages, especially loss of life resulting from 
                                                     
104 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
105 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
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homicide, means that all those on the perpetrator’s side are guilty and should be 
punished to the same degree or more” (KI 2: 23/1/16).106  Revenge in Dinka and 
Nuer culture tends to be an instinctive reaction to homicide or raids. It is also the 
case when justice is delayed and people have lost patience. During the South 
Sudan’s decades of civil war which also pitted communities against one another, this 
understanding of justice largely characterized intra-Nuer conflict relationships as well 
as inter-ethnic relationships with their neighbouring ethnic groups such as the Dinka 
and the Murle. Cycles of revenge have often been part of their conflict relationships 
(Johnson 2016b). But this is not completely hopeless, a respondent added: “they do 
have this mechanism where the revenge cycle must stop somewhere and the peace 
process takes over. But they have largely lost these positive features in the last two 
decades of war and they are now stuck with the notion of revenge” (KI 25: 
27/2/16).107 This is one area civil war has contributed to the weakening of traditional 
institutions and the erosion of traditional values in South Sudan.  
But justice also means “amnesty”. As discussed in chapter four, this was the case 
during the 1999 Wunlit peace conference, a participant recalled where, after both 
sides aired their grievances during a truth-telling session, some of the chiefs 
declared, “fine, we are prepared to forfeit the right to cattle for what took place before; 
let us start a new page, but if anybody kills from today onwards, we will demand 
cows from him” (KI 25: 27/2/16).108  Similarly, the Akobo intra-Nuer peace 
conference of 1994 also ended with an amnesty as a mechanism to deal with human 
rights abuses and atrocities committed during the conflict between the Lou and the 
Jikany Nuer regions (Bradbury et al 2006: 36). Amnesty can be a vital local 
peacemaking tool to bring about peace and reconciliation. However, as I will discuss 
in Chapter Six, based on the universalist notion, certain crimes such as genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, when committed, cannot be amnestied.  
                                                     
106 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
107 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (25/2/2016) 
108 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016) 
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5.2.2 Concepts of Justice among the Dinka 
Justice among the Dinka means “fairness”, “equal treatment”, “sharing” and 
“compensation”.  The translation is kenyiec (justice), used in the context of homicide. 
Justice is also translated as “boko nyimthong” (equality). One participant said, “equal 
treatment of children in a family by parents, fairness by chiefs in arbitration and in 
mediation by elders in dispute resolution constitute justice” (KI 29:19/2/16).109 This 
means that people are equal and no one is above or below another so that no one 
can manipulate another and no one should suffer violations, especially the weak. 
Justice also means “sharing”. “One cannot, for example, carry on eating in a Dinka 
community when a hungry person is sitting nearby or have too much of something 
when others have none” (KI 9: 7/2/16).110 This notion of justice resonates with the 
ubuntu principle where promotion of the welfare of the community members 
underpins the value of common humanity and interconnectedness. Sharing shows 
justice, which also means distribution of wealth, so that others also benefit from it to 
promotes collective welfare.   
The idea of wealth distribution as justice is vital among the Dinka and constitutes a 
very important part of their customary law; especially the distribution of bride wealth 
during marriage. One respondent reported, “the bride wealth or dowry that comes 
from a daughter’s marriage is shared out amongst relations and friends and is not 
for the father alone” (KI 9: 7/2/16).111  Marriage, among the Dinka, as among other 
Nilotic and African ethnicities, is not an individual affair, but a union between two 
kinship groups, and this is the case when it comes to the conventions of bride wealth 
distribution. Certain categories of relatives of the bride must receive a recognized 
proportion before the marriage is considered binding (SAD 768/1/42).112 With the 
                                                     
109 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/2016) 
110 Interview 9, with a Dinka elder: (7/2/2016) 
111 Interview 9, with a Dinka elder: (7/2/2016) 
112  Miscellaneous notes on Dinka courts and customary law and on the distribution of bride wealth, Howell, 
P.P. 1948; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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distribution and redistribution of cattle come reciprocity which in most cases is taken 
as a right within a family and extended family.  I observed during my field work among 
the Twic Dinka of Mayen Abun, how children of families without milk cows, for 
example, benefit from milk supplied through the distribution and redistribution of 
cattle. In that way, the broader and wider concept of justice among the Dinka 
translates into the promotion of rights and dignity for the poor and the weak in 
society. This aspect of distribution and redistribution is evocative of the Ubuntu 
principles of hospitality, generosity, reciprocity and collective welfare which lead to 
solidarity and peaceful coexistence: values at the heart of Ubuntu.  
But Dinka and Nuer local procedures are unfair and unjust in many ways against 
women. Most Dinka and Nuer women participants in this study asserted that local 
justice practices run counter to what ought to be the case as discussed in the concept 
of justice. Women claim unfair treatment in Dinka culture, for example, that they do 
not share in family resources and benefits and often not consulted in family matters. 
They are not entitled to bride wealth paid in the marriages of their own daughters 
and sometimes some men use this marital wealth to marry more wives. One of them 
declared, “we have no inheritance right to family wealth such as cattle, land and 
other property” (KI 29: 19/2/16).113 This raises the question of how a peaceful society 
can be built where people live in harmony if a section or sections of the society 
(women and youth) feel alienated. Other examples include unequal education 
opportunities for boys and girls in a family where boys always receive preferential 
treatment. For example, in situations of limited resources the decision is always to 
educate boys, as girls are in waiting for marriage or could even be married off to 
sponsor the boy’s education (KI 29: 19/2/16).114  Women are also married off to their 
abusers such as rapists and abductors. For example, after the 1999 Wunlit peace 
                                                     
113 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/2016) 
114 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman (19/2/2016) 
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conference, payment of dowry was required for those girls who had been taken by 
the soldiers as wives (Ashworth 2014: 159). 
Conceptualized in these terms, justice among the Dinka as well as among the Nuer 
means equality in everything, including rights, services, and treatment without 
discriminating between men and women, girls and boys, or any other criteria such 
as level of education and age. But drawing from the participants’ views, there are 
some contradictions in practice and therefore, gender bias and injustice in both 
Dinka and Nuer cultures. It also suggests that the practice is in contradiction to the 
Ubuntu values of common humanity, respect for human dignity, solidarity and 
peaceful coexistence. It seems there is no significant difference between Dinka and 
Nuer concept of justice. However, as will be discussed under compensation section, 
a marked difference exists in practical applications not only between Dinka and Nuer 
but also amongst the different Dinka sections.  
5.3 Customary law, local institutions and mechanisms  
Local conflict resolution is generally based on customary law. Dinka and Nuer 
customary law principles and local practices tend to be largely similar. Most cases 
in Dinka and Nuer customary courts concern offences arising from the payment of 
bride wealth in marriage, offences against the marital systems and legal rights for 
women and finally offences against the human body: injury or homicide. Based on 
these similarities, in this section, I will concurrently discuss their customary laws, 
institutions and practices.  
More than half of the respondents (27 out of 43) interviewed between January and 
June 2016 said the sources of customary law among Dinka and Nuer are customs, 
cultural values and beliefs in spiritual beings or powers and they carry the Dinka and 
the Nuer world views. One of them, for example, explained, “customary law comes 
from the culture and traditions which were being followed since precolonial time and 
people decided to maintain and orally transfer them from generation to generation in 
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the form of songs and storytelling” (KI 2: 23/1/16).115 Despite some changes, these 
cultures and traditions have been followed and are still being practised. 
Regarding the how and when and by whom these laws were made, a respondent 
said, “during Nuer chiefs’ meetings in Fangak116 in the 1940s, emerging challenges 
from people’s experiences in maintaining peace, security and coexistence were 
discussed, formulated as rules and incorporated into the existing customary law” (KI 
1: 20/1/16).117  A representative body of Nuer chiefs met at Fangak in 1945 for the 
first time to discuss differences in the law which had emerged in the settlement of 
intra-ethnic disputes (SAD, 767/6/36).118 From then on, these meetings have been 
occasionally held to review the situations and then come up with solutions that will 
form new resolutions for the chiefs. The rules were made in Fangak, another 
respondent emphasized, for example, how many cows would be paid when a person 
was intentionally killed and when the killing was unintentional or if somebody was 
just wounded, how many cows would be paid? If somebody took a girl by force, what 
was the penalty in terms of cattle? (KI 10: 7/2/16).119 The review of existing laws in 
the light of new situations and challenges led to finding solutions to recent problems. 
Since the socio-economic and indeed the whole life of the Nuer and of the Dinka 
were based on cattle, the entire system, of justice, compensation, restitution and 
reconciliation were centred on livestock.  
The Nuer Kuar muon (Land or Earth Master) or Kuar kwac (Leopard-skin chief), the 
Dinka Bany Bith (Spear Master), traditional experts and, from the 1950s to the 
                                                     
115 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
116 Fangak is a town in Unity state, Nuerland. It has a historical significance, as it was the Administrative unit 
for the colonial authorities in Upper Nile where the first meeting of Nuer chiefs was held. It remained the seat 
for customary law where Nuer chiefs annually meet to formulate and review aspects of customary law. 
117 Interview 1, with a Lawyer: (20/1/2016) 
118 Introduction to a manual covering the legal situations dealt with by Nuer courts, based on Howell’s 
experiences in Central Nuer District.  Howell, P.P. 1949; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
119 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
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present, government chiefs, are the law makers (KI 2: 23/1/16).120 These people 
have legislative powers, and through the judgments they pass on cases, precedents 
become procedures and are set. These are then followed in other similar cases. It 
seems these are the procedures other ethnic communities also follow to formulate 
their laws based on customs, practices and precedents. But basing procedures on 
precedents is sometimes problematic especially as local courts frequently make 
compromises such as ordering some small numbers of cattle to be paid to appease 
the complainant SAD 72/6/69).121 If the grounds for the action are not right, the 
number of cattle paid in these cases soon become a precedent, accepted as 
customary and are eventually judged to be traditional. This is where customary law 
lacks in consistency and due process according to the universalist view. In the 
absence of written rules and regulations, nothing could prevent irregularities from 
occurring. However, the situational and contextual adaptation and flexibility in 
dealing with cases could turn out to be a strength of customary law, though it could 
also be a route to easy interference and manipulation by the government and 
politicians.  
Like other ethnic communities in Southern Sudan, between 1890s-1930s, Dinka and 
Nuer communities had no regular institutions for the enforcement of customary law.  
Social control was not maintained through the systematic application of ‘the force of 
politically organized society’ and on this strict definition, then, the universalists would 
argue they had no ‘law’. But were they lawless? There were recognized standards 
for the control of human relationships even though these were maintained by 
sanctions too indeterminate to be called legal. According to Howell (1954: 22) a 
Nuer, for example, would think in terms of cuong (rights) and of duer (wrongs) In this 
                                                     
120 Interview 2, with a Nuer Chief: (23/1/2016) 
121 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”, Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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sense, it means the failure to recognize a right or the infringement of a right. The 
Nuer has, because of his membership of a kinship group, both rights and obligations. 
Duer (wrong) had two meanings: first it was a wrong, when a man actively violated 
the right of another; it was also a wrong when a man refused to honour his obligations 
towards his kinsmen (Howell 1954: 22). 
What were the sanctions which made for the observance of these rules? The primary 
sanction was self-help: retaliation if a wrong was committed, or the use of force to 
claim a right. Fear of retaliation was a sanction. This applies to individuals, who fear 
that those they have wronged or those to whom definite obligations have not been 
fulfilled will take physical action against them, and fear also that, because their action 
is agreed to be wrong, they will receive no support from their fellows if they resist. 
Moreover, the wronged may receive the help of their close kinsmen and neighbours, 
who will crush any attempt at resistance. This applied to groups or individuals in 
relation to other groups in the same way, and was expressed in the balanced 
opposition of ethnic segments and kinship groups (Howell 1954: 23). A Nuer may 
owe one of his kinsmen a cow and refuse to pay it. His kinsman will take the cow by 
stealth or wrest it from him by force, and the success of this action will depend on 
the extent of non-intervention of other relatives. In the relationship of individuals 
there is also the prevailing principle of collective responsibility, so that in fact there 
is rarely an isolated individual wrong or an isolated right (Murithi 2008). This explains 
why reparation of wrong is not an exclusive business of the offender and his family 
but of the clan or community, depending on the magnitude of the wrong. The strength 
of the right or the extent of the wrong, is qualified by the relationship of the parties 
concerned. Other sanctions are social reprobation, unpopularity, loss of approval 
and respect of neighbours, and hence loss of the privileges which the individual 
possesses as part of a larger social group. Such privileges are both social and 
political. They are also economic, because so many economic activities must be 
carried collectively.  
For some wrongs there was also a religious sanction, which was often an expression 
of kinship ideals (Howell 1954: 23). What a man and his kinsmen feared in terms of 
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religious sanctions and legal processes was the breach of observance which would 
bring them disaster in the form of dueer (natural disease) or of sterility among 
themselves and their cattle. Although a deterrent to homicide, religion among the 
Nuer serves more as a sanction for carrying out accepted modes of behaviour after 
the event. It is further a sanction for the immediate confession of homicide, and 
therefore, the Nuer rarely if ever attempt to conceal their guilt (KI 2: 23/1/16).122 The 
dangers of concealing an act of homicide are expressed in the concept of loic.123  
But is this still the practice among the Dinka and the Nuer? There have been changes 
over the decades. What in the precolonial time operated through the sanction of 
expediency, fear of retaliation, and the force of limited public opinion, from 1940s up 
to now is enforced by the courts with the government’s support.  
But these changes have come with costs, as the colonial administration altered some 
elements of Dinka law simply because such law seemed incompatible with European 
and later Sudanese Islamic conceptions of justice. Without a full understanding of 
the social system for the maintenance of which Dinka and Nuer customary laws were 
devised, such alterations could have been more destructive. The British colonial 
administration for example introduced imprisonment as punishment in the local 
courts, something which has not been known before, as local institutions did not 
include police and prison (Mohamed, 2009) in (Gado 2013: 262). In such cases 
offenders were exiled from their areas to live in other areas beyond the boundaries 
of their ethnic homeland and only allowed to come back after a period. This 
contradicted the restorative approach to dealing with offenders which is central to 
African philosophy. 
Another way colonialism impacted traditional practices was that DCs were in the 
position to approve a local justice practice or to reject it based on their personal and 
                                                     
122 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
123 Loic refers to a situation when the killer has not confessed to his crime until long after the death of his 
victim. Such situation is associated with cien (curse) which brings bad spirits that cause sickness and/or death. 
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professional ethical and moral values. For example, in 1935 the DC of Yirol had to 
approve the total number of Arwok124 payable in different instances such as for an 
unmarried girl, for a married woman on adultery and on a married woman on divorce. 
For example, in his letter of 21 February,1935 to the Governor of Upper Nile, the DC 
of Yirol said, “I’ve accepted it as a rule that Arwok shall, in future, only be paid for 
living children” (SAD 767/11/2).125 He furthermore said, “I promise to support the 
chiefs’ courts in refusing divorce in such cases” (SAD 767/11/2).126 
The current state of Nuer and Dinka customary law, institutions and mechanisms 
reflect the life of the largely rural population which owes as much to customary 
principles and mechanisms as to local institutions. Generally, there is preference to 
customary courts regarding resolution of certain violations of rights including 
homicide. Although a homicide case is settled in statutory courts, most rural Dinka 
and Nuer do not consider the case over yet, revenge is likely to continue until 
reconciliation and reintegration rituals are performed in their communities by their 
traditional leaders. 
5.4 Role of traditional authorities (spiritual Leaders) 
Disputes and homicide cases in Dinka and Nuer communities during the pre-colonial 
period were resolved by spiritual leaders and elders who served as a group 
mediation and reconciliation forum. The main actor in Dinka community was the 
                                                     
124 Aruok is the Dinka name for cattle paid as a fine in cases of adultery and fornication. 
125 Official correspondence, Upper Nile Province and Equatoria concerning Dinka customs and practices 
including G.M Hancock, DC. Yirol and M. W. Parr. Governor Upper Nile Province on the payment of Aruok, 
1935-1939; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
126 Official correspondence, Upper Nile Province and Equatoria concerning Dinka customs and practices 
including G.M Hancock, DC. Yirol and M. W. Parr. Governor Upper Nile Province on the payment of Aruok, 
1935-1939; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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Bany Bith (Spear Master)127 and in Nuer community was the Kuar muon (Land 
Master) or Kuar kwac (Leopard-Skin Chief). Their offices were hereditary and held 
by special priestly clans with “Spear” and the “Leopard Skin” as the symbols 
(insignia) of their offices respectively, which is handed from owner to successor 
((Wassara 2007: 8). The Nuer Kuar kwac was called the ‘Leopard-skin chief’ 
because he was always clothed in a leopard skin (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 5). This 
traditional leader had two roles among the Nuer: that of Landlord (Earth or Land 
master) and that of Leopard-Skin Chief who was endowed with both a spiritual role 
and the administration of justice.  
Evans-Pritchard (1940) has listed the functions of Kuar kwac or kuar muon as: 
management of the land especially the welfare of crops; a limited role in rain-making 
and the regulation of the weather; the ritual of homicide; the ritual of incest; the ritual 
of preventing feuds and protecting warriors on raiding expeditions; arbitration in all 
kind of disputes. Skill in arbitration was considered by the Nuer one of the attributes 
of ruec (leadership) and the ruic naath (Nuer leaders) often extended their influence 
into the sphere of legal disputes. One respondent said Kuarmoun was directly 
responsible for dispensing cuong (rights), also known as justice (KI 2: 23/1/16).128 
The Kuarmuon families were assigned the role of administering justice by the first 
ancestors of the Nuer; and the spiritual leaders believed that their powers came 
directly from God the creator, not smaller gods, because they could cast a curse on 
people who refused their will, which was God’s will, and something would happen” 
(KI 2: 23/1/16).129 It was probably this spiritual power that traditional leaders used to 
resolve conflicts and maintain peaceful coexistence prior to the establishment of the 
Chiefs’ Court Ordinance. 
                                                     
127 Bany Bith commonly translated as “Chief of the Fishing Spear” and as “ritual expert” among the Dinka is 
like Kuar muon (Earth Master) or Kuar Kwac (Leopard- skin chief) among the Nuer. 
128 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016 
129 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016 
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With certain duties to perform regarding the composition of blood-feuds, the 
Leopard-Skin Chief may be called upon to arbitrate in disputes of almost any kind. 
The role of the spiritual leader was purely that of a mediator and his powers, both 
ritual and secular, were brought into operation only if there was genuine desire by 
the hostile parties to reach an agreement. He had no executive powers with political 
force behind them, although it was expected that he would attempt to intervene in 
the initial stages of a feud, and he sometimes threatened to use his power to curse 
the disputants if they would not agree. Moreover, in all matters in dispute, the 
frequency with which he woulc be approached depended largely on his prestige and 
personality, and not merely on his hereditary status (Howell 1954: 211).Other 
persons, as I will discuss in the next section with no hereditary ritual status could 
also acquire a reputation for fairness and diplomacy and be employed as arbitrators 
in minor disputes. 
The Dinka Bany Bith also had certain recognized functions to perform for their 
people. The principal one was that of arbitration between hostile parties within the 
group, the composition of homicide cases and the settling of disputes which were 
too bitter to be composed by the elders concerned. He was a ritual expert who had 
political influence within his own group’s circle, but like the Nuer Kuar Kwac, he did 
not impose his authority, he represented the ‘voice of the people’ and articulated 
their wishes (SAD 72/6/38).130 He was invited to arbitrate and by persuasion led the 
disputants to reach a compromise. This attitude is still apparent in the working of any 
Dinka court, just as it is among the Nuer. The traditional leader articulates values 
inherent in the social system, and has the power to curse violators, but is not 
expected to use his powers to his own ends and certainly does not impose his 
authority by threat of a curse unless warranted by exceptional circumstances. This 
spiritual leader has ritual powers which strengthen and emphasize his function in 
society as a peacemaker. The Bany Bith had religious powers and functions which 
                                                     
130 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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gave him political authority out of the ordinary and, such political status was later 
backed by the colonial government (SAD 72/6/41).131  
The influence of these functionaries varied in effectiveness not only from tribe to 
tribe, but from time to time, but it was significant and their functions were similar. 
Both the Dinka Bany Bith and the Nuer Kuarmuon were essentially arbitrators, both 
had religious sanctions behind them, both had what may be called a respectable 
status well founded on tradition. Yet with both, the effectiveness of their powers 
depended largely on other sanctions prevailing; the actual need for co-ordination in 
the face of external aggression, the need for integration because a lack of security 
was a threat to the very continuance of social and economic existence (SAD 
72/6/53).132 
The introduction of colonial chieftainship by the British in 1931, affected the powers 
of these leaders. The Bany Alath (colonial chief) in the Dinka community was the 
person whom the government appointed as chief to inherit power from the Bany Bith 
and he was a member of the customary court (Wassara 2007: 8). But these leaders 
as noted in Chapter Four, to some extent continued to work together. Cases that 
required taking an oath were referred to the Bany Bith before the Bany Alath made 
the ruling (Wassara 2007: 8). Among the Ngok Dinka for example, it was the Bany 
Bith, as a chosen representative of the government since 1945, who supervised 
these processes (SAD 72/6/42).133 Unlike the interactions between the Bany Alath 
                                                     
131 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD 
132 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD 
133 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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and Bany Bith in the Dinka community, in the Nuer community such cooperation was 
apparently lacking and the role of the Kuar kwac was reduced to a ceremonial 
function as the administration of real justice was given to colonial chiefs (Wassara 
2007: 8). This was a marked difference between the Nuer and the Dinka practices 
after the establishment of the chiefs’ courts.  
In both Dinka and Nuer communities, Bany bith and Kuarmoun families still exist and 
are still respected. But actors on local justice are government chiefs in collaboration 
with modern courts. The introduction of organized legal procedures with panel 
sanctions behind them, the instruments for the enforcement of administrative 
obligations not only in the execution of judgements but also collective tasks, have 
had a profound effect on political, socio-cultural and judicial systems and structure 
in local communities (SAD 72/6/42).134 Although some government chiefs such as 
the Ngok Dinka paramount chief in theory more than in practice, combine 
administration of justice with spiritual role, most chiefs do not. This explains why 
some chiefs’ courts refer people to diviners or other practitioners outside the court 
when required by circumstances.  
5.5 Religious Functionaries and Magical Experts 
There were also families in both Nuer and Dinka communities that played other 
peacemaking roles or managed specific disputes and issues. These ritual experts 
had specific functions to perform for public welfare,  including: fertility in man and 
cattle, success in hunting and fishing, and in raids and warfare (Howell 1954: 211). 
Among the Nuer, they included the wut ghok (cattle expert), the kuar thoi (water 
expert), the kuar yiika (expert of fecundity of women), the kuar juath (expert of 
                                                     
 
134 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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epidemic diseases among humans) the gwan tang or kuar bith (expert who ensures 
the success of warriors in battle). One fact distinguished them from other categories 
of magical expert; they had an established ritual status in society, and were expected 
to carry out religious tasks which in some African tribes were less specialized or 
even embodied in the person of one man, for example, the reth (King) of the Shilluk 
tribe who was (apart from his political and executive functions) generally responsible 
for fertility in man, cattle and crops, as well as success in hunting and fishing (Howell 
1954: 11).The special functions of the ritual experts and their magical powers were 
derived from and were dependent upon kwoth (gods or spirits) (Howell 1954: 204). 
Ancestors are intermediaries between man and God; prayer is offered by them to 
kwoth. A close relation exists between the concept of kwoth and religious practices. 
The Nuer ethnic group has also known a history of prophets with the last famous 
one being Ngundeng Bong,135 who gained considerable political power and 
widespread fame during the last century. Prophets are among the religious experts 
of the second category. They are the possessors of ‘sky-spirits’ direct and identify 
manifestations of kwoth. The activities of most of these experts were limited to 
ordinary ritual divination and diagnosis of the cause of the minor misfortunes which 
beset the individual. Though without extensive political power, they had exceptional 
influence over the Nuer (Howell 1954: 214). Prophets and persons possessed by 
spirits and magicians of lesser importance were clearly distinguished from the ji twac, 
(skin bearers), religious functionaries who had a traditional right to twac (a skin) as 
a badge of office. Unlike ji twac, owners of the spirits were more concerned with 
individuals, and were approached by individuals to perform ritual tasks for them in 
return for an agreed fee (Howell 1954: 214).136 But kuar kwac could also be 
                                                     
135 Ngundeng Bong was one of the famous Lou-Nuer prophets who died in 1905 and was believed to have had 
special power of prophecy. He was said to have prophesized a lot about South Sudan, including the ongoing 
civil war, characters and personalities of key actors in the conflict. 
136 This does not mean that the ji twac do not also receive fees. There are recognized fees for specific functions: 
for example, fees paid to the kuar kwac for arbitration in blood feuds (Howell, 1954:214). 
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approached by an individual, who would ask him to bless his land or his wives and 
ensure fertility. 
Modern Nuer society still has prophets, but not all of them necessarily promote 
peace. Hutchinson and Pendle (2015: 15) for example recount the roles of two Nuer 
prophets; Gatdeang Dit and Nyachol who played crucial roles during the two 
decades of the SPLM/A war. Gatdeang strives to support traditional Nuer ethical 
codes of fighting and raiding unravelled by decades of civil war. His emphasis 
revolves not around the power of gun, but around the power of traditional cultural 
norms of hospitality, marriage, kinship, and shared cattle rights and obligations. He 
discouraged cattle raids between Dinka and Western Nuer, but encouraged 
intermarriages, partly with the aim of creating opportunities for the peaceful sharing 
of critical resources across this cultural and linguistic divide during periods of 
drought, hunger and insecurity (Hutchinson and Pendle 2015: 9). This resonates 
with the principle of Ubuntu where socio-economic and political spheres of life are 
constructed around solidarity, generosity and reciprocity.  
Unlike Gadeang Dit whose spiritual and social roles promote harmony and build 
peace Nyachol’s promote lethal violence and break peace through the construction 
of group identity around war (Hutchinson and Pendle 2015: 15). She discouraged 
Nuer-Nuer war but mobilized Nuer youth for raids and war with Dinka. However, with 
chiefs referring cases to her, Nyachol stepped in to fill a political vacuum created 
during the war by either the absence or weakness of judicial institutions. She offers 
a kind of judicial service that would in normal situation be the role of the government 
but which it has failed to provide; a failure that extends across South Sudan Pendle, 
et al. (2012) cited in (Hutchinson and Pendle 2015: 10). A situation such as this, 
where serious cases such as homicide are resolved through local mechanisms, 
confirms the critique directed against international and domestic legal systems that 
often either crumble in the face of violent conflict or are totally absent in rural 
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communities. There are still many Nuer prophets today including those whose 
spiritual powers are questioned. A respondent said, “some of the prophets we have 
today are making a living, because they can neither stop wars nor predict calamities” 
(KI 2: 23/1/16).137 
Among the Dinka, apart from the Bany Bith (Master of the Fishing Spear) found in 
Bahr el Ghazal and northern Upper Nile, all Dinka Bany (Masters) have Ring, the 
clan divinity of Flesh. But not all Bany de Ring or in some cases Bany Riem, (Masters 
of Blood), are spear masters (KI 12:2/2/16).138 The Bany de Ring of Bor for example 
are not Spear Masters. This means that like in Nuer Society, there are other spiritual 
functionaries and experts in Dinka society who carry out similar or different spiritual 
functions besides Bany Bith. 
5.6 Homicide and blood feuds 
Among both Dinka and Nuer, homicide required a restoration of equilibrium between 
the groups involved. Whether the act was committed by stealth, in fair fight, or by 
accident, revenge was the first reaction, unless curbed promptly by actions from 
spiritual leaders or compensation. Cases concerning homicide and the payment of 
blood money revealed the nature of mutual obligations, in this case expressed in the 
duty to avenge or the duty to assist in the collection of blood-money to settle that 
feud by peaceful means (SAD 768/1/39).139 One informant reported, “when 
somebody is killed, all members of the killer’s family are guilty, any of them can be 
killed to compensate for the dead” (KI 10: 7/2/16).140 Retaliatory sanctions were 
operative since the first obligation of the dead man’s kinsmen was to take vengeance 
upon the killer or upon one of his kinsmen (Howell 1954: 27). Pursuit of the Dinka 
                                                     
137 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
138 Interview 12, with an academic (13/2/2016) 
139 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD 
140 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/ 2016) 
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ter (feud), by killing any one of his male kinsmen meant that this was extended to all 
persons of one’s wut (lineage) as it was not necessary to take revenge on the person 
of the killer himself; any one of his kinsmen would do instead. Killing a person of the 
other group restored the balance by reducing their numbers proportionately.   
The principle of a life for a life rarely led to permanent peace even if honour was 
satisfied for the moment. The likelihood of a positive settlement by compensation 
and the performance of the necessary ritual depended largely on the degree of social 
integration and interdependence of the groups involved (Howell 1954: 40-1). A feud 
between two closely related groups was settled without great difficulty because 
common habitation and common economic pursuits, strengthened by the tradition of 
blood relationship, demanded peaceful resolution as a matter of expediency. The 
sustained feud was usually one which had spread to larger units of society and 
became a permanent expression of opposition between them. Hostilities may stop, 
but even comparatively trivial provocation may be sufficient to start further fighting 
(Howell 1954: 40).  
Among both Dinka and Nuer, the kinsmen of the killer and those of the dead man 
were not allowed to partake of food together (SAD 72/6/61).141 To do so would cause 
spiritual contamination in the form of physical disease which might well lead to death. 
The killer was believed to be in a condition of ritual impurity, and between the killer’s 
group and the dead man’s group there arises a condition of spiritual danger 
expressed in a prohibition on eating and drinking together and indeed on any form 
of social intercourse (SAD 72/6/66).142 This taboo on eating together, which is cross-
cutting and still practised among some tribes of South Sudan, continues until final 
settlement has been reached and often long afterwards. These difficulties were 
removed by a series of ritual processes conducted by the Dinka Bany Bith whose 
                                                     
141 DUL; Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
142 DUL; Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; Special Collections GB 0033 SAD 
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functions were in this respect exactly like those of the Nuer Kwar Kwac (SAD 
72/6/61).143 They were called upon to solve the problem, and negotiate a blood 
wealth payment and stood as a ritual mediator between the victim’s family and the 
culprit’s.  
During this process, the spiritual leader customarily gave the murderer asylum in his 
house; and when compensation was settled, he performed a ritual. Both parties had 
to abide by his decision; and if anybody violated his directives, he cast a curse and 
it was believed, that the person would die or something bad would happen to that 
family (KI 2: 23/1/16).144 The curse was and still is a very powerful tool of social 
control among the Nuer and the Dinka. The fear of a curse invokes compliance by 
the parties to a conflict to pay compensation and to respect this leader who had no 
political or executive authority to enforce decisions but who alone had moral force 
(Wassara 2007: 8). The curse has always been a powerful mechanism of social 
control across communities in South Sudan. In judicial terms, spiritual leaders’ power 
to curse has been a crucial sanction against harmful and antisocial behaviour 
(Leonardi et al. 2010: 54).  
The spiritual leaders as noted above were the mediators, but without authority to 
enforce decisions and ability to compel the people to come to an agreement even 
though they have spiritual powers in the form of a curse. They only use their powers 
in a conventional manner as spokesmen of a general, moral sentiment which 
condemns the killing of kinsmen; both neighbours and remote parties 
(SAD72/6/61).145 Traditionally the spiritual leader was simply the focus of public 
opinion and could operate only when the situation was such that his activities as a 
mediator were both expedient, convenient and in demand. Bany bith, like Kuaar 
                                                     
143 DUL; Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD.  
144 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/2/2016) 
145 DUL; Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950; Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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kwac, can draw a line in the ground between the warring parties with his spear, 
across which they dare not pass and actual hostilities are unlikely to take place in 
the presence of this spiritual leader, but this does not prevent the parties from 
continuing hostilities later (SAD 72/6/61).146 The good will of neighbours is needed 
especially their assistance in resisting external aggression.  
But law enforcement is as important as having the law. The lack of legal sanctions 
and force by the local justice system makes it unlikely to be called law by 
international standards, and therefore, has little need of recognition. However, 
currently, much of the peacemaking role and maintenance of order is taken up by 
the government, through the chiefs’ courts whose decisions are enforced by the 
government. Since the 1940s, some paramount chiefs such as the one of Ngok 
Dinka, combines both as Bany bith and government chief. In cases of homicide, the 
culprits now report or taken to the police custody instead of seeking asylum in the 
residence of the spiritual leaders. 
5.7 Mediation and Arbitration  
Since the introduction of the colonial chieftaincy in 1931 to the present, the mediation 
role of the Nuer and Dinka spiritual leaders for the resolving of blood-feuds and to 
arbitrate in disputes has been largely played by chiefs and councils of elders. It 
seemed the change was in keeping with the colonial policy, which meant having in 
place institutions and leaders who would serve colonial interest.  
Among the Twic Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal and the Ngok Dinka of Abyei, for example, 
when a dispute leads to homicide, local chiefs and elders mediate between the two 
involved families and negotiate accounts of the murder and subsequent 
                                                     
146 DUL; Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell, P.P. 1950, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD.  
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compensation (KI 29: 19/2/16).147 The negotiation and mediation process may last 
for weeks and even months depending on the nature of the case. The Elders will 
work to first establish the truth regarding the root causes and impact of the hostilities 
before making decisions on compensation. One respondent stated that “first you 
have to accept that you have committed a crime; and once an agreement is reached, 
the offender is asked to pay “puk” (blood price) to the family of the deceased” (KI 10: 
7/2/16).148 This process is followed by reconciliation and re-integration rituals that 
may or may not involve the role of Bany Bith or Kwar Kwac.  
5.7.1 Truth-seeking 
Local peacemaking begins with truth seeking, the establishment of guilt, confession 
then compensation (Komakech 2012). This is because the first aim of the mediation 
and problem-solving approach is to understand what took place by uncovering the 
whole truth. The truth-seeking process is where the offender and witnesses are 
allowed ample time to tell their stories about what happened and to answer questions 
from those in attendance before the elders and chiefs decide the case. The telling of 
one’s story, followed by questions and clarifications would almost take the place of 
what can be considered an investigation in an ordinary court trial. Everything could 
be said in such a setting, even cases of theft and sexual misconduct. The community 
environment would not be intimidating as in a court of law but supporting (Balati 
2015: 7) This contrasts with the modern peace process with its structured and 
predetermined time and outcomes, where little or no effort is made to address the 
root causes of the conflict. 
Truth-telling is an integral part of the justice system in local societies (Alie 2008: 
133). In Dinka and Nuer local peacemaking, truth-telling takes the form of lengthy 
stories. As noted by many scholars who wrote about the 1999 Wunlit Dinka-Nuer 
peace conference, in the Nilotic tradition, peace can only truly be achieved when 
                                                     
147 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/2016) 
148 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
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everyone knows fully what wrongs were committed (Duany 2003; Bradbury et al 
2006; Ashworth 2014: 156). According to Johnson (2014b: 4), possibly the most 
remarkable application of the customary court system during the second civil war 
was in the 1999 Wunlit conference. The two communities were each given an 
opportunity to tell their story about their suffering and bitterness. Each wronged 
group spoke long and fully of its issues (Ashworth 2014: 156). One of the 
respondents who attended the conference recalled, “Time was not a problem and 
nobody was in a hurry to conclude the peace meeting as long as accumulated 
grievances were being aired. People told their stories and it was this releasing of 
bitterness that led to reconciliation” (KI 25: 27/2/16).149 The significance of lengthy 
storytelling is that it helps release tensions and bitterness and to raise awareness of 
the kinds of suffering and destruction the victims have suffered.  According to Boege 
(2006: 8), restitution, reconciliation and restoration of harmony and relationships can 
only be built on a mutual understanding of what went wrong in the past. Therefore, 
the disputing parties must negotiate a consensus regarding the interpretation of the 
past. This is an often very lengthy endeavour as facts must be established and truth 
revealed. 
Although story-telling is a vital mechanism for uncovering truths and releasing of 
tensions and bitterness, it can be a narration of serious human rights violations which 
sometimes simply ends up with a declaration of amnesty for the perpetrators. This 
is where, in the universalist’s view based on retributive justice, Dinka and Nuer 
justice systems may be deemed to be in contravention of laws against human rights 
violations including atrocity crimes. But the fact that uncovering truths and airing 
grievances such as in Wunlit, brought about a degree of reconciliation and put in 
place local procedures of compensation and the return of abductees can be 
measured as an achievement in the line of restorative justice (Balati 2015: 8). 
                                                     
149 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016) 
 206 
12018735 
5.7.2 Oaths and Ordeal among the Nuer 
Traditional and local approaches employ certain truth-seeking techniques when 
there is denial or a suspect does not want to admit culpability for homicide and other 
serious offences. In this situation, the services of diviners, medicine men and other 
supernatural agencies are sought to help identify the culprit (Alie 2008: 137). Oath, 
ordeal and swearing are the common truth-seeking techniques used in traditional 
justice systems as the examples below show. Among the Nuer, the ceremony of 
oath was usually performed by the Leopard-Skin Chief, who was called in for this 
purpose. There were two common forms of kweng (oath); kwil or kap tang (to hold 
the spear-shaft) which was used in a variety of circumstances; and math (literally to 
drink) the form often employed in cases of unconfessed homicide. The taking of an 
oath was not an individual process carried out by one man alone. In the former 
ceremony both accuser and accused were expected to take part, and it amounted 
to something of an ordeal between them; in the latter where there was no known 
accused, those suspected and all their kinsmen were expected to participate. The 
colonial government discouraged the use of such an oath especially in court. Nuer 
chiefs and members were also reluctant, mainly in keeping with government policy 
(Howell 1954: 219). Although they may be willing, participants were often persuaded 
to take some other course. 
In the kap tang ceremony, although the nale kap tang referred to the spear of the 
Leopard-Skin Chief, the most important ritual association was clearly with the earth, 
and the ceremony amounted to a symbolic and sympathetic enactment of the 
process of burying the dead.   
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Table 2: Oaths and Ordeal among the Nuer 
Kap tang oath ceremony among the Nuer 
“A small hole was dug in the ground by the Leopard-Skin Chief, and this 
represented the grave; over it were placed sprigs of Calotropins proceri and 
balanitis aegyptiaca, for these were usually spread over the newly buried dead as 
protection against the diggings of hyenas. Over this hole the Leopard-Skin Chief 
put his spear, while the disputants squatted on either side and placed their right 
hands on the spear-shaft and each swore his innocence or belief in the other’s 
guilt. It was believed that the one who was telling a lie would be seized with 
sickness possibly followed by death unless an antidote was applied. If either party 
fell ill he would hurry to the Leopard-Skin Chief, who reversed the process and 
thereby removed the contamination. Sometimes the ritual was less elaborate; the 
disputants simply passed under the outspread leopard-skin spear held by the 
owner. Math was applied, though not always, in cases of homicide where the killer 
had not confessed or was quite unknown. It was performed by the Leopard-Skin 
Chief, who filled a gourd with milk from one of the cows belonging to the dead 
man. Those who protested their innocence were then expected to drink of the milk. 
This act openly defied the taboo on drinking or eating which automatically came 
into operation between the hostile parties in a blood-feud.  There could be no 
graver danger than drinking the milk of the dead man’s cow if there was blood 
between them” (Howell 1954: 220). 
 
Since contamination was extended to all kinsmen of the unknown killer, it was 
unlikely that anyone would agree to take the oath unless he was certain of the 
innocence of all his kin. Evidence or test by ordeal was questioned by the Governor 
of Upper Nile in 1935. This was a reaction to a situation where a defendant refused 
to take the oath and the court inevitably drew its own conclusions.  At the Governor’s 
order, an ordeal should not be allowed which tended to emphasize or spread the 
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magical power of some living person, chief or commoner, if it was repugnant to 
humanity, equality or good conscience (SAD 767/11/7).150 
5.7.3 Swearing among the Dinka 
Among the Dinka, thiep (bean) was used as a test of a person’s guilt when accused 
of causing death by witchcraft or poison. The seeds used to belong to a climbing 
plant called “thiep” (SAD 767/9/13):151 They must not be handled before the 
ceremony except by persons of either sex who are too young or too old for sexual 
intercourse. The owner of the seeds took an important subsidiary part (SAD 
767/9/6).152 During the previous 24 hours, each of the two men undergoing this trial 
took very little to eat or drink to have their stomachs as empty as possible. They 
brought with them a spear and goat each as payment to the owner of the seeds, and 
decided on some measure such as a bull, calf or even several head of cattle to be 
paid by the loser to the winner. This was quite distinct from any judgment in cattle 
because of the trial and was, in short, a side bet (SAD 767/9/6).153 
  
                                                     
150 Official correspondence, Upper Nile Province and Equatoria concerning Dinka customs and practices 
including G.M Hancock, DC. Yirol and M. W. Parr. Governor Upper Nile Province on the payment of Aruok, 
1935-1939, with reply from E.G. Coryton Deputy Governor; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
151 Letters from D. W. Cowie, A/Government Analyst to Governor Equatoria and Botanist, Botany and Plant 
Pathology section to Cowie re to identification of seed referred to above, 1938; DUL, Special Collections GB 
0033 SAD. 
152 Note by A. E. D. Penn, DC Lakes on thiep, the customary mode of swearing among the Agar with covering 
letter to Governor of Equatoria and resume by W.F. Cottrell, A. D. C. Lakes District of a case in which the chiefs’ 
court asked that their customary method thiep be resorted to, 1938; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
153  Note by A. E. D. Penn, DC Lakes on thiep, the customary mode of swearing among the Agar with covering 
letter to Governor of Equatoria and resume by W.F. Cottrell, A. D. C. Lakes District of a case in which the chiefs’ 
court asked that their customary method thiep be resorted to, 1938; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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Table 1: Swearing among the Dinka 
Swearing with thiep among the Dinka 
“A large bucket of water, with a spare one at hand if required, was placed before 
each man and a large shallow pan. A fire was lit and the seeds put into the embers, 
the owners recited, “My seeds, I put you on the fire (the actual putting was done 
by the small boy) to show us the truth. As you were suffering from the fire and 
showed that you have life, reveal the truth to us”. The seeds were then taken out 
and put with a little water into a gourd before each man, and the owner of the 
seeds smacked the bellies of each of the goats provided, saying. “If your owner is 
lying, let your belly swell and prove it”. He then cut off the tip of one ear from each 
goat and threw it on the fire. Before starting to drink each man prayed that if he 
was telling the truth, he would vomit up the seed but that if he was lying, the seed 
would remain in his stomach. They then swallowed the seed with their first 
mouthful and their mouths were inspected to see whether they were trying to 
conceal the seed behind the teeth or under the tongue with a mouthful of water. 
Now the real drinking started and they were supplied with water until they began 
vomiting it up again in quarts. They must each have drunk and spewed up some 
two or three gallons before the elderly witness produced his seed or, rather part of 
it as it had broken into bits (SAD 767/9/7).154 The Ran Wel (the master of 
ceremonies) who oversaw the ceremony was paid for his service” (SAD 
767/9/10).155 
 
                                                     
154  Note by A. E. D. Penn, DC Lakes on thiep, the customary mode of swearing among the Agar with covering 
letter to Governor of Equatoria and resume by W.F. Cottrell, A. D. C. Lakes District of a case in which the chiefs’ 
court asked that their customary method thiep be resorted to, 1938; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
155  Note by A. E. D. Penn, DC Lakes on thiep, the customary mode of swearing among the Agar with covering 
letter to Governor of Equatoria and resume by W.F. Cottrell, A. D. C. Lakes District of a case in which the chiefs’ 
court asked that their customary method thiep be resorted to, 1938; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD 
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This practice was discouraged by the colonial administration as it would appear to 
be a danger to the participants’ health not only from the swallowing of the bean or 
its after effects, but also from the excessive amount of water swallowed. According 
to the Dinka of Yirol DC, the last occasion it was used, in the government recognized 
courts, was 1925 (SAD 767/9/12).156 The Dinka used other methods of looking for 
evidence such as consulting traditional and magical experts in witchcraft and curse-
related disputes, known as private cases. These were sometimes allotted to such 
functionaries by the customary courts, except for thiep. It seems this truth-seeking 
practice was one that needed a degree of moderation given its physical and 
psychological effects on the participants subjected to it. This may be where 
colonialism had some positive impact as it discouraged some negative traditional 
practices that today would be described as violations of individual and community 
rights and welfare.  
The practice of truth-seeking through consultation with witchdoctors and some 
traditional and magical experts may still be in practice among the Dinka and the Nuer 
rural communities, but with the advent of churches and conversion to Christianity 
and other monotheistic religions in recent years, these practices have generally 
become unpopular and it seems customary courts no longer also refer people for 
evidence to these experts. They encourage evidence that comes from witness’ 
testimonies.  
5.8 Compensation    
Once the truth regarding homicide is established and the killer identified, the feud 
might be amicably resolved, balance restored and future hostility avoided by 
payment of compensation. The case is examined based on the circumstances that 
led to the killing and in accordance with the perpetrator’s intention; whether the killing 
                                                     
156  Note by A. E. D. Penn, DC Lakes on thiep, the customary mode of swearing among the Agar with covering 
letter to Governor of Equatoria and resume by W.F. Cottrell, A. D. C. Lakes District of a case in which the chiefs’ 
court asked that their customary method thiep be resorted to, 1938; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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was done intentionally or unintentionally and compensation will be charged 
accordingly (KI 10: 7/2/16).157 Theoretically the question of intention should not enter 
the assessment of compensation. It should be the same since the main object of 
payment of blood money is to restore the balance between the two groups in 
opposition and as will be shortly discussed, to marry a wife to the dead man. But 
some Nuer sections do take into consideration the intention of the killer. The 
difference in the weapon used was also a qualification among some Nuer sections 
as among the Dinka, where the use of the fighting-spear for example, was an 
indication of intention. Compensation for intentional homicide was usually at least 
double that for accidental killing (KI10:7/2/16).158  
Justice was achieved by the payment of puk (blood price) among the Dinka and ghok 
thunge (cattle of compensation) among the Nuer (Howell 1954: 6), commonly paid 
in the form of cattle. The present-day Twic Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal and the Ngok 
Dinka for example, pay 31 cows, for a youth, 15 for an old person and 15 for a child 
(KI 14: 19/2/16).159 The numbers of cows paid as compensation are not the same 
for all sections of the Dinka ethnic groupings. The Dinka from Bor, for example, pay 
50 cows when it is a planned murder and 25 for manslaughter (KI 10: 7/2/16).160 The 
Nuer people pay 50 cows for a person unintentionally killed, but the number of cows 
paid ranges between 80 and 100 for intentional killing (KI 10: 7/2/16).161 Previously, 
in all Nuer disputes, scales of compensation were treated more as a basis upon 
which a compromise could be reached than an exact rule, and compromise was 
                                                     
157 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
158 Interview with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
159 Interview 14, with a Dinka chief: (19/2/2016) 
160 Interview 10, with a Dinka elder: (7/2/2016) 
161 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
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more likely in cases of unintentional homicide rather than intentional killing (SAD 
72/6/68).162 
There was no distinction in the number of cattle paid in compensation for the death 
of women and uninitiated boys, but since a man had already paid bride wealth for 
his wife, he would not be expected to pay full compensation if he killed her, but he 
would be expected to pay something to her kinsmen known as Ghok Riem (usually 
three cattle) to re-establish peaceful relations with them. Similarly, if a man killed a 
close kinsman he would not be expected to pay more than Ghok Riem (SAD 
72/6/64).163 The current number of cattle considered reasonable to compensate for 
human life and to constitute fairness and justice in post-conflict situations, also 
appears to vary among sections of ethnic groups, and across different societies and 
cultures in South Sudan and in Africa as a continent. This suggests that traditional 
and local practices are socially constructed: a philosophical paradigm that underpins 
this study. It also means that tradition is not static as cultures meet each other and 
adopt innovative ideas and practices.    
On the other hand, among Dinka as among Nuer, if a woman killed someone, her 
legal husband would be held responsible, although her own kinsmen are expected 
to assist him in the collection of compensatory cattle (SAD 72/6/65).164 This was yet 
another reflection of gender inequality and economic disparity between men and 
women in Dinka and Nuer societies but Howell was writing in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Currently, all persons are supposedly equal before the law, and constitutionally, 
                                                     
162 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell. P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
163 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell. P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
164 Howell’s DPhil thesis, “A comparative study of customary law among the cattle-owning tribes in the 
Southern Sudan”. Part 2 “Dinka and Shilluk law”. Howell. P.P. 1950; DUL, Special Collections GB 0033 SAD. 
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homicide is a crime beyond the remit of traditional authorities, although they remain 
key actors in reconciliation rituals.  
Significance of cattle compensation 
The significance of the Dinka and the Nuer payment of blood compensation by cattle 
and not cash money is due to the following; first because their socio-economic life is 
centred on cattle and so cattle define their day-to-day life; second, payment by cattle 
is an effective way of restoring the original balance and allowing social and economic 
contacts to continue. The primary object of this payment is to marry a ting de koic 
(Ghost-Wife) to the deceased, known as a ciek jooka among the Nuer, and thereby 
assure the continuation of the dead man’s line for posterity and the future of his 
kinship group, thus appeasing the reaction of indignation which his kindred were 
bound to display (KI 3: 27/2/16).165 Thus, Puk and Thung, the indemnity for homicide, 
was primarily intended for this purpose and for this reason, compensation should 
theoretically be in proportion to current rates of bride wealth though the relative 
number was not exact as there were other claims to be met, for example, a cow was 
taken by Bany Bith for his ritual performances.  Third, the group also lost the 
economic asset of the deceased both in ensuring the subsistence of his immediate 
family and in the collective economic interests of his associates (Howell 1954: 41). 
Therefore, other close kinsmen must receive some share of the compensation to 
meet this loss, to satisfy their indignation and their desire for revenge and because, 
were the position reversed, they might be called upon to subscribe towards the 
payment of compensation to some other groups.  
Traditional communal lifestyle and revenge are still practised in the rural Dinka and 
Nuer communities. However, With the changes which have happened over time, and 
the existence of the government as a recognized authority with penal sanctions 
behind it, revenge as a form of justice and a way of expressing anger has been 
discouraged as the law must take its course, although this law is largely absent in 
                                                     
165 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
 214 
12018735 
rural communities. The conception of individual punishment inflicted on the killer and 
not on the entire family or community members has become a common norm 
enforced by the government. Depending on circumstances, Dinka and Nuer also 
now accept cash money payment as blood compensation although often the money 
is in turn used to acquire cattle in line with their traditional practices. 
5.9 Reconciliation and re-integration of offenders  
The notion of reconciliation as a means of ending cycles of violence and achieving 
normal relations remains the most widely appreciated aspect of local justice. In the 
traditional context, justice and reconciliation are generally inseparable (Alie 2008: 
133). I have talked about justice processes in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
I now turn to discuss reconciliation, and I argue that reconciliation is built into the 
justice system of the Dinka and the Nuer. This is contrary to the international idea of 
justice where reconciliation is not a key consideration despite the claim that the 
process also leads to reconciliation.  
5.9.1 Concept of reconciliation among the Nuer  
The Nuer word thong (reconciliation) means the coming together in peace of two 
parties who have been in conflict. The word is used for murder-related reconciliation. 
Reconciliation can also mean palika (forgiveness) and its aim is peaceful 
coexistence. This is suggestive of the position of Freeman and Hayner (2003: 148) 
who argue that the aim of reconciliation is to break a cycle of violence and promote 
peaceful coexistence. But it also reflects the principles of Ubuntu which promotes 
harmony as prerequisite of peaceful coexistence.  
The concept and aim of reconciliation as defined in the contexts of Nuer mechanisms 
suggest a mutual understanding across societies in Africa and some parts of the 
world. Alie (2008: 133), for example, defines reconciliation in the context of Sierra 
Leone as the act of reuniting groups or parties who have been fractured as a result 
of conflict and may also involve the granting of some form of reparation to the 
aggrieved party. Similarly, in the case of Northern Uganda, Komakech (2012: 71) 
argues that reconciliation refers to a normalization of relations between the offended 
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and offending parties to a conflict. Based on the above definitions and viewed from 
the ubuntu perspective, an abuse of any sort between clans, or even within a clan, 
was considered a disturbance in the relationship between the people who depended 
on each other for many things. Repairing broken relationships, and maintaining the 
status quo based on this philosophy, is the essence and goal of reconciliation as is 
the case with the Dinka and the Nuer communities. But the return to, and 
maintenance of status quo may be problematic if it was characterized by oppression.  
5.9.2 Concept of reconciliation among the Dinka  
The word reconciliation in Dinka is dour (to come back) to the previous life. The 
Dinka perceive conflict as separating people because it damages relationships and 
creates a gap between people; individuals, groups and communities. One 
respondent remarked, “reconciliation is the last step in the process of peacemaking 
in the Dinka community; this comes after the truth is established by the elders and 
chiefs and compensation paid” (KI 10: 7/2/16).166  Compensation payment is 
followed by reconciliation rituals that were performed by Bany Bith. On the appointed 
day, after compensation, cattle were collected by the killer’s kinsmen and handed 
over to the Bany Bith, the two parties assemble and the Bany Bith sacrifices one of 
the bulls, the Mior de yuom (the bull of the bone). He then takes the bones of the 
right hide leg of the beast, splits in two and throws one half to the killer’s party, the 
other half to the relatives of the deceased’s brother or son or another legal heir. 
Partaking in eating of the same animal is a significant act in that it signifies unity and 
togetherness after separation since the occurrence of homicide. Brock-Utne (2001: 
3) emphasizes the significance of traditional practices such as the use of rituals, 
symbols and interpretation of myths to bring conflict to an end. These include the 
identification of cattle and /or goats that must be sacrificed to cleanse the evils of 
conflict from society. 
                                                     
166 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
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Among the Twic of Bahr el Ghazal and Ngok Dinka, each of the families involved 
brings a goat and they exchange their goat meat and eat together for the first time 
since the incident happened. The Dinka from Bor and the Nuer use a white bull for 
reconciliation (KI 29: 19/2/16).167  As noted earlier, variations in reconciliation 
practices exist among the different sections of Dinka ethnic groups. The bull is called 
Thon-Mabor in Dinka and Tut Mabor in Nuer (KI 9: 7/2/16)168.  A white bull was used 
during the Wunlit PPP held to reconcile the Nuer and Dinka in 1999 (Ashworth 2014: 
155)  
5.10 Dinka and Nuer local reconciliation practices 
Traditional rapprochement or the restoration of relationships between parties in 
conflict is strongly connected to a process of shared eating and drinking, often after 
slaughtering an animal. The reconciliation rituals mark the end of bitterness and the 
beginning of harmony until another incident happens. The ritual ceremony and the 
sharing of meals signify new relationships when people have cut contact after the 
event of a murder.  
The significance of these practices is that they are attached to real day-today life, 
and it is believed that death will follow if someone participates in that process and 
later deviates. An animal is always sacrificed and they say whenever you stray from 
the reconciliation commitment, you will face the same consequences. At the Dinka-
Nuer reconciliation in Wunlit 1999, discussed in Chapter Four, the elders said; 
“Mabor is the Bull that will be sacrificed for reconciliation and peace; anyone who 
breaks this commitment to peace will follow the way of Mabor. A curse is placed on 
anyone who takes part in the Mabor sacrifice and later breaks the oath. It is very 
serious curse; it is a curse of death” NSCC (2002:60) in Ashworth  (2014: 155). 
Ashworth (2014: 156), recounts that once the bull was slaughtered, and its blood 
held aloft for a blessing and oblation, some chiefs decided to leave and were quoted 
                                                     
167 Interview 29, with a Dinka woman: (19/2/2016) 
168 Interview 9, with a Dinka elder: (7/2/2016) 
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as saying, “we have sacrificed the bull; we are now at peace”. This means that once 
the agreement has been sealed in a ritual way, it is binding. 
But the politicization of local peace processes has caused some agreements to be 
short-lived. One respondent pointed out that “though Lilir and Wunlit peace 
agreements were very powerful they didn’t last; after only two years some factions 
of these tribes went back to war” (KI 3: 27/2/16).169  The same respondent 
maintained that in recent years local agreements are dishonoured for two reasons: 
“first, because of manipulation of the local population by politicians; second, 
modernity has undermined the role of traditional healers to inflict curses. This used 
to be dreaded and effective, but a curse is nowadays explained away scientifically 
by educated people and spiritually by the adherents of modern religions” (KI 3: 
27/2/16).170 This points to the influence of evangelism and modernity on local 
mechanisms in achieving social control and reconciliation. Similarly, the 1994 peace 
and reconciliation conference in Akobo appeared to offer a resolution to the Lou-
Jikany intra-ethnic conflict, but it did not provide an enduring resolution (Bradbury et 
al 2006: 32). Although some respondents insisted that there has been no fighting 
between the Lou and Jikany since the Akobo peace conference, it seems that in 
local mediation such as this, if the terms of the settlement do not serve the political 
interests of some politicians from the feuding communities, the agreements may be 
tampered with despite the rituals of curse, oath-swearing and shared meals.  
Cleansing and re-integration  
Cleansing and re-integration ceremonies remain integral to the major practices of 
forgiveness and reconciliation among local communities in South Sudan. Cleansing 
is an essential element of traditional reconciliation among the Dinka and the Nuer 
communities. The marks put on the perpetrator by the spiritual leader and the ritual 
                                                     
169 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
170 Interview 3, with a Nuer youth: (27/2/2016) 
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of cleansing performed during the reconciliation, released the evil spirit and brought 
an end to the possibility of any revenge (Howell 1954). As part of the exoneration 
process cleansing finds expression in the slaughtering of a bull, a sheep, a goat and 
sometimes even a chicken. It could also take the form of drinking of water from the 
same calabash by both the victim and perpetrator, accompanied by some 
pronouncements by the performing elders. Among the Acholi of Northern Uganda 
who have the same traditional practices as the Acholi in South Sudan, cleansing has 
also been regarded as a welcoming back and reintegrating of the individual into the 
community. It was applied to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) abductees and ex-
combatants (Komakech 2012: 70-1). Reconciliation was only possible when truth-
telling, compensation and cleansings had already taken place or were part of the 
final settlement.  
Role of Nuer and Dinka Women 
Nuer and Dinka women have frequently played a crucial role in conflict resolution 
and reconciliation though often behind the scenes. Elderly women in the Dinka and 
Nuer ethnic groups are highly respected and exert profound influence on men 
throughout the community when it comes to issues of peace (KI 2: 23/1/16).171 
However, generally they were kept in the background to provide necessary services 
such as water, food, alcohol and so forth, though they took part in the concluding 
performances, composing of peace songs, dancing etc. A Dinka woman who was 
asked to mobilize women to do the cooking during the 1999 Wunlit PPP, reiterated 
her response, as recounted by Ashworth (2014: 157), “I said no, the women will do 
that naturally anyway, but what about the voice of the women in the conference? 
Who are the ones who suffer in the war? I insisted that one third of the delegates 
should be women and that they should be allowed to speak”. One woman was later 
reported to have chaired one of the sub-committees with a translator by her side 
(Ashworth 2014: 157). It seems that the potential of women in the reconciliation 
                                                     
171 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
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processes has not been fully utilized, particularly their role in addressing the root 
causes of the problems and the drawing up of recommendations. 
An informant accepted that conflict affects men and women differently and it is 
important to conduct peacemaking at various levels and to include women at all 
stages of the peace and reconciliation process, but she equally acknowledged 
women’s role as perpetrators of discord. “It would be naïve to always think of women 
as neutral or passive victims in disputes; today women are active combatants, and 
politically represent the opposing constituents they come from” (KI 38: 16/3/16).172 
This suggests that the neutrality of women in hostilities and peacemaking is 
questionable and irrespective of how differently conflict affects men and women. It 
is wise to also consider women as potential instigators of conflict, because they are 
just people and not some kind of benevolent collective.  
Through their duel role, Nuer women for example can signal danger in an 
exaggerated fashion that would send men to war: signals that could be interpreted 
as the presence of impending danger such as raids (KI 2: 23/1/16).173 Such an 
influence could also have a positive aspect as women in times of crisis have been 
known to prevent men from going to war even if the men had already decided and 
were preparing themselves. In such cases, they would embrace their men and stand 
in their way, and to overcome the men’s determination they would even threaten to 
strip naked to shame the men (KI 2: 23/1/16).174  During the SPLM/A civil war in the 
1990s, women threatened a no-sex strike, if ceasefire was not implemented and they 
reminded the men of women’s traditional influence on war and peace, and warned, 
“we will stop giving birth” (Ashworth 2014: 158). Such scenarios suggest that women 
can take the lead for peace and reconciliation.  
                                                     
172 Interview 38, with European Diplomat: (16/3/2016) 
173 Interview 2, with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
174 Interview 2 with a Nuer chief: (23/1/2016) 
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5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter examined Dinka and Nuer justice and reconciliation mechanisms as 
practised in the aftermath of violent conflict. It discussed concepts of justice and 
reconciliation and how they work among the Dinka and the Nuer of South Sudan; 
subjected them to scrutiny based on the Universalist notion of human rights and 
justice.  It established that though these mechanisms remain normatively popular for 
their previous roles, their strengths have been undermined by several factors both 
external and internal including: colonialism, modernization, evangelism and wars. 
However, despite current weaknesses and challenges, opportunities exist at both 
the theoretical and practical levels: first, culture being non-static and socially 
constructed suggests that these mechanisms can be reconstructed by adapting new 
and progressive values from other practices. At the practical level, there is room to 
engage with other procedures such as international practices which could result in a 
mutually complementary approach that would profit from the benefits of both as they 
strive to work together. The following Chapter sets out the analysis defining this 
thesis by setting out the convergences and divergences of these ‘traditional’ and 
modern normative justice methods. 
  
 221 
12018735 
Chapter Six 
Blending Local and International Approaches 
6.0 Introduction  
This is an analysis chapter that considers in detail the local and international justice 
systems and practices that relate to post-conflict justice and reconciliation. It 
discusses and assesses the potential roles and limits of these institutions and 
approaches with a view to establishing a common ground for the possible application 
of local strategies in the resolution of contemporary armed engagements. It 
examines the extent to which the Dinka and the Nuer justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms can be applied to transitional justice. It is a synthesis of topics 
discussed in this study, ranging from theories and historical context, to case studies 
and empirical evidence. By bringing together and analysing the key themes of the 
thesis, this chapter offers a detailed account of the nature, types and causes of 
conflicts in South Sudan both local and national, before, during and after the colonial 
period. It assesses the traditional methods used to resolve local disputes, the 
changes that have happened over time and their relevance to modern conflicts. The 
focus of the chapter is on understanding the divergences and convergences 
between the two approaches for a possible fusion and harmonizing of intervention 
in dealing with past human rights violations and efforts towards reconciliation.  
The chapter argues that local justice and reconciliation mechanisms as practised by 
the Dinka and the Nuer have deep historical roots with a track-record of success in 
providing accountability and redress for atrocities committed. However, like all 
socially constructed human and societal agencies, it has not been spared from 
changes that have taken place over time such as the impact of colonialism, 
modernization, globalization, evangelism, political changes, and the militarization of 
society. Moreover, these procedures have not often been used to resolve modern 
conflicts or to address the legacy of past human rights violations. Whether local 
mechanisms have relevance and potential to address the atrocities of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity depends on their competence and how their 
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justice systems and judicial practices resonate or not with international human rights, 
humanitarian law, and judicial practices and standards. It is in this chapter that my 
research questions are expected to be answered. The questions are; what is the 
potential utility of local approaches to modern conflict in South Sudan? To what 
extent can the Dinka and Nuer justice and reconciliation mechanisms be applied to 
the current conflict in South Sudan? 
The purpose of this study was to explore the ability of local approaches to resolve 
contemporary armed conflicts by critiquing the liberal peace approaches that, 
despite the growing interest in promoting local mechanisms, remains the dominant 
practice applied across a wide range of post-conflict settings. The critique of the 
liberal peace models has always been that of their failure to recognize local 
resources and mechanisms. When war ends proponents adopt the dominant 
discourse and meta-narrative about what to do in post-war environments. The 
practice of leading states and international policy makers to decide what is to be 
done about a specific conflict without significant local representation continues 
unabated. UN and other international documents and policies encompassing 
Agenda for Peace (1992) to Responsibility to Protect (2001) are indicative of this 
approach (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 763). 
I have critiqued the liberal peace theory and presented the limitations of local 
procedures in the theoretical chapter so that in this analysis chapter, I will look at 
their application, strengths, and weaknesses based on the interviewees’ comments. 
Details of the limitations and possibilities of applying them to the case of South 
Sudan are discussed in the later sections of the chapter. When dealing with the 
Dinka and the Nuer communities during field work, the participants interviewed in 
the study recognized the relevance of local mechanisms, but they had reservations 
about their utility and efficacy in resolving modern conflicts. It is this empirical 
evidence that I have used to support, corroborate and refute claims about these 
mechanisms. 
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6.1 Customary versus International law  
Customary and international legal systems owe their origins to different philosophical 
foundations and world views. While the international (retributive) justice system is 
based on statutory law and the Western world view, the local (restorative) justice 
system is based on customary law and the African world view. But tensions exist 
between the two legal systems mostly in relation to the standards and requirements 
of international human rights and humanitarian law. The main area of tension 
concerns due process in legal procedures and whether atrocities such as genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, can be tried by local courts or be amnestied 
as customary practices tend to do. 
Trials in customary courts often lead to reconciliation that takes place to soothe the 
resentment between the litigating parties. The use of rituals to reconcile conflicting 
parties and their communities is an important feature of customary law (KI 10: 
7/2/16).175  As will be shortly discussed, this contrasts with practice under statutory 
courts where the court is not concerned with whether the disputing parties become 
reconciled upon the conclusion of legal proceedings. In addition to the customary 
post-trial reconciliation, some communities in South Sudan, including the Dinka and 
the Nuer, have specific rituals and ceremonies outside of the customary legal 
process for cleansing offenders and in recent years, combatants when they return 
to civilian life. The Dinka and the Nuer reconciliation rituals of sacrificing a white bull 
and sharing in the meal serve both as an end to hostilities, as well as a cleansing 
and re-integration of combatants and offenders (Ashworth 2014: 158).  
The focus of local approaches as a respondent stated, is restorative justice, where 
they combine the elements of truth, accountability, compensation, and restoration of 
relationships, thereby prioritizing reconciliation over punitive justice (KI 1: 
20/1/16).176 Restorative justice’s main principles are the victims’ rights to have 
                                                     
175 Interview 10, with a Nuer elder: (7/2/2016) 
176 Interview 1, with a lawyer: (20/1/2016) 
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crimes acknowledged and addressed and the perpetrators’ rights to be integrated 
into the community. To help build fractured relationships, restorative justice employs 
various strategies, including hearings that are designed to be participatory, including 
both victims and perpetrators whereby the perpetrators acknowledge their 
wrongdoing and provide compensation and other reparations to the victims (Balati 
2015: 7). Restorative justice considers that punishment alone is not enough to 
address past violations of human rights and to apportion justice to both victims and 
perpetrators. A respondent said, punishment may be necessary but should be 
administered in ways that enable victims and perpetrators to rebuild relationship both 
between individuals and throughout the entire community (KI 30: 9/3/16).177 The 
overall aim is to help the victims heal, to make the perpetrators aware of the harm 
they have caused and to understand their duty to repair such injury, to prevent similar 
behaviour in the future, and to rebuild the self-worth and self-confidence of both the 
victims and perpetrators.  
But the restorative approach is at odds with Western preferences for justice through 
prosecutions and punishment. The international community prefers international 
justice instruments such as ad hoc tribunals and ICC to punish and deter future 
offenders from violating human rights (Novak 2015). The view that prosecutions are 
the antidote to human rights violations was shared by a large majority of informants 
in this study (36 out of 43), who claimed that human rights abuses and atrocities 
committed in South Sudan in recent years have reached a magnitude never 
experienced before, and that the killings involved methods of fighting the war that 
are increasingly brutal and cruel. One informant commented, “The hurt is so deep 
and wounds still fresh that traditional approaches if applied can only be a temporary 
solution because the people who witnessed their loved ones killed or raped will not 
believe in reconciliation without justice” (KI 3: 27/2/16).178 Another informant said 
that the impunity that has been allowed in South Sudan since the beginning of the 
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Sudan’s civil wars in the 1950s needs to be addressed (KI 40: 14/3/216).179 The 
views expressed here seem to suggest that the local system is not adequate and 
does not render justice, whereas in other views it does. The question is whose justice 
and what kind of justice? Local mechanisms render not retributive but restorative 
justice. Local system alone, based on these views cannot deliver the required justice 
that will deter future atrocities and deliver peace and reconciliation.  
But what evidence is there that punishment can deter future offenders from human 
rights violations and lead to reconciliation? While prosecutions may be necessary, it 
seems there is no evidence to show that such interventions have reduced human 
rights abuses in civil war situations or that they have addressed the victims’ 
problems. Atrocity crimes continue to be committed in various parts of the world 
despite the creation of criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR): The ICC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone among others. Prosecutions 
focus on offenders and not on the victims of violations. A respondent asserted, “one 
of the significant criticisms of the ad hoc tribunals is that there has been no significant 
victim participation beyond some key witnesses” (KI 41: 17/11/16).180  Incarcerations 
of offenders in this regard do not serve both the victim and community’s interests for 
justice and reconciliation.  
Restorative Justice methods, such as those of the Mato Oput in Northern Uganda, 
in many ways focus much more on engaging the victims (The Mato Oput Project 
2009: 14). It takes the view that these people have suffered; and, as part of their 
rehabilitation, recovery and rebuilding, it is essential to include them in the process 
and not just to select a few of them for the very limited purpose of eye-witness 
evidence without testimony, but as stakeholders and partners in the process. These 
two situations are diametrically opposed and so there can be some significant 
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tension between them. The friction point between the two types of justice lies in the 
different goals pursued by each justice system.  
Despite this tension however, there are some examples of the complementarity of 
the two justice systems in South Sudan. The use of a dual legal system, as enshrined 
in the national constitution of South Sudan, where both statutory and traditional 
customary laws constitute legal practice, is evidently a recognition of the role the 
local justice agencies play in the judicial system of the country, where local initiatives 
appear to have a leading role in dispute resolution amongst most of the rural 
population. Statutory courts handle death (homicide) cases and once a case is 
concluded, traditional institutions and justice mechanisms take over from that point 
to administer the reconciliation process and rituals for reintegration as practised by 
the communities involved.  One informant stated: “rural communities believe more 
in customary procedures than in statutory courts, because even if a homicide is 
settled in a formal court, it is not considered so by them until the traditional rituals of 
cleansing and reconciliation are performed by traditional experts (KI 2: 23/1/16).”181 
This view indicates that the two could work together in cycle with the statutory court 
acting first, followed by the customary procedures or vice versa through appeals or 
referrals. Either way, the process is concluded with a traditional ritual of 
reconciliation.  Another respondent, however, indicated that these two systems are 
not in harmony; “Sometimes in pursuit of advocacy for law you tend to run into red-
tape to attain those goals and so there is a problem because this is a disharmonious 
bi-legal system which needs to be reconciled (KI 30: 9/3/16).”182  It seems that 
tension such as that between the local and the international approaches is frequently 
encountered in South Sudan, which questions the possibility of complementarity in 
transitional justice. 
In terms of procedures, customary institutions are more flexible than statutory courts 
in that they allow for adjustments to accommodate changing circumstances to 
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society, as explained by the following example below: The fusion of gospel values, 
local conflict resolution practices and modern peacebuilding strategies in recent 
years such as the ones applied during the 1991 Wunlit peace conference (Ashworth 
2014: 158), demonstrate not only the flexibility of local institutions and practices, but 
also the potential and possibilities of applying local strategies to modern conflict and 
transitional justice in a complementary manner. It is important to understand the 
complexity of customary legal systems, how they adapt to changing circumstances, 
and where they correspond to and diverge from international standards of human 
rights, rather than dismissing valuable practices simply because they are unfamiliar 
(UNDP 2016: 14). With the number of people that are typically involved in internal 
strife like that raging in South Sudan and subsequent human rights abuses, there is 
no way to achieve true retribution, because no statutory court can manage such 
enormous numbers of combatants.  
6.2 Human rights violations and international law 
Human rights violations and related abuses are at the centre of any transitional 
justice strategy. Most of the key informants interviewed for this study (27 out of 43) 
gave similar testimony regarding human rights violations in South Sudan. One 
participant, for example, said, “there is no respect for human rights principles, 
because human rights are an integral thing that begins with the right to life; when life 
has become so cheap, where people, especially journalists, are arrested, tortured, 
subjected to fear, hunger and death and when the government does things that are 
not acceptable by any international standard, then there is no respect for human 
rights” (KI 18: 11/3/16).183  Another informant stated of: reports from the South Sudan 
Human Right Commission, the Panel of Experts commissioned by the UN Security 
Council, statements from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have all 
documented serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, that; “the 
situation is terrible” (KI 38: 16/3/16).184 The same informant added that “these are 
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not only credible reports, but factual reports185 about the situation” (KI 38: 
16/3/16).186  In like vein, Johnson (2014b: 2) confirms that these abuses have been 
documented by independent investigations and are beyond dispute.   
There may be a different understanding of human rights in South Sudan, but based 
on the above responses, conventional human rights principles are seriously violated, 
and it could be true to say in many local communities, real conventional human rights 
treaties are not being respected or observed. One informant commented, “It’s not 
that we have to “parrot” what the western world says about human rights, but if you 
consider our laws, whatever law is being formulated in South Sudan, if you read 
through it, you will be amazed at the things that are put there and you will be 
surprised if you check on whether this is being practised or not” (KI 25: 27/2/16).187 
He further insisted, “that is why you’re not seeing people going out and marching to 
protest to express concern or demonstrate about something; because the 
government security agents will crack down on protesters with a heavy hand” (KI 25: 
27/2/16).188 It is easy to say that, as impunity seems to reign in South Sudan, there 
is a need for the ICC to address this issue. But why is this the case? Below are 
outcomes of my analysis based on comments from my informants as well as a case 
study.  Factors accounting for the lack of respect for conventional human rights 
include ignorance and a wrong perception of human rights, weak institutions of law 
enforcement and the impact of conflict.  
First, there is a vague understanding of human rights and many people are unaware 
that it is misinterpreted. The main reason is that those in authority, who ought to 
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promote an understanding and respect for human rights, do not seem to be 
conscious of the concept because they have never experienced the existence of 
rights. The present leaders are a collection of armed people who are members of 
the SPLA or a composite of militia and other defence groups who have taken part in 
the fighting.  In times of war, respect for human rights is downplayed because, for 
both sides, the goal is to win the war irrespective of the means used. Abductions, 
disappearances, arrests, torture and killings are commonplace; journalists are 
intimidated and told not to balance stories, newspapers are closed, opposition 
figures are locked up and permission is required from the security authority for any 
gathering or meeting of more than five people. One of my informants asserted, “when 
you begin talking about human rights, many people will consider you as somebody 
talking against the government” (KI 31: 10/2/16).189 A negative perception of human 
rights has been created to intimidate anybody who would dare to criticize the system. 
Second, weak institutions lead to a breakdown in the rule of law. Once this happens 
and the people take the law into their own hands, they start violating the constitution 
at will. Individuals do not see the police as the custodians of human rights because 
most of them are ignorant of such a concept. This is because military personnel who 
fought the liberation war, but are lacking in the relevant training and qualifications 
simply changed uniforms and appointed to top positions in the police. The question 
of human rights normally prevails only in situations where powerful systems exist. 
The third concerns the current conflict. The 2013 eruption of hostilities marked the 
most horrendous violations of human rights in which initially there were targeted 
killings of men and women of Nuer ethnicity (Johnson 2014a). But when revenge 
dynamics kicked in, both sides of the war committed serious human rights violations. 
Rape was used as a weapon of war and most of those engaged in the fighting 
targeted women and killed innocent elders and children; a situation that forced many 
to seek shelter in the UN PoCs in various parts of the country, as IDPs or to flee to 
neighbouring countries as refugees. One informant reported, “The challenges of 
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2013 were many. As a journalist and a human rights defender, I was rescued and 
taken to Uganda with the help of the European Union (EU) and the UN as I was 
destined to be killed for reporting the incident” (KI 26: 4/3/16).190 Several informants 
and people I informally talked to reported comparable stories of abuse. It means that 
journalists and other activists who were not lucky enough to obtain help from such 
bodies as the EU and the UN were eliminated by the regime. So many journalists of 
many media outlets have been harassed, tortured and some of them killed, reported 
a respondent (KI 34: 14/3/16).191  With all this said, the pressing questions are; are 
local approaches capable of addressing these crimes? Does an international notion 
of human rights fit within an idea of local restorative justice? These questions are 
considered in the following sections of this chapter. 
6.3 Local approaches and the impact of change  
Local peacemaking and justice mechanisms were designed to resolve local and 
small-scale community conflicts such as homicide, diverse types of combat including 
spear fights, bodily injuries, psychological harm resulting from witchcraft and other 
forms of socio-economic and cultural disputes, such as marriage, land and other 
claims. The Dinka and Nuer local institutions and justice mechanisms were made 
effective by voluntary actions on the part of the perpetrators who surrendered 
themselves to the traditional authorities after committing homicide or other related 
crimes. The Nuer and the Dinka believed that if you killed somebody and you did not 
reveal it to the spiritual leaders, you or your children would die of a curse caused by 
the blood of the victim. A Nuer participant affirmed, “the Nuer who killed, came and 
declared that I or we have done this” (KI 2: 2/1/16).192  
To avoid revenge, killers came to their spiritual leaders; Bany Bith (Spear Master) of 
the Dinka or Kuaar Kwac (Leopard-Skin Chief) of the Nuer, to declare who they had 
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killed lest their families suffered loss due to cien (a curse or an evil spirit) caused by 
the victims’ blood. By extension, the curse could also affect those who knew what 
happened and failed to report it (KI 2: 23/1/16).193 This was of course possible 
because most wars were between families, clans, communities or ethnic divisions. 
Identification of the victims and perpetrators was also possible in wars with 
neighbouring ethnic communities because group leaders knew all their combatants. 
The difference today is that modern conflicts such as civil wars are more complex 
and include different actors with different interests, some of whom may not be Dinkas 
or Nuers, to follow the practice. Even if they all happen to be Nuers and Dinkas, it 
would simply be too overwhelming for the spiritual leaders and traditional practice to 
handle, given the number of culprits. 
Although it had the ability to tackle large-scale community conflicts, just like any other 
local mechanisms, Nuer and Dinka justice process was solely about homicide and a 
few deaths. Communities were used to engaging in local squabbles; and even 
though sections of the Nuer and Dinka are very big, the losses incurred were not of 
a magnitude experienced today because they did not have modern weapons. The 
use of traditional weapons of warfare, mainly spears and bows and arrows, restricted 
the number of deaths so that the traditional authorities could manage any loss 
resulting from these regional attacks. Casualties on both sides and the identities of 
the killers were easily established and reported to the chiefs during peace meetings 
and each side could mobilize and pay the required numbers of cattle as 
compensation according to custom and tradition. Families, extended families and 
relatives contributed cows for compensation since, because of their 
interconnectedness through the principle of ubuntu; they shared in the guilt of killing 
(Murithi 2006). With the death toll amounting to thousands and sometimes millions 
in contemporary armed encounters, such as the SPLM/A war that ended with the 
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2005 CPA, and the one raging in South Sudan, the utility and application of this 
justice system would inevitably face serious challenges or find it impossible to cope. 
The most recent cases, as discussed in chapters four and five, were the conflict 
between the Nuer of Nasir called the Jikanyi, and the Lou Nuer of Akobo, resolved 
at the 1994 Akobo peace conference; and the fighting between the Dinka of Bahr el 
Ghazal and the Nuer of Western Upper Nile, resolved at the 1999 Wunlit conference. 
The war claimed many lives; rituals were performed in which cows and bulls were 
killed in declaration of that covenant (Duany 2003; Myers and Shinn 2010). Given 
the overwhelming number of casualties, neither side asked for compensation but 
only amnesty. This is one clear example that gross human rights abuses and 
atrocities of the magnitude of Darfur or Rwanda may be beyond the capacity and 
capability of local justice mechanisms. Or perhaps amnesty is the answer. 
While the Akobo and the Wunlit peace and reconciliation conferences were 
apparently successful, not all recent cases have been.  The intra-communal disputes 
which erupted in 2010 between the Dinka of Twic East and the Ayuel counties of 
Jonglei state, where about 22 people were killed, is a case in point (KI 26: 4/3/16).194 
Despite efforts by traditional authorities and people from the Diaspora, no settlement 
had been reached at the time of field work. One participant suggested that, “the 
politicization of the case made it too complicated even for the government to find a 
solution to the problem” (KI 26: 4/3/16).195 A case like that between the Twic East 
and the Ayuel confirms the assertion that the local mechanism had been weakened 
by politics and corruption. This is typical of situations where traditional authorities 
are induced to take sides, bribed or else manipulated because some of them are 
paid salaries by the government or their efforts are simply frustrated by elected 
representatives who see them as competitors in shared constituencies. In the 
following sub-sections, I will discuss some of the key challenges to possible 
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applications of local mechanisms to modern conflict and transitional justice in South 
Sudan.  
6.4 Civil wars and disempowerment of traditional institutions and authorities  
Many challenges exist regarding the application of local methods to civil war 
situations. The Dinka-Nuer inter-ethnic war fought within the overarching North-
South civil war and which followed the 1991 split in the SPLM/A for example, 
undermined local efforts to resolve their differences. The ethnicization of the political 
conflict and the increasing brutality which was employed by both parties to the 
conflict prevented them from their traditional role (Hoehne 2008: 16). Traditional and 
spiritual leaders of both groups could not travel across country to settle conflicts 
between groups and conduct rituals. This is another example of how civil war or 
similar violent conflict can disempower and erode the capacity of traditional 
authorities. It was only through the initiative and facilitation of the Churches that Nuer 
and Dinka chiefs were enabled to come together and start the 1999 Wunlit peace 
process.  
The war has generally had a significant impact on the people of South Sudan. 
Civilians and traditional authorities alike suffered from war and violence inflicted 
upon them by warlords, militias and government soldiers. Refusal or failure to assist 
guerrillas or to provide them with food, recruits or other resources was often the 
reasons for attacks (Hoehne 2008: 16). The harsh treatment reminded people of 
similar treatment by colonial and post-colonial external forces. These forces used 
traditional authorities for their purposes and very important in this regard was tax 
collection (Rolandsen, 2005:32). The chiefs collected tax mainly in kind and 
mobilized human resources. But failure to collect taxes or to provide young men as 
recruits for the army or guerrilla forces could result in severe punishment. Leonardi 
(2005: 13) observes that chiefs were also punished for crimes committed by their 
subjects and frequently the punishment had the aim of humiliating the chiefs in front 
of their communities. Badal (2006) cited in (Hoehne 2008: 17), observes that the 
loss of authority equally engulfed traditional religious leaders whose spiritual powers 
were questioned, for example, by rebels who demanded immediate ‘rain making’ in 
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dry seasons, and when the rain makers failed, the religious authorities were 
punished. However, the coercion of chiefs by guerrillas does not mean that guerrillas 
and traditional authorities did not cooperate or continue to share a similar belief 
system (Rolandsen, 2005:64-71). 
War-induced displacement was one of the factors that undermined chiefly authority. 
The frequent installation of new chiefs by the people in IDP camps, the government 
and rebel movement in the respective territories has contributed to the weakening of 
the institutions and has led to a power struggle between the old and the new chiefs 
and their followers (Hoehne 2008: 17). The result was a conflict of loyalty after the 
return of the people and their chiefs to their original territory. Leonardi (2007: 541-
43) asks; after the war, who is the real chief-the one who was deposed or fled or the 
one who replaced him? Moreover, the ease with which chiefs were appointed and 
dismissed by soldiers or guerrillas made a mockery of their office, Badal (2006) cited 
in (Hoehne 2008: 17). 
A general loss of respect for traditional authority and values is still the main challenge 
in South Sudan. Young people with guns, for example, have become very powerful 
and they have their own leaders and do not respect traditional leaders. This is more 
the case with cattle camp youth in both the Dinka and Nuer ethnicities who provide 
the bulk of fighters in any clashes or raids; but who can also be the most 
uncompromising during community peacemaking. One informant asserted, “I don’t 
think traditional leadership has any longer a lot to offer; we need to recognize the 
new leaders, the youth leaders” (KI 25: 27/2/16).196 This suggests that in the 
presence of young people who have wielded power through their guns, traditional 
authorities’ peacemaking role is weakened. This may also be a form of retaliation for 
the exclusionary practice by older men of youth and women through historical 
traditional arrangements that sometimes served their own interests. But the 
implications are great for the present and future roles of traditional authorities in 
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peacemaking, as the loss of respect by traditional institutions at local level means 
that their application to modern transitional justice is even more problematic. 
Another informant affirmed, “unless we actually bring back at least part of the powers 
lost by traditional society and make modern society believe that these traditional 
leaders are important and the rules are observed, we may risk losing all the good 
things of the past” (KI 31: 10/2/16).197  When asked what needs to be done to reclaim 
at least part of the power and respect of the chiefs and elders, one informant 
observed that this is a long-term process. “I don’t see an immediate remedy because 
this is something which is to do with mind-set and conduct, and when you are 
addressing an issue relating to behaviour change, you need to be patient” (KI 31: 
10/2/16).198  It will take quite a long time to restore a moral order in a society such 
as South Sudan with a long history of dehumanization and trauma. These views do 
not just expose the impact of war on traditional institutions, but also on any post-
conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. The agency of schools and cultural 
education, especially family is crucial.  
The disempowerment of communities and traditional leaders by people with guns 
makes the code of behaviour which used to regulate societies before this war started 
no longer respected. One respondent accused politicians and military leaders of 
supplying the youth with money and guns; an act that leads to disrespect of 
traditional authorities.  
“I think the big problem is that the youth are being manipulated by politicians 
and military leaders. It is much more difficult to influence young people for 
peace. You can go to the Cattle Camp Youth and talk to them and find the 
right ways of helping them to build peace amongst themselves, but then, a 
general or a politician comes along, offers some guns and money, starts telling 
them how bad the other people are, and especially because of the low level 
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of education of our people, it’s just too easy for these big people to manipulate 
the small people and I think this is what we are seeing in the country at the 
moment; this is the real problem” (KI 25: 27/2/16).199  
This means that temporarily the chiefs and elders have lost or are losing their 
authority as only a few people listen to them when it comes to matters of war and 
cattle raids. I say temporary as opposed to permanent because despite the impact 
of the civil war and the change in the social behaviour of people, traditional 
institutions and local mechanisms for peacemaking appear to be relevant and may 
persist. But they will not go back to the kinds of influence they had in the past as 
they continue to come under both internal and external influences (Wassara 2007). 
Any effort to apply the mechanisms to transitional justice may require creative 
modifications. This is in line with social constructionist perspectives; where reality 
such as culture and practices are socially constructed and reconstructed to suit 
prevailing circumstances. There is a need to engage with these youth leaders to 
incorporate them into a new form of traditional leadership. The challenge in doing 
this means departing from the established traditional set-up, where membership of 
the customary leadership was exclusively reserved for older men, and that suggests 
a further weakening of the institutions that have been associated with the role of 
chiefs and elders, with age, wisdom and experience. However, this may be part of 
the modifications suggested above.  
However, based on my field work observations, the manipulation of the youth by 
politicians and military leaders, the culture of the gun and the subsequent loss of 
respect for authority do not seem to be a permanent situation, but a war factor whose 
widespread effects include the government which has lost its monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force. South Sudan has seen many rebellions and insecurity, the 
proliferation of arms and armed groups leading to the dysfunctionality of the rule of 
law. This means that both the conventional and local approaches are affected. The 
situation may change when the war ends and institutional reforms, such as the SSR, 
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including DDR of both combatants and civilians are conducted. But the end of war 
such as the one raging in South Sudan often introduces changes and in most cases 
permanent changes. Whether this will mean temporary or permanent 
disempowerment and loss of legitimacy for traditional authorities in South Sudan is 
a question that begs an answer. However, experiences from across Africa are 
instructive. For example, the role, influence and recognition of women in leadership 
and peacemaking at different societal levels have increased in recent years in 
countries such as Kenya, and after conflicts in Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
(Harris 2013: 160). But the increasing role of women as discussed by Harris tends 
to pose a challenge to the patriarchy in countries across the African continent.  
6.5 Tradition and Ethics of Wars and violations of Human Rights 
Apart from the loss of power by traditional leadership, the recent human rights 
violations and atrocities committed as discussed above, and which continue in South 
Sudan demonstrate that some long-established values are being eroded. The killing 
of women and children, the mutilating of bodies and rape as a weapon of war that 
have been witnessed in South Sudan are not traditional. One respondent recalls that 
there used to be rules for fighting;  
“a warrior can kill a warrior, a young man can kill another young man but you 
can’t kill women, children or old men. You can’t burn houses or crops, you 
can’t attack places like hospitals, churches or mosques where people have 
sought shelter; you can’t rape people”. He further said “The war can be 
stopped if a woman carrying a baby, for example, comes to intervene or if a 
man surrenders; if he throws away his spear, you cannot kill him. If you are 
about to kill a man and his wife comes and throws herself on top of him you 
can’t kill him, because now she has protected him” (KI 25: 27/2/2016).200  
Similarly, Johnson (2014b: 11) argues that before the last century, warfare between 
South Sudanese communities tended to follow certain basic rules. Fighting was 
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between armed men. Women and children might be captured, but they, and the 
elderly were not the targets of fighting. These traditional rules of war have been lost 
in recent years. The question is why are these negative changes happening? 
This could be partly explained in terms of the strategies and impact of the second 
South-North Sudan civil war, 1983-2005 between the SPLM/A and the Khartoum 
government; when both groups recruited militias in their controlled areas to fight on 
their respective sides. These militias and warring groups targeted communities who 
provided a support base for the opposing factions in the war. According to Johnson 
(2014b: 12), it was the Khartoum government’s militia strategy specifically to attack 
the civilian support base of the SPLA where livestock was stolen, crops destroyed, 
and women and children were abducted or killed. To destroy the opponents’ support 
base means to target communities, destroy livelihoods, homes and villages, 
humiliate them using rape on their women as weapons of war and enforcing 
displacement and migration.  
The current war in South Sudan has taken these violations to a higher level where 
the sick in hospitals, people with disabilities and those who have sought shelter in 
churches and mosques have been killed: a situation which has now spread 
throughout the entire country as a way or form of revenge and retaliatory response 
intended to inflict on opponents as much loss and pain as possible. But this war is 
no longer between people of different races and beliefs hostile to one another; but 
among brothers fighting on the opposing sides, neighbours and people linked by 
intermarriage who will continue to live in mutual dependency after the war.  Any 
attempt to apply local mechanisms to transitional justice may first need to re-
appraise these lost values. This means devising a new way to work with the existing 
mechanisms not so much to respond to contemporary needs, but at least to make 
sure that all the good aspects of the old culture are not lost as new ones evolve.  
6.6 Contemporary and traditional warfare 
It has become difficult to make any clear distinction between traditional and modern 
conflicts in South Sudan in terms of the weapons used and casualties incurred. The 
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proliferation of arms in the hands of civilians has encouraged individuals and 
communities to ignore local methods of problem-solving as they can easily take the 
law into their own hands. This concern was raised by several respondents 
interviewed for this study. One of them cited the 2009 deadly conflict between the 
Lou Nuer and Murle ethnicities of Jonglei state where he said, “cattle-raiding turned 
into very violent attacks on villages where hundreds of civilians were killed or 
abducted. It was unlike traditional cattle-raiding which did not target people and 
property. The use of sophisticated machine guns encouraged this” (KI 27: 7/3/16).201 
The scale of loss in inter-communal conflicts was not as high and alarming as it is 
today, since primitive weapons such as spears, bows and arrows were used. 
But targeting of civilians based on their ethnicities is not a recent experience in South 
Sudan. In 1991, following a split within the SPLM/A, which pitted the Nuer against 
the Dinka, innocent civilians on both sides were targeted which led to the Bor 
massacre (Johnson 2011). Furthermore, as I have discussed in chapter four, the 
new form of war which is now common in South Sudan and across other African 
countries is impersonal. The more impersonal the conflict, the harder it is to employ 
local forms of peacemaking and reconciliation, because the victim may never see 
the attacker, and traditional leaders on both sides find it more difficult to reach an 
understanding, find a solution, assess blame and determine appropriate 
compensation (Myers and Shinn 2010). Similarly, as observed by Hutchinson (2001: 
314-5), the new interpretations of war morality among the SPLA forces and the Nuer 
civilians, which differentiates between government war and homeland war, where 
government wars are entirely devoid of the social and spiritual risks associated with 
deaths caused by more localized ‘homeland wars,’ is a challenge to local 
mechanisms.  
The loss of the values from which local institutions and mechanisms draw their 
authority, because of war and external social influence, poses a challenge to the 
relevance and effectiveness of such approaches not only in dealing with modern 
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conflicts, but also in attending to the local disputes for which they were designed. 
This raises the question as to whether local mechanisms are relevant to address 
such conflicts. But changes in the conduct of traditional warfare could also mean that 
there is a need to modify local strategies to respond to the situation in an appropriate 
manner and by so doing, we will also acquire the capability of dealing with modern 
hostilities. 
6.7 Politics, chiefs and changing circumstances  
The changing circumstances regarding the present status and role of chiefs have 
led to concern by some participants. The view that elected or appointed government 
chiefs and their council of elders (advisors) are less accountable to the communities 
has allowed for a lot of interference by the government in their roles. One respondent 
confirms this by saying “Tribal chiefs, in my view, have been compromised. They are 
no longer independent as they were” (KI 28: 14/3/16).202 It seems this view is 
premised on the belief that, as chiefs are now government employees who are paid 
salaries, the institution has lost its independence and is being used to serve political 
interests. They are sometimes seen as partisan and no longer command the respect 
of the people, which is crucial for their roles. In the past traditional leaders did not 
have executive powers to enforce decisions, adherence to their rulings depended on 
the respect they enjoyed (Howell, 1954).  
But the chiefs who were interviewed for this study see the situation differently, as 
one of them observed, “we are being victimized by both sides but we are doing our 
work though we are aware that many things have changed. The people we represent 
accuse us of being government agents and the government criticizes us for serving 
community rather that government interests” (KI 21: 22/6/16).203 This resonates with 
the observation of Leonardi (2007: 552), that if a chief becomes too close to the 
government/external power he loses legitimacy among his own people. She argues 
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that the leaders ended up in the “cross fire” between external powers and their own 
people in the process of mediating the needs of both. Bargaining has been the role 
of chiefs through colonialism, post-colonialism and war (Leonardi 2007: 540), and in 
this case she suggests that authority derives from the capacity to communicate with 
sources of power, not from possession of power itself  (Leonardi 2007: 551). This 
means that the chiefs had to develop good working relationships with the powers in 
their respective locality, and to balance between providing for the needs of their 
people such as defending them against abuses and interference as well as the 
needs of the government and/or guerrillas. 
Traditional authorities also face the challenge of competition with elected 
representatives regarding their legitimate control over their constituencies. Another 
respondent commented “I don’t believe local mechanisms will work because here 
we have a presidential and a parliamentary system and the judiciary. There is no 
way traditional authority will grow because a member of parliament of that 
constituency claims to be the representative of the people” (KI 28: 14/3/2016).204 
Commenting on the competition between chiefs and parliamentarians over their 
constituencies, a respondent said, “when it comes to reconciliation, politicians think 
this is an opportunity to make money. They will try to confuse the entire process and 
influence their communities so that the role of the traditional leaders is watered 
down. So, interference from politicians is a big problem” (KI 27: 7/3/16).205 The view 
suggests that once politicians take the lead, they will influence their people to act to 
serve their political interests. At the end of the day it becomes a failure because the 
objective of the process which is to reconcile warring communities will not be 
achieved. This is a challenge as well for any efforts to apply local strategies to 
modern conflict.  
In the past, communities sat down to resolve even murder cases amicably and it 
broadly worked. As an example, one respondent cited the 2012 land conflict between 
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the Madi and the Acholi in Eastern Equatoria State which claimed more than 20 lives 
saying, “without the involvement of the politicians that issue would have been 
resolved without bloodshed. But the involvement of politicians kept this issue 
unresolved to this day” (KI 27: 7/3/16).206 There are similar experiences in other parts 
of the country where committees were formed to investigate and resolve disputes 
but these remained unresolved because the issues had been politicized. Among 
other examples, a respondent cited, the land disputes between the Bari and the 
Mundari in Mangala; between the Bari and the Nyangwara in Kuda, amongst the 
clans of the Pojulu tribe in Wonduruba and the one which involved four tribes around 
Kit; Acholi, Madi, Bari and Lulubo (KI 13: 4/2/16).207 
The politicization of differences over land often relates to the economic and political 
interests of politicians who see land in terms of investments (KI 31: 10/2/16).208 A 
common view of those I have informally interviewed is that politicians tend to see 
land in terms of expanding their constituency since, acquiring more territory 
translates to possibility of creating grassroots administrative units and the 
appropriation of voters. This is yet another indication that the role of traditional 
authorities, as custodians of land and community property in South Sudan, has been 
negatively affected by politics.  Political manipulation seems to be one of the most 
crucial factors behind tribal conflict in South Sudan. Ashworth (2014: 160) affirms 
that this highlights a dynamic which the Church had always been aware of: that while 
ethnic conflict often has its own roots, it is manipulated and exacerbated by political 
and military interests. 
But modern conflicts to which we wish to apply local mechanisms are politically 
motivated, and they tend not to fit in very well with local traditions guided by 
customary law. Most elements of the local system are created in a coherent way so 
that things simply flow freely, and whoever attempts to deviate from the route is 
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challenged by the traditional authorities and threatened by curse (KI 17: 12/2/16).209 
But in politically motivated cases, these become difficult to handle, because they 
involve instigators, perpetrators and victims and some victims on occasion become 
perpetrators. This is clear from the recent conflict in South Sudan where victims 
turned into perpetrators and where the dividing line became blurred. For example, 
about the 2013 hostilities, one informant claimed, “in Upper Nile state, the Shilluk 
people were first victims of the Nuer and later of the Dinka, and finally they 
themselves also became perpetrators"(KI 25: 27/2/16).210 This could pose a big 
challenge to the traditional process which, though it may be flexible, may not be 
conversant with the dynamics of modern politics. But what do these challenges mean 
for the future of local institutions and mechanisms in South Sudan?  
Several informants (24 out of 43) have acknowledged the changes that have 
happened but affirmed that chiefs and elders are still peacemakers. One of them 
added, “I think local mechanisms have potential for application to modern conflicts, 
we only need to research and develop them further and practice them” (KI 27: 
7/3/16).211 That they still exist despite the long history of hostilities and change, 
means that there are ways by which they are resolving conflict and maintaining 
peace. My interviews, both formal and informal, with several people during the 
fieldwork revealed that most people in South Sudan tend to see the greater potential 
of local peacemaking based on African philosophy, because the Western 
approaches, still widely used, are not necessarily conducive to every conflict 
situation. But there is a need for gender fairness in the local approaches.  
 6.8 Local justice and international legal standards 
Local forms of justice are designed to deal with relatively small numbers of cases: 
ordinary or daily criminal and civil disagreements both large and small and not those 
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arising from large-scale wars. Do they have the capacity to restore years and 
sometimes decades of abuses? Can they bear the weight of the most serious 
crimes? The problem in answering these questions is that there are yet only recent 
experiences of restorative justice being implemented in post-conflict situations. The 
most ambitious manoeuvre which has also attracted lots of criticisms, so far is the 
re-modelling of the gacaca tribunals in Rwanda with the aim of speeding up the 
prosecution of suspected perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. This increased the 
participation of the population, and introduced elements of mediation and 
reconciliation into the process (Freeman and Hayner 2003: 113).  
The continuous failure of international justice systems to address the bitterness 
experienced by war-affected communities in Africa and the global South in general 
when war ends, and the sources that generate it, are the reasons for seeking 
complementary schemes that are founded on the histories and cultures of conflict-
affected communities which might prove to be appropriate methods. According to 
Alai (2012: 128), some communities have opted to adopt local justice procedures, 
such as the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR), the Rwanda gacaca courts, and traditional cleansing ceremonies such as 
the Mato Oput in Northern Uganda, among others. While these initiatives make their 
vital contribution particularly in dealing with offences at community level, they face 
several challenges regarding maintaining international standards.  
An informant underscored the limitations involved in the use of local procedures in 
the transitional justice processes. She acknowledged that South Sudan had a lot of 
mechanisms that are still being used. However, she insisted, “this is good for local 
things where for example, you have conflict between cattle owners from the Lakes 
State destroying farm areas in the Equatoria region, or cases where cattle have been 
stolen and one or two persons were killed, then you can use it” (KI 38: 16/3/16).212 
But “when you talk about SPLA officers, for example, she further stated, committing 
atrocities that involve a lot of people as part of their current structure or if it involves 
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people in formal decision-making, I don’t think you can use it” (KI 38: 16/3/16).213 
There are limitations and these depend on the kinds of atrocities committed. 
Similarly, a different informant asserted “back in the colonial period, they had a 
system of measuring customary law against three criteria, the last of which being if 
a crime is sufficiently bad then some sort of universally-accepted law needs to be 
applied. But for something that is at the level of a dispute about cows, some form of 
restorative justice or customary laws could be applied” (KI 39: 16/3/16).214  It seems 
part of the answer to the application of both legal systems is the hybrid court provided 
in the ARCSS, which I will discuss in a later section. But how justice works is unclear.  
Apart from the critical voices of sceptics, uncertain of the mechanism’s usefulness 
in the South Sudan situation and their capacity and effectiveness to generate 
sustainable peace given the magnitude of the conflict, in which thousands of civilians 
have been killed, raped and maimed, other challenges exist. The concern among 
international lawyers and among international Human Rights NGOs, such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International. These organizations accept no curtailment 
of the international obligation to put someone on trial, and argue that customary tools 
do not respect the duty under international law to prosecute mass atrocities (Allen 
and Macdonald 2013: 16). Equally, Human Rights discourse does not usually allow 
justice against whole sections of people as local justice sometimes does: for 
example, the granting of amnesty to entire communities of Bahr el Ghazal Dinka and 
the Nuer of Western Upper Nile during the 1999 Wunlit peace conference (Bradbury 
et al 2006: 36), only against individuals. While local rituals and customs are important 
for populations caught in a violent conflict and dealing with its aftermath, those local 
rituals and customs do not form a coherent alternative to formal national and 
international processes. Thus, local justice cannot be harnessed to the transitional 
justice agenda in a straightforward way (Allen and Macdonald 2013: 21). 
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Local methods have not previously been applied in the context of mass atrocities 
and therefore lack the capacity to address gross violations such as sexual slavery 
(Alai 2012: 129). While many of the elements of war crimes are the same as those 
committed outside of war situations, such as murder and rape, the motives and 
gravity of the offences are often very different in the context of war. Local justice 
practices do not appear to be designed to address crimes in which only the victim or 
only the perpetrators are known, a common reality for many of the communities who 
have suffered losses during contemporary conflicts (Komakech 2012: 74). 
But is this challenge unique to local interventions? Apparently not; It equally applies 
to international justice interventions. Retributive justice mechanisms such as the 
ICC, for example, cannot both prosecute and conduct trials in situations of mass 
killings where individual killers cannot be identified. The idea of command 
responsibility where an area commander is prosecuted for human rights abuses 
committed in his jurisdiction instead of unknown perpetrators could have been a 
pragmatic attempt to respond to this dilemma. But mostly it is not, because chains 
of command in African conflicts tend to be opaque and undocumented. Moreover, 
logistically and practically it is impossible to prosecute all those who are suspected 
of committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in a conflict of the 
magnitude of South Sudan with multiple armed actors involved. The case of the 
Rwandan genocide, for example, illustrates how backlogs of cases prompt the 
reintroduction of the traditional mechanism of ‘Gacaca’ to expedite dealing with the 
cases (Waldorf 2010: 186).  
Justice in the courts is usually the first and most prominent of demands, but also the 
most difficult. Many attempts to prosecute and punish those responsible for serious 
abuses under prior regimes have seen little success. Typically, as in El Salvador, 
South Africa, and Chile, the political transition has involved political compromise, 
and these compromises have included some form of immunity from prosecution for 
the repressors of old, perhaps even preserving some of their power or incorporating 
them into the new government (Hayner 2002: 12). Despite what are sometimes the 
best intentions of the new authorities and despite a pressing demand for justice from 
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victims and human rights advocates, post-conflict justice is rare, except in the case 
of the victor’s justice. Where there are trials, they are usually few and sometimes fail 
to convict even those who everyone knows are guilty (Hayner 2002: 12). In South 
Africa, none of the security and police officers who were responsible for the most 
horrendous abuses during the apartheid regime, were prosecuted, despite being 
denied amnesty by the Amnesty Committee of the TRC.  
6.9 Local Mechanisms: Application, strengths and weaknesses 
Local methods of peacemaking in South Sudan conform to the notion that conflict 
resolution and reconciliation mechanisms revolve around mediation, arbitration and 
compensation and sometimes amnesty, though these differ in application from one 
society to the other. In this section I will discuss the key components of local 
mechanisms practiced by the Dinka and the Nuer. 
6.9.1 Mediation  
Mediation is the most commonly used method of conflict resolution and local justice 
in South Sudan and is based on customary law. Though mediation approaches may 
vary between the international and the local in that the former is based on liberal 
theory and assumptions and the latter on the African philosophy of peace and 
customary law, there are similarities in the general understanding of the concept. 
Both approaches converge in three areas: first, that mediation involves actors in a 
conflict and a neutral third party (an individual, a group, and an organization) and/ or 
a state; second, it tackles issues underlying the conflict; and third, it comes with 
resolutions that address the disputes. This means that mediation is a process of 
conflict management which relates to the parties’ own negotiations, where those in 
conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from an outsider to resolve 
their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the 
law (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 34). 
The local mediation process in South Sudan most often takes the form of informal 
judicial procedures where guilt is apportioned and compensation and reparations 
exacted according to customary law. Where adjudication is necessary these 
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traditional authorities act both as mediators and judges by simply switching their 
roles. But as discussed in chapter five, traditional authorities have no executive 
power to enforce their decisions and rulings except for the use of a curse. This 
means that those who are either unwilling or unable to abide by the decisions could 
defy the rulings. Among the Dinka, for example, when killing happens, the offender 
generally hides or goes to another tribe for shelter, and his family tries if possible to 
arrange a peace (KI 9: (7/2/16).215 Sometimes these efforts go without success until 
the culprit is brought to explain the murder’s account and ask for forgiveness. 
Another concern relates to the local mediation process which must include all the 
relevant actors, as reconciliation would otherwise only be between the perpetrator 
and his victim and their communities. This could be a problem in the case of the 
South Sudan civil war where the dispute has also pitted the government against 
certain ethnic communities or sections of the population. Traditionally there is no 
clear framework that can be constructed to include the government as a party to the 
conflict.  
6.9.2 Procedures:  
There are different scenarios where mediation is initiated. The first by neighbours 
who see certain kinds of violent conflict as disturbing and which could affect peaceful 
coexistence. The second is by the parties themselves who take the initiative to 
negotiate and to reach out to traditional leaders for assistance to have their 
differences peacefully settled, and the third is where respected elders offer 
themselves to mediate by deciding to voluntarily intervene, summon the parties in 
conflict and mediate.  
The nature and magnitude of the conflict determines how mediation is initiated. Most 
of Dinka and Nuer key informants separately interviewed by this study stated that 
before the two decades of the South-North war, there was little direct involvement of 
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the government in local conflict resolution and reconciliation. They claimed that the 
situation has changed so that now state governors or government officials in their 
full capacities initiate community reconciliation and ask the traditional authorities to 
mediate. Jonglei state particularly, seems to offer several examples of government-
initiated local conflict mitigation processes. One respondent explained, “it is the 
government-initiated local mediation processes that provide the space where 
manipulation and politicization of local peacemaking and justice systems mostly 
takes place” (KI 26: 4/3/16).216 But these initiatives have always been political, 
because local conflicts are fundamentally about politics of community, land, power, 
space, and access among others. The role of the government remains crucial for the 
following reasons: to provide security and protection in a situation where tribes used 
heavy weapons in their fighting and present a problem much greater than the ability 
of traditional authorities to control; to provide logistical support for the mediators and 
participants; to serve as guarantor for the implementation of the agreement reached 
(Gado 2013).  
6.9.3 Compensation 
The role of compensation for losses incurred is crucial in any local peacemaking and 
justice systems among the cattle-keeping and Nilotic communities of South Sudan, 
more so when considering the subject of reconciliation. Compensation and 
restitution are significant among the Dinka and the Nuer in their efforts to repair harm 
caused to lives, property and relationships. As reported by most of my informants 
(31 out of 43), the payment of cattle as compensation for human lives has been in 
practice among the Dinka and the Nuer for centuries. One of them said, “fighting is 
not a recent thing; within our own communal settings, these fights have always been 
there, but there have been ways in which we deal with this: through compensation, 
truth and reconciliation” (KI 30: 9/3/16).217 This would aid reconciliation and, like 
reparative justice, which has become so central in any transitional justice efforts, 
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could provide a level of solace to those who suffered in the conflicts. The restorative 
value of such exchanges also re-establishes peaceful relations and removes the 
need for revenge killing.  
The payment of blood price in both the Dinka and Nuer communities also serves a 
cultural purpose: that of restoring the loss of reproductive resources (Leonardi et al. 
2010: 65). But the overemphasis on marrying a ghost wife to the deceased tends to 
overshadow care for the family of the deceased. This means that if local 
compensation for loss is to be equated to reparations in transitional justice which is 
intended to restore the original state of the victims or survivors by repairing the loss 
and damages due to violations, then the Dinka and the Nuer compensation does not 
seem to serve the purpose. This is a point of divergence from modern transitional 
justice which needs to be considered if local solutions are to be applied to modern 
conflicts.   
Despite their cultural, social and economic values, there are challenges regarding 
the application of this approach to large-scale violent conflicts or war situations 
where many people have lost their lives and where it is hard to establish who killed 
whom and to pay compensation. When asked, what can be done in these situations, 
an informant commented that compensation, as traditionally understood, would be 
impossible to enforce for several reasons: first, in many instances, people do not 
know the identities of the victims and perpetrators. Thus, even if compensation were 
possible, it would not be easy to determine who would compensate whom. Second, 
certain cases are peculiarly complicated such as where victims have become 
perpetrators (KI 30: 9/3/16).218  Wasonga (2009: 37) observes that a perpetrator may 
have been forced to kill his or her parent or up to ten people like the case of the LRA 
in Northern Uganda; in such instances compensation, may be difficult to apply. Most 
respondents (28 out of 43) insisted there should be no compensation. One of them 
stated “so many people have been killed in the ongoing war, there is no way people 
can afford to pay puk. The destruction has left people without anything they had 
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before. They are now in displaced camps and others have fled to neighbouring 
countries” (KI 14: 19/2/16).219 Despite the above obstacles, individual compensation, 
however complicated it may be, can be crucial for facilitating reconciliation. 
However, some participants believe that the institutions and systems will continue 
with their moral strengths and roles despite the impact of changes; hence their 
potential and possible application to modern warfare.  Commenting on the relevance 
of blood price among the Dinka, for example, one respondent noted, “Yes, payment 
of puk is possible; even recently our chief participated in solving the problem of the 
Apuk and Aguok communities in Gogrial, where more than 20 people were killed and 
the killers paid about 2,000 cattle for the number of people they killed in Aguok; each 
victim was compensated with 31 cows” (KI 5: 20/2/16).220 It seems this informant’s 
belief in the efficacy of the mechanism, despite serious potential challenges in its 
application to contemporary conflicts, is based mainly on normative imagination. 
However, this practice is not sustainable in a situation of mass killings, the kinds we 
have seen in South Sudan in recent years and across some African countries.  
Another respondent cautiously affirmed that blood compensation could be applied, 
but it might take a long time to settle such a payment (KI 22: 20/2/16).221 What she 
did not talk about was whether, unlike the case of community or inter-communal 
conflicts, the number of those killed and the identities of their killers could be 
ascertained if, for instance, they were killed by a war plane, artillery bombardment 
or tanks.  Rather she emphasized the kind of creative approach to negotiations that 
focuses on identifying root causes of conflict to apportion blame and payment or not 
of compensation: in other words, it is essential to consider who is right or wrong, so 
any compensation would depend on culpability. Again, her reference here seems to 
be to individual or communal disputes and not civil wars with their complexities of 
motives and actors. Another respondent argued that native methods are still relevant 
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and can be applied to modern disputes, specifically at the community level, because 
they are tradition-based and well understood by the affected people; but payment of 
blood price is irrelevant in terms of the great challenges to establish the perpetrator’s 
and victim’s identities and to mobilize resources (cattle) for such a payment (KI 2: 
23/1/16).222  He suggested, in relation to the current war, that the government should 
take full responsibility since it was politics that ignited the war in the first place.  
The role of the government was emphasized by most respondents. One of them said 
that the government should make reparation in the form of community projects for 
those most affected by the strife and violations; there should be restitution instead 
of compensation (KI 29: 19/2/16).223 However, contrary to this view, Komakech 
(2012: 73), argues that restitution might fulfil the purpose of compensation, which is 
intended to address the economic impact of an abuse, but may not be able to 
address the reconciliation process at a local level. In that regard, one informant 
maintained, “compensation and reparations should be provided by the government; 
traditional authorities should conduct cleansing and re-integration rituals to bring 
about healing and communal reconciliation” (KI 5: 20/2/16).224  This is considered a 
better option (complementarity) because of the complexities associated with modern 
conflict, in terms of the multiple actors involved, the severity of abuse and their 
impersonal nature. 
The obvious other source of reparations would be the international community. In 
Sierra Leone, the UN funded some of the needs as the government said there were 
other priorities that needed more attention (Graybill 2017). The challenge with this is 
that if reparations are internationally supported, then there is no acknowledgment of 
violations by the government. Again, how does that resonate with traditional 
requirements that perpetrators and their clans should share responsibility by 
mobilizing resources? This raises another basic challenge regarding the 
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appropriateness of traditional justice practices as far as the payment of reparations 
is concerned. Should it be material or symbolic compensation? How about 
communities, given that the focus of restorative justice falls on both the victim and 
the perpetrator as well as their communities? To what extent can financial 
reparations repair communities?  The numerous challenges discussed above, 
necessitate the exploration of the idea of ‘symbolic compensation’ or some kinds of 
affirmative action policies involving the communities most affected.  
Based on the challenges discussed above, community reparations are probably 
better, so that if the providing of free educational opportunities to victims is part of 
that, all the children of the affected community can attend school. But a distinction 
will need to be made between what constitutes development and what constitutes 
reparations. In such situations, reparations may not necessarily need to be material: 
money or cattle. According to Ogora (2009: 8), community reparation can take 
various forms including: the construction of memorials in places where mass killings 
or massacres occurred; starting up micro-finance projects for the survivors of the 
conflict in order to enable them to sustain a meaningful livelihood; the construction 
of rehabilitation centres where victims can receive treatment; the construction of 
museums or community memorial centres in IDP camps in memory of those who 
died; and the funding of commemorative events in local communities. A reparation 
fund would also provide for key rituals which could be helpful for fostering 
reintegration, community cohesion and solidarity. But the pursuit of individual 
compensation can be a complicated matter because of the costs involved and 
difficulty to define who qualifies as a victim and who does not. The challenge of 
applying local mechanisms in a complex situation such as this means that 
transitional justice requires a complementary and holistic approach rather than using 
only one or two initiatives like South Africa.  
Symbolic reparation in the form of an apology could be another option. President 
Mandela expressed regret to the nation for the crime of apartheid in South Africa. 
Paul Kagame of Rwanda apologized for the crime of genocide. President Uhuru 
Kenyatta expressed regret for the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. The 
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President of Sierra Leone begged forgiveness for the war and the gross violations 
of human rights and was applauded, unlike his predecessor (Graybill 2017). Apology 
is about nation building not about crimes committed by the individual head of state. 
It is about the recognition of victims and this can be more powerful especially when 
it comes from those who have benefited from previous regimes.   
With these difficulties identified, should these approaches be confined to local 
communities or applied alongside modern Western strategies? According to Ogora 
(2009: 9), the trouble is not about the limited applicability of the local justice system, 
but that many of these local mechanisms are presented in their ‘ancient’ and ‘archaic’ 
formats as they used to be practised in the past. He argues that except for a few 
experiments such as the gacaca in Rwanda, many African cultural procedures have 
not been adapted to suit contemporary situations and conflicts. He further argues 
that because modern military encounters involve phenomena unfamiliar to local 
communities, such as ‘crimes against humanity’, war crimes’ and ‘genocide’, the 
obvious conclusion is that these novel outrages must be beyond the capacity of local 
mechanisms. For Clark, the challenges, critiques and controversies regarding local 
techniques such as gacaca demonstrate that local methods can indeed be 
restructured to handle contemporary crimes and transitional justice needs (Clark 
2014). These views resonate with several comments made by informants in this 
study who suggest that if local methods are to be applied to modern hostilities and 
transitional justice, they will require some modifications in both methodologies and 
practices.  
Modifications may be possible with socially constructed efforts, but a great deal of 
imagination and creativity will be needed if local forms of justice are to be reframed 
for use in the context of massive atrocities, such as genocide or prolonged human 
rights violations. Every initiative will have to take an uncharted path. Moreover, as 
discussed above, most recent developments in the international environment 
involving the UN, large NGOs, and civil society organizations almost exclusively 
favour retributive institutions, such as ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, universal jurisdiction 
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and so on. This one-sided approach discourages experiments to develop a 
restorative approach (Freeman and Hayner 2003: 114). 
6.10 The Church and traditional authorities 
As a civil society actor, the Church in South Sudan has been playing a vital role in 
peacebuilding efforts since before, during and after the decades of war in the 
country; through advocacy, mediation and reconciliation as well as humanitarian and 
development services. It has a record that includes working closely with other 
international and national actors as well as traditional institutions and authorities. 
One informant claimed, “the Church has always been at the forefront of 
peacemaking and reconciliation in South Sudan. Apart from its moral authority, its 
grassroots reconciliation efforts have been possible because South Sudan is still a 
very rural and religious society” (KI 32: 15/3/16).225 Through the close collaboration 
between the Church and traditional authorities in 1990s as discussed in chapter four, 
PPP as a new model of local peacemaking was invented. The processes and 
procedures are like the ‘palaver hut’ conflict resolution and reconciliation meetings 
that are common in most rural communities across African countries (Omeje 2008).  
But how and why was the process facilitated by the Church? Traditional authorities 
lack the national structure to accomplish such a task throughout the whole country, 
so the Church provides that structure. But in each local area it is the traditional 
leadership who are the ones who must make things work. One respondent said; “the 
PPP is made possible because first, the church is an institution that is nation-wide. 
Second, the church has the trust and credibility to do that, as the power of the chiefs 
and elders is local and they don’t have national associations of chiefs” (KI 25: 
27/2/16).226 Traditional leaders were the main actors in the entire process as they 
were the ones who had to agree on the agenda and procedures. Thus, it has been 
recognized as a model of grassroots peacemaking and has become a trend that 
                                                     
225 Interview 32, with a Pastor: (15/3/16) 
226 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016) 
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continues to be used across the country (Ashworth 2014: 164). It seems many of 
such conferences were held since 1990s to reconcile communities in conflicts. 
In their comments about the potential of local mechanisms to be applied to modern 
conflicts, most informants interviewed by this study referred to the Akobo and Wunlit 
peace and reconciliation conferences that were conducted in 1994 and 1999 
respectively, where different approaches converged: the gospel values, traditional 
peacemaking practices and the modern peacebuilding model (Redekop 2007; 
Ashworth 2014). The model maintained the peace between the Dinka and Nuer 
communities until new antagonisms erupted. Again, through its strategic linkages 
PPP also produced outcomes that contributed to the efforts that led to the signing of 
the 2005 CPA (Ashworth 2014: 59).   
The success of the conference was partly because the SPLA provided security and 
protection for the participants during the entire period. But could the conference have 
taken place with the same degree of success without the support of the Church and 
the SPLA security forces? Perhaps this question leads to a criticism of the PPP 
model as a new form of local approach because its dependence on the government 
for security and implementation of the recommendations could create another 
opportunity for political manipulation. But could this provide the basis for future 
complementarity with the modern transitional justice framework? It appears that this 
is already a good beginning where different values and strategies as well as different 
actors, local, national and international, converge.  
Again, how was the process different from the well-known local process as practised 
by the Dinka and the Nuer? One clear difference was the role of women and youth. 
The participation of women was crucial because part of the PPP principle was that 
one third of the participants were women; usually elderly women, women who were 
respected (Ashworth 2014). The traditional chiefs and elders and women were part 
of the planning process. In this respect, the PPP scheme departs from tradition in a 
significant way, because it involves women and youth who were historically excluded 
from such processes. In the past, women and youth were not part of traditional 
peacemaking or at least did not play key roles such as planning the proceedings. As 
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argued by Graybill (2017: 148) in the case of the Sierra Leone TRC, this deviation 
addresses criticisms that disapprove of local methods of conflict resolution when 
they do not adapt to respect the rights and agency of women and youth. This also 
resonates with the observation of Wassara (2007) that traditional institutions and 
local mechanisms for peacemaking appear to be relevant and may persist, but will 
not revert to the kinds of organization and influence they had in the past. 
6.11 Transitional Justice and the 2015 Peace Agreement  
The signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan 
(ARCSS) which was brokered by IGAD in August 2015, between the SPLM-IG and 
SPLM-IO, temporarily ended the conflict which started in December 2013. Unlike the 
previous agreements discussed in chapter three; the 1972 AAA and the 2005 CPA, 
ARCSS included a transitional justice component. It dedicated a whole chapter (5) 
to Justice and Accountability to deal with violations committed between 2005 and 
2015, and to seek the truth about the causes and impact of the conflict as well as to 
provide reparations and compensation to victims and survivors of the violations. To 
that end, three transitional justice institutions were to be established: The 
Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH); the Hybrid Court for 
South Sudan (HCSS); and the Reparations and Compensation Authority (RCA).  
Based on interviewees’ comments, this section will analyse the three institutions in 
relation to the Dinka and the Nuer local justice and reconciliation practices.   
In proposing and focusing on only two non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms: 
The CTRH and the RCA, ARCSS omitted the local justice and reconciliation 
approaches and the role of religious bodies that are crucial to the South Sudan 
context. This is not surprising, given the influence of liberal peace agents such as 
the UN, the Troika and other international actors who, despite being IGAD-led have 
financed and backed the peace process. These bodies promote retributive justice 
and non-judicial mechanisms that are based on the Western liberal approaches to 
transitional justice: ICC or Hybrid tribunal, TCs and associated mechanisms such as 
reparations. Harris (2013: 155) observes that regarding Western donor influence in 
Sierra Leone, in such scenarios, there is a wider argument that the concerns are 
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those of the donors which, despite some variation in emphasis are all current liberal 
concerns that align with democratization, accountability, human rights, the promotion 
of civil society, economic liberalization and good governance. This section aims to 
understand whether possibilities exist to combine the three modern mechanisms 
proposed by ARCSS with local strategies. I now turn to discuss the possible role of 
local approaches in relation to each of the three institutions. 
6.11.1 Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) 
The CTRH will be responsible for investigating, documenting and reporting on 
human rights abuses over a predetermined period to address the legacy of conflict, 
as well as promoting peace, national reconciliation and healing. The hypothetical 
relationship between the CTRH and customary institutions may be a complex one, 
but it potentially offers unique advantages in the South Sudanese context. Possible 
difficulties may arise from the diversity of local systems in South Sudan, and the 
challenges discussed above that have negatively impacted on customary institutions 
throughout the different periods of South Sudan’s history. This is in addition to the 
inherent weaknesses of the institutions, including certain customary laws that 
discriminate against women and girls. 
However, since they are far more accessible geographically, established institutions 
in South Sudan could play a key role in extending the CTRH’s reach to rural parts of 
the country. Traditional authorities also have hands-on knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances of the conflict, including the nature and extent of damage done, 
materially or psychologically, which could provide a rich source of data for truth-
seeking efforts (UNDP 2016). The CTRH could set up a truth-seeking branch at the 
level of traditional leaders and their communities.The customary system encourages 
the accused person to tell the whole truth about what they did; especially important 
is the truth concerning the motivation and circumstances under which the offending 
action occurred, which is used to determine whether the sentence ought to be 
mitigated or not (UNDP 2016). 
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Various views were expressed by the participants as to preferred approaches to 
national reconciliation in South Sudan. About half of the participants said that if the 
CTRH followed the model of South Africa it could lead to reconciliation. One of them 
proposed “the process needs to include truth-seeking, apology, compensation, 
reparations and forgiveness; but with the heavy presence of the international 
community and the involvement of the grassroots” (KI 27: 7/3/16).227 Another 
informant further remarked, “the reconciliation and healing process must be 
undertaken by bodies that enjoy the confidence of all communities: the churches, 
civil society and the NGOs” (KI 18: 11/3/16).228  These positions confirm the view 
that reconciliation is a multi-faceted process with several layers and multiple actors 
across the board. The reference made to the presence of the international 
community in the process is indicative of the importance of complementarity of 
approaches.  
But a locally led TC could perhaps generate more information than the Western-style 
court process. Drawing on the experiences of Sierra Leone, Graybill (2017: 145) 
observes that the ‘Fambul Tok’ of Sierra Leone has had a far greater impact than 
the Sierra Leone TRC. The TRC alone, she argues, would appear to be too official 
and a lot of people in rural areas where most of the conflicts and fighting took place, 
would be unable to air their opinions. It was also viewed by rural villagers as a foreign 
institution; and because they did not operate at village level, the people did not 
benefit from the TRC and the Special Court and thus opted for village dialogue as a 
means of settling their conflicts. 
The TRC’s emphasis on individual victims where only the victim is invited to testify 
without the entire family does not resonate with villagers (Graybill 2017: 149). This 
is because it contradicts the African philosophy of interconnectedness based on 
ubuntu where families are expected to participate. The hurt during the war was to 
the whole family and not only the directly affected individuals. This is another reason 
                                                     
227 Interview 27, with a South Sudanese intellectual: (7/3/2016) 
228 Interview 18, with a member of an opposition political party: (11/3/2016) 
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why incorporating local truth-seeking strategies, such as oaths and rituals involving 
families and communities in South Sudan, would positively contribute to the process.  
Huyse and Salter (2008) observe that the reasons why African post-conflict countries 
may prefer the ritual reconciliation approach are because it is informal, ritualistic, 
and communal, as opposed to Western style, approach such as the TRC which are 
formal, rational and individualistic. Again, like the Hybrid Court, the TRC has a limited 
lifespan (Graybill 2017: 149). This is a challenge to reconciliation, which is a process 
for a country like South Sudan that has suffered a prolonged and devastating war. 
As reconciliation cannot be accomplished within one or two years, and most TRCs 
are expected to end their tasks; involving local mechanisms means that the process 
will continue even if the formal process has ended. 
One of the participants remarked, “in a country like South Sudan in which the literacy 
rate is so low, ways of life differ enormously, so the best policy is to use the local 
culture to move the communities forward, otherwise we will end up with an alien 
concept that people cannot understand” (KI 25: 27/2/16).229 The question is how can 
this be nationalized as opposed to making it a communal issue? It must be broad-
based. Another informant observed, “I think there are a few important matters that 
could be taken seriously, for example, there are different mechanisms in South 
Sudan but they all actually deal with the same restorative justice: mediation, 
compensation and reconciliation” (KI 30: 9/3/16).230 These three elements which are 
being applied in various degrees by different communities could be used nationwide. 
But this may involve the question of codifying the practice for uniformity, which again 
will deviate from the oral ways in which these mechanisms have been preserved and 
passed on from generation to generation.   
                                                     
229 Interview 25, with a peacebuilding practitioner: (27/2/2016) 
230 Interview with a Human Rights Lawyer: (9/3/2016) 
 261 
12018735 
6.11.2 Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) 
The HCSS is a tribunal that is to be established to bring cases against individuals 
responsible for international crimes committed since 15 December 2013. The justice 
and accountability component of the ARCSS is premised on some of the heinous 
and horrendous atrocities committed in South Sudan since 2005 but more especially 
between 2013 and 2015. It was hoped that the peace agreement of August 2015 
would hold. But the war has continued after 2015; this means there will be a need to 
revise this provision and similar ones in the agreement documents to make them 
relevant and encompass all the human rights violations when the war ends.   
The fight against impunity and efforts to hold to account those with the highest 
responsibility and to ensure non-repetition is the responsibility of criminal tribunals 
and the ICC (Novak 2015). This means trials of atrocity crimes: genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, are not within the remit and jurisdiction of 
customary justice systems. But customary courts could be endowed with the power 
to hear cases of international crimes in cases involving victims and perpetrators who 
come from the same community (UNDP 2016).  
Traditional institutions provide important services that often resonate more with the 
South Sudanese conceptions of justice which are restorative, aimed at community 
harmony and peaceful coexistence rather than the statutory system. The 
involvement of customary institutions could also help to reduce the exorbitant costs 
associated with Western-styled justice, which relies heavily on expensive 
prosecutors and lawyers. The PPP, for example, could be cost-effective compared 
to the Hybrid court and the TRC. One respondent commented, “the Wunlit people-
to-people process took about two weeks to resolve an atrocious conflict and 
reconcile communities, but it took the ICTR too long to deal with the genocide cases 
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in Rwanda and the ICC to handle the case of Charles Taylor in The Hague” (KI 23: 
19/2/16).231 
But if a role is provided for customary institutions in the transitional justice process, 
a key procedural question concerns how to formulate such a role.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The formalization of customary institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms such 
as the Gacaca after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda proved problematic because the 
process undermined the flexibility of the institutions and reduced principles that in 
practice had been negotiated on a case-by-case basis to specific rules (UNDP 2016: 
XV). Moreover, unlike the Rwanda case with only two major ethnic groups: the Tutsi 
and Hutu who share similar cultures, South Sudan has over 60 ethnicities. This 
means a huge difficulty of formalizing customary processes through legislation, given 
the diversity of customs. Another approach would be to allow customary and 
statutory processes to proceed in parallel without forcing the customary mechanisms 
into an artificial formalization process.  
But there are many challenges to the application of local approaches in the three 
transitional justice institutions provided in the ARCSS. The major challenge is to try 
and accomplish this outside the Peace Agreement. One respondent argued, “if a 
role is to be provided for customary institutions in the judicial process, then we must 
negotiate it outside the Peace Agreement and this means we must change some 
sub-sections within the Agreement” (KI 30: 9/3/16).232 The process of changing any 
term in the settlement applies to all the parties and stake-holders involved, and this 
is a very tedious business and a challenge because the process leading to this is 
exclusively political. The national constitution includes government acts that give 
power to traditional authorities and we also have the customary law that recognizes 
what these people do by way of custom. But the current accord states that when 
there is a conflict between the agreement and the constitution, the terms of the 
agreement take precedence over the latter and so ARCSS is much stronger than the 
                                                     
231 Interview 23, with a member of parliament: (19/2/2016) 
232 Interview 30, with a Human Rights Lawyer: (9/3/2016) 
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constitution (ARCSS 2015). These are some of the practical challenges that make 
the application of the local approaches to ARCSS problematic. 
Another difficulty associated with the application of customary justice methods is that 
there are sometimes cultural barriers that impede on individual’s speaking out for 
his/her rights because they feel stigmatized. For example, both women and men 
who have suffered sexual abuse face the problem of cultural obstacles which need 
to be overcome if local mechanisms are to be applied alongside the HCSS.  But do 
all South Sudanese prefer local procedures over prosecutions? The evidence is 
mixed. A majority believe that perpetrators should be prosecuted, but an equal 
number also support the use of local solutions. For those who prefer these 
mechanisms, healing and the restoration of relationships rather than the imposing of 
punishment are the primary goals. One respondent observed, “South Sudanese 
have their own way of addressing justice and it does not involve sending them to 
prison” (KI 25: 27/2/16)233. Similar comments have been made by a small number of 
participants. 
Based on my observation during field work and informal conversations with a few 
individuals, however, I have learned there is a lot of bitterness among members of 
different ethnic communities; so, in a country like that where the conflict has 
assumed an ethnic dimension, it becomes difficult to go after individuals through 
trials, because that sort of action ends up polarizing the community and what the 
accused has to say is that this is the work of the other group, which is sufficient to 
estrange people. On a similar note, one respondent asserted, “I think we should stop 
this whole idea of moving the whole thing towards a punitive form of justice because 
this will end up polarizing the people further, and probably we might witness a fresh 
round of violence, as we can already see from the way that the agreement is being 
                                                     
233 Interview 25: with a peacebuilding practitioner (27/2/2016) 
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implemented that there is no compliance on either side because each feels they 
might get convicted” (KI 30: 9/2/16)234.   
Referring to similar post-conflict contexts, another individual pointed to the 
Mozambique strategy because its dynamics resemble that of South Sudan. The 
Mozambicans made a political decision to move forward and forgive, so the issue of 
prosecutions ended and that seems to have worked to an extent, there is still 
sporadic violence in the country. The South Africa TRC provides another relevant 
example, because they stopped short of prosecutions, except for those denied 
amnesty. The perpetrators could come out openly and confess what they did in 
exchange for amnesty. In South Sudan, despite the three proposed transitional 
justice institutions, there is no incentive for people, who otherwise have committed 
atrocity crimes, to come forward, testify and apologize for what they did. But one 
participant did not consider South Africa a relevant case, as he explained, “in South 
Africa many are still sad because of a lack of justice and they feel upset to see the 
perpetrators walking free and even being rewarded for what they did” (KI 41: 
17/11/16).235 The failure to see justice done, according to this view, could even 
encourage the victims become perpetrators themselves. For example, there is the 
case of a police officer who was denied amnesty and wanted to solicit forgiveness 
from the family of his victim to obtain absolution but was hit and injured by the son 
of his victim (DVD-IJR).236 
Not all the participants interviewed in this study were in favour of local reconciliation 
and/or TRC. There were voices supporting retributive justice. “For us to break this 
kind of impunity we must know all the people who committed that offence if they are 
still alive. They must face justice so that people will say, ‘yes, let us now reconcile’ 
                                                     
234 Interview 30, with a Human Rights Lawyer: (9/3/2016) 
235 Interview 41, with a transitional justice practitioner: (17/11/2016) 
236 A DVD on Truth, Justice and Memory: A 12 -episode course on the TRC produced by the Institute for 
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Cape Town-South Africa. 
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because the law has taken its course” (KI 3: 27/2/16).237 In his view, we cannot talk 
about reconciliation, and people will not re-establish friendly relations if they see the 
culprits and their abusers not just moving about freely but also still enjoying the 
positions of power granted to them as rewards by the state and who could kill more 
people if they are not stopped through punitive action. The general arguments of 
supporters of retributive justice, that there is no peace and no reconciliation without 
punitive justice, seem to be problematic in some political contexts where choices 
must be carefully made and peace and justice paths need to be sensitively charted 
without overlooking either alternative.  
For some, retributive justice is the obvious instrument to realize both these 
conditions. A list of its possible benefits, have been identified by adherents which 
may help policymakers in assessing its potential contribution to reconciliation 
(Freeman and Hayner 2003: 97). The first is avoiding unbridled private revenge: If 
there is no criminal prosecution at all, victims may be tempted to take justice into 
their own hands: this poses the risk of turning into vigilante justice with summary 
executions, a spiral of revenge and so on. Such “self-help justice” can trigger social 
and political disturbances. On the other hand, refraining from prosecution may 
encourage conspiracy theories according to which the leaders of the new regime are 
suspected of collusion with the former regime (Freeman and Hayner 2003: 97). This 
is where it is important to devise a context-specific complementary approach to 
transitional justice where all the available mechanisms, including local justice, should 
be evaluated and their contributions validated and implemented, if found relevant.  
This may provide a solution to the overemphasis on the dominant international 
measures which have been applied as a universal template but have often been met 
with failure.    
Whatever form justice takes however, in the views of some informants, the guilty 
party needs to account for the harm done. In the case of South Sudan, the 
government needs to accept liability for the problems the country has experienced 
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since December 2013 because, as discussed in Chapter Three, the civil war started 
as a political power struggle within the ruling party. One respondent declared, “our 
leaders need to apologize and take responsibility for the harm they have caused to 
the people of South Sudan, especially to those communities who bore the brunt of 
gross human rights violations and atrocities committed against them which include: 
killings, torture, rapes, destruction of property, and forced mass displacement” (KI 
27: 7/3/16).238 In his view, it was clear that such public as well as specific apologies 
by the leadership would open a path for reconciliation as both victims and survivors 
would think the horrors they had experienced had been acknowledged, so they had 
no need to remain stuck in the past. This suggests that accountability is not all about 
retributive justice but can take different non-judicial forms such as apologies. 
6.11.3 Reparations and Compensation Authority (RCA) 
The RCA is a body that is to be established to provide compensation and reparations 
to people who lost property or were victims of abuses because of the fighting. As 
intermediaries between communities and the government, traditional authorities 
have a wealth of information about the circumstances of people in their communities, 
which could be used to supplement information compiled about the victim population 
through truth-seeking efforts and criminal investigations (UNDP 2016). The 
reparations programme should also coordinate its activities with traditional forms of 
compensation, such as: the customary practice of paying ‘blood wealth’ in the form 
of cattle from the culprit to the family of the deceased in cases of homicide.  
Other possible areas of coordination include the determination of punishments and 
remedies. For example, statutory courts or HCSS could refer disputes about 
reparations or compensation to the relevant customary law courts, or ask traditional 
authorities to oversee the ceremonies of post-trial reconciliation of the parties. 
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As discussed in the previous sections, this is not without problems if the traditional 
compensation mechanism is to be applied, consideration must be given to the 
magnitude of atrocity crimes committed during the conflict where it is virtually 
impossible to ascertain the number of lives lost, who has killed, and the destruction 
of property that always results from modern warfare. However, traditional authorities 
could play a vital role in a reparation programme because there may be cases that 
are straightforward and where compensation for murder could be determined. Since 
they are well acquainted with their communities, traditional authorities would be well 
placed to assess reparation claims and manage disputes or misunderstandings that 
result from the process (UNDP 2016: 12). 
6.12. Findings 
From the discussions and analysis in this chapter, it seems the limitations of local 
approaches regarding possible application to modern conflict and transitional justice 
in South Sudan out-weigh the strengths attributed to the mechanisms and resources. 
For example, traditional authorities have already suffered political manipulation and 
a loss of respect by an armed youth and a militarized society, as well as interference 
from statutory lawyers, and a loss of values from which they draw their authority 
because of war and external social influences.  The nature of local antagonisms and 
warfare has changed and has contributed to the erosion of the old mechanisms, 
increasing the loss of oral history because they are not coded; the politicization of 
ethnicities and communities, the manipulation of chiefs by the government.  
There is also competition over constituencies and legitimacy between representative 
legislators and traditional authorities. The influence of modern monotheistic religions 
(Christianity and Islam) continues to erode the traditional, ritualistic and spiritual role 
of local beliefs as some of their new converts look on their ceremonies as devil 
worship. Added to this, there is an absence of appreciation for the local by young 
people. All these difficulties have weakened the capacity of the native mechanisms 
to attend to the issues they were designed to address, and has revealed their lack 
of relevance and potential in relation to modern war situations and how to deal with 
their aftermath. Conversely, the claim that traditional strategies have a certain 
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relevance and potential has been validated, because the claim is about the failure of 
the international liberal institutions and actors to recognize, utilize and incorporate 
local initiatives and resources for the management of modern conflicts. Useful and 
potentially compatible local processes include peacebuilding and post-war 
reconstruction.  
South Sudan is a recipient of the dominant liberal peacebuilding methods. As a 
researcher, I sought to find out what the international peacemakers have been doing 
in South Sudan. I have interviewed the agents of the liberal peace intervention 
systems, such as the UN, Troika member countries, international civil society groups 
and the IGAD mediation team, who acknowledged the relevance of local 
mechanisms and resources that could be applied alongside other interventions for 
the resolution of modern conflicts. For example, one of the international informants 
admitted, “South Sudan has these mechanisms which are important and they are 
being used for peacebuilding efforts at local level” (KI 38: 16/3/16).239 If they are 
important and relevant, the question is what have they done? To what extent have 
they been adopted, if at all? Why is it the case that they have not actually integrated 
them into the current peacebuilding strategies?   
I have found no evidence to support their claim, at least during the time of the study, 
about their practical intervention through the incorporating and utilizing of local 
resources. Neither did they demonstrate that they were making a difference by 
producing complementarity of hybrid peacebuilding. For example, in the 2015 
ARCSS, they made no use of the TRC system which is based wholly or, at the very 
least, on local procedures, rather they used the usual dominant TRC approach. They 
have not moved in the direction of restorative justice to address the issue of how we 
can reconcile bitterly divided communities. Instead, they have used the Hybrid Court, 
thus mainly focusing on the retributive justice dimension, to address the issue of 
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impunity. It is one thing to recognize the relevance of these mechanisms and another 
to apply them. Is the question rhetorical?   
Based on my observation during field work, it is not only rhetorical at all that they 
realized the possible relevance of local methods for post-conflict justice and 
reconciliation. There are processes that they are doing to support, compliment and 
validate their position. As an example, since signing the ARCSS in August 2015, the 
UNDP, through the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS,) has been providing training 
in transitional justice for the traditional authorities. Other efforts include a three-
phase research known as South Sudan Customary Authorities Project (SSCA) 
commissioned by the Swiss government and managed by the Rift Valley Institute 
(RVI).  But this does not translate into any effort to incorporate local approaches into 
transitional justice.  
The dominant liberal peace procedure continues to be used even if it does not agree 
with the African world view, such as ubuntu, which promotes restorative justice over 
retributive justice. It most likely means that having made their usual interventions in 
the post-conflict situations and initiated various activities based on a short-term quick 
fix-and-exit strategy, they realized, at the implementation phase, that these activities 
did not translate into peacebuilding, because there was a disjuncture between the 
citizens’ aspirations for restorative justice and the problem of reconciling bitterly 
divided communities, an issue which programmed activities could not address. They 
then became aware of the use and relevance of local initiatives, an idea they had 
not previously considered. In this way, validating the utility of the actual intervention 
may be considered as an afterthought, not an idea which they had from the outset.  
6.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed in detail the local and international justice systems and 
practices from the viewpoint of post-conflict justice and reconciliation in South 
Sudan. It has assessed the potential roles and limits of these institutions and 
strategies and the extent to which the Dinka and the Nuer justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms have a potential for application to transitional justice. There are 
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possibilities for fusion and complementarity of interventions in dealing with past 
human rights violation and efforts to bring about reconciliation. However, based on 
the participants’ comments, it seems that the debate and the claims made about the 
efficacy of traditional approaches and societal resources, as well as local institutions 
that are to be used for the resolution of conflict or peacebuilding, are overstated. 
Conversely, the international approaches to address post-conflict situations in Africa 
have always failed to address the context-specific justice and reconciliation needs 
of the local people. This is due to failure to recognize and incorporate local practices 
in their intervention strategies; something that needs to be addressed if 
complementarity is to be realized. The following Chapter will make a summary of the 
findings, core arguments, implications of the study and general conclusion. 
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Chapter Seven 
General Conclusion 
7.0 Introduction: 
What is the potential usefulness of local South Sudanese approaches to the 
resolution of current-day conflicts in the country? In recent years, there have been 
many assumptions around the answer to this question: from pinning all hopes for 
conflict resolution on ‘customary’ mechanisms, to discussions of ‘hybrid’ solutions, 
or expressions of the futility or ineffectiveness of older local justice in the face of 
modern technological warfare and the form and scales of political conflict. This thesis 
has sought to better understand the relevance, potential and role local approaches 
can play in resolving modern conflicts in South Sudan. It focused on post-conflict 
justice and reconciliation as practiced by Dinka and Nuer ethnic communities. The 
study aimed not to solve South Sudanese problem but to provide an understanding 
of issues surrounding conflict resolution in the country by exploring the possible role 
local peacebuilding procedures could or could not play in global peace efforts and in 
current and future attempts to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses and to 
reconcile divided communities in the aftermath of South Sudan’s long civil wars.   
7.1 The core arguments of the study 
This thesis is based on comparative analysis of historical and anthropological 
secondary data; contemporary research on South Sudan’s conflicts; contemporary 
literature and theory on justice and peacebuilding; and primary research in South 
Sudan via a series of in-depth open interviews. As well as interviewing traditional 
authorities, I explored the opinions of other stakeholders, both local and 
international, including the UN and other international and regional partners, about 
the relevance of applying local methods to the current conflict in South Sudan. 
I employed social constructionist and interpretivist procedures and relied on a 
thematic analysis. From the interpretivist perspective, local approaches are social 
constructions that are lived by the people who have experienced local conflict 
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dynamics and so the meaning that is interpreted as knowledge resides with the 
people’s opinions, perceptions and experiences. In this analytical process, research 
participants’ comments both confirmed and contradicted some of the claims of the 
liberal peace critics.  
This thesis has set out several key arguments. Firstly, it critiques the dominant liberal 
peace approach to post-conflict peacebuilding, acknowledging its strengths and 
exposed its limitations by examining two peace agreements that followed its model: 
the 2005 Sudan CPA and the 2015 ARCSS. I analysed the transitional justice 
policies provided in the agreements and their efficacy to deal with or fail to deal with 
the legacy of the wars. I examined the claim of the liberal peace critics that the local 
mechanisms and justice systems, as opposed to international legal institutions such 
as the ICC and ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, were relevant to 
societies that rely on other philosophies and world views such as the African Ubuntu 
principle based on communitarian rather than individual logic. The focus of Ubuntu 
is on the rebuilding of the broken relationships of peaceful coexistence based on 
restorative justice, instead of punitive measures informed by retributive justice which 
often polarizes communities instead of reconciling them in the aftermath of violent 
conflict.  
The thesis then turned to a critique of the African ideology of peace represented by 
the Ubuntu principle. This was necessary to arrive at a reasoned and balanced 
approach that would capture the benefits of both beliefs by analysing their 
weaknesses and strengths for possible complementarity and hybridity in 
peacebuilding. It was also important because initially, and before going to the field, 
I concurred with most critiques of liberal peace theory. But the thesis’ overall finding 
contradicted my initial understanding that local approaches are an antidote or 
alternative to liberal peacebuilding techniques, mainly employed by the UN and 
international agencies. My field research experience and analysis of the participants’ 
comments revealed different views regarding the role of local institutions and 
mechanisms in South Sudan in civil war situations. Lack of appreciation of these 
views, I felt, would be a major drawback to any understanding and analysis of the 
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role these mechanisms could or could not play in resolving modern conflicts and in 
dealing with post-conflict justice and reconciliation. Thus, on this basis it is vital to 
any discussions on methods of peacebuilding and reconciliation in South Sudan and 
elsewhere to be built not on stark theoretical view but on the more complex analysis 
of the complementarity and interconnectivity of concepts and practices. 
Thus, the central finding of this study is that claims made about the efficacy of local 
strategies and societal resources (not to mention the local institutions that are to be 
used for the resolution of conflict or peacebuilding) are overstated. The limitations 
out-weigh the so-called strengths attributed to the mechanisms and resources. As 
discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the power of these mechanisms has been 
weakened by several factors both external and internal. These current weaknesses 
seem to pose numerous challenges in applying these ‘customary’ mechanisms to 
contemporary conflicts and transitional justice in post-war societies. Nevertheless, 
the evidence shows that local institutions for peacemaking and justice mechanisms 
are still widely used in South Sudan. Opportunities still exist at both the theoretical 
and practical levels: culture being non-static and a social construction means that 
the procedures can be reformed by adopting new and progressive values from other 
practices. 
Conversely, the international approaches to address post-conflict situations in Africa, 
such as the ICC and the international tribunals, have systematically failed to address 
the context-specific justice and reconciliation needs of the local people. However, 
there are possibilities for the fusion and complementarity of interventions in dealing 
with past human rights violations and efforts to bring about reconciliation. The 
efficacy of both approaches in dealing with modern conflicts seems to reside in 
complementarity. This means a one-size-fits-all programme, whether this is 
prescribed by the liberal or the local approach, is inappropriate to internal wars. The 
evidence for this is to be found in Dinka and Nuer experience in the 1990s during 
the South Sudan liberation war, as exemplified by the 1999 Wunlit peace and 
reconciliation conference. The convergence of traditional strategies, the gospel 
values and the modern peacebuilding techniques (discussed in chapters four and 
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five and employed in Wunlit) showed hybridity as well as pragmatic complementarity 
in action. The extent to which such a procedure can be used to address the issue of 
post-war peacebuilding in South Sudan should be determined by the context rather 
than by the imposition of a universal template.  
Based on the conflict analysis, peace agreements and international efforts at 
peacebuilding in South Sudan, it seems that the role of grassroots strategies is 
crucial if the fundamental causes of internal conflicts and the building of sustainable 
peace are to be successfully addressed. The study established that traditional 
mechanisms were not incorporated and applied in the two peace processes and final 
agreements that settled the 1983-2005 war and the ongoing post-independence 
conflicts. Nonetheless, it uncovered the role and contributions of local mechanisms 
before and during the years of war. The survey has also shown how the failure to 
employ local strategies to address community grievances and to deal with past 
human rights abuses, in favour of the dominant liberal peacebuilding model, is 
significantly responsible for the persistence of hostilities in South Sudan. In many 
respects, this model may be fit for purpose, but it seems that on its own, it is unequal 
to the task of building sustainable peace in South Sudan.  
The conflict in South Sudan is so complex that it has attracted various actors with 
different interests; where local conflicts, grievances, cattle-raiding economies and 
loss of livelihoods (through war or climate change) all feed into a hybrid conflict 
situation, and wider societal crises that must be resolved, not just the immediate 
political power sharing and temporary political reconciliation between elites.  The 
practical implication of this study shows that, for the liberal peacebuilding model to 
address the root causes of internal conflicts and build sustainable peace, local 
strategies could provide a significant complementary contribution, since justice, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, entails more than simple retribution.  
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7.2 Wider Implications 
This study has important implications for South Sudan in a practical sense and in 
terms of outside interventions; but this is not just about South Sudan. There are also 
wider implications in practice, theoretical considerations, and ongoing armed 
encounters in Africa and other parts of the world. For example, there is certainly a 
resemblance to ongoing hostilities in the Congo which are preoccupying the ICC. 
The DRC has been involved in multiple civil wars since its independence in 1960. 
Over the years and at different moments under different leaders, these 
confrontations, which have been characterized by gross human rights violations, 
have assumed a regional dimension with the involvement of such countries as 
Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan and Eritrea. These foreign actors 
sometimes fought alongside local people. But some of the disputes are themselves 
local, involving local ethnic groups and tribes. This has made the conflict hybrid in 
nature as the actors pursue different goals and interests within the same territory 
and conflict. 
For many years, efforts to resolve the conflict and build sustainable peace have not 
so far worked. Equally, transitional justice mechanisms both judicial and non-judicial 
provided in the different peace agreements that attempted to resolve the conflicts 
have faced serious challenges. Like the Hybrid Court provided in the recent South 
Sudan peace agreement, the current mechanism in the DRC is the Specialized 
Mixed Chambers which involves international and national magistrates to deal with 
crimes committed since 2003. Operating in tandem with this mechanism is an effort 
to reinforce the national judicial system, mainly to deal with crimes committed after 
2003. The ICC’s role in this mix is to prosecute those with high responsibility, while 
other national and foreign groups who committed atrocity crimes during the civil war 
are handled by the national system supported by the UN through a group of 
magistrates based in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)240 known as the ‘Prosecution 
Support Cell’, the main UN project in the DRC.  
At the local level, there is a joint effort by traditional and religious leaders.  This is 
the main framework for reconciliation in the DRC but lacks adequate support from 
both the government and the international organizations; so, its exertions and results 
have not been impressive. The lack of support for local action may be because the 
ICC, for example, has taken centre stage in dealing with the past human rights 
violations in the DRC. Preoccupation with the ICC may have overshadowed other 
efforts such as those championed by the church and the local institutions. A hybrid 
model might be better because, as I discussed in Chapter Two, modern African 
conflicts are civil wars which attract and involve different actors from different societal 
levels and sometimes neighbouring countries with different interests such as that in 
the DRC. This means that addressing such conflicts requires not only the 
cooperation of these actors but also the application of the relevant mechanisms that 
address the feelings of these groups and appeal to their holistic needs: political, 
economic, spiritual and psycho-social among others. The reconciling of victims and 
perpetrators and their communities and the ritual reintegration of offenders into 
society for the purposes of peaceful coexistence is at the heart of the ubuntu 
principle, which the ICC does not provide. 
This study highlights the importance of local specificity and context in any analysis, 
rendering wide comparisons somewhat redundant beyond a broad lens. This is a 
draw back in determining implications in other places. However, as I mentioned in 
Chapter Four, conflict resolution and reconciliation in South Sudan and throughout 
Africa revolves around mediation, arbitration, compensation and reconciliation 
rituals. And as underpinned by the African philosophy of common humanity 
                                                     
240 An acronym based on its French name: Mission de l’ Organisation des Nations unies pour les stabilisation 
en Republique democratique du Congo, a United Nations peacekeeping force in the DRC. 
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exemplified by the ubuntu vision, they only vary in application. Moreover, lessons 
can be learned from the experiences of other communities.  
This thesis evidences, and emphasizes, the importance of creating hybridized and 
historically-contextualized intervention policies, involving traditional strategies. This 
issue of combining local and international processes involves points of serious 
disagreement. I have discussed these contentions in Chapter Six: they include 
tensions between local practices and international human rights and humanitarian 
law; retributive versus restorative justice systems, for example, the granting of 
amnesty for atrocity crimes that goes contrary to universalist norms. The question 
is: are Nuer and Dinka transitional justice systems effective, and/or can they be 
incorporated into international initiatives? In Chapter Five I discussed the norms that 
are associated with identity, justice, compensation and reparations; and the ideas of 
Nuer and Dinka restorative justice, their convergences and divergences and how 
both differ and converge with those of the international community. 
The key proposals which come from liberal international thinking, as discussed in 
Chapter Six, are that certain crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity require punitive action for deterrence and as a guarantee of non-
repetition; and that trials are also important to ensure citizens’ trust in the judicial 
system. The long-term benefit of these standards is that they engender respect for 
the rule of law and human rights, including through state institutional reforms 
necessary in periods of transition from civil war to democracy. But serious tensions 
exist between these global liberal norms and customary standards, with little room 
for manoeuvre. So far there is an impasse whereby the liberal international legal 
framework controls the agenda and dominates the discourse. No matter how much 
scholars and practitioners insist that we need to address ourselves to the local, this 
has not really happened at policy level, which suggests a poor environment for 
complementarity. As discussed in Chapter Six regarding the roles of the Truth 
Commissions, Hybrid Courts and Reparations and Compensations, possibilities for 
overlap do exist. But the more important question is: are these people speaking the 
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same language? It is likely that further work and research is needed to determine 
how far, and how, these entities can converge. 
The underlying political and economic philosophy underpinning the liberal approach 
to the post-conflict environment is the assumption and discourse about entering the 
post-conflict situation to democratize it, implement a rule-of-law revision or 
constitutional reform, promote respect for human rights, and attend to some aspects 
of state building, rebuilding and reforming the police, civil society and state-society 
relations.  While these are the post-war peacebuilding intervention activities for the 
reformists, they do not translate into peacebuilding and the reconciling of the bitterly 
divided communities, as the process lacks consultation and an engagement with the 
local representatives before intervention. This means that one of the elements of 
being successful in peacebuilding is that of working with and through the local culture 
and society which serve as an example of complementarity in peacebuilding. The 
critique of liberal peace concerns the reforming of the intervention practices in order 
to recognize, incorporate and take on board local relevance prior to intervening. The 
argument goes that before entering the post-conflict zone the actors should consult 
with the conflict-affected communities and get their views as to how the issues 
should be addressed. The failure of liberal peacebuilding to recognize local 
resources and mechanisms has implications for practical participation when war 
ends. Sticking to the dominant discourse and meta-narrative and ticking boxes about 
what to do in a post-war situation without involving local resources tends to block 
constructive engagement with the local agencies for possible complementarity.  
But not all liberal peacebuilding activities in post-conflict situations are problematic 
and irrelevant to local contexts. There are values promoted by the liberal 
peacemakers that are good such as advocacy for the protection of human rights 
though that depends on definition of human rights; political participation at various 
levels of society to ensure that separate groups feel represented as part and parcel 
of the larger society; security and the rule of law as a means of establishing order 
and protecting the most vulnerable in the society by ending impunity from 
punishment. This means that the liberal peace agenda, when undertaken in a 
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complimentary way, could lead to positive results. Human rights advocacy, for 
example, which is generally associated with liberal peace agenda, and promoted by 
liberal peace agents, when implemented through existing local structures could 
change societal perceptions and empower vulnerable members of the community. 
This could play a key role in emancipating certain groups from cultural forms of 
injustice. As discussed in chapter five, some women participants commented on the 
unequal treatment of women and girls in Dinka society especially regarding, for 
example, unequal opportunities in education and ownership of property such as land 
and livestock. This suggests that there are situations where liberal values such as 
human rights, are consistent with the needs of the community in terms of equality of 
treatment, political participation, socio-economic rights and freedom from 
institutionalized exclusion by chiefs and councils of elders.  
There are some key points of convergence highlighted by this thesis. There is 
evidence of cooperation between local and international peacebuilding agencies (for 
example, as discussed in Chapter Six), and support to chiefs’ meetings and 
reconciliation events by international bodies such as the UNDP and UNMISS. 
Findings on complementarity such as these are significant because they contradict 
the liberal peace critiques and assertions on the failure of liberal peacebuilding to 
recognize local mechanisms. But this cooperation and support does not amount to 
incorporating these local procedures in their programming and intervention policy. 
Moreover, the international bodies, as agents of the liberal peace agenda, cannot 
promote culturally-based justice mechanisms which, according to the universalist 
view, tend to be non-progressive and sometimes contradict human rights principles. 
Although some participants from the international community whom I interviewed 
recognized the relevance and potential utility of traditional procedures, I found no 
evidence to support their claim in terms of practical intervention by incorporating and 
utilizing local resources.  
I examined whether it was purely rhetorical that they realized the possible relevance 
of indigenous methods for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. I established such 
was not the case, there are some efforts and engagements with local authorities. 
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But these efforts may not translate into any attempt to incorporate local approaches 
to transitional justice, as the dominant liberal peace procedure continues to be used 
even if it does not agree with the African world view, such as Ubuntu. But it 
demonstrates something positive which confirms and reinforces the upsurge of 
interest in local turn in the fields of development and peacebuilding. Important to 
note is that local approaches and liberal peace elements, such as the international 
human rights and humanitarian laws, are socially constructed. This means it is 
possible to construct and reconstruct them for complementarity, drawing on both 
philosophies when dealing with the legacies of civil wars.   
7.3 Further research 
This thesis has highlighted many areas of further research within the core issues 
and findings of this study. Firstly, one of the main contributions of this study to 
peacebuilding literature is the discourse on the spiritual dimension of conflict, peace 
and reconciliation with the spirits of the dead, which remains an under-researched 
area. The spiritual realm of peace and conflict has not been adequately explored by 
Peace Studies. The general trend in Peace Studies is to analyse cause and effect 
based on the material world. However, in some cultural contexts, such as those of 
Dinka and Nuer communities, cause and effect goes beyond the material world into 
the realm of the spirits. Thus, the analysis of cultural practices such as witchcraft, 
cursing, oath-swearing and violations as offences that not only harm the living but 
also offend the living-dead (ancestors) are an important aspect of the spiritual 
dimension of local procedures. This is very important in understanding the practice 
of reconciliation with the dead. 
Second, another area of future research would be to further study, analyse, 
document and compile all the local peace agreements within the context of civil war 
in South Sudan, and the local peacebuilding mechanisms employed, especially 
those that were conducted since 1991. There have been several local reconciliation 
initiatives in South Sudan such as the Akobo and the Wunlit peace conferences. 
Documenting and analysing these strategies would provide a greater understanding 
of the potential and the limits of local approaches to modern conflicts.  
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Thirdly is the area of gender and local peacebuilding, especially the gendered 
approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation. Without the civic engagement and 
political participation of both men and women, it would be difficult for peacebuilding 
to address historical, systemic and structural factors of women’s exclusion and 
gender inequalities, including agency and rights. The main trend in Peace Studies 
has been to analyse gender in terms of role and activities, but a gender-oriented 
approach to local theories of peacebuilding and transitional justice would inform 
theory and enrich literature.   
Fourthly, this study acknowledged the limitations of native techniques because of 
internal and external influences and, based on my discussion in Chapter Six, local 
strategies deserve further attention as a complimentary method to achieving justice 
and positive peace. These approaches could benefit from more empirical research 
and theoretical considerations for a better understanding of their potential and 
possible application to modern conflicts. The interplay between politics, history and 
anthropology provides possible routes for investigation. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a study. This sheet provides some information 
to help you to decide whether you wish to take part in this research. Your 
participation is strictly voluntary, and won't receive any financial benefit in return. 
Furthermore, no potential harm or risk is anticipated. Before you decide if you wish 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Thank you for reading this. 
Who will conduct the research? 
Martin Ochaya Lino Agwella, PhD student University of Bradford, UK 
Title of the Research 
Localizing Peacebuilding in South Sudan? A case of transitional justice and 
reconciliation 
What is the purpose of the research? 
In this study, I am interested in and will explore the potential utility of local 
peacemaking approaches to contemporary armed conflicts; and to determine the 
extent to which the justice and reconciliation mechanisms used by the Dinka and the 
Nuer in South Sudan can be applied to the conflicts in South Sudan to build 
sustainable peace. 
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Who can take part? 
Traditional Authorities (Elders & chiefs), government staff, UN staff, IGAD Mediators, 
civil society groups (Professionals, experts, Peacebuilding practitioners, Faith 
based, Development corporation partners), women & youth. 
Why have I been chosen? 
I chose you to participate in this study because you are a chief/an elder/ a 
professional/an expert/a civil society actor/ peacebuilding practitioner/UN staff/IGAD 
Mediator/ of your position and role in the government. 
What will the study involve? 
If you decide to take part in this study, I will ask you to answer some questions. The 
discussions will take about 45 minutes to one hour at the longest. There are also 
questions on your age, sex and level of education, because these factors can 
influence social behaviour and attitudes.  
What will happen to the data collected? 
All the information you give me will be confidential and used only for this study. It will 
be securely stored in my University of Bradford drive and only destroyed after 
completion of the study, guided by the data protection policy of the University. 
How is confidentiality maintained? 
The information given will not be made available to anyone not directly involved with 
the study. This is to protect the privacy of participants. However, names of the 
participants will/can be written on the study materials, that is including the interview 
guides. The interview guides will be kept by the researcher and nobody else will be 
allowed access to them. Anonymity may also be offered on request.  
Ethics approval has been granted by the Chair of Humanities, Social and Health 
Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 18th December 
2015.  
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What will happen if I don’t want to take part or if I change my decision? 
You are free to decide to take part. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to 
sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself. 
Will the outcomes of the research be published? 
The outcome of the research will be submitted to the University of Bradford for 
academic purpose and award of a Doctoral degree. 
 
Contact for further information 
Dr.  David Harris 
Email: d.harris7@bradford.ac.uk  
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Appendix 2: Consent form 
 
Research Title:  
Localising Peacebuilding in South Sudan? A Case of Transitional Justice and 
Reconciliation 
Aim of the Research:  
To explore the potential utility of local approaches to the resolution of contemporary 
armed conflicts; and to determine the extent to which the justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms used by the Dinka and the Nuer in South Sudan can be applied to the 
conflicts in South Sudan to build sustainable peace.  
Ethics approval has been granted by the Chair of Humanities, Social and Health 
Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 18th December 
2015. 
Consent: 
I have read and understood the attached information sheet giving details of the 
research project. I have had the opportunity to ask the researcher questions that I 
had about the project and my involvement in it and understand my role in the project. 
My decision to consent is entirely voluntary and I understand that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. I understand that data gathered in this 
project will be for research purposes and I understand that my name will not be used 
in the report, and that every effort will be made to protect my confidentiality. I agree 
to take part in the study. 
Participant’s name…………............Date…………………............Signature............. 
Researcher’s…………….................Date……………………........ Signature........... 
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Appendix 3: Data collection Instruments 
 
 
Interview Guide 
 
 
Section One: 
 
Part One: Concept & Practice of Justice and Reconciliation in Dinka/ 
Nuer community 
 
a) Concept and aims of Justice  
 
1. When we talk about justice in Dinka/Nuer language, what do we mean?  
2. What was the main aim of indigenous justice? 
3. How many types of justice are there in Dinka/Nuer culture? 
4. Who were the most important people to administer justice? 
5. What did they do? 
6. What happened afterwards (colonial period; 1956-1982; 1983-2015) 
7. How did Dinka/Nuer call indigenous justice process? 
a)  Customary Law  
8. What were the sources of customary law? 
9. Who were the law makers? 
10. How important was human life in Dinka/Nuer culture? 
11.  How did indigenous justice work in tragic cases where many people have 
suffered violent deaths? 
12. What happened afterwards (colonial period; 1956-1982; 1983-2015) 
b)   The legacy of impunity  
13. Were there occasions where offenders sometimes went unpunished? 
14.  In situations where offenders went unpunished how did people react? 
15. What happened afterwards (colonial period; 1956-1982; 1983-2015) 
16. What do you think should be done to address situations where people 
commit crimes and go unpunished? 
c)  Justice Mechanisms used by the Dinka/Nuer 
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17. How did the local justice and accountability work in cases of violent conflicts 
where many people have suffered deaths? 
18. What are examples of justice that have been implemented at different points 
in the past (colonial period to 1956; post interdependence 1956-1982 and 
1983-2015?  
19. What were the outcomes of the implemented programmes? 
20. Are there records of major practices that you can show? 
21. What political environments existed at each point of the history, which 
supported or not the implementation of those programmes? 
22. What has been happening in recent years 2005-2015 in terms of transitional 
justice and reconciliation? 
23. What effects did colonialism have on local justice system? 
24. What changes have the process of interactions with the outside world have 
on indigenous justice system?  
25. What do you think about Dinka/Nuer local justice and reconciliation practices 
being used in the context of war? 
26. Are there variations in practice of justice and reconciliation among the 
different Dinka/Nuer clans/regions? 
27. What commonalities can we draw between the Dinka/Nuer local justice and 
reconciliation practices? 
 
d) Actors: Chiefs and their roles 
 
28. What were the main requirements for becoming a chief? 
29. What did chiefs do? 
30. Have there been changes in the roles of chiefs over the years? 
31. How can chiefs help in the resolution of modern conflicts in South Sudan? 
e) Concept and aims of reconciliation 
32. When we talk about reconciliation in Dinka/Nuer what do we mean?  
33.  What was the main aim of reconciliation? 
34. How did reconciliation work? 
35. Are there any differences in the way reconciliation currently works?  
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36. How did Dinka/Nuer call local reconciliation process? 
37. What were the local rituals of reconciliation in cases of violent conflict where 
many people have suffered deaths/ 
38. What are examples of reconciliation that have been implemented at different 
timeframe in the past (colonial period to 1956; post interdependence 1956-
1982 and 1983-2005?  
39. What were the outcomes of the implemented programmes? 
40. What political environments existed at each point of the history, which 
supported or not the implementation of those programmes? 
41. Was there any local reconciliation ritual used in cases of war related rape? 
42. Do you think similar rituals can be applied in civil war situations? 
43. What has been happening in recent years 2005-2015 in terms of 
reconciliation? 
f) Actors:  Elders & their roles 
 
44. Who were the most important people to manage reconciliation? 
45. Were elders important for the peacemaking process? 
46. What did elders do in local reconciliation? 
47. What were the requirements for becoming an elder? 
48. How can elders help to reconcile people in civil war situations? 
 
Part Two: Gender and local mechanisms of Justice and Reconciliation 
1. What was the role of women in local justice and reconciliation? 
2. Were there female chiefs? 
3. Were women members of the council of elders? 
4. What role do women play today? 
 
Part Three: Potential and limitations of local approaches  
 
Strengths               
 
1. What do you think are the strengths of local approaches? 
2. What types of conflict are settled by local mechanisms 
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3. Do you think local processes capable of dealing with large-scale atrocities 
where many people have suffered violent deaths? 
4. What capabilities and comparative advantages relative to other methods do 
you think local approaches have for more effective peacebuilding in civil war 
situations? 
5. What do you think about the Dinka/Nuer local justice and reconciliation 
practices being used in the context of the modern war in South Sudan? 
6. What other local practices which are/might be used for war offences? 
Weaknesses 
7. What are the weaknesses of local approaches? 
8. What do you think can be done to mitigate the weaknesses to raise the scale 
of the mechanisms to be applied to modern conflicts? 
9. How was the Dinka/Nuer society organized prior to colonialization? 
10. What effects did colonialism have on the local mechanisms of justice and 
reconciliation? 
11. Do you think the rise of religious (Christian & Muslim) institutions and practices 
have undermined Dinka/Nuer local institutions and practices? 
12. What challenges do you foresee arising from implementing these practices 
today? 
13. Do you think contacts with other cultures have had influence on and caused 
some changes in local peacemaking institutions and approaches? 
14. How can local approaches be adapted to suit contemporary environments and 
conflicts? 
Section Two 
  
Part Four: Causes and impacts of armed conflicts in South Sudan 
 
1. There have been increased inter-communal conflicts in South Sudan before 
and after its independence; what do you think are the causes?  
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2. South Sudan got its independence in 2011; why do you think the country 
relapsed into violent conflict just two years after its independence? 
3. The conflict which erupted in 2013 equally targeted civilians, particularly 
vulnerable groups (women, children, the sick and elderly) why do you think 
that happened? 
4. What do you think can be done to reconcile the communities?  
Part Five: Human rights violations & transitional justice policies in South 
Sudan 
1. What do you say about the respect of human rights’ principles in South 
Sudan? 
2. What is the role of South Sudan human rights commission? 
3. What is your opinion about the performance of the commission regarding 
defence and promotion of human rights? 
4. Do you think violators of human rights sometimes go unpunished? 
5. What transitional justice policies could be adopted in the case of South Sudan 
conflict? 
6. The Compromise Peace Agreement for the resolution of the conflict in South 
Sudan provides for a hybrid court, what do you think about that? 
7. South Sudan is a diverse society with diverse traditions of justice. Which local 
justice mechanisms are intended to be applied alongside formal justice 
system in the hybrid court?  
8. What lessons do you think South Sudan can borrow from other African 
countries in terms of local peacemaking in post-conflict situations? 
9. In Rwanda where there was a mix of justice processes (international, national 
and local), it was reported that the relationship was characterized by 
suspicion, friction and sometimes incompetence rather than by productive 
cooperation. How do you think the case of South Sudan will be different? 
10. What kinds of institutional reforms do you think South Sudan needs 
(governance, economic, legal and security) sectors? 
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Part Six: Peacebuilding in South Sudan 
 
a) Role of Government 
 
 
1. Can you tell me about some of your peacebuilding projects? 
2. Where do you see there are successes/ weaknesses? 
3. Who are the key peacebuilding actors in South Sudan? 
4. What is the role of South Sudan peace commission? 
5. What peacemaking roles does the government expect indigenous authorities 
(chiefs & elders) to play regarding Justice and reconciliation? 
6. What role did local authorities play during the implementation of the CPA? 
7. What legal powers does South Sudan constitution provide to Chiefs in terms 
of administering customary law/justice? 
8. What do you think should have been done to build sustainable peace in South 
Sudan after the signing of the CPA, 2005? 
9. Which lessons have been learnt from the previous (post CPA) peacebuilding 
in terms of justice and reconciliation? 
10. After the signing of the Compromise Peace Agreement in August 2015, what 
are the government’s key peacebuilding priorities? 
11. What does the government expect the civil society/faith based to do? 
12. What does the government expect the UN/international community to do? 
 
b) Role of the United Nations (UN)/ international community  
 
 
1. Can you tell me about some of your peacebuilding projects in South Sudan? 
2. Where do you see there are successes/ weaknesses? 
3. What kind of training does the UN provide to build the capacity of local actors? 
4. What are challenges the UN faces in peacebuilding in South Sudan? 
5. What do you think is the potential of local justice and reconciliation 
approaches to the resolution of modern conflicts? 
6. What contributions do you think chiefs and elders can make in the 
implementation of the South Sudan Compromise Peace Agreement? 
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7. What do you think should have been done to build sustainable peace in South 
Sudan after the signing of the CPA, 2005? 
8. Which lessons have been learnt from the previous (post CPA) peacebuilding 
in terms of justice and reconciliation? 
9. After the signing of the Compromise Peace Agreement in August 2015, what 
do you think should be the government’s key peacebuilding priorities? 
 
c) Role of Civil society  
 
1. Can you tell me about some of your peacebuilding projects in South Sudan? 
2. Where do you see there are successes/ weaknesses? 
3. What methods did/do you use? 
4. Who are the key peacebuilding actors in South Sudan? 
5. What peacebuilding roles do you think local authorities can play in a post-
conflict setting? 
6. What peacebuilding relations exist between local institutions and actors and 
other civil society organizations? 
7. What contributions do you think chiefs and elders can make in the 
implementation of the South Sudan Compromise Peace Agreement? 
8. What legal powers does South Sudan constitution provide to Chiefs in terms 
of administering justice/customary law? 
9. Which lessons have been learnt from the previous (post CPA) peacebuilding 
in terms of justice and reconciliation? 
10. After the signing of the Compromise Peace Agreement in August 2015, what 
do you think should be the government’s key peacebuilding priorities? 
11. What do you think the Un/internationals should do to build peace in South 
Sudan? 
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Appendix 4: List of interviews 
S/N Interview Code & Dates Gender Locations 
1 KI 1: 20/1/2016 Male Nairobi 
2 KI 2: 23/1/2016 Male IDP/PoCs- Juba 
3 KI 3: 25/2/2016 Male Juba 
4 KI 4: 5/3/2016 Male Juba 
5 KI 5: 27/1/2016 Male Nairobi-Kenya 
6 KI 6: 4/2/2016 Male Juba 
7 KI 15: 18/6/2016 Male Uganda 
8 KI 29: 19/2/2016 Female Agok/Abyei 
9 KI 26:14/3/2016 Male Juba 
10 KI 16: 19/6/2016 Male Juba 
11 KI 34: 14/3/2016 Female Juba 
12 KI 18: 11/3/2016 Male Juba 
13 KI 25: 27/2/2016 Male Juba 
14 KI 7: 4/2/2016 Male Juba 
15 KI 31:10/2/16 Male Wau 
16 KI 27: 7/3/16 Male Juba 
17 KI 30: 9/3/16 Male Juba 
18 KI 41:17/11/16 Female South Africa 
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19 KI 42: 2/12/16 Male South Africa 
20 KI 13: 8/1/2016 Male Juba 
21 KI 3:27/2/16 Male IDP/PoCs -Juba 
22 KI 16:19/6/16 Male Mayen Abun 
23 KI 10: 7/2/16 Male Juba 
24 KI 4: 5/3/2016 Female Juba 
25 KI 5: 20/2/2016 Female Agok/Abyei 
26 KI 24:2/3/2016 Female Juba 
27 KI 40: 15/6/2016 Female Wau 
28 KI 6: 4/2/2016 Female  
29 KI 29:19/2/2016 Female Agok/Abyei 
30 KI 9: 7/2/2016 Male Juba 
31 (KI 12:12/2/2016 Male UK 
32 KI 14: 19/2/2016 Male Abyei 
33 KI 38: 16/3/2016 Female Juba 
34 KI 28: 14/3/2016 Male  
35 KI 21: 22/6/2016 Male IDP/PoCs/Juba 
36 KI 13: 4/2/2016 Male Juba 
37 KI 17: 12/2/2016 Male  
38 KI 39: 16/3/2016 Male Juba 
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39 KI 22: 20/2/2016 Female Mayen Abun 
40 KI 32: 15/3/2016 Male Juba 
41 KI 33: 22/2/2016 Male Wau 
42 KI 34: 14/3/2016 Female Juba 
43 KI:35: 8/3/2016 Female Juba 
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Appendix 5: Thesis Planner 2014-2018 
WORK PLAN FOR PHD STUDY 
 2014-2018 
Activity Location  
J 
A 
N 
F 
E 
B 
M 
A 
R 
A 
P 
R 
M 
A 
Y 
J 
U 
N 
J 
U 
L 
A 
U 
G 
S 
E 
P 
O 
C 
T 
N 
O 
V 
D 
E 
C 
                            
2014 
Graduate School: Modules 2 & 
4 second semester Bradford  x  x x  x  x               
Study trip to Northern Ireland 
Northern 
Ireland     x        
Annual Progress Report  Bradford          x             
Research proposal first draft  Bradford          x               
Research proposal second draft Bradford      x       
Vacation 
South 
Sudan       x      
Tentative table of content draft Bradford        x     
Conference Oxford      x     x  
Conference Manchester         x    
Conference  
 Nairobi                x    
Conference Durham           x X 
Graduate School Modules 1 & 3 
first semester Bradford          x x X 
2015 
End of Graduate School 
Modules1 & 3 Bradford  x                    
Writing up & submission of 
research proposal (module 5) 
 Bradford   x x x  x  x       
Writing up & submission of 
research paper module 6  Bradford     x x  x       
Presentation of Module 6 Bradford       x            
First monitoring Bradford       x            
Literature review Chap 2 draft & 
submission  Bradford  x x x x x x x     
Second monitoring meeting Bradford         x    
Vacation 
South 
Sudan       x      
Ethics application & clearance 
process  Bradford          x       
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Chapter 1 draft submission Bradford           x  
Chapter 2 draft submission  Bradford                      x 
Corrections of chapters 1 & 2 
seen by the supervisor Bradford           x x 
2016 
Field work 
South 
Sudan   x  x x   x x   x             
Conferences 
Durham 
        x    
Adam Curle Symposium 
Bradford 
        x    
Data Analysis & writing 
Bradford 
            x x x x   
Conference 
Leeds 
         x     
Data Analysis & writing 
Bradford 
             x  x  x  x   
Transitional Justice Fellowship 
in South Africa (Institute for 
Justice and Reconciliation)-IJR 
Cape Town 
          x x 
Transfer to Writing-Up 
Bradford 
           x 
2017 
Submission of draft chapters 
1,2 & 3 Bradford  x                     
Library Fellowship-Sudan 
Archive, University of Durham Durham    x x x       
Submission of draft chapters 4 
& 5 Bradford          x             
Vacation Uganda       x      
Conference 
Oxford 
        x    
Submission of draft chapter 6  
Bradford 
       x     
Submission of first full draft 
Bradford 
               x  
Corrections 
Bradford 
                     x 
2018 
Corrections Bradford  x x                    
Final submission of the thesis Bradford   x          
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Appendix 6: Fieldwork Plan 
Topic: Indigenising Peacebuilding in South Sudan? A Case of Transitional Justice & Reconciliation  
Research questions Objectives Required data I hope to find Respondents Who gives the 
required data 
Who doesn’t 
give the 
required data 
Remarks 
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What is the potential utility of 
indigenous approaches to the 
resolution of modern conflicts in 
South Sudan? 
• Which are the cultural 
institutions of 
peacemaking in South 
Sudan, and what are the 
methods they apply? 
• What examples of justice 
and reconciliation have 
been implemented at 
different points in the 
past (colonial period, 
Sudan’s post- 
independence period 
1956-1982 and during 
the SPLM/A war 1983-
2005) among the 
Dinkas/Nuers? 
• What were the 
outcomes of the 
implemented 
programmes? 
 
 
 To determine the relevance and 
potential usefulness of indigenous 
mechanisms to modern conflicts in 
South Sudan. 
To identify indigenous peacemaking 
institutions and the methods they 
use in South Sudan 
 
To find out examples of justice and 
reconciliation that have been 
implemented at different historical 
periods. 
 
 
 
To find out the outcomes of the 
implemented programme 
 
 
 
I will need data which are 
qualitative in nature. I hope to 
obtain them from participants’ 
views, opinions, perceptions, 
personal and experiences about 
indigenous mechanisms of 
peacebuilding. 
Direct observation will also help 
me to understand nonverbal 
information as they surface 
during the study. 
Data will also come from the 
analysis of documents; 
government’s publications, early 
research, dissertations, journal 
articles, books and Maps among 
others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I propose a sample size of 
30 -35 participants who are 
comprised of the following 
categories: Indigenous 
authorities (Dinka & Nuer 
chiefs and elders), staff 
from government’s 
peacebuilding institutions; 
UN staff, IGAD mediators; 
civil society groups, faith 
based, experts, academics, 
Development Corporation 
partners, women and 
youth 
 
 
 
 
Chiefs & elders, 
women, civil society, 
govt. academics & 
experts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN and 
international 
partners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally, all the 
selected research 
participants will 
provide the required 
data. However, 
some questions will 
be better answered 
by certain categories 
of participants. For 
example, questions 
that pertain to the 
inner working of 
indigenous 
mechanisms are 
better answered by 
traditional 
authorities. 
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• What has been 
happening in terms of 
justice and reconciliation 
from 2005-2015? 
 
 
• What roles have 
traditional leaders 
played in administering 
justice and reconciliation 
after violent conflicts? 
 
• Are these roles still 
capable of serving the 
same purposes they once 
did? 
 
 
• Who are the key 
peacebuilding 
institutions and actors, 
their roles and the 
methods 
 
 
• What are the aims and 
benefits of indigenous 
peacemaking 
approaches? 
To ascertain any local justice and 
reconciliation efforts that have been 
carried out between 2005-2015 
 
To find out the roles traditional 
authorities have played in local 
settings in administering justice and 
reconciliation after violent conflicts 
 
To determine whether these roles 
are still capable of serving the same 
purpose they once did. 
 
To identify key indigenous 
peacebuilding institutions, actors, 
their roles and the methods they 
use in South Sudan 
 
 
To determine the aims and benefits 
of indigenous peacemaking 
mechanisms 
local mediation initiatives to 
resolve intra and inter-ethnic 
conflict, peace and reconciliation 
conferences 
 
local mediation initiatives and 
intra and inter-ethnic peace and 
reconciliation conferences, 
administering local justice 
 
They still serve their purposes but 
there are many challenges that 
undermine these efforts 
 
The institutions and actors are 
likely to be; Chiefs, council of 
elders, religious authorities, 
Diviners, fortune tellers, 
rainmakers and the methods they 
use are; adjudication, mediation, 
rituals etc   
Presumably they include; 
delivering justice, repair of 
damages caused to human lives 
 
 
 
Traditional 
authorities, govts, 
civil society, NGOs, 
chiefs, women and 
youth, academics, 
UN agencies and 
other international 
partners 
 
 
 
Governments, civil 
society, NGOs, 
chiefs, women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IGAD 
mediators 
and other 
international 
partners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indigenous 
authorities and civil 
society will provide 
the required data as 
main actors in 
constructing those 
institutions and 
from experiences. 
Data will also come 
from government’s 
peacebuilding 
commission and 
ministry of culture. 
Academics and 
experts will provide 
information based 
on empirical 
research evidence. 
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• What types of conflicts 
were settled by 
indigenous methods? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To determine the types and levels of 
conflicts being settled by indigenous 
approaches. 
 
 
 
  
and property (accountability) 
repair of broken relationships, 
fostering peaceful co-existence 
(reconciliation) creating fear in 
offenders (deterrence). 
Participants will tell when these 
occur and other benefits 
prioritized by them.  
I presume they include; Land & 
property conflicts, family and 
marriage disputes, cattle raiding, 
thefts, witchcrafts, sorcery, 
homicide, blood feuds & revenge. 
Again, participants may confirm 
and inform of what they know 
and think.  
 
 
 
Chiefs & elders, 
women, govt, 
academics & experts 
 
 
 
 
 
Chiefs, elders, some 
international 
partners women, 
local civil society, 
academics, experts, 
government and 
some youth 
 
 
 
UN and some 
international 
partners  
At least all the 
selected research 
participants will 
provide data based 
either on their 
experiences, 
knowledge and/or 
their opinions. 
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• What are the root causes 
of the current conflict in 
South Sudan? 
 
 
To find out the immediate and the 
underlying root causes of the 
internal armed conflicts in South 
Sudan. 
 
 
 
 
These may include; Violent power 
struggle among politicians, lack of 
reforms in the army, legal and 
security sectors, failure of the 
government to provide the 
expected services and peace 
dividends, perceived unequal 
distribution of power and 
resources, lack of inclusive 
political participation, alleged 
corruption, tribalism and 
nepotism in public services and 
institutions, unaddressed war 
time grievances among 
communities, 
Proliferations of small arms and 
light weapons in the hands of and 
militarization of civilians, land & 
property disputes, failure of the 
international community to 
properly implement the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA), and Cattle raiding,  
 Governments, civil 
society, NGOs, 
chiefs, women, 
youth UN, IGAD 
mediators, Dev. 
partners Chiefs & 
elders, women, 
academics, experts 
and IGAD mediators 
 
Non At least all the 
selected research 
participants will 
provide data based 
either on their 
experiences, 
knowledge and/or 
their opinions on the 
causes of the 
current conflicts in 
South Sudan. 
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• What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of 
indigenous approaches 
to post-conflict justice 
and reconciliation? 
To identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of indigenous 
peacemaking approaches 
Strengths: 
Inclusive and participatory, open 
& transparent, cost effective, 
restorative in nature, legitimacy & 
ownership by community, leads 
to healing & reconciliation 
Weaknesses: 
Male dominated, limited sphere 
of applicability, contradicts basic 
standards of human rights, 
preservation of status quo, its 
supportive socio-cultural 
environments could be washed 
away by war 
 All the participants Non At least all the 
selected research 
participants will 
provide data based 
either on their 
experiences with 
indigenous 
approaches, 
knowledge and/or 
their opinions on 
their strengths and 
weaknesses 
• What are the indigenous 
justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms used by the 
Dinka and the Nuer? 
To identify the past and current 
indigenous justice and 
reconciliation mechanisms used by 
the Dinka and the Nuer in South 
Sudan after mass atrocities  
Sources of the law: Social & 
cultural values, world view & 
belief systems and importance of 
human life   
Relationships: 
importance of co-existence and 
Community as a structure of 
support and source of identity 
Rituals: Symbolism, cleansing. 
reintegration performances and 
 Dinka &   Nuer 
chiefs, elders and 
women, govt, 
experts and 
academics 
 UN, IGAD 
Mediators 
and other 
international 
partners 
International NGOs 
IGAD mediators and 
the UN are unlikely 
to provide the 
required data as the 
practices are locally 
inspired and are 
constructed and 
administered by 
indigenous 
authorities.  
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to show if there are records of 
major justice & reconciliation 
practices 
Others:  
Apologies, restitution, 
compensation & amnesty 
• To what extent can the 
Dinka and the Nuer 
justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms be applied 
to post conflict 
peacebuilding? 
• Do the dominant 
Western liberal peace 
approaches leave room 
for local versions of 
restitution? 
 
• To what extent were the 
indigenous initiatives 
included in the 
mediation and 
negotiations of the CPA 
and ARCSS? 
 
 To determine the extent to which 
the Dinka and the Nuer indigenous 
justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms can be applied or not 
to the current conflict in South 
Sudan 
To find our whether liberal peace 
model leaves room for local 
versions of restitution. 
More relevant to ethnic, inter-
communal and communal levels 
of the conflicts and possibly civil 
wars with multiple actors 
involved (hybrid violent conflicts), 
and in areas where there is 
absence of state mechanisms. 
Indigenous versions of 
compensation and restitution are 
relegated by the dominant model, 
not recognized and not 
incorporated in peacebuilding 
programming and interventions 
policies. 
The answer is likely to indicated 
lack of inclusion or simply invited 
as observers. 
 Dinka & Nuer chiefs 
& elders, govt, local 
CSOs, academics 
and experts, UN, 
IGAD mediators and 
other international 
partners 
 
 
Non  
 
 
 
 
Indigenous 
authorities, women, 
local CSOs, 
government, 
academics and 
experts, UN IGAD 
mediators and other 
international 
partners will provide 
the needed data 
based on their 
knowledge about 
the mechanisms, 
experiences and 
opinions. 
 301 
12018735 
 
 
• What are the limits of 
indigenous peacemaking 
procedures 
To find out challenges facing 
indigenous peacebuilding in South 
Sudan  
 
The dominance of liberal peace 
model, relegation of the role of 
indigenous approaches, co-option 
by CSOs who are agents of the 
international liberal peace, state 
interference in indigenous justice 
processes, politicization of 
indigenous institutions and 
actors, lack of sufficient empirical 
research to show the 
effectiveness of indigenous 
approaches modern conflicts 
 All the participants Non All the selected 
research 
participants will 
provide the required 
data. However, 
indigenous 
authorities, local 
CSOs, women and 
youth, govt, 
academics and 
experts are well 
placed to provide 
information from 
experiential 
perspectives and 
expert knowledge as 
they understand the 
internal dynamics, 
weaknesses, 
strengths as well as 
the political and 
cultural contexts of 
these approaches  
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• What are stakeholders’ 
perceptions (local and 
international) about the 
application of indigenous 
techniques to 
transitional justice and 
reconciliation? 
 
To determine opinions of 
peacebuilding stakeholders about 
the potential of indigenous 
approaches to transitional justice 
and reconciliation in South Sudan. 
 
Gender insensitive, contradicts 
human rights, rigid and maintains 
status quo, ancient and archaic, 
needs to be codified, slow and 
bias, lack capacity to handle cases 
of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide and thus, 
can’t be applied to modern 
conflicts. 
 
However, some participants are 
likely to talk in favour of it being 
inclusive & participatory, based 
on local resources that people 
understand, restorative, 
legitimate and owned by the 
community and thus, can 
complement the liberal peace 
model in environments of hybrid 
political orders.   
 Some local CSOs, 
some academics and 
experts, some 
women and govt 
staff, International 
CSOs, UN, youth, 
some academics and 
experts, some 
women and govt 
staff. 
 
Traditional 
authorities, some 
government 
officials, women, 
youth and local civil 
society,  
Non The international 
and local NGOs, 
government, 
women and some 
academics, 
professionals and 
experts who 
promote the liberal 
peace model of 
democracy and rule 
of law are unlikely to 
give answers that 
promote indigenous 
approaches. 
However, given the 
recent upsurge of 
interests among 
some academics and 
practitioners in 
promoting 
indigenous 
approaches, it is 
likely some of them 
together with 
indigenous 
authorities and faith 
based groups may 
give favourable 
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answers about the 
relevance and role 
of indigenous 
approaches for 
possible application 
to civil war situation. 
 
  
 
 310 
12018735 
Bibliography 
Alai, C. (2012) Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Africa. In Okello, M. C., Dolan, 
C., Whande, U., Mncwabe, N., Onegi, L., and S., O. (editors) Where Law Meets 
Reality: Forging African Transitional Justice.   Cape Town, SA: Pambazuka Press. 
124-130. 
Alie, J. A. D. (2008) Reconciliation and traditional justice:tradition-based practices of the 
Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone. In Huyse, L. and Salter, M. (editors) Traditional Justice 
and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences.   
Stockolm, Sweden: International IDEA. 123-146. 
Allen, T. and Macdonald, A. (2013) Post- Conflict Traditional Justice: A Critical Overview. 
The Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) (3), 27. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56357/1/JSRP_Paper3_Post-
conflict_traditional_justice_Allen_Macdonald_2013.pdf  
Andrews, T. (2012) What is Social Constructionism? Grounded Theory Review: An 
International Journal 11 (1), 1-8. 
Antwi-Boateng, O. and O' Mahony, G. M. (2008) A Framework for the Analysis of Peace 
Agreements and Lessons Learned: The case of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. Politics & Policy 36 (1), 132-178. 
ARCSS, I. (2015) Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 
(ARCSS). (Igad), I. A. O. D. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:   
Arthur, D. D., Issifu, A. K. and Marfo, F. (2015) An Analysis of the Influence of Ubuntu 
Principle on the South Africa Peacebuilding Process. Journal of Global Peace and 
Conflict 3 (2), 63-77. 
Ashworth, J. (2014) The Voice of the Voiceless:The Role of the Church in the Sudanese Civil 
war 1983-2005. Nairobi, Kenya: Paulines Publications Africa. 
AUCISS, A. U. (2014) Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South 
Sudan. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union (AU).   
Balati, E. (2015) A Truth Commission to Boost Reconcilitaion in South Sudan.  
Barnes, C. (2005) Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and 
Building Peace. In Tongeren Et Al (editor) People Building Peace II Successful 
Stories of Civil Society.   Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 7-24. 
Bashir, M. O. (1984) "Ethnicity, Regionalism and national Cohesion in Sudan". The Sudan: 
Ethnicity and national Cohesion.   Bayreuth University,Germany: African Studies 
Series.  
Beitzel, T. and Castle, T. (2013) Achieveing Justice Through the International Criminal 
Court in Northern Uganda: Is Indigenous/Restorative Justice a Better Approach? 
International Criminal Justice Review 23 (1), 41-55. 
Bellamy, A. J., Williams, P. D. and Griffin, S. (2010) Understanding Peacekeeping. Second 
edition. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Bercovitch, J. and Jackson, R. (2009) Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: 
Principles,Methods, and Approaches. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Boege, V. (2006) Traditional Approcahes to Conflict Transfromation-Potentials and Limits. 
Berghof Handbook for Confflict Transformation.  
Boege, V. (2011) Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peacebuilding. In 
Beatrix, M. F. and Hans, J. G. (editors) Advancing Conflict Transformation. The 
 311 
12018735 
Berghof Handbook II.   Opladen andFarmington Hills, MI: :Barbara Budrich. 431-
457. 
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy,peacemaking and 
peace-keeping. New York, USA: United Nations.   
Boyle, K. (2005) The Institutional Framework for Human Rights: The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. In Smith, R. K. M. and Anker, C. (editors) The 
Essentials of Human Rights.   UK: Hodder Arnold.  
Bradbury et al (2006) Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study. Rift Valley 
Institute:    
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. Qualitative 
Research In Psycholohy 3 (2), 77-101. 
Brock-Utne, B. (2001) Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Africa. In Week-end Seminar on 
Indigenous Solutions to Conflicts. University of Oslo, Institute of Educational 
Research.  1-16.   
Brouneus, K. (2003) Reconciliation Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation. 
Sweden: SIDA.   
Call, C. T. (2008) Ending Wars, Building Peace. In Call, C. T. and Wyeth, V. (editors) 
Building State to Build Peace.   Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 22. 
Cheeseman, N., Anderson, D. M. and Scheibler, A. (2015) Routledge Handbook of African 
Politics. London: Routledge-Taylor and Francis Group. 
Clark, P. (2014) Negotiating Reconciliation in Rwanda: Popular Challenges to the Official 
Discourse of Post-Genocide National Unity. Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 8 (4), 18. 
Collins, R. O. (2008) A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Copnall, J. (2014) A Poisonous thorn in our hearts:Sudan and South Sudan's bitter and 
incomplete divorce. London: Hurst & Company. 
Creswell, W. J. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches. Second edition. UK: Sage Publications. 
Crotty, M. (1998) The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process. USA: SAGE Publications. 
Daley, P. (2006) Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa. Third World Quarterly 27 (2), 303-319. 
Deng, F. M. (1987) Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of 
Sudan. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press. 
Descombe, M. (2003) The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Project. 
England: Open University Press. 
Duany, J. A. (2003) People-to-People Peacemaking: A Local Solution to Local Problems. In 
Bamat, T. and Cejka, M. A. (editors) Artisans Of Peace: Grassroots Peacemaking 
among Christian Communities.   New York, USA: Orbis Books.  
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1940) The Nuer: A drescription of the modes of livelihood and 
political institutions of a Nilotic people. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Fischer, R. (2012) The Peace of Westphalia and the World State: A case for causal pluralism 
in International Relations. Master of Arts. Central European University.  
Fisher, S., Ludin, J., Williams, S., Abdi, D. I., Smith, R. and Williams, S. (2000) Walking 
With Conflict: Skills & Strategies For Action. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
 312 
12018735 
Francis, D. J. (2012) Introduction: When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities 
- Core Issues. In Francis, D. J. (editor) When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided 
Communities.   Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 1-25. 
Freeman, M. and Hayner, P. B. (2003) The Truth Commissions of South Africa and 
Guatemala. In Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T., and Huyse, L. (editors) Reconciliation 
After Violent Conflict: A handbook.   Stockholm, Sweeden: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.  
Gado, Z. M. B. (2013) Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan: Inter-tribal 
Reconciliation Conferences in South Darfur State up to 2009. Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. University of Bradford.  
Gawerc, M. I. (2006) Peacebuilding: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives. Peace & 
Change 31 (4), 435-478. 
Gergen, K. J. (1985) The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology. American 
Psychologist 40 (3). 
Giampapa, F. (2011) The Politics of "Being and Becoming"a Researcher: Identity, Power 
and Negotiating in the Field. Journal of Language, Identity, and Education 10, 132-
144. 
Goodale, M. (2006) Ethical theory as social practice. American Anthropologist 108, 25-37. 
Goodhart, M. (2005) Theories and critiques of human rights: Universalism. In Smith, R. K. 
M. and Anker, C. (editors) The essentials of Human Rights.   UK: Hodder Arnold.  
Graybill, L. S. (2017) Religion, Tradition, and Restorative Justice in Sierra Leone. Indiana, 
USA: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Hamber, B. and Kelly, G. (2004) A working Definition of Reconciliation. Belfast, UK:    
Harris, D. (2013) Sierra Leone: A Political History. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co. 
(Publishers) Ltd. 
Hayner, P. B. (1996) Commissioning the Truth: further research questions. Third Worl 
Quarterly 17 (1), 19-29. 
Hayner, P. B. (2002) Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions. New 
York, USA: Routledge. 
Hoehne, M. V. (2008) Traditional Authorities and Local Government in South Sudan. Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany. 
Howell, P. P. (1954) A Manual of Nuer Law: Being an account of Customary Law, its 
Evolution and Development in the Courts established by the Sudan Government. 
London, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Hughes, C. (2009) "We just take what they offer":Community Empowerment in Post-War 
Timor-Leste. In Newman, E., Paris, R., and Richmond, O. P. (editors) New 
Perspectives in Liberal Peace.   Tokyo: United Nations University Press.  
Hughes, C. (2013) Friction, Good Governance and the Poor; Cases from Cambodia. 
International Peacekeeping 20 (2), 144-158. 
Hutchinson, S. E. (2001) A Curse from God? Religious and political dimensions of the post-
1991 rise of ethnic violence in South Sudan. The Journal of Modern African Studies 
39 (2), 307-331. 
Hutchinson, S. E. and Pendle, N. R. (2015) Violence, Legitimacy, and Prophecy: Nuer 
struggles with Uncertainty in South Sudan. Journal of the American Ethnological 
Society 42 (3), 415-430. 
Huyse, L. (2008) Introduction:tradition-based approaches in peacemaking, transitional 
justice and reconciliation policies.  Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for 
 313 
12018735 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Chapter_1_Introduction
_tradition-
based_approaches_in_peacemaking_transitional_justice_and_reconciliation_policie
s.pdf Accessed 14/02/15. 
Huyse, L. and Salter, M. (editors) (2008) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent 
Conflict: Learning From African Experiences.   Stromsborg, Sweden: International 
IDEA. 
Igreja, V. and Dias-Lambranca, B. (2008) Restorative Justice and the role of Magamba spirits 
in post-civil war Gorongosa, central Mozambique. In Huyse, L. and Salter, M. 
(editors) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from 
African Experiences.   Stockholm, Sweeden: International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance. 61-83. 
Ingelaere, B. (2008) The Gacaca courts in Rwanda. In Huyse, L. and Salter, M. (editors) 
Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African 
Experiences.   Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance. 25-59. 
Jabri , V. (2013) Peacebuilding, the local and the international: a colonial or a post colonial 
rationality? 1 (1), 3-16. 
Jackson, P. (2009) 'Negotiating with Ghosts': Religion, Conflict and Peace in Northern 
Uganda. The Round Table 98 (402), 319-331. 
Jenkins, R. (2013) Peace Building: From Concept to Commission. Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge. 
Johnson, D. H. (1986) Judicial Regulation and Administrative Control: Customary Law and 
the Nuer. Journal of African African History 27, 59-78. 
Johnson, D. H. (1994) Nuer Prophets: A history of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. USA: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson, D. H. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Indiana, USA: Indiana 
University Press. 
Johnson, D. H. (2011) The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce. Revised, 
edition. Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers. 
Johnson, D. H. (2014a) Briefing: The Crises in South Sudan. African Affairs 113/451, Oxford 
University Press. 
Johnson, D. H. (2014b) South Sudan's Experience at Peacemaking: The 22nd Annual Ghandi 
Peace Festival. In Bertrand Russel Peace Lecture:Symposium on Conflict and 
Peacebuilding in South Sudan. MacMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.  
24.   
Johnson, D. H. (2016a) South Sudan: A New History for a New Nation. Ohio, USA: Ohio 
University Press. 
Johnson, H. F. (2016b) South Sudan: The Untold Story From Independence to Civil War. 
London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd. 
Jok, A. A., Leith, R. A. and B.Hum, C. V. (2004) A study of Customary Law in Contemporay 
Southern Sudan. Rumbek, South Sudan: World Vision International.   
Kabbede, G. (1997) Sudan: The North-South Conflict in Historical 
Perspective:Contributions in Black Studies. A Journal of African and Afro-American 
Studies 15 (1), 16-31. 
 314 
12018735 
Kappler, S. and Richmond, O. (2011) Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Hezegovina:Resistance 
and Emancipation? Security Dialogue 43 (3). 
Kariuki, F. (2015) Conflict Resolution by Elders in Africa: Successes, Challenges and 
Opportunities. Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1-17. 
Kerr, R. and Mobekk, E. (2007) Justice & Peace:Seeking Accountability After War. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Komakech, L. (2012) Traditional Justice as a form of adjudication in Uganda. In Okello, M. 
C., Dolan, C., Whande, U., Mncwabe, N., Onegi, L., and Oola, S. (editors) Where 
Law Meets Reality: Forging African Transitional Justice.   Cape Town SA: 
Pambazuka Press. 64-79. 
Kumar, R. (2011) Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners. Third 
edition. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Lambach, D. (2007) Oligopolis of Violence in Post-Conflict Societies. Germany: GIGA 
German Institute of Global and Area Studies.   
Lapan, S. D., Quartaroli, M. T. and Riemer, F. J. (editors) (2012) Qualitative Research: An 
Introduction to Methods and Designs.   USA: Jossey-Bass. 
Lappin, R. and Harris, D. (2010) The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
Reconciling or Redividing Liberia? Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International 
Relations 9 (1), 11. 
Leach, J. D. (2013) War and Politics in Sudan: Cultural Identities and the Challenges of the 
Peace Process. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 
Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. 
Leedy, P. D. and Ormrod, J. E. (2013) Practical Research: Planning and Design. 10th 
edition. Boston, USA: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Leonardi, C. (2005) Knowing Authority: Colonial Governance and Local Community in 
Equatoria Province, Sudan 1900-1956. Doctor of Philosophy. University of Durham.  
Leonardi, C. (2007) Violence, Sacrifice and Chiefship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan. 
Africa 77 (04), 558. 
Leonardi, C. (2015) Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, 
Community and State. UK: James Curry. 
Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M. and Isser, D. H. (2010) Local Justice in Southern 
Sudan. United States Institute of Peace.   
LeRiche, M. and Arnold, M. (2012) South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence. UK: 
C. Hurst & Co. Ltd. 
Lesch, A. M. (1998) The Sudan: Contested National Identities. UK: James Currey Ltd. 
Mac Ginty, R. (2008a) Indigenous Peacemaking Versus the Liberal Peace. Cooperation and 
Conflict 43 (2), 139-163. 
Mac Ginty, R. (2008b) Traditional and Indigenous Approaches to Peacemaking. In Darby, J. 
and Mac Ginty, R. (editors) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes 
and Post-War Reconstruction.  Second edition. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 120-130. 
Mac Ginty, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2013) The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: a critical 
agenda for peace. Third World Quarterly 34 (5), 763-783. 
Malan, J. (1997) Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa. Durban, South Africa: African 
Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). 
 315 
12018735 
Malan, J. (2008) Understanding Transitional Justice in Africa. In Francis, D. J. (editor) Peace 
& Conflict in Africa.   London, UK: Zed Books Ltd. 133-147. 
Malwal, B. (2005) Sudan's Latest Peace Agreement: An Accord that is Neither Fair Nor 
Comprehensive-A Critique. Omdurman, Sudan: Abdel Karim Mirghani Cultural 
Centre. 
Manning, R. E. (2009) The Landscape of Local Authority in Sierra Leone: How Traditional 
and Modern Justice Systems interact. USA: World Bank.   
Masabo, C. J. (2013) Discerning for Peace in Africa:The Sudan Civil Wars and Peace 
Processes 1955-2013. Hekima Review, 137-150. 
https://works.bepress.com/conrad_masabo/16/  
Mbiti, J. S. (1991) Introduction to African Religion. South Africa: Heinemann. 
Moore, T. S., Lapan, S. D. and Quartaroli, M. T. (2012) Case Study Research. In Lapan, S. 
D., Quartaroli, M. T., and Riemer, F. J. (editors) Qualitative Research: An 
Introduction to Methods and Designs.   Jossey-Bass: 243-270. 
Murithi, T. (2005) Traditional values supporting human rights: Ubuntu and human rights. In 
Smith, R. K. M. and Anker, C. (editors) The essentials of Human Rights.   UK: Hodder 
Arnold.  
Murithi, T. (2006) Practical Peacemaking Wisdom from Africa: Reflections on Ubuntu. The 
Journal of Pan African Studies 1 (4), 25-34. 
Murithi, T. (2008) African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and Conflict 
Resolution. In Francis, D. J. (editor) Peace & Conflict in Africa.   London, UK: Zed 
Books Ltd.  
Murithi, T. (2012) Towards African models of transitional justice. In Okello, M. C., Dolan, 
C., Whande, U., Mncwabe, N., Onegi, L., and Oola, S. (editors) Where Law Meets 
Reality: Forging African Transitional Justice.   Cape Town, SA: Pambazuka Press. 
200-217. 
Myers, L. J. and Shinn, D. (2010) Appreciating traditional forms of healing conflict in Africa 
and the World. Black Diaspora Review 2 (1), 2-14. 
Nabudere, D. W. (2004) Ubuntu. In Villa-Vicencio, C. and Doxtader, E. (editors) Pieces Of 
The Puzzle: Keywords On Reconciliation and Transitional Justice.   Cape Town, 
South Africa: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 10-16. 
Nantulya, P. (2004) Sudan: Causes of Conflict, and the Peace Process. Electronic Briefing 
Paper.  
Newman, E. (2009) "Liberal"peacebuilding debates. In Newman, E., Paris, R., and 
Richmond, O. P. (editors) New Perspective on Liberal Peacebuilding.   New York, 
USA: United Nations University Press. 26-53. 
Newman, E., Paris, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2009) Introduction. In Newman, E., Paris, R., 
and Richmond, O. P. (editors) New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding.   Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press. 3-25. 
Novak, A. (2015) The International Criminal Court: An Introduction. Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing. 
OCHA, P. f. h. (2006) The History of Sudan: Independence and The First Civil War. 
Ogora, L. O. (2009) Moving Forward: Traditional justice and victim participation in 
Northern Uganda. Cape Town, South Africa: Institute For Justice and Reconciliation, 
Africa Programme.   
Omeje, K. C. (2008) Understanding Conflict Resolution in Africa. In Francis, D. J. (editor) 
Peace & Conflict in Africa.   London, UK: Zed Books Ltd. 68-91. 
 316 
12018735 
Orvis, S. (2001) Civil Society in Africa or African Civil Society? Journal of Asian and 
African Studies 36 (1), 19. 
Paris, R. (2004) At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2011) Contemporary Conflict Resolution: 
The Prevention, Management and Transformation of deadly Conflicts. Third edition. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Redekop, V. N. (2007) Reconciling Nuers with Dinkas: A Girardian Approach to Conflict 
Resolution. Religion 37 (1), 64-84. 
Richmond, O. P. (2002) Maintaining Order,Making Peace. Basingstoke, USA: Palgrave. 
Robson, C. (2011) Real World Research. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Rolandsen, O. H. and Daly, M. W. (2016) A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to 
Independence. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, G. (1997) Situating Knowledges:Positionalities, Reflexivities and other Tactics. 
Progress in Human Geography 21 (3), 305-320. 
Rukuni, T., Machingambi, Z., Musingafi, M. C. C. and Kaseke, K. E. (2015) The Role of 
Traditional Leadership in Conflict Resolution and 
Peace Building in Zimbabwean Rural Communities: The Case of 
Bikita District. Public Policy and Administration Research 5 (3), 75-80. 
Schensul, J. J. (2012) Methodology,Methods,and Tools in Qualitative Research. In Lapan, S. 
D., Quartaroli, M. T., and Riemer, F. J. (editors) Qualitative Research: An 
Introduction to Methods and Designs.   San Francisco, USA: Jossey-Bass. 69-103. 
Schierenbeck, I. (2015) Beyond the local turn divide: lessons learnt, relearnt and unlearnt. 
Third World Quarterly 36 (5), 12. 
Shaw, R. and Waldorf, L. (2010) Introduction: Localizing Transitional Justice. In Shaw, R., 
Waldorf, L., and Hazan, P. (editors) Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions 
and Priorities After Mass Violence.   USA: Standford University Press.  
Sriram, C. L. (2009) Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional 
Justice. In Mac Ginty, R. R., O. P. (editor) The Liberal Peace and Post-War 
Reconstruction.   London: Routledge.  
The Mato Oput Project, C. (2009) Community Perspectives on The Mato Oput Process: A 
Research Study by the Mato Oput Project. Gulu University: The Institute for Global 
Leadership.   
Thomas, E. (2015) South Sudan: A Slow Liberation. London: Zed Books. 
Tom, P. (2011) The Liberal Peace and Post Conflict Peace-building in Africa: Sierra Leone. 
Doctor of Philosophy. University of St. Andrews. http://research-repository-st. 
Andrews.ac.uk  
Tutu, D. (1999) No Future Without Forgiveness. London: Rider, an imprint of Embury Press, 
Random House. 
UNDP (2016) New Beginnings: A Way Forward for Transitional Justice in South Sudan. 
Transitional Justice in South Sudan. Juba, South Sudan. UNDP South Sudan.  
Verjee, A. (2017) South Sudan's High Level Revitalization Forum: Identifying conditions for 
success. United States Institutes of Peace (USIP).   
 317 
12018735 
Villa-Vicencio, C. (2004) Restorative Justice. In Villa-Vicencio, C. and Doxtadar, E. 
(editors) Pieces of the Puzzle: Keywords on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice.   
Cape Town, SA: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 33-38. 
Villa-Vicencio, C. (2009) Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa. USA: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Wachira, G., Kamungi, P. and Sillah, K. (2014) Stretching The Truth:The Uncertain Promise 
of TRCs in Africa's Transitional Justice. Nairobi-Kenya: Nairobi Peace Initiative 
(NPI)-Africa. 
Waihenya, W. (2006) The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace 
Process. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenway Publications. 
Waldorf, L. (2010) "Like Jews Waiting for Jesus": Posthumous Justice in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda. In Shaw, R., Waldorf, L., and Hazan, P. (editors) Localizing Transitional 
Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence.   Standford, California: 
Standford University Press. 183-202. 
Wasonga, J. (2009) Rediscovering Mato Oput: The Acholi Justice System and the Conflict 
in Northern Uganda. Africa Peace and Conflict Journal 2 (1), 27-38. 
Wassara, S. S. (2007) Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution in Southern Sudan.  
Berlin, Germany: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. https://www.eisf.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/0979-Wassara-2007-Traditional-Mechanisms-of-CR-in-
South-Sudan.pdf Accessed 14/02/15. 
Yamashita, H. (2014) Peacebuilding and "Hybrid" Peace. The National Institute for Defense 
Studies News.   
Yin, R. K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Third edition. London, UK: 
Sage Publications Ltd. 
Young, J. (2012) The Fate of Sudan:The Origin and Consequences of a Flawed Peace 
Process. London: Zed Books. 
Zehr, H. (2002) The Little Book of Restorative Justice. USA: Good Books. 
Zerai, A. (2010) U.S. Press Representation of the Southern Sudanese Civil War, 1983-2005. 
Doctor of Philosophy. The University of New Mexico.  
 
